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‘Law is order, and good law is good order.’ 
Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) 
 
As the world moves ever faster towards digitisation and networked arrangements, electronic 
contracting, and other means of trading electronically, are now accepted methods for doing 
business.  This technology-driven phenomenon has transformed the way people transact 
business globally.  In many sub-Saharan African legal systems, however, the development of 
e-commerce appears to be slow, due partly to a lack of regulatory frameworks supporting 
electronic transactions.  Tanzania is a system in point.  Its law of contracts, which is in 
essence based on an outdated version of English common law, is still designed to handle only 
conventional modes of transacting business, namely, the use of paper-based documents. 
This dissertation examines Tanzania’s legal framework in the light of the modern 
information and communication technologies, especially the Internet and e-commerce.  The 
main goal is to assess the adequacy of the existing law and to provide recommendations for 
reforms that will reflect the borderless nature of e-contracts.  These reforms must ensure the 
certainty and predictability needed for successful cross-border commerce.  Achievement of 
these aims will build confidence and trust on the part of business entities and consumers, and, 
in addition, will enhance free trade, strengthen the growing market-based economy, and 
integrate Tanzania into the global economy.  Throughout the dissertation it is evident that 
Tanzania’s poorly developed law affects economic growth and the pursuit of successful 
market-oriented economic policies. 
The dissertation analyses issues in the law of contract including: formal 
requirements; difficulties arising from the use of e-agents; problems of evidence; inadequate 
consumer protection; and inappropriate jurisdiction and choice of law rules.  To overcome 
these problems the thesis turns to international model laws, notably the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws on E-commerce (1996) and E-signature (2001) and the UN Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts (2005), together with initiatives in the 
US and the EU.  It is argued that, by adopting such international measures, Tanzania can find 
a ready-made answer to its problems and, at the same time, contribute towards the 
convergence of municipal laws. 
As it happens, South Africa is one of a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa to have 
developed a suitable legal framework to cater for e-commerce, and it made extensive use of 















African legislation in point, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002, 
with a view to identifying the problems that the country sought to address – especially 
contract, consumer protection and conflict of laws - and the lessons that Tanzania may learn 
from this legislation.  Overall, the South African Act reveals a pattern of problems analogous 
to those identified in Tanzania, thereby suggesting that African countries share similar 
challenges despite very different legal systems. 
The thesis finds that the existing international frameworks for regulating e-
commerce provide reliable methods for solving the shortcomings of Tanzanian law.  Indeed, 
by adopting international models, Tanzania may contribute to the achievement of a 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
‘Those who fail to anticipate the future are in for a rude 
shock when it arrives’
1
 
1. Background  
In 1859, the famous English novelist, Charles Dickens, wrote a novel titled A Tale of Two 
Cities.2  In that book, which was set in London and Paris prior to and during the early days of 
the French Revolution, Dickens described the crisis that befell both the aristocracts and 
peasantry.  Through a literary lens he potrayed it as a blessing in disguise.  To the peasantry it 
was a blessing, a breakthrough and the dawn of new era, while to the aristocrats it was a 
catastrophic moment, a day of political pestilence and untamed evils.  Dickens sums up this 
dichotomy as follows:  
[i]t was the best of times, it was the worst of times; it was the age of wisdom, it 
was the age of foolishnesses…it was the season of Light, it was the season of 
Darkness… we had everything before us, we had nothing before us….
3
  
Dickens’ presentation of that era seems an apt description of the modern technological 
revolution, brought about by information and communication technologies (referred to as 
‘ICTs’).  
ICTs, as a ‘necessary tool for the contemporary [business] scene’
4
 have created a 
paradigm shift in contract formation: a shift from paper-based transactions to the use of 
electronic data messages.  Nowadays, contracts concluded electronically constitute a large part 
of global commercial transactions.
5
  The application of ICTs in facilitating business has been 
an unprecedented success.  Their success lie in the high volume of business transactions that 
can be executed quickly between parties stationed in any part of the world.  
                                                 
1
 See R G Smith, P Grabosky & G Urbas Cyber Criminals on Trial (2004) 156.  
2
 See C Dickens A Tale of Two Cities (With a New introduction by Fredrich Busch) (1997).  
3
 Ibid, at 13. 
4
 See Y Hayakawa ‘Making Uniform Rules in the Era of E-transactions’ in T Kono, C G Paulus & H Rajak (eds) 
Selected Legal Issues of E-Commerce (2002) 14. See also R Schware ‘Overview: E-Development: 
From Excitement to Effectiveness’ in R Schware (ed) E-Development: From Excitement to Effectiveness (2005) 
xiii.  
5
See R Schu ‘The Applicable Law to Consumer Contracts Made Over the Internet: Consumer Protection Through 
Private International Law?’ (1997) 5 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 192, 193,194. See 
also L Gillies ‘A Review of the New Jurisdiction Rules for Electronic Consumer Contracts within theEuropean 
Union’ Commentary (2001) 1 The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (part 2.1) (available at 
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-1/gillies.html (as accessed on 27/5/2010)); S Bhaloo ‘Jurisdictional Issues in 
















Sustaining the Dickensian dichotomy, the success of the ICTs represents ‘the best of 
times’ in the business community.  On the other hand, in his depiction of the worst side of the 
French revolution, Dickens painted a picture of panic, plunder and rampage that shook the pre-
existing social order.  The application of ICTs, like the ‘worst of times’, has unleashed various 
legal challenges, which were not earlier envisaged, especially in the field of commerce.
6
   
The application of ICTs to facilitate commerce, for instance, has raised questions 
regarding the appropriateness of the existing law, notably the law of contract.
7
  Such concerns, 
however, present a platform from which to analyse the role that law and technology plays in 
socio-political and economic development, and how the former should support the 
development and application of the latter.  Consequently, there is ample reason to seek reforms 
that will situate law in a dynamic, responsive and even proactive position vis-à-vis the 
continuing reinvention of society through technological innovation.
8
 
The law in many developing countries, however, is not in tune with the modern 
information technologies, and hence cannot protect the inter sts of those who rely on them.
9
  
This does not portend a good future for these countries because failure to anticipate the future 
often creates problems for those who are ill prepared.
10
  In Tanzania, and in many other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are no proper laws promoting and regulating the 
application of ICTs for commercial and other purposes.  The Tanzanian law of contract, based 
in essence on the common law received from England, is still fashioned to support paper-based 
transactions.  This study examines this legal framework in the light of the Internet and e-
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See S K Daniel (ed) The Impact of The Regulatory Framework on E-Commerce in Singapore Symposium 
Technology Law Development Group Singapore Academy of Law 5 April (2002)  (available at 
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See L Edward & C Waelde (eds) Law and the Internet: regulating cyberspace (1997) 4. See also J Savirimuthu 
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/12/2006). 
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4/6/2011). 
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commerce.  While it appreciates that these innovations represent the ‘best of times’ in our 
modern era, it posits that appropriate legal measures need to be in place not only to continue to 
support and regulate the enjoyment of such ‘best of times’, but also to minimise the effects of 
the ‘worst of times’ associated with these developments.  
Considering that this study examines the adequacy of the existing Tanzanian legal 
framework, the researcher’s responsibility is ‘primarily descriptive; it involves the 
identification of the “issues”, “uncertainties” and the “gaps” to be addressed by policy-makers 
and legislators.’
11
  Thus, apart from discharging this responsibility, this study provides the 
background regarding e-commerce, its prospects, and the challenges for its development in 
Tanzania. 
(a) The Thesis Statement 
This study argues that the lack of a comprehensive legal regime for e-contracts in Tanzania 
undermines the prospects for the successful development of its e-commerce.  The study 
submits that the seemingly slow legal response to the modern electronic ways of transacting 
business may affect the country’s economic growth and the pursuit of successful market- 
oriented economic policies.  This slow response denies the country not only the potential 
economic benefits and developmental opportunities flowing from e-commerce, but also creates 
uncertainty in e-contracting processes.  Consequently, the country is put in a disadvantageous 
economic position for three reasons. 
First, e-commerce is no longer just a prospect, but a reality, with the potential to create 
economic benefits and opportunities for all countries.  
Secondly, communicating via the Internet has become an indispensable way of doing 
business.  Hence, it is vital to ensure that, while the existing regulatory environment responds 
positively to the needs of the new economy, it also takes into account the interests of 
vulnerable groups, such as consumers.  Moreover, as once noted, while ‘customers who know 
you well may be less concerned about the law… the law may help to build trust among those 
who do not [know you].’
12
  Thus, for e-commerce to flourish there is a need for laws that 
                                                 
11
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sufficiently and openly promote technological innovation while also promoting ‘confidence in 
both the business community and the public.’
13
 
Thirdly, appropriate legal infrastructure for e-commerce has the potential to promote 
the creation of new markets for goods and services in and from the developing countries.  
However, while ‘good laws alone [may not] create the market … inadequate laws may shut the 
door of a potential market.’
14
  And, as some authors predict, ‘countries that do not take time 
now to create appropriate infrastructures that support the Internet will find their economies 
plummeting in a matter of years ….’
15
  In order to avoid such an eventuality, this study submits 
that Tanzania needs to ensure that its current legal infrastructure can appropriately address the 
legal and technical problems ensuing from the modern technologies.  In other words, the law 
must not only support the development and wide application of these technologies but should 
also protect commercial interests in online mediated transactions as well as shielding other 
personal interests arising out of such transactions.
16
   
(b) The Structure of this Chapter 
This chapter introduces the main argument, which forms the basis of the discussion in this work 
and delineates the scope of the analysis of e-commerce vis-à-vis the law of contract in 
Tanzania.  It is divided into five parts.  Part one consists of two sections: the first emphasises, in 
general terms, the need for an appropriate legal framework to facilitate e-commerce; the second 
outlines the structure of this chapter.   
Part two is divided into three parts:   
 first, it frames the research problem within the existing demand for legal 
certainty in e-commerce;   
                                                 
13
See G Jones ‘Failings in the Treatment of Electronic Signatures’ (2003) 1 Hertfordshire Law Journal 101. See 
also R Dagada, M M Eloff & L M Venter ‘Too Many Laws but Very Little Progress: Is South African Highly 
Acclaimed Information Security Legislation Redundant?’ Proceedings of the 8th Annual ISSA Conference, 6 -8 
July 2009, University of Johannesburg's School of Tourism and Hospitality facility, Auckland Park Johannesburg 
Gauteng South Africa, (available at  http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/2660/1/dagada.pdf (as accessed on 
12/10/2010)). 
14
See UNCITRAL Secretariat (n12). 
15
See M van der Merwe & F J van Vuuren ‘Internet Contracts’ in Buys R (eds) Cyberlaw@ SA 1ed (2000) 155-
192, 155.  Indeed, according to Christensen, the ‘decentralised’ nature of the Internet has totally changed the way 
commerce is being undertaken nationally and internationally.  (S Christensen ‘Formation of Contracts by Email – 
Is it just the same the post?’ available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QUTLJJ/2001/3.html (as accessed 
21/9/2007)). See also Smith et al (n1). 
16















 thereafter it sets out the objectives and the significance of this research; and 
 finally, it delineates the scope and limit of this study.   
Section three of this chapter consists of two parts, each of which defines certain basic 
terms and concepts used in the study.   
  The first one defines e-commerce as a business concept, the history of e-
commerce, and the various types of e-commerce and the prospect for their 
development in Tanzania.  It also analyses the role of ICT and e-commerce in 
economic growth, and maps the current development roadmap that a company, 
wishing to embark on an e-commerce journey may follow.  In addition, this 
first section discusses the benefits and challenges of accommodating e-
commerce in Tanzania.   
 The second part defines the e-contract and expounds on various types of e-
contracts.  
Section four establishes the socio-economic and political context within which this 
study is set, while section five provides a comprehensive chapter synopsis for the entire thesis. 
2. E-commerce and the Need for Legal Certainty 
(a) Framing the Research Problem 
Risk taking is a common phenomenon in human activity.  Ordinarily, people in any society 
‘want to know under what circumstance and how far they will run the risk of coming against 
what is so much stronger than themselves.’
17
  From a business viewpoint, the necessity for such 




In the field of e-commerce, legal uncertainty is a risk factor that undermines the spirit 
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  Entrepreneurs may shy away from new ventures, however promising they 
might be, because they find the risk too great.  Coupled with the problems of remoteness and 
anonymity, uncertainty in e-commerce makes consumers unwilling to rely on web merchants.
20
  
Overall, legal uncertainty reduces the level of trust and confidence that are ‘a valuable 
facilitator of many forms of exchange.’
21
   
In a traditional face-to-face scenario, trust and certainty constitute important aspects in 
the consummation of commercial transactions.
22
  Although it is easy to establish these values in 
such an environment, it is difficult to do so when parties transact electronically. 
23
  Even so, 
trust, security and certainty of online transactions may be enhanced through a linkage between 
law and technology by, for instance, legally supporting the use of certain technical 
infrastructures, such as e-signatures and secure payment systems.
24
  
In this era, when contracts are concluded electronically, existing principles and 
established contract rules face immense technical challenges.  While courts may be striving 
through the common law approach to adapt the existing rules to suit the requirements of 
modern technologies, the technological terrain in which they are currently operating is itself 
fast changing.  As a result, such efforts become redundant at some point as they often fail to 
adequately protect the various interests of the parties to electronic transactions.
25
  Indeed, it is 
clear that reform through judge-made law is not always suitable, since it has strict limits.  These 
                                                 
19
For a lengthy discussion on Legal uncertainty see A D'Amato ‘Legal Uncertainty’ (1983) 71 California Law 
Review 1. 
20
See L E Ribstein ‘Law v Trust’ (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 553, 585.  See also L F De Duca, A H 
Kritzer & D Nagel ‘Achieving Optimal Use of Harmonization Techniques in an Increasingly Interrelated Twenty-
First Century World of Consumer Sales: Moving the EU Harmonisation Process to a Global Plane’ (2009) 27 
Pennsylvania State International Law Review 641.  
21
See K H Lim, K Leung, C L Sia & M K O Lee ‘Is eCommerce boundary-less? Effects of Individualism-
Collectivism and Uncertainty Avoidance on Internet shopping’ (2004) 35 Journal of International Business 
Studies 545, 546.  See also J C Dugan, E M Egan, A D Kraus & E M Hancock ‘Privacy & e-commerce in the 
United States’ in M E Plotkin, B Wells & K Wimmer (eds) E-commerce Law & Business Vol I (2003); D E 
Morrison & J Firmstone ‘The social function of trust and implications for e‐commerce’ 19 (2000) International 
Journal of Advertising 599. 
22
 See S X Komiak & A Benbasat ‘Understanding Customer Trust in Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, 
Web-Mediated Electronic Commerce, and Traditional Commerce’ (2004) 5 Information Technology and 
Management 181. 
23
 See Dagada et al (n13) 3. The authors state that the question of security in e-commerce has been regarded as 
Achillie’s heel.  See also Ribstein (n20) 585.  See also G J Udo ‘Privacy and Security Concerns as a Major Barrier 
for E-commerce: A Survey Study’ (2001) 9 Information Management and Computer Security 165. 
24
See E A O’Hara ‘Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection’ 
(2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1883, 1896.  The author argues that such security measure 
‘can work to decrease (if not eliminate) the extent of vulnerability associated with [e-commerce].’ See also 
UNCITRAL Secretariat (n12). 
25
According to Pound, the law must guarantee its subjects that, whenever a dispute arises there are established 
















include the slowness of the process and the fact that currently the technological changes are 
outpacing the law.
26
  These limitations create further uncertainty among e-contractants and cast 
doubt on the effectiveness of the existing contract rules.   
Essentially, law must not only assist those it serves to make the right decisions but 
should also seek to discharge its core functions, namely: to ‘answer to the need for certainty, 
predictability, order and safety.’
27
  From a commercial perspective this means that the law must 
be able to direct, regulate and support technologically mediated transactions.  In addition, as an 
instrument of public policy,
28
 it must enable the best routes towards successful economic 





 in many African countries, including Tanzania, there is a mismatch 
between the existing legal frameworks and the increasingly rapid technological progressions. 
This raises doubts as to the adequacy of the existing legal frameworks on the continent to 
handle issues of e-commerce, such as formation of e-contracts and evidentiary issues (for 
instance, validity of e-signature and the admissibility of electronic evidence in court).  Failure 
to address these and related issues denies African countries the opportunities offered by ICTs 
through e-commerce and widens the digital divide between Africa and the rest of the world.
31
  
In Tanzania, for instance, the extent to which the existing contract law framework 
offers legal protection to parties in an e-contract, and whether it can adequately support e-
contracts, is uncertain.  Currently, many Tanzanians are concluding online contracts either by 
way of e-mail or via the Internet.  The online purchase of motor vehicles from Japan, for 
instance, has grown significantly in recent years.
32
  Given the current legal position, 
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participants in such e-contracting processes may find themselves lacking legal protection.  It is 
also doubtful whether the current legal framework can successfully handle disputes arising 
from e-contracting activities and the new internet-driven economy in general.  The prevailing 
legal uncertainty therefore exposes the commercial interests of various business enterprises to 
unnecessary risks, discourages foreign investors, and undermines the spirit of local 
entrepreneurship, eventually retarding economic growth. 
In view of the current uncertainty, and considering the fast changing technological and 
socio-economic environment, there is a need to thoroughly re-examine the existing contract 
rules.  Claiming that the existing ‘old [rules] are ready [to] cover every case ... is to pretend to a 
certainty and regularity that cannot exist in fact. The effect of that pretension is to increase 
practical uncertainty and social instability.’
33
  
Indeed, legislation in many African countries may be considered ‘old rules’ owing to the 
era of their promulgation.  In Tanzania, for instance, modern contract law owes its origin to the 
colonial era.
34
  As will be discussed in chapter two, the Tanzanian Law of Contract Act is based 
on the Indian Contract Act of 1872,
35
 which was imported and applied by the British in 
Tanganyika since 1920.
36
  The law governing sales of goods (the Sales of Goods Act) was 
enacted in 1931.
37
  Considering the era when these statutes were enacted, and taking into 
account current technological developments and the need to integrate the Tanzanian economy 
into the global economic system, these Acts, only contemplating  face-to-face or paper-based 
contracts, are clearly out of date.
38
   
The Sale of Goods Act, for instance, did not deal with sale of services.  As its name 
suggests, it was enacted largely to govern the sale of tangibles.  Buying goods at an auction is 
another example.  Section 59(1)(b) of the Act contemplates the common law ‘fall of the 
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  Today, however, auctions are conducted online,
40
  and the current law 
cannot effectively regulate the situation.   
Ordinarily, in any contractual arrangement parties have issues of common interest.  
For instance, they wish to know with certainty the rules governing their relationship, the terms 
and conditions governing their contract, their identity and legal existence, the enforceability of 
their agreements, and, most important, whether they have a binding agreement.  Take, for 
instance, situations involving international contracts.  Since transactions over the Internet 
disregard political boundaries, choice of law and choice of forum are all matters of 
importance.
41
  In an online contract, unless parties have carefully considered these issues when 
negotiating the agreement, problems may arise.  
Choice of law in consumer contracts is a special problem.  It involves the need to 
protect freedom of contract, on the one hand, and the need to protect consumers from the risks 
associated with online contracting on the other.  E-contracts, where goods ordered by a 
consumer, pursuant to an on-line contract, either fail to be supplied or, if they are, find the 
goods to be defective, raise this problem in an acute form.  As will be discussed in chapter two, 
in Tanzania a number of online purchasers of used motor vehicles from Japan have been 
defrauded by bogus suppliers.
42
  According to a statement from the Tanzanian embassy in 
Japan, Tanzanian nationals have lost a total of US$91,554 due to fraud.
43
  Most of them failed 
to obtain legal redress either due to the costs involved or due to the nature of their contracts 
with the suppliers or the inadequacies of the existing contract law.
44
  
Thus, several questions need to be asked regarding e-contracting.  If parties to an 
online consumer contract did not choose a governing law or, if they chose a law that provided 
only weak protection for the purchaser, how should the purchaser be protected?  One may as 
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well ask whether courts will uphold the parties’ chosen law even when it manifestly infringes 
rights that an ordinary consumer should have enjoyed under his or her domestic law.  
Furthermore, should choice of law in online consumer contracts be considered as an 
exceptional case?  These questions are problematic and call for a careful legal analysis.  
Apart from jurisdiction and choice of law issues (which will be discussed further in 
Chapters III and IV) other problems regarding e-contracting can also manifest differently given 
the current legal position regarding contracts in Tanzania.  Take, for instance, the requirement 
of consent in the course of contract formation.  The current law demands that there should be a 
meeting of the minds (consensus ad idem).
45
  Traditionally, reaching consensus in contract 
entails exchange of promises in the form of an offer made by one party and its acceptance by 
the other.
46
  This process involves negotiations, and when the two minds are ad idem, together 
with other requirements, such as existence of a lawful consideration and capacity of the parties 
to contract, a contract comes to existence.
47
  
Whereas the law described above fits well in the conventional face-to-face or paper-
based contracts, certain web-based contracts present problems.
48
  In most cases, a typical 
website-based contract lacks an active human mind on the vendor's side.
49
  In the so-called 
'browse-wrap agreements', for instance, mere browsing of a particular merchant’s website may 
bind the browsing party to the terms and conditions of use of such a website even though she 
may not have expressly consented to those terms or conditions.
50
  Consequently, it is doubtful 
whether the parties are fully ad idem as regards such terms and conditions.  Considering that 
browse-wrap agreements are common in e-commerce, and since the law in Tanzania, as it 
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currently stands, stresses consensus ad idem as an essential element in validating a contract, 
there is a fundamental legal problem.  
There are obviously other problems that need to be explicitly addressed if e-commerce 
is to be a success in Tanzania.  One such relates to financial infrastructure.  Although this is an 
area worth independent research, a financial service environment that is secure and user-
friendly is a pertinent issue in the development of e-commerce.
51
  This includes an expanded 
usage of other technology-enabled facilities in the financial market,
52
 such as credit and debit 
cards.  Analysis of these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Overall, this study identifies seven major areas in the Tanzanian law of contract that 
are problematic, and which need to be addressed in the light of the current use of the Internet 
and other related technologies.  These areas are:  
(i) contract formation and the requirement of consensus ad idem,  
(ii) formalities,  
(iii) online mistakes or input errors,  
(iv) proof,  
(v) consumer protection,  
(vi) jurisdiction of the courts, and  
(vii)  choice of law. 
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(b) Research Objectives  
This study examines the adequacy of the existing contracting legal environment in Tanzania 
and the problems associated with e-contracts.  It also asks whether the traditional rules on 
jurisdiction and choice of law apply effectively to modern e-contract disputes, and whether 
consumers are adequately protected when they engage in online transactions.  
The study pursues the following goals: 
(i) proposing the establishment of a requisite legal framework which will assist Tanzanian 
businesses to function  more effectively in the online environment.  This includes 
adopting necessary measures to address the identified inadequacies in the law with a 
view to promoting e-commerce.  Doing so will in turn enhance free trade, strengthen the 
growing market-based economy and integrate Tanzania into the global economy.  
(ii) to promote confidence in the use of e-commerce by ensuring that Tanzanian consumers 
are effectively protected when they transact online; and 
(iii) to promote the much needed coherent and harmonised rules to reflect the borderless 
nature of e-commerce at national level, and to ensure certainty and predictability in 
cross-border contracts. 
The study draws lessons from other countries, notably South Africa, and takes into 
account the proposals of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) through its Model Laws on e-commerce and e-signature,
53
 and the UN 
Convention on E-contracts.
54
  It also reflects to a lesser extent on developments in other 
regions such as the EU, the USA and East Asia. 
The importance of this study is three-fold.  Firstly, it is expected to be a catalyst for 
reforms in the existing legal and policy framework governing commercial undertakings in 
Tanzania.  Such reforms are necessary in order to promote confidence in the ICT-led economy. 
As a developing country, Tanzania cannot successfully build a strong economy without paying 
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attention to the current developments in the area of ICT, especially e-commerce.  And, because 
e-commerce has the potential to promote greater participation in the global economy,
55
 its 




Secondly, it paves the way for the government, individuals and the business 
community in Tanzania to appreciate the significant role that e-commerce can play in the 
economy and the need to address obstacles to its development.   
Finally, this work contributes to other efforts to establish an enabling environment for 
e-commerce in Tanzania.  The existence of such an environment increases the ability of a 
developing country like Tanzania to participate in international commerce.  
(c) The Scope and Limits of This Study 
E-commerce is a business term that has gone global and raises diverse legal questions in all 
countries.  Such questions relate to a variety of fields, such as contract formation, consumer 
protection, intellectual property, cybercrimes, online advertising, e-procurement, competition 
(antitrust) law and taxation.
57
  E-commerce thus spans a vast terrain and still ‘in many ways … 
an uncharted new frontier.’
58
  Defining its exact scope has never been straightforward.  Every 
inquiry, however, must have its limits.  Consequently, this work does not cover each and every 
aspect of e-commerce.  Although it deals with e-contracts, and the general implications of e-
commerce to contract law, it does not include e-procurement contracts.
59
   
In particular, this work only discusses issues relating to contract formation in the 
online environment, consumer protection, jurisdiction and choice of law.  Its analysis of the 
legal developments in South Africa is also confined to these issues.  Geographically, its scope 
of inquiry is confined to the Mainland–Tanzania.  Zanzibar, though forming part of the United 
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Republic of Tanzania, has its separate law regulating contracts, and it is therefore beyond the 
scope of this research.
60
   
3. Definition of Terms and Concepts  
(a) E-commerce 
According to May, there has never been an agreed definition of e-commerce.
61
  In attempts to 
define it, however, there have been both narrow and wide approaches.  The latter would 
include ‘all financial and commercial transactions that take place electronically, including 
electronic data interchange (EDI) and electronic funds transfers (EFT).’
62
  The former is 
limited to online retail sales to consumers.
63
  Simpson & Docherty also define e-commerce 
narrowly to mean ‘the buying and selling of goods and services on the Internet.’
 64
  In this 
narrow sense, it includes ‘advertising, invitations to treat and the negotiation and conclusion of 
contracts and performance.’
65
  In turn, the European Commission views it broadly as a practice 
which involves:
 
doing business electronically, encompassing many diverse activities including 
electronic trading of goods and services, online delivery of digital content, 
electronic fund transfers, electronic share trading, electronic bills of lading, 
commercial auctions, collaborative design and engineering, online sourcing, public 
procurement, direct consumer marketing and after-sales services.
66
 
This thesis adopts the narrow view.  It therefore considers e-commerce to mean online 
transactions between suppliers of goods and services.  It is also important to note that e-
business, which is another term related to the use of electronic technology in business 
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facilitation, should not be confused with e-commerce.  The term ‘has a wider perspective than 
e-commerce’ and the latter is considered a subset of the former.
67
  Some authors, however, use 




(i) History of E-commerce 
Although e-commerce is considered a novel way of doing business, its earliest form can be 
noted from ‘mid-1800s when the first contract was entered into using telegraph or telephone.’
69
 
According to Brinson et al, the 'Request and Reply' system introduced by the American Airlines 
in 1930s represents the earliest form of e-commerce.
70
  This system had ‘an inventory control at 
a central point for telephoning in changes with replies to requests received via teletype.’
71
  The 
use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) technology, introduced in the late 1970s, is another 
early example of e-commerce.  
Currently, however, e-commerce constitutes a unique phenomenon because it has 
moved from the previous closed proprietary business-to-business networks to more open 
networks, such as the Internet.  The peculiar advantage of the Internet lies in its ability to 
provide ‘universal connection from any location world-wide’ and its accessibility ‘from any 
Internet-linked computer.’
72
  Because of the speed of the Internet and its global inter-
connectivity character, corporate entities as well as individuals use it for commercial 
transactions.
73
  Indeed, in certain commercial sectors, like banking, the current use of online 
banking and mobile phones presents a completely new phenomenon.
74
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(ii) Different Types of E-commerce and the Prospects for their Development in 
Tanzania 
E-commerce facilitates a huge market for businesses, the service industry being one of the 
greatest beneficiaries.
75
  As a business model it can be classified into four types namely: 




 Business-to-Business (B2B) E-commerce 
B2B e-commerce involves one organisation buying products and services from another, while 
relying on modern technologies, especially the Internet.  In most cases, it involves 
manufacturers and merchant wholesalers.  Initially B2B e-commerce was based on Electronic 
Data Interchage (EDI) technology.
77
  The advent of the Internet, however, has changed the EDI 
practice.
78
  Consequently, B2B e-commerce transactions based on the Internet have been given 
greater attention as a modern way to improve traditional paper contracting.
79
  The use of e-
agents, for instance, has continued to shape B2B e-commerce relations.  With the Internet and 
other modern technologies at hand, ‘buyers [are now] in control of the transaction[s] and “pull” 
products and services from suppliers rather than having suppliers “push” products and services 
onto [them].’
80
  Increased reliance on the Internet in B2B e-commerce is further exacerbated by 




Although prospects for growth of this type of e-commerce exist in Tanzania, both the 
government and the busi ess community need to put more effort into its development.
82
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Indeed, as Majuva asserts, prospects for an efficiently thriving e-commerce in a developing 
country like Tanzania rest on three pillars.  These are business, technology, and regulation.
83
  
The three are interactive and support one another.  
Majuva’s analysis, though useful, is not exhaustive.  For instance, she has not 
analysed difficult regulatory issues concerning B2B e-commerce (or even B2C e-commerce), 
such as formation or validity of e-contracts.  Furthermore, she has not addressed some key 
questions regarding where and when an e-contract is formed for the purpose of determining 
conflict of laws issues.  Consequently, although her work is useful for understanding the 
general
 
dynamics regarding the development of e-commerce in Tanzania, there is a knowledge 
gap that needs to be addressed.  
Currently, there is a general emphasis on the importance of ICT for greater economic 
growth, and various SMEs in developing countries like Tanzania are being encouraged to 
increase usage of this technonoly in various ways, including developing e-commerce 
websites.
84
  Indeed, some organisations including those in support of SMEs in Tanzania have 
invested in ICT in order to grasp the benefits offered by the Internet technology.
85
   
Earlier in 2000, Internet usage and interactions over the Internet among commercial 
organisations in Tanzania were still a new phenomenon.
86
  Computer usage trends at the time 
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were still marginal and Internet connectivity in Tanzania was low.
87
  These trends, however, 
have changed over time and the recent landing of the SEACOM fibre-optic cable in Dar-es-
salaam provides a new dimension in terms of connectivity and enhanced data traffic.
88
  
A recent survey conducted between June and September 2010 by the Tanzanian 
Communication Authority (TCRA) with a view to ascertaining the level of penetration and 
usage of internet services in Tanzania indicates that, out of 68 Application Services Licencees 
(ASLs) present in the country 46 of them (equal to 67 percent) are operational, 20 of them 
(equal to 30 percent) could not be traced, and 2 (equal to 3 percent) are not operational.
89
  The 
trend depicting their growth from 2000 to 2010 is shown below in Figure 1.  The Survey 
Report further notes that ‘total available internet and data capacity in Tanzania [was] 
3,459Mbps, out of which 1,475 Mbps (43%) [was] from sattellite and 1,984 Mpbs (57%) [was] 
from fibre optic.’
90
  As of June 2010, however, only 2,239 Mpbs (65 percent) were in use, 49 
percent from fibre optic and 51 percent from satellite.
91
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Figure 1. Trends of ASLs from April 2000-June 2010 
 
(Source of Data TCRA Report 2010)
92
  
Overall, earlier research on developing countries’ technological terrain has shown that 
‘[t]he principal barrier to achieving the potential benefits of B2B e-commerce [include] 
insufficient investment in the telecommunication infrastructure and the high costs of 
connectivity.’
93
  These observations do not portray a healthy scenario for successful B2B e-
commerce.  Low internet connectivity is not only a sign of limited knowledge about ICT's 
usefulness, but also an absence of effective government initiatives to generate policies that 
support a digitised economy.
94
 
The observations above reveal the difficult terrain over which many developing 
countries are treading and the future prospects for e-commerce in a country like Tanzania. 
They are also a reminder that effective B2B e-commerce demands foresight, vigilance and 
political will on the part of not only the government (through its development policies) but also 
the private sector (which is currently being co-opted as a partner in the development process).  
Commitment towards change is also vital. 
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For its part, the government has a special role to play.  This includes establishing a 
reliable regulatory framework that ensures safety, transparency and certainty of transactions in 
an information economy where the ‘private sector continues to take the lead.’
 95
  In this way the 
government will be a catalyst to both business entities and the general consumers.  
According to Panagariya, developing countries stand to gain more from e-commerce 
than the developed ones because they have the opportunity to skip some of the stages that 
developed nations had to go through.
96
  Whether this view is plausible and whether there is a 
short cut to development is arguable.  Nevertheless, this can only be a reality if developing 
countries assist their SMEs to take part in e-commerce by creating the necessary policies and 




There are plenty of reasons why Tanzanian firms need to be encouraged to participate 
in B2B e-commerce and why the laws governing contractual relations need to be reviewed.
98
 
Adherence to traditional paper-based contracting hinders companies from accessing new 
trading opportunities offered by e-commerce,
99
 and increases ‘contracting cost and time 
requirements.’
100
  Moreover, companies fail to gain competitive advantage because they face 
new business scenarios that cannot be supported ‘by means of traditional paper contracting.’
101
 
For instance, companies using e-agents to form contracts in a B2B scenario, have the 
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advantage of using the same system to ‘monitor the responsibilities of each contractual party 
and the performance of the obligations.’
102
  This is not the case in a paper-based setting.  
Consequently, to firms in developing countries like Tanzania, B2B e-commerce is a not-to-be-
miss opportunity. 
It is also true that Tanzania, as a country with unique traditional products (for 
instance, coffee, spices from Zanzibar, Makonde Carving, Tanzanite gemstone, national parks 
and other tourist attractions), can gain ‘considerably from sustainable e-commerce 
activities.’
103
  Despite the many natural resources and products available in Tanzania, however, 
there is very limited information about them in the global market.  Through B2B e-commerce 
these resources can be advertised to the outside world, and in this way, Tanzanian firms will 
secure more access to international markets.
104
  
 Business-to-Consumer (B2C) E-commerce  
B2C ecommerce involves ‘marketing and selling to individual consumers online.’
105
 
Strategically, B2C e-commerce is about ‘mass marketing.’
106
  Several websites, such as 
Amazon.com or eBay are characterised as online B2C interactions.
107
  Whereas it is also 
possible for a ‘business that sells to end consumers’ to maintain trading relations with other 
businesses on the supply side,
108
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B2C e-commerce in most ‘less developed countries’ is a viable venture if, for 
instance, B2C portals are specifically created to target expatriates from these countries working 
in the diaspora.
110
  B2C e-commerce portals such as http://www.EthioGift.com and 
http://www.ghanamall.com.gh represent good examples.
111
  According to Lake these online 
enterprises ‘are succeeding in operating profitable online businesses by serving the Ethiopian 
and Ghanaian diaspora respectively.’
112
  Lake has also pointed out that Radio One, a Tanzanian 
Internet radio station, reported ‘unexpectedly high numbers of people (presumably Tanzanian 
expatriates) tuning in.’
113
  This indicates that an online market for traditional and cultural goods 
and services, such as local music, is available for Tanzanian citizens in the diaspora.   
Certain obstacles, however, need to be overcome.  These ‘include the high costs 
involved in developing a quality website and acquiring online clients, expensive fulfilment 
costs, problematic online payment issues, exclusivity of distribution channels and the lack of a 
domestic market.’
114
  In addition, the level of Internet penetration among the Tanzanian 
population is also a matter of concern.
115
   
The 2010 TCRA Report
116
 reveals that as of June 2010 the total number of internet 
users stood at 4.8 million.  Of this number, 5 percent access the Internet through cybercafés, 55 
percent do so from organisations or institutions and 40 percent from households.  In terms of 
penetration, as at June 2010, only 11 percent of all Tanzanians were able to access and were 
using the Internet.
117
  However, certain ICT-related sectors, such as the mobile telecoms 
service, are making good progress in the country.  Currently, the telecoms market in Tanzania 
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is one of the most competitive on the continent, as the level of mobile market penetration has 
passed the 50 percent mark since 2010.
118
  
The TCRA’s Report, when compared to a previous research on ICT usage in 
Tanzania, shows that the past five years (ie from 2005 to 2010) have shown a steady 
development.  A study conducted in 2005 shows that only 2 percent of the Tanzanian 
population had e-mail addresses. For the purposes of access to Internet and computer use in the 
household, only 2 percent were found to have a working computer.
119
  In Dar-Es-Salaam, 
which is the central business city, only 6 percent of households were found in possession of a 
computer, half of which had a printer and 15 percent of which had a scanner.
120
  Out of these 
households only 15 percent had Internet connection.
121
  The table below summarises the 
growing trends from 2001-2005.  Overall, despite positive growth indications, the levels of 
Internet penetration in Tanzania is still low since: only 11 percent of an estimated population of 
more than 40 million people have access to the Internet.
122
   
















Tanzania 2001 1,478 0.44 60.0 0.18 120 0.36 
2005 5,908 1.57 333.0 0.89 278 0.74 
Africa 2005  4.92  3.72  2.24 
World 2005  421.63  15.17  13.3 
Table 1 reveals the difficulties for developing e-commerce in Tanzania, especially the 
B2C model.  Overall, although the TCRA Report
124
 shows steady developments, increased 
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 According to a Population Census Report issued by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2006, the total 
population in 2002 was 34.4 million. See The United Republic of Tanzania Analytical Report Vol X National 
Bureau of Statistics Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment Dar es Salaam August (2006) 1 (available 
at http://www.nbs.go.tz/pdf/2002popcensus.pdf (as accessed on 28/6/2011)). The current estimates according to the 
CIA World Fact Book stands at 42,746,620 (July 2011 est.) (available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html (as accessed on 28/6/2011)). 
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efforts to improve Internet access for people or households and improving financial 
infrastructures by introducing credit and debit card systems are still needed in order to promote 
B2C e-commerce activities in the country.  
In Canada, for instance, in the year 2003 alone an estimated 3.2 million Canadian 
households actively participated in e-commerce and accessed the Internet from various 
locations, including their homes.
125
  While one may argue that Canada is ‘another world’ 
compared to Tanzania, the latter ‘cannot afford to be left behind too long due to globalisation of 
business across the world.’
126
  As part of the networked global society Tanzania needs to take 
appropriate measures to bringing its economy ‘into the centre of the e-commerce revolution.’
127
   
The limited internet access in Tanzania, however, does not mean that there are no 
prospects for the development of B2C e-commerce.
128
  In the financial sector, for instance, 
some banks have introduced smart–card technologies, including VISA online shopping, hence 
contributing to the growth of e-commerce.  These include the CRDB 1997 Ltd, with its well-
known TemboCard VISA, and the Tanzania Postal Bank (TPB) that developed the 
UHURUCard.
129
  In 2005, the CitiBank (T) introduced Electronic Funds Transfer services, 
making it the first bank in Tanzania to launch an online domestic funds transfer service.
130
  The 
recent introduction of mobile phone money transfers services, such as Vodafone M-Pesa
131
 or 
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 is another remarkable development that can potentially influence m-
commerce
133
 between the ‘unbanked’ rural populations and the urban areas.
134
 
Although B2C e-commerce is growing, albeit at a slow pace, those engaging in it may 
face difficulties where a dispute arises concerning enforceability of contracts purported to have 
been formed online by use of, let us say, an e-mail.
135
  Consider the following hypothetical 
case. 
Madelaine from Florida, USA wants to spend her Christmas holiday in Tanzania.  
With a view to arranging for her accommodation and possibly an excursion trip to Mount 
Kilimanjaro, she has quickly browsed through the Internet for suitable hotel accommodation 
and a tour operator.  She was lucky to find a website belonging to a tour operating company in 
the name of Kilimanjaro Tour & Hotel Operator.  The website provided a personal e-mail for 
correspondence, the company's bank account (and a SWIFT Code for payment purposes) and a 
cell phone number for further contacts.  She decided to e-mail one Adrian Mjanja (this being 
the contact person whose e-mail address was available on th  website) and she wrote:  
Dear Adrian, 
I will spend my summer vacation in Tanzania and will want to see Mt. 
Kilimanjaro.  I have seen and agree that your prices for rooms and excursion are 
reasonable, and I am happy with them.  Kindly reserve 2 suitable hotel rooms for 




 2009.  Payments will shortly be made into 
your account as soon as I hear from you.  
Regards.  
Madelaine.  
                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.vodafone.com/start/media_relations/news/group_press_releases/2007/vodacom_announces.html (as 
accessed on 29/1/ 2009). ‘M’ stands for mobile while ‘Pesa’ is a Kiswahili word for money.  
132
Zantel is a telecommunication company registered in Zanzibar and offers mobile phone money transfer 
services.   
133
M-commerce or mobile commerce is a form of e-commerce which is carried out using an individual’s mobile 
phone to settle several transactions of commercial nature. (For more about it see R Rannu ‘Mobile Services in 
Estonia: Policy Analysis No2’ PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies (2003) 12 (available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Praxis_Estonia_m-
gov.pdf?resourceurlname=Praxis_Estonia_m-gov.pdf (as accessed on 22/7/2011). 
134
See M Reed ‘M-money is an idea whose time has come’ (available at http://www.telecoms.com/174/m-money-
is-an-idea-whose-time-has-come (as accessed on 30/3/ 2009).   
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Suppose after some few minutes she received a reply from Adrian stating:  
Dear Madeleine, 
Thank you for your e-mail.  Our prices are always reasonable.  Terms and 
conditions will have to apply. 
Regards. 
Adrian. 
Suppose Madeleine, believing that a contract was made, paid for the hotel online 
while in Florida and travelled with her entire family to Tanzania only to find that no 
arrangements were made by the hotelier and no rooms were reserved for her.  After incurring 
more expenses than she had planned, Madeleine's family secured accommodation in another 
hotel but could no longer enjoy an excursion trip to see Mount Kilimanjaro.  They ended up in 
Zanzibar.  Madeleine feels disappointed by what transpired and wants to sue the tour operating 
company for breach of contract.  Given these facts, one may wish to raise several questions.  
Was there a contract? By relying on no more than the e-mail communications can she 
successfully sue the company?  If there was a contract, when and where was it formed?   
Suppose Adrian disputes some of the contents of the e-mail which Madeline intends to 
rely upon, how could Madeleine establish its authenticity?  As will be discussed in chapter two, 
these issues, and others, are likely to arise in the B2C environment, and may well arise in other 
e-commerce types.  Resolving them on the basis of the existing law may not be easy. 
 Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C) E-commerce  
C2C e-commerce exemplifies a situation where a private individual or a consumer deals with 
another consumer online.
136
  It is characterised by the growth of electronic market places and 
online auctions, and it manifests in at least three forms: auctions facilitated at a portal (such as 
eBay, to allow online real-time bidding) peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (for example, Napster file 
sharing model),
137
 and classified advertisements at portal sites, (for example, the Excite 
Classifieds (http://classifieds.excite.com) or eWanted (http://www.ewanted.com/)).  Although 
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the prospects for C2C e-commerce growth in Tanzania exists, for instance, in the music 
industry, it has not been well established due to various factors, such as the lack of an effective 
intellectual property regime, the lack of an effective payment system and the lack of functional 
local websites.  
 Business-to-Government (B2G) E-commerce 
‘Players in e-commerce today are not only Business and Consumers but also the 
Government.’
138
  Thus, ‘B2G’ e-commerce refers to business interactions between business 
entities and the public sector or governmental institutions,
139
 especially where a country has 
adopted an e-government strategy.  Basically, B2G interactions in an e-government scenario 
are a fertile ground for e-business growth.
140
  Through such interactions ‘governments create a 
positive business climate by simplifying relationships with businesses and reducing the 
administrative steps needed to comply with regulatory obligations.’
141
  Additionally, B2G 
interactions provide significant contributions to the growth of e-business culture.  Many 
transactions and other important government-related operations, such as e-procurement or 
licensing procedures, can be executed electronically.  This has overall positive effects on the 
development of e-commerce because it inculcates into the minds of the general public a sense 
of confidence and a demand for a wider application of ICT.  
Additionally, governmental involvement in e-commerce creates a ‘spillover effect…to 
businesses, [forcing them] to improve efficiency by adopting e-commerce strategies.’
142
  The 
end result is improved services and expanded e-business opportunities in and outside the 
country.  At the moment, however, prospects for B2G development in Tanzania are few as 
most government departments do not have established interactive and transactional websites 
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where interactions with the business community, such as tendering and other procurement 
processes, can take place. Although the relevant authority that regulates public procurement - 
the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) - has established an online presence,
143
 
this is only an initial, though positive, step.  In the absence of a functioning e-government 
strategy, growth of B2G e-commerce in Tanzania will be slow in coming, and thus need not 
delay us unduly. 
From the foregoing discussion, it suffices to state that, although the e-commerce types 
discussed above constitute a huge market for businesses in Tanzania, three types, namely B2B, 
B2C and C2C e-commerce are the most likely to develop in the near future.  The reasons are, 
firstly, that Tanzania has largely liberalised its economy by adopting market-based policies to 
attract more investments from outside (and hence international merchants).  Thus, businesses 
outside the country are now targeting customers or business partners in Tanzania.
144
  
Secondly, the private sector in Tanzania is currently growing and an increasing 
number of SMEs seek to harness the new technologies.  More SMEs will want to embrace e-
commerce in the form of B2B or B2C, both locally and internationally.  As ICT penetrates the 
tourism industry, for instance, it has given rise to the so-called e-tourism,
145
 consequently 
introducing this industry to e-transactions.
146
  Thirdly, because some banks in the country have 
introduced smart–card technologies, a growing number of Tanzanians can shop online.  In view 
of these reasons, and, given the future trend of e-commerce in Tanzania, whether in the nature 
of B2B or B2C, we can expect online transactions with foreign-based companies to generate 
more and more problems regarding conflict of laws and consumer protection.
147
  
                                                 
143
See http://www.ppra.go.tz/ and http://www.mca-t.go.tz/ (as accessed on 23/5/2010). 
144
Companies from countries like China and Japan have, for instance, established links with Tanzanian businesses 
or opened offices in the country with a view to supplying their goods to the rest of East and Central Africa.  See, 
for instance, (n128) above. 
145
The term eTourism signifies a body of knowledge resulting from the interaction between ICTs and Tourism.  
For more about this see Kamuzora (n135) 12-13.  See also F Kamuzora ‘eTourism for Empowering Small and 
Medium Tourism Enterprises in Poverty Eradication in Tanzania’ in F Ayadi (Ed) African Business and 
Development: Strategies for Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation Vol 6 Dar es Salaam IAABD (2005) 363-
371; F Kamuzora ‘The Internet as an Empowering Agent for Small, Medium and Micro Tourism Enterprises in 
Poor Countries’ (2005) 3e-Review of Tourism Research (eRTR) 82 (available at http://ertr.tamu.edu  (as accessed 
on 23/5/2010)). 
146
According to UNCTAD, tourism sector is ‘a perfect fit for e-commerce.’  See UNCTAD E-commerce and 
Development Report (2003).  
147
See, for instance, J A Ismail & J E Mills ‘Contract Disputes in Travel and Tourism: When the Online Deal Goes 















(iii) E-commerce and the Transforming Power of ICT  
The importance of ICT and its role in global economic growth cannot be overemphasised.  It 
has exerted a considerable impact on society, such as ‘improved communication, increased 
accessibility of news, the beginnings of e-commerce, the emergence of Internet cafes, to name 
but a few.’
148
  Information technology has become ‘the single most important factor shaping 
the structure of the economy and society.’
149
  In the past, communication pattern used to be on 
a ‘one-to-one’ basis but currently, through technological developments, the pattern is no longer 
linear but has multiple ends.  It is now possible to communicate on a ‘one to many’ pattern by a 
simple click of a mouse.  
In the field of commerce, ICT has simplified the manner of executing and handling of 
business information while enabling customers to access information concerning prices or even 
drive pricing.
150
  Thus, as some scholars put it, ICT has created a ‘third wave of civilisation.’
151
  
With increased innovations, ICT is bound to have a significant influence on various sections of 
the economy.
152
  Its effects are felt in a number of legal areas, from conclusion of contracts to 
the protection of intellectual property, taming of ‘cybercrimes’ and ‘cybertorts’, to mention but 
a few. 
Currently, producers and marketers can globally relay information about products and 
services online to their potential customers and among themselves.  Such technology-enhanced 
interactions have led to growth of e-commerce, referred to by some as ‘a new game in town’
153
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or ‘a “trading centre” without restrictions from territorial and geographical factors.’
154
  In this 
virtual market transactions valued in billions of US dollars take place annually.
155
  In 1999, for 
instance, the worldwide e-commerce levels hit US $145 billion while in 2004 projected trends 
were above US $6.8 trillion.
156




According to the Eurostat press release, a total of 12 percent of enterprises’ turnover 
in the EU was generated from e-commerce in 2008.
158
  In China, the China Daily reports that 
China’s e-commerce turnover had increased by 22 percent in 2010,
159
 while in Kenya in 2010 
M-payment services carry more than 12 percent of the country's GDP.
160
  Overall, the 
continuing rise of e-commerce globally suggests that ICT has the potential to drastically 
transform the socio-economic dynamics of a given society even in other areas such as 
education, health, and business procurement.
161
   
It is also clear that the current technological support for e-commerce has led to the 
creation of an almost perfect state of free competition by reducing market entry barriers and 
lowering transaction costs.  In order to facilitate an easy harnessing of all these benefits and to 
allow ICT to contribute towards socio-economic growth, however, there is a need for a legal 
framework that supports wider application of ICT.  And, because e-commerce requires a high 
level of trust and legal certainty of its transactions, countries, like Tanzania, wishing to fully 
participate in e-commerce are obliged to not only establish the basic technological capabilities 
in terms of ICT infrastructure development but also appropriate supporting legal 
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(iv) The Road Map of E-commerce Development  
Development of e-commerce is an evolutionary process.  It progresses in phases, namely: 
presence, interaction and transaction, integration and transformation, and an on-going 
evolutionary stage.
163
  The first stage, presence, is when a company establishes an online 
contact by, for instance, opening an e-mail address.  At this point, the company relies on the 
services provided by the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to communicate with its clients.  
In the second stage, interaction and transaction, ‘a company becomes more e-enabled 
and may create a transactional e-commerce site as part of its development cycle.’
164
  In this 
way, the company makes its online presence more presentable and can interact with customers.  
This stage is followed by greater integration of its business whereby ‘its Web front–end [is 
integrated] with its back-end systems.’
165
  The company's transaction interface ‘may be linked 
to its inventory management systems [to create] a ‘hands-off approach.’
166
  The company may, 
however, go further to the extraneous spheres and become fully connected with ‘its partners, 




The final stage of a company's e-commerce evolution involves continuing 
transformation whereby a firm creates a new path as a result of changes in technology, 





 diagrammatic presentation of a company's e-commerce roadmap is 
reproduced in Figure 2 below. 
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Available at http://srdc.msstate.edu/ecommerce/events/01conf/duncan_beth.ppt (as accessed in 23/03/2007). 
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(v) Benefits and Challenges of Accommodating E-commerce in Tanzania 
Although e-commerce has caused tremendous changes in the operational landscape of many 
businesses worldwide,
171
 there is a dearth of materials regarding its overall impact on 
businesses in Tanzania.
172
  Nevertheless, from a general viewpoint, it constitutes one of the 
significant opportunities for an economic breakthrough.  Apart from giving consumers a wider 
online forum for choosing with whom to transact, e-commerce presents itself as an opportunity 
to increase business competitiveness.
173
  Through it, businesses can adapt to changes in market 
conditions, reduce paper work, cut down costs, automate and control their inventories, and co-
operate with partners.
174
  They can also access existing markets more effectively and create 
new markets that are accessible globally.  
If examined in the context of the existing legal framework in Tanzania, e-commerce is 
both an opportunity to be harnessed and a challenge.
175
  It is an opportunity because of the 
various economic benefits associated with it–for instance, increased business efficiency and 
output and reduced costs– and it is a challenge because Tanzania lacks an appropriate legal 
framework to respond to the exigencies brought about by modern technologies.   
It is worth noting that due to ‘the dynamism of the contemporary economic, cultural, 
and technological evolution’ existing legal frameworks must adapt themselves ‘to the modern 
demands.’
176
  This is crucial because technology, apart from changing very fast, continues to 
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change the ways we interact socially and economically.  Consequently, law, as an instrument 
for socio-economic development, must learn to keep pace with technology.177  
(b) E-contracts: Meaning and Types 
The major interest in this thesis is in the law relating to e-contracts, especially consumer 
contracts.  E-contracts are those created wholly or in part through communications over the 
Internet either by exchange of e-mails or otherwise (for instance, by clicking on a button on a 
particular website to indicate consent to be bound by terms governing the contract).  This 
concept, in essence, applies to contracts created by the aid of electronic communications, such 
as the Internet, e-mail or sms.  
Traditionally, legally binding contracts have either been oral or in the form of paper 
documents written and signed by the parties.
178
  Such contracts have been well supported by 
established rules and concepts.
179
  Extensive reliance on the Internet, however, has created a 
world of digital alternatives,
180
  which have given rise to a variety of e-contracts as further 
discussed below. 
(i) Commercial Contracts in the form of EDI 
Electronic Data Interchange (hereafter referred to as ‘EDI’) involves electronic transfer of 
agreed standard-structured information from one computer to another.
181
  This technique 
developed with advances in the computing industry in the 1970s which came to replace use of 
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  Data under an EDI system involve ‘contractual or trade-related information, such as 
orders, invoices, specifications or parts lists, and increasingly, the information required for 
“electronic funds transfer” for the settlement of invoices.’
183
   
Essentially, EDI-based contracts follow the conventional contracting approach.
184
  
They involve an ongoing business-to-business (B2B) relationship typically carried out within 
an underlying prior agreement called Trading Partners Agreement.
185
  As the Internet becomes a 
useful business tool, EDI contracts are increasingly being formed via this medium.
186
  Legal 
problems concerning the Internet-enabled EDI contracts, such as the question where, when and 
how the contract was concluded, cannot be avoided.  
(ii) E-mail-Based contracts 
E-mail communications constitute the greatest part of traffic on the Internet.
187
  Communication 
through e-mails is common among businesses and individuals.  Currently, e-mails are used to 
create contracts.
188
  Parties may exchange e-mails and send attachments embodying the terms 
of their contract.  When a sender’s server sends a message to the receiver’s mail server, 
however, such e-message may travel through a number of servers before reaching the recipient 
or may even be stored in a server for a while before being sent on its way.
189
  From a legal 
standpoint, this new technique has its own peculiarities and issues needing careful 
consideration.   
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(iii) Click-wrap Agreements 
Click-wrap agreements are web-based agreements setting out the rights and obligations of the 
involved parties.
190
  A web merchant relying on a click-wrap agreement requires clients to 
express their willingness to be bound by its terms and conditions.  Consent is expressed through 
clicking on an icon which indicates ‘agreeing’ or ‘accepting’ such terms before concluding a 
transaction or downloading or installing a purchased software.
191
  Unlike other web-based 
agreements, in click-wrap agreements, users have constructive notice of the terms.
192
  
(iv) Browse-wrap Agreements 
Browse-wrap agreements are web-based agreements that do not require users to indicate 
consent before accessing an online product or service.  They are typically used ‘where 
commercial considerations make click-wrap agreements undesirable.’
193
  Their lack of express 
demand for consent, however, has exposed them to criticism and objections.
194
 
(v) Shrink-wrap Agreements 
A shrink-wrap agreement is an unsigned licence agreement with terms and conditions binding 
purchasers of particular licensed products or software when they either open it, or use it or by 
some other specified means.
195
  In the context of e-commerce, a shrink-wrap agreement may be 
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used to accompany goods purchased online.  These have also been open to criticism, since it is 
wrong to assume that the act of tearing the shrink-wrap package is sufficient to signify
 
consent.  
As Robertson argues, consent cannot be obtained before reading the terms that are included 
inside the package.
196
  Consequently uncertainty has existed in some jurisdictions regarding 
enforceability of these agreements.   
4. The Context of this Research: The Political and Socio-economic Paradigm-shift in 
Tanzania 
(a) The Arusha Declaration and the Adoption of Socialist Policy: The Economic 
Isolation Period (1967-1980) 
The issues raised in this thesis are discussed within the context of an understanding that the 
ongoing technological developments are fundamental in promoting a market-oriented 
economy.
197
  In order to comprehend their genesis, it is important to analyse Tanzania’s past 
and present socio-political and economic policies and their effects on the development of ICT.  
Doing so is imperative because ICT development is either positively or negatively influenced 
by various factors, including the laws and policies that a state adopts.
198
  Indeed, the historical 
journey of ICT development in Tanzania substantiates this assertion.  
The application of computer technology in Tanzania started when the country was still 
under the British colonial rule.  In 1956, the colonial government introduced the Hand-Punch 
input device for computer cards.
199
  This device ‘was used to capture data for processing 
elsewhere.’
200
  In 1961, Tanzania became an independent state and started to shape its own 
national developmental vision.  From the mid 1960s to late 1980s it pursued the ideals of 
socialism and self-reliance.  As a single party state, the ruling party at the time was the only 
organ mandated to shape the future direction of state policies.  
                                                 
196
 See Robertson (n191) 275. 
197
 As for the role of science and technology in promoting economic growth see See, for instance, Tanzania’s 
National Science & Technology Policy (1996), para 9.  See also S Tanigaki ‘Reshaping Japan: The Role of 
Science and Technology' in AAAS Science and Technology Yearbook (1999) part 3.8 (available at 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/yearbook/contents.htm (as accessed on 25/9/2005)). 
198
See (generally) A Addis,  B Selassie & R Seidman  ‘On Research on the State, Law, and the Legal Process of 
Development’ in A Seidman & F Anang (eds) 21st Century Africa: Towards a New Vision of Self-Sustainable 
Development (1992) 243-247. These authors argue (in pages 258-259) that the kind of laws and policies a state 
adopts affect its socio-economic, political, and technological development.  See also S Chamarik & S Goonatilake 
(eds) Technological independence- The Asian experience (1994). 
199
See H M Twaakyondo, J L Ndalichako & E P Bhalalusesa ‘Factors Shaping Successful Public Private 
Partnership in the ICT Sector in Developing Countries: The Case of Tanzania’ (2002) at 4 (available at 

















In 1967, the first major policy changes came into effect when the country adopted the 
Arusha Declaration.  Being named after the town where it was promulgated, the declaration 
intended to develop a centralised command economy.
201
  Consequently, ‘all privately owned 
business entities, including banks, telecommunications, marine services, insurance, and mining 
companies, were nationalised.’
202
  The government created state-owned corporations (referred 
to as Parastatals) to take over all nationalised assets.  In this economic set-up, the government 
marginalised the private sector in favour of the public sector’s dominance.
203
  These steps had 
negative economic and technological implications as the country became isolated from 
effective participation in the global economy, and the private sector, which should have been 
the engine for economic growth, became stagnant.
204
  
(b) The Socialist Policy: Its Effects on ICT Development  
In 1968, a Tanzanian National Scientific Research Council (UTAFITI) was established.
205
 
Despite its establishment, the government failed to pay serious attention to science and 
technology.
206
  Gaillard contends that the National Scientific Council did not have a defined 
mandate, and, its functions were thus limited.
207
  The country lacked specific national policy to 
guide the development of science and technology.
208
  Moreover, diverse transfer of technology 
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The early years of independence, however, envisaged a need to embrace the new post 
World War II technologies, such as computerisation.  In 1965, the government embarked on an 
ambitious computerisation project aiming at key sectors and ministries.
210
  The Ministry of 
Finance was the first to start computerising its operations, when it installed an ICT Hollerith 




Much as the computerisation programme was a significant initiative, it faced 
problems, including the lack of sound policy co-ordination, guidance, and qualified indigenous 
personnel.
212
  Consequently, it failed and occasioned a huge financial loss to the government.  
Exclusion of private sector involvement in this project was a contributing factor too.  As one 
scholar argued, it is ‘the investment policy of private enterprise vis-à-vis that of public 
institutions which accounts for computer developments and utilisation.’
213
  
The failure of the computing initiative and the loss it occasioned to the government, 
created disappointment, anger and confusion.  In 1974, without reasonable foresight, the 
government made a decision to restrict all importation of computers into Tanzania.
214
  If any 
import was to be made, it needed the clearance of the responsible minister.
215
  This decision 
                                                 
209
See Nangela (n202) 20. See also Nguluma (n206). 
210
See S G Mhayaya A Study of the Potential Usage of ICT (E-Government) in improving efficiency and 
effectiveness of ‘Executive Funct ons’ of the Government including delivery of public services- Case of Tanzania 
(Unpublished MscEM Dissertation, University of Dar-es-salaam, 2004).  See also K Mgaya Mgaya 'Development 
of Information Technology in Tanzania' in E Drew & F G Foster (eds) Information Technology in Selected 
Countries Tokyo United Nations University Press (1994) 134-148 (available at 
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu19ie/uu19ie0i.htm (as accessed on 23/5/2011)). See further D C P 
Masalu ‘Evolution of information and communication technologyin Tanzania and its impact on oceandata and 
information management’ (2005) 48 Ocean & Coastal Management 85. 
211
See Mhayaya (n210).  
212
Ibid.  See also M Tedre, N Bangu & S I Nyagava ‘Contextualized IT Education in Tanzania: Beyond Standard 
IT Curricula’ (2009) 8 Journal of Information Technology Education 101. 
213
See L K Shayo ‘The Role of Computers in Developing Countries with reference to East Africa’ Doc. IC/84/224-
Marked ‘Internal Report (Limited distribution)-IAEA & UNESCO International Centre for Theoretical Physics, 
(June 14th 1985) at 2-3 (available at http://streaming.ictp.trieste.it/preprints/P/84/224.pdf (as accessed on 5/7/ 
2007)). 
214
The ban was made by the Government through The Imports Control (Electronic Computer and Television Sets) 
(Prohibition) Order, 1974 published on 14th June 1974, GN 142.  The said Government Notice was made under 
section 15(1) of the Imports Control Ordinance (Cap 292).  For more on this see B E K Mganga ‘The Use of 
Electronic Evidence in Administration of Justice in Tanzania’ unpublished Advanced Course Work Paper 2, 
submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Dar-Es-Salaam (2008) 2. 
215
See The Imports Control (Electronic Computers and Television Sets) (Prohibition) (Amendments) Order 















was another setback for the ICT industry.  According to a survey conducted in 1993, the 
country had:  
 in 1965, one Main Frame Computer,216  
 in 1978, five mainframes, seven minicomputers,217 
 in 1984, 13 mainframes, 15 minis, 79 micros,218 
 in 1986, 16 mainframes, 37 minis, 470 micros,219 and  
 in 1993, 570 micros imported during the second quarter alone.220 
Importation of these computers to the country, especially after the ban, was by way of 
special permission from the relevant ministry
221
 (especially where they belonged to specified 
public corporations, such as the Tanzania National Electricity Supply Corporation 
(TANESCO)).  Those owned by individuals were imported through clandestine routes to avoid 
the ban.  
(c) Transformation Period (1980's Onwards): Liberalisation and Reform Strategies 
Transformation from a centrally planned to a market-based economy began in the 1980s.  This 
was essential as the Tanzanian economy was fast deteriorating due in part to the 1970s oil 
crisis, and in part to the socialist economic policy.
222
  The country never became self-reliant 
despite the Arusha Declaration.
223
  Instead Tanzania was (and has continued to be) 
economically dependent on foreign aid.
224
  Between 1967 and the 1980s, economic growth 
slowed down and the Tanzanian economy was ‘growing at a rate of 3-4% per annum.’
225
  The 
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challenging economic climate of the 1980s shook the country’s political and socio-economic 
foundations.  As a result, the policies pursued between 1967 and 1985 had to be abandoned in 
favour of a more market-oriented model.
226
  
In order to embrace a meaningful transformation process, the country adopted policies 
and strategies that favoured liberalisation.  This on-going reform process was at its peak when 
the government privatised the erstwhile nationalised corporations in the early and mid 1990s.  
Moreover, in order to rebuild the economy, the World Bank introduced a set of comprehensive 
socio-economic strategies.  These included the Structural Economic Programmes, in the form 
of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), introduced in 1986, followed by the Economic 
and Social Action Programme (ESAP) in 1989.
227
  These programmes led to a shift from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system, the top priority being rehabilitation of 
key economic infrastructures that were by then fast deteriorating.
228
 
The need to attract capital from private investors was another reason for policy 
reforms in Tanzania.
229
  As part of the process, and having r alised its inability to be the master 
of everything, the government finally changed its attitude towards the private sector.
230
  It 
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recognised this sector as a crucial engine for sustainable economic development.
231
  Since then 
the private sector has become a vital partner in the development of the country’s economy.
232
  
(d) Liberalisation: Its Effects on ICT Development  
The adoption of a liberalisation policy in Tanzania necessitated legal reforms and facilitated 
transfer of technology to the country, which was impossible during the era of the socialist 
economy.  With this new economic policy in place, more foreign investments have been 
attracted, thus encouraging more transfer of technology to Tanzania.
233
  It is within this context 
of liberalisation that ICT development in Tanzania was revived. 
Between 1985 and 1994, deliberate efforts were made to expedite effective use and 
sustainable transfer of technology.  In 1985, for the first time, Tanzania adopted a National 
Science and Technology Policy (NSTP).  This policy, having been revised in 1995, seeks to 
‘develop and manage science and technology in a manner consistent with physical and human 
endowments of [the] country.’
234
  It also seeks to promote public-private initiatives.
235
  In 
addition to the adoption of this policy, the government established a Commission for Science 




In order to embrace a meaningful and holistic reform process, the country needed to 
be guided.  Consequently, a National Development Vision 2025 was adopted as a major policy 
document in Tanzania.
237
  Vision 2025 considers the application of information and 
communication technologies as central to a competitive socio-economic transformation and a 
major driving force for its realisation.
238
  In order to concretise this vision other policy reforms 
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were necessary.  Consequently, the ban on importation of electronic computers and their 
accessories was lifted in 1993.
239
  In 1996, 1997 and 2003 Tanzania adopted three policy 
documents, which are vital in building an ICT-led economy.  These were the National Science 
and Technology Policy (1996),
240
 the Telecommunication Policy (1997),
241
 and the National 
ICT Policy (2003).  
(e) Moving E-Commerce Forward in Tanzania: Building Policy Support for ICT and 
Internet Use 
Partial Internet access in Tanzania started in the early part of the 1990s.
242
  With this 
technology finding its way to Tanzania, and with the adoption of the ICT policy in 2003, the 
country made a significant step towards the implementation of e-readiness strategies.
243
   
The ICT policy recognises the need to promote e-commerce.
244
  Because this policy is 
an important tool in winning the battle against poverty, it has also been linked to other policies 
and strategies, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
245
  To make this a 
success, however, emphasis on the use of ICT and e-commerce to explore new markets is 
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  As the World Bank indicates, ‘ICT–broadly defined—can become a ubiquitous 
economic tool, customised to the needs and sophistication of a particular user.’
247
  
The SMEs Policy (adopted in 2000) and the Trade Policy (adopted in 2003) are also 
useful in the e-commerce agenda.  Under the SMEs policy the government has committed itself 
to establishing a data bank for SMEs.  This includes a national web-site for SMEs and a 
directory of service providers.
248
  It has also committed itself to enhancing and facilitating 
acquisition and adaptation of technologies, and networking between Research and 
Development Institutions in a bid to upgrade technologies so as to raise productivity and 
competitiveness.
249
  The Trade Policy on the other hand, acknowledges that trade is an engine 
of development in the face of a globalised world.
250
  Consequently, it emphasises the need to 




The need to improve the country’s competitiveness, efficiency in resource allocation, 
raising domestic savings and investments and strengthening technological capabilities are part 
and parcel of the ongoing reforms in Tanzania.
252
  Improved trade performance is also viewed 
as a means of enabling the country to take advantage of increasing opportunities arising from 
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the on-going reforms, and thus, contributing to the economic growth.
253
  Similarly, upgrading 
the existing legal framework and improving infrastructures that constrain not only exporters 
but also producers is considered a crucial aspect of an export development strategy.
254
  
Essentially, therefore, Tanzania has realised the need to build an export-oriented economy in 
order to stimulate economic growth.  
Although e-commerce is not directly mentioned in the export strategy, the Trade 
Policy points to e-commerce as one of the prerequisites for achieving its objectives.  
Considering this, however, one would have expected reforms in the areas of law governing 
commercial intercourse.  Delay in giving effect to positive legal reforms and the lack of a 
specific strategy on e-commerce casts doubt on the weight accorded to the implementation of 




Indeed, even though efforts to reach distant and new markets for Tanzanian products 
were to be made, the same will be weakened by the lack of a specific policy on e-commerce 
promotion and a legal framework that cater for electronic transactions in Tanzania.  These gaps 




Although the already existing ICT policy bears a vital relationship to e-commerce, it 
cannot be a sound basis for e-commerce.  Understandably, a policy document is not legally 
binding.  Hence, where a court, for example, rejects an e-contract, one cannot rely on a policy 
document that recognises the need to promote e-commerce in the absence of a clear legal 
provision supporting it.  This is even more complicated where the Tanzanian law governing 
                                                 
253
See Ibid. The three volumes can be accessed at (i) http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/EDPVolI.pdf, (ii) 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/EDPVolII.pdf, and (iii) http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/EDPVolIII.pdf (as accessed on 
25/10/2009). 
254
 According to a survey of Tanzania’s SMEs, it has been noted that,  ‘the main hurdles besetting SMEs in 
Tanzania [include] legal and regulatory environment, which is still cumbersome, bureaucratic, costly, and 
centralized; many taxes and high rates, lack of/inadequate physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, cold rooms, 
warehouses, power, water and communication), and limited access to finance.’  See T Bekefi Tanzania: Lessons 
in building linkages for competitive and responsible entrepreneurship. UNIDO and Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University (2006) 17 (available at 
http://www.daedalusadvising.com/Comp_Entr_Tanzania.pdf (as accessed on 26/6/2011). See also F Oguttu, H P 
Ngowi & M Millanzi ‘SME competitiveness facility (SCF) SME export market prospects desk study Volume II: 
Detailed study output’ (2006) A consultant Report (available at http://www.marketaccesstz.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/SCF-FINAL-REPORT-vol-II.pdf (as accessed on 26/6/2011)). 
255
The two policies put emphasis on the importance of e-commerce in Tanzania. The time frame set to realise the 
Trade policy objectives which include reform of most commercial laws in the country was the year 2007. 
256















contractual transactions raises more questions than answers as will be demonstrated in Chapter 
II.
257
  Although some laws, for instance those dealing with intellectual property and electronic 
banking, can be said to reflect some of the new developments in their areas,
258
 they 
nevertheless do not fill other gaps, such as the lack of an effective credit card system.
259
 
It is necessary to note, therefore, that because developing e-commerce is a cross-
cutting issue, for it to be effectively developed there must be not only a clear technological 
strategy, but also an effective and reliable legal framework.
260
  Any meaningful participation in 
global e-commerce will only occur in an environment where players can function without fear 
of legal risks in their commercial undertakings.
261
  The current era of digitisation calls for 
strategies and coherent rules which will reflect its borderless nature at national and 
international levels.
262
  Consequently, the existence of a reliable legal framework will help to 
establish an environment which is conducive to e-commerce growth.
263
 
5. Chapter Synopsis 
Chapter one introduced this thesis as a whole.  It provided background information regarding e-
commerce and e-contracts and listed the key problem areas in the law of contract that need to 
be examined in order to create a more reliable legal framework for e-commerce.  The chapter 
set out the goals pursued and the socio-economic policy context within which this study has 
been undertaken.  
Chapter two assesses the adequacy of the existing Tanzanian law of contract by 
expounding on the key issues outlined in chapter one.  The legal issues examined in that 
chapter include: 
 problems relating to contract formation in the online environment, for instance, 
the problem of establishing consensus ad idem in cases involving e-agents,  
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establishing the distinction between offer and invitation to treat, the time and 
place of contracting,  and validity and enforceability of web-based agreements. 
 problems related to formalities, for instance, the legal requirements for writing 
and use of an e-signature,  
 problems  arising from mistakes or input errors occasioned by e-agents, and 
 problems relating to proof of contract (for instance, the issues of authentication, 
attribution, non-repudiation and admissibility of electronic records). 
Chapter two also addresses the existing problem regarding the lack of effective rules 
to protect consumers involved in e-contracts. 
Chapters three and four build on chapter two by examining additional cross-border 
legal problems associated with the use of the Internet in concluding contracts.  Specifically, 
Chapter three addresses jurisdictional issues that may affect the development of e-commerce.  
It examines the applicable rules in Tanzania, England, the United States of America, and the 
European Union, and how they address the challenges brought by the Internet.  The chapter 
also examines how such rules promote predictability and certainty in e-commerce, especially in 
the area of online consumer contracts.  Through a global welfare approach, Chapter three 
examines whether the traditional rules on jurisdiction can effectively apply to the modern e-
contract disputes.  
Although Chapter four is a continuation of the discussion in Chapter three, it was 
deemed necessary to have a separate chapter on choice of law to complement the earlier 
discussion in Chapters one, two and three.  Because Tanzania adheres to the English common 
legal system, the analysis of its choice of law rules was basically an analysis of the ‘traditional’ 
English common law rules on choice of law (ie, the common law rules prior to the 
developments that took place in England in 1990 and onwards).  The chapter further examines 
the developments in the European Union on this subject and how these developments address 
challenges brought by e-commerce, including the issue of protecting online consumers. 
Chapters five and six seek to offer remedial measures that Tanzania ought to consider 
in the course of remedying the problems identified in all the preceding chapters.  Specifically, 















important international and regional initiatives seeking to create a regulatory environment 
conducive for e-commerce.  The chapter analyses the UNCITRAL Model laws on e-commerce 
and e-signature
264
 and the UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts.
265
  The chapter examines the rules developed by these instruments and 
emphasises the need to adopt or incorporate these rules into Tanzania's domestic law of 
contract.  It submits that doing so will position the country's legal framework within the context 
of agreed international standards.  
Chapter six is a case study that examines the legislative developments regarding e-
contract and consumer protection in South Africa, a country selected because it is one of the 
few in Africa to have enacted a law to regulate electronic transactions.  The analysis in this 
chapter establishes the extent to which the legal developments in South Africa were influenced 
by the UNCITRAL Model laws and developments in other regions, especially the European 
Union.  It also affords Tanzania the opportunity to draw meaningful lessons from these 
developments to enrich the country’s efforts to reform its laws.  Such reforms are necessary so 
as to enhance greater predictability in contract, promote consumer protection and confidence in 
e-commerce, as well as integrating the country in the global economy.  Finally, Chapter seven 
concludes this study and suggests the way forward. 
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CHAPTER TWO: E-CONTRACTING AND THE LAW IN TANZANIA– 
AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL GAPS IN 
THE EXISTING LAW OF CONTRACT 
1. Introduction 
Contract law in Tanzania has remained intact from the colonial era to the present.  This chapter 
examines the adequacy of this law in facilitating e-commerce, including formation and 
enforcement of e-contracts, as well as protection of consumers who engage in online 
transactions.  Whether in a developed or a developing country, e-commerce, as ‘a new wine’ in 
the business environment, has created questions in the minds of lawyers, economists, 
consumers and business entities.  Many are sceptical or suspicious about its functional 
mechanisms, namely, the transparency of its processes and the quality of various products 
offered online.
1
  The present uncertainty, however, is often associated with not only potential 
technological security problems but also inadequate or unclear legal norms.
2
  Consequently, 
those who take part in e-commerce seek to know whether the ‘old rules’ can still insulate their 
concerns and interests from the various risks which they may encounter, especially in the 
course of e-contracting.  Because legal certainty of contract is such a fundamental issue in 
commercial relations, the law governing contractual transactions has been one of the areas of 
concern.   
For a country like Tanzania, where contract law is still that designed to handle 
conventional contracts, the basic issues for discussion, from an e-commerce perspective, are 
whether online contracts will be enforced and what measures are needed to address any 
uncertainty in the existing law.  Analysis of these issues requires examination of the existing 
Tanzanian law of contract in order to identify areas which will hinder smooth development of 
e-commerce.  The discussion in this chapter is organised under eight parts.  
Part one consists of this introduction.  Part two sets out the historical development of 
the law of contract in Tanzania.  Part three deals with problems regarding consensus.  Apart 
from considering the key issues arising from website marketing, such as the distinction 
between online offers and invitations to treat, this part also considers the problems raised by e-
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agents.  It examines whether they can form the necessary intention to create legally binding 
obligations.  Additionally, part three discusses problems regarding acceptance in certain web-
based agreements as well as problems regarding the time and place where a contract is formed. 
Part four deals with obstacles raised by formality requirements.  Part five examines 
the effects of online mistakes, such as wrong pricing.  Part six discusses obstacles regarding 
proof of existence of a contract, while part seven considers problems about the lack of rules for 
consumer protection.  Part eight is a conclusion to this chapter.  
2. The History of the Law of Contract in Tanzania 
The law which governs non-customary contracts in Tanzania is embodied in the Law of 
Contract Act
3
 and the Sale of Goods Act.
4
  The colonisation of East Africa (Tanganyika, Kenya 
and Uganda) by the British had a marked effect on the non-customary law of contract of the 
region:  the colonial government imported the Indian Law of Contract Act into East Africa.
5
  
This law was a product of the codification of English common law of contract of the mid 19th 
century as applied mutatis mutandis by the British in their Indian colony.
6
  It had initially 
incorporated provisions on the sale of goods
7
 but these sections were later repealed in India by 
the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
8
  The Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was based on the 
English Sale of Goods Act, 1893.  Its introduction to India was later followed in East Africa.
9
 
After independence, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) re-enacted the Indian Law of 
Contract Act, 1872 (with minor changes including giving it a different name, the Law of 
Contract Act).
10
  Since then the legislation has remained unchanged.
11
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While Tanganyika (now Tanzania) re-enacted the Indian Law of Contract Act with 
some minor changes after independence, after their independance Kenya
 
and Uganda opted for 
the English law of contract.
12
  Section 2 of the Kenyan Law of Contract Act
13
 repealed the 
India Contract Act of 1872 and provides that the English law of contract would apply.  In 
Uganda, s 2 of the Contract Act
14
 also repealed the Indian Contract Act, and section 3 approved 
the application of the English common law as it may have been modified by equity, statutes of 
general application in force in England before 11 August, 1902, and other Acts of parliament.  
With this brief history, two more issues need to be clarified.  The first is the authority 
and extent to which English contract law applies to Tanzania.  Although the Law of Contract 
Act owes its origin to India, various English common law principles and doctrines of equity 
have relevance to Tanzania, and where necessary may be resorted to by courts according to the 
Judicature and Application of Laws Act.
15
  This Act provides that the substance of the common 
law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in England on 22 
July, 1920, shall have force in Tanzania where the circumstances permit, and subject to such 
qualifications as local circumstances may render necessary.
16
   
The second issue on which clarity is needed concerns the value and place of foreign 
precedents, for instance, English decisions or cases from other common law countries on 







 were, before independence, considered binding if they 
dealt with common law or doctrines of equity.
20
  The English common law, however, was to be 
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After independence, the East African Court of Appeal became the final appellate court 
in the region.  The court made it clear that the courts in East Africa were no longer bound by 
English decisions, including decisions of the Privy Council.
22
  Rather, these decisions were 
only of persuasive value.
23
  After the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, each 
country established its own Court of Appeal.  Tanzania established its Court in 1979.
24
  In 
Juwata v Kiuta
25
 the Tanzanian Court of Appeal approved Govindji Mulji Dodhia v National & 
Grindlays Bank Ltd & Another.
26
  It held that it is free to depart from its own decisions where 
necessary, and, that foreign cases are only of persuasive value.
27
 
3. Problems Regarding Contract Formation in an Online Environment 
Consensus ad idem is an essential element in the law of contract in Tanzania.
28
  Section 10 of 
the Law of Contract Act provides that:  
‘[a]ll agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties 
competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not 
hereby expressly declared to be void ....’ 
Additionally, s 13 provides that ‘[t]wo or more persons are said to consent when they 
agree the same thing in the same sense.’
29
  These sections reflect the classical concept of free 
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consent and consensus ad idem.
30
  Existence of consensus ad idem demarcates the pre-
contractual and contractual stages.  Thus, enforceable rights or obligations generally arise only 
when a mutually binding contract is concluded, and, from a classical theory viewpoint, this 




Although the will theory has been criticised,
32
 s 13 above shows that consensus ad 
idem is still considered an important element in contract formation in Tanzania.
33
  On this Nditi 
concludes that ‘consent is an essential ingredient to make an agreement a contract; absence of 
consent will make an agreement void.  Where parties are at cross purpose there is absence of 
consent; there is no consensus ad idem and therefore the agreement is void.’
34
  His conclusion 
finds support in Star Service Station Co Ltd v Tanzania Railways Corporation.
35
  In this case, it 
was held that ‘existence of a valid contract presupposes that the contracting parties were ad 
idem as to the terms of the contract and that each of them willingly accepted those terms of the 
contract.’
36
   
It is necessary, however, to state that a court may infer an agreement from the conduct 
of a party even where the two minds are not ad idem.  Such inference may arise
 
if it is clear to 
the court that one party so conducted or represented himself to the other, that the other party, 
relying on such representations, acted or abstained from executing a particular act with a 
reasonable belief that the two parties had entered into a binding contract.
37
  In other words, the 
injured party will be entitled to rely on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
38
  Three elements 
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are required for the doctrine of promissory estoppel to operate.  These are: (i) a clear and 
unequivocal representation; (ii) an intention that it should be acted upon, and (iii) action upon it 
in the belief of its truth.
39
 
Hence, although in modern economic life the classical view of freedom of contract 
may be manifestly lacking,
40
 freedom to contract, which the law in Tanzania supports, 




In an online environment, establishing the necessary consent in the form of consensus 
ad idem between the parties may be problematic.  Four issues that may be encountered in such 
an environment will be addressed below.  The first one concerns the capacity of e-agents to 
conclude contracts and whether such agents can form the necessary intention to form an 
enforceable contract.  The second issue is whether marketing on a website constitutes an offer 
or an invitation to treat, while the third relates to lack of a firm requirement of acceptance in 
certain web-based transactions and whether such transactions are valid.  The final issue 
concerns when and where an e-contract is concluded.  All these issues are closely connected to 
contract formation and are discussed further below.  
(a) Do E-agents have the Capacity to C ntract? 
According to Russell and Norvig, an e-agent can be defined as ‘anything that can perceive its 
environment through sensors and acting within that environment through effectors.’
42
  These 
authors argue that while ‘a human agent has eyes, ears, and other organs for sensors, and 
hands, legs, mouth and other body parts for effectors, software agent has encoded bit strings as 
its precepts and actions.’
43
  E-agents, therefore, are computer programs or software with the 
ability to perform certain functions desired by their programmer or by themselves, depending 
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  For instance, some e-agents can act as search or decision-making agents 
while others can operate as intermediaries or both.
45
  
As technology in computing and the Internet enter into an advanced stage,
46
 e-agents 
form contracts, having been ‘endowed with cognitive capability of reasoning, learning, 
choosing and even taking an initiative.’
47
  In the course of doing so, they operate 
autonomously, without being directly controlled by an individual, even if the resultant effect 
will be attributed to an individual.
48
  Reliance on these e-agents in e-contracting is currently on 
the increase.
49
  Their effect is also well noted as they have made it possible for big companies, 
such as eBay or Amazon.com, to attract a high number of participants in their online 
transactions compared to their brick-and-mortar counterparts.
50
  Owing to the increased 




One of the obvious issues is whether an e-agent can form the necessary intent, and 
whether the traditional legal framework can still sufficiently establish a convincing link 
between them and the persons on whose behalf they are presumed to act.
52
  The fundamental 
nature of a contract, as it is generally understood, is that the parties must intend to be bound by 
the agreement.
53
  What is the position, however, if the offeree uses an e-agent to communicate 
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the acceptance to the offeror?  Was the offeror intending to contract with a programmed 
machine?  Will that e-agent be regarded as a duly authorised agent for the offeree?  
Beatson argues that, since the basis of communicating acceptance is to make the 
offeror aware that the offer has been accepted (and hence a binding contract has been formed), 
there is no reason (apart from one of certainty) why a third party should not be authorised to 
communicate the acceptance of the offer to the offeror.
54
  Even so, if we consider that an e-
agent should be regarded as an authorised third party, this may prompt more legal questions 
regarding capacity than answers.  
As stated above, capacity to contract is not restricted to the parties’ competence to 
exercise their freedom; it extends also to their ability to form the necessary intention to be 
legally bound in contract.  According to ss 10 and 13 of the Law of Contract Act, clearly 
expressed and concurring intentions of the parties establish the necessary consensus to bind 
them.  It is arguable, however, whether e-agents can validly consent to be bound in contract in 
the sense envisaged by the Act.  Reference to ‘consent’ und r the Tanzanian Law of Contract 
Act means the consent of the ‘parties’.  According to s 2(1)(a) and (b) of this Act, parties to a 
contract are the offeror and the offeree, who are referred to as persons.
55
  In view of this, one 




Because e-agents act autonomously, and, in the absence of human intervention to form 
the necessary intent to be bound by the contract, they are simply the passive tools of a 
merchant to facilitate his trade.
57
  Dahiyat argues that the action which leads to the conclusion 
of a contract through autonomous e-agents ‘does not usually arise from a conscious and 
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positive decision of such users, but it arises autonomously from the experience and cognitive 
process of their agents.’
58
  Consequently, ‘it would require a very imaginative approach to infer 
the actual and subjective consent of such users to terms of which they were completely 
unaware, or to consider that they have intended to be bound by a contract they never know 
about.’
59
  This being the case, can it be argued that e-agents are agents of the parties?  
Some authors have argued that e-agents should be considered agents of the parties.
60
  
In the first place, ‘under the objective theory of contract a party, being unaware that a 
communication was prepared by an electronic agent, should be able to rely on the objective 
manifestations of assent.’
61
  The application of the objective theory in determining existence of 
a contract was discussed in the English case of Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson,
62
 where the 
court held that existence of an agreement is ‘not determined by evidence of the subjective 
intention of each party [but] by making an objective appraisal of the exchanges between the 
parties.’
63
  Authors who consider e-agents as true agents further argue that courts should 
enforce all contracts made by e-agents if they comply with the attribution procedures 
recognised by the parties.
64
  Consequently, these authors contend that an e-agent's response to 
an offer or an acceptance is manifestation of consent.
65
   
In the second place, proponents argue that e-agents should be considered the agents of 
their principals since they are programmed by them to do exactly what the principals want 
them to do.
66
  If this view is correct, the acts of e-agents should be imputed to the acts of their 
programmer (their principal), which means the law of agency should be applied.
67
  The 
question remains, however, whether an e-agent qualifies to be an agent in the sense in which 
this concept is understood under the law of agency. 
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Tanzanian law recognises that an authorised agent can act on his principal’s behalf 
and can bind his principal by so acting.
68
  Section 134 of the Law of Contract Act defines an 
agent as ‘a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with 
third persons.’  Furthermore, s 136 provides that, ‘[as] between the principal and third persons, 
any person may become an agent; but no person who is not of the age of majority and of sound 
mind can become an agent, so as to be responsible to his principal according to the provisions 
of this Act.’  In these definitions an agent is a person in the eyes of the law.  
According to the Interpretation of Laws Act,
69
 the word ‘person’ means ‘any word or 
expression descriptive of a person and includes a public body, company, or association or body 
of persons, corporate or unincorporated.’
70
  Since entities that have been given legal personality 
are expressly mentioned in this definition it is clear that e-agents are excluded from the list.  
And the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies.  To use the words of 
Weitzenboeck, ‘those to whom the parliament has not conferred juridical life cannot be 
considered persons in the eyes of the law.’
71
  Thus, a contract concluded by an e-agent in 
Tanzania falls outside the ambit of the existing law by virtue of s 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Law of 
Contract Act.
72
   
(b) Problems Raised by E-commerce Regarding Offers: Is Marketing on a Website an 
Offer or an Invitation to Treat? 
Often consensus in contract formation is evidenced by the existence of a valid offer and 
acceptance.  The Tanzanian Law of Contract Act provides that, 'when one person signifies to 
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another his willingness to do or abstain from doing anything with a view to obtaining the assent 
of the other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal.’
73
  ‘When the person to 
whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted.’
74
  
An offer must be valid, and for it to be so, it must be a final, firm and unambiguous 
expression of a party showing the intent to be bound to the promise made to another should that 
other decide to accept it.
75
  If held to be otherwise, such expression will fall short of an offer, 
and probably be an invitation to treat.
76
  The requirement for an offer to be sufficiently clear 
and definite is long standing in case law.
77
  
An offer must also be made with intent to secure acceptance or consent of the other 
party, and, for it to be effective, it must be fully communicated to reach the party or parties for 
whom it was intended.
78
  According to the Law of Contract Act, communication of an offer is 
deemed to be made by any act or omission of the offeror by which he intends to communicate 
the offer, and which has the effect of communicating it.
79
  The significance of attaching all 
these conditions is to distinguish an offer from a mere invitation to treat. 
In Tanzania, an invitation to treat does not constitute an offer but reflects only the 
willingness of the inviting party to enter into negotiations which, if successful, will lead to 
formation of a contract.  Merchants employ various methods to entice customers or interested 
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  All these methods are intended to invite a bargain or to promote the sale of a 
particular product, but they fall short of being offers.  In contracts by tender, for instance, even 
if the tendering party fulfils all conditions to be observed and submits her tender in time, the 
only obligation which the inviting party has is that of opening and considering it alongside 
others.
83
  The one inviting the tender is in no way obliged to accept it.
84
  
Whether promotion of products on a website should be treated as creating a binding 
offer or a mere invitation to treat constitutes one of the most controversial issues in e-
commerce law.
85
  Unlike Poole, who is of the view that a website generally constitutes an 
invitation to treat,
86
  Polanski argues that it will depend on how the site is structured.
87
  In an 
online environment there are two types of merchants.  The first use their websites to offer 
goods for sale to their potential customers and the second use their websites to solicit offers.
88
 
Thus, except for minor differences, such as the extent of its reach, this latter kind of solicitation 
is no different from a normal advertisement or shop display of goods.
89
  Nevertheless, it is 
possible within the technology interface to fuse display and the actual sale on the website.  This 
may lead to problems when deciding whether what was presented to customers was an offer or 
a mere invitation to treat.
90
 
According to Durtschi et al, where the display is supported by adequate information as 
to price, mode of payment, terms and conditions of the contract, mode of delivery and mode of 
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acceptance (for instance, a click of a button), there is no reason why this should not be held to 
constitute a direct offer by the particular web-merchant.
91
  Indeed, as Stone argues, in the 
absence of problems of limited supply, such advertisements should amount to an offer.
92
  
In Chwee Kin Keong & Others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd,
93
 the Singapore High 
Court pointed out the material difference between physical goods of which stock can be limited 
and digital goods that are, at least theoretically, inexhaustible.  In view of this possibility, the 
court stated that it may be impossible to ‘bail out an Internet merchant from a bad bargain, a 
fortiori in the sale of information and probably services, as the same constraints as to 
availability and supply may not usually apply to such sales.’
94
  In this regard, the underlying 





shortage of supplies of goods on the part of the seller) does 
not apply in its fullness to the online environment unless it is for supply of physical goods.  
In view of the above discussion, an advertisement or digital image of products for sale 
on a website, depending on its wording, may constitute an offer.
96
  Even so, one would need to 
make a distinction between those merchants who use their websites for mere display of goods 
and those who structure them in such a way that they constitute an offer capable of being 
accepted to create a binding contract.
97
  Since the law in Tanzania has not accommodated 
electronic transactions, and, because no case in Tanzania has been decided on whether an 
online advertisement constitutes a valid offer or a mere invitation to treat, it is difficult to 
predict the view of the courts in Tanzania if called upon to decide such a problem.  A clear rule 
on the status of online advertisements may therefore be necessary.
98
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(c) Problems Regarding Acceptance in Certain Web-based Agreements 
(i) Lack of a Specific Act of Acceptance in Browse-wrap Agreements 
Website owners purport to regulate the use of information and services on their websites 
through end-user license agreements (EULA).
99
  Browse-wrap agreements are one such licence 
and use agreement that bind a web-user to the terms and conditions of the website upon 
browsing the web-site.  They purport to create a contract without first requiring the user to 




Web-owners may notify web-users that the latter’s use of the website, service or 
software signifies consent to its terms and conditions, (hence constituting an agreement).  The 
terms and conditions, however, may be located elsewhere far below the screen, in most cases, 
in inconspicuous small print or in another website accessed via a hyperlink.
101
  The user may 
therefore not be reasonably notified of the terms because these agreements lack an outright 
requirement of consent before users proceed with doing business as is the case with click-wrap 
agreements.  Consequently, this has exposed these agreements ‘to challenge on the grounds of 
lack of reasonable notice and bona fide assent to the browse-wrap terms.’
102
  
In the United States, for instance, courts have arrived at varied conclusions while 
searching for analogical rules from cases on shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements.
103
  Cases 
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which have dealt with browse-wrap agreements can be categorised into two groups.  The first 
represents cases which upheld the validity of consent in these agreements, while the second 
represents cases which declined to uphold its validity.  
Register.com Inc v Verio Inc
104
 and Pollstar v Gigmania Ltd
105
 are examples of cases 
from the first group, ie, they upheld the validity of a browse-wrap agreement.  In Register.com 
Inc v Verio Inc, the plaintiff (a registrar of domain names) was also an Internet service 
provider.  The Defendant was a competitor in business.  The Plaintiff, as a registrar of domain 
names, entered into an agreement with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) for it to be accredited.  The agreement required all registrars to provide an 
on-line interactive 'WHOIS' database, containing the names and contact information for 
customers who registered domain names through them.  This database was accessible freely via 
a registrar’s web page and through an independent access port.  The access channel to the 
'WHOIS' database allowed users to collect registrant contact information for one domain name 
at a time by entering the domain name into the provided search engine.  
The plaintiff’s website, through its terms and conditions, restricted those who 
submitted a 'WHOIS' query to its 'WHOIS' database from, among others things, use of its 
information for commercial purpose. The plaintiff's website stated as follows: ‘by submitting 
this query, you agree to abide by these terms.’  The defendant (Verio), using automated 
software programs, accessed the 'WHOIS' database maintained by the plaintiff, and in total 
disregard of the plaintiff’s terms of use, used the data obtained from the plaintiff’s 'WHOIS' 
database for commercial purposes.  The plaintiff sued the defendant alleging breach of contract 
which was formed when the defendant submitted a query to the plaintiff’s ‘WHOIS’ 
database.
106
   
The defendant challenged the enforceability of the plaintiff's terms of use arguing that 
the defendant was never called upon to manifest consent to those terms.  Nonetheless, the court 
held that there was a breach of contract and that there was consent to the terms.  The court 
relied on the notice that submitting the WHOIS query subjects the inquiring party to the terms 
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and conditions of use.  It held that, by doing so ‘Verio manifested its assent to be bound by 
Register.com's terms of use, and a contract was formed and subsequently breached.’
107 
 
In Pollstar v Gigmania Ltd
108
 the plaintiff, Pollstar, created and maintained a website 
from which updated concert information could be obtained.  By accessing the website, an 
Internet user could download and use the up-to-date concert information pursuant to the 
conditions of Pollstar's licence agreement.  One of the conditions prohibited using the 
information obtained from their website for commercial purposes.  Users were also warned that 
use of the website was subject to a license agreement which was set forth on the website.  
The defendant, Gigmania, downloaded concert information from Pollstar's website, 
and posted the information on its competing website.  Pollstar sued the defendant alleging inter 
alia, breach of contract.  The defendant, Gigmania contended that the breach of contract claim 
should fail since the alleged contract lacked the required element of mutual consent.
109
  In 
response Pollstar argued that all users of the concert information were bound by the license 
agreement even if the license agreement was not set forth on the homepage but on a different 
web page linked to its homepage. 
While agreeing with the defendant that users were not immediately confronted with a 
notice of the license agreement, the court held that that fact alone could not ‘dispose of 
Pollstar's breach of contract claim.’
110
  Although there was lack of express demand for consent 
in the browse-wrap agreement the court expressed its hesitation to declare the browse wrap 
agreement invalid or unenforceable.  Instead it stated that, since ‘people sometimes enter into a 
contract by using a service without first seeing the terms the browser-wrap license agreement 
may be arguably valid and enforceable.’
111
 
Under the category of cases declaring browse-wrap agreements to be invalid, the 
following two examples will be considered.  These are Ticketmaster Corp v Ticket.com Inc
112
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and Specht v Netscape Communication Corp.
113
  In the first case the plaintiff had created a 
website containing information about up-coming events, such as concerts and ball games.  
Users could access this information and buy tickets online.  The Defendant accessed and 
obtained information about the upcoming events from the plaintiff’s site and presented it in a 
different format on its own website.  From the defendant’s website, however, customers were 
directed to the interior pages of the plaintiff’s website by a hyper-link hence by-passing the 
plaintiff’s home-page.  The plaintiff sued the defendant alleging, inter alia, breach of contract.  
In response the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim. 
The plaintiff’s browse-wrap agreement had a general statement to the effect that use of 
the website binds the users to its terms and conditions.  The statement was followed by a link to 
the terms and conditions which could only be accessed in full text if the customer scrolled 
down to the bottom of the page.  The terms prohibited, among other things, deep-linking and 
copying for commercial use.  The defendant’s acts were, therefore, prohibited under those 
terms.  Nowhere, however, were the users called upon to consent to the terms.  The plaintiff, 
relying on cases that upheld the enforceability of click-wrap agreements, argued that its claim 
on breach of contract was based on the notice on its home page, which cautioned users that 
continuing past the plaintiff's home page amounted to consenting to be bound by its website's 
terms and conditions.  
Ruling in favour of the defendant, the court declined to uphold the plaintiff’s 
arguments.  It stated that it cannot be said that, by merely setting out the terms and conditions 
in the manner used by the plaintiff that necessarily creates a contract with anyone using the 
website.
114
  It therefore held that the agreement lacked the necessary consent and was hence 
unenforceable.   
In Specht v Netscape Communication Corp,
115
 the browse-wrap agreement between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants had an arbitration clause as one of its terms and conditions.  
This clause required all disputes between parties to the browse-wrap agreement to be submitted 
to an arbitrator.  The plaintiffs, who had downloaded and used software (called Smart 
Download) from the defendants' website, sued the defendants, alleging that the software was 
transmitting information about their Internet activities to the defendants, hence violating their 
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right to privacy.  The defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and subjected the 
plaintiffs to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the browse-wrap 
agreement.  The defendants’ website had, below the download page, a link with words stating: 
‘[p]lease review and agree to the terms of the Netscape ‘Smart Download’ software license 
agreement before downloading and using the software.’  These words were in fine print and not 
visible on the page without scrolling down the page.  
The issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs had consented to arbitration.  Did 
they indicate or fail to indicate their consent?  Were they given sufficient notice to do so?
116 
Although the defendants argued that the mere act of downloading the software constituted 
consent to be bound, the court was not convinced and stated that it had always been a legal 
requirement in contract that ‘assent to the formation of a contract be manifested in some way, 
by words or other conduct, if it is to be effective.’
117
  In view of this legal requirement, the 
court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, stating that a mere download could in no way present a 
clear consent to an agreement.
118
 
In view of the kind of problems that web-based agreements, especially browse-wrap 
agreements, have posed to courts, and as shown in the four cases discussed above, some 
scholars have argued that browse-wrap agreements should not be enforced.
119
  Robertson 
contends, for instance, that browse-wrap agreements affect consumers because they are against 
the basic contractual principles of notice and consent.
120
  When viewed in the light of the 
existing laws in Tanzania, the cases discussed above represent the kind of problems that courts 
may have to face in future.  So far, no case of a similar nature has been decided in Tanzania, 
though businesses and consumers encounter these agreements when downloading software 
onto their computers.
121
  Although courts may refer to the so-called ‘ticket cases’ to fill the 
existing gaps in browse-wrap agreements, a counter argument is that such cases may be useful 
in click-wrap agreements but not in browse-wrap agreements.  Clear articulation of rules to 
govern such agreements may thus be necessary.  
                                                 
116




Ibid at 595. 
119
See Gautrais (n28) 194-195. See also Robertson (n103). 
120
See Robertson (n103) 296. 
121
See J O Koyugi The Uneasy Case for Copyright Protection in Computer Programs: A challenge to the 
















(ii) Lack of Specific Act of Acceptance in Shrink-wrap Agreements 
As defined in Chapter I, shrink-wrap agreements, and other web-based contracts, are standard 
form contracts or contracts of adhesion.  Such contracts are not new to courts in Tanzania since 
they have been dealt with in the so-called ‘ticket cases’, and the mechanisms for dealing with 
such cases form part of the law in Tanzania.
122
  The legal position with regard to the so-called 
‘ticket cases’ is that terms relied upon to defend a fundamental breach will not be enforced.
123
  
Similarly, terms that are contrary to public policy will not be binding.
124
  In addition, all terms 
or clauses incorporated into such agreements with a view to exempt, exclude, or restrict 
liability or a legal duty of the stronger party can only be relied upon in his favour if they are 
reasonable, unambiguous, and were sufficiently brought to the attention of the weaker party to 
obtain his or her consent, (and which was in fact obtained).
125
  
Generally, one problem with regard to shrink-wrap agreements is that customers do 
not have sufficient time to analyse the terms and conditions governing the contract until after 
such contract has been formed and a particular product has been opened.  In view of this, can 
shrink-wrap agreements be enforceable under the law in Tanzania?  Up to now, these 
agreements have never been the subject of litigation in Tanzania.  Nevertheless, if the courts 
could be persuaded to accept that these agreements are akin to the so-called ‘ticket cases’, then 
the best response to such a question will come from case law dealing with such cases.  
The legal status of shrink-wrap agreements has been considered in case law and 
statutory provisions in certain other jurisdictions, for instance, the United States of America.
126  
As recently as the 1990s, the US courts were not prepared to enforce shrink-wrap agreements 
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for lack of consensus.
127
  It was considered that an action by ‘a user merely opening a package 
or viewing terms when starting up a software programme did not constitute express assent to 
the terms of a shrink-wrap.’
128
  
As time went by, however, some courts in the USA started to accept these agreements 
as binding on various grounds.  For instance, in one of the early leading cases on shrink-wrap 
agreements,
129
 ProCd v Zeidenberg,
130
 Zeidenberg had bought a telephone directory on CD-
ROM produced by ProCD.  Having opened the package and installed the software on his 
personal computer, Zeidenberg created a website and offered the information, originally on the 
CD, to visitors of his website for a lower price than what ProCD offered to its commercial 
customers.  This violated the shrink-wrap agreement supplied with the product, and ProCD 
filed a suit against Zeidenberg.  The court of first instance (district court)
 
held that the license 
agreement that accompanied the product was ineffectual because its terms did not appear on 
the outside of the packages.  The district court upheld Zeidenberg’s argument that placing the 
package of software on the shelf constituted an ‘offer,’ which the customer ‘accepts’ by paying 
the asking price and leaving the store with the goods.  In that way, it was held, upholding 
Zeidenberg’s argument, that a contract includes only the terms on which the parties have 
agreed, and one cannot agree to hidden terms. 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeal, that Court ruled in favour of ProCD.  
The court referred to Art 2-204(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that ‘[a] 
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including 
conduct by both parties which recognises the existence of such a contract.’  The Court held that 
the shrink-wrap agreement constituted a binding and enforceable contract.  It pointed out that 
in every box containing ProCD’s consumer product there was a declaration that the software 
comes with restrictions stated in an enclosed license.  The said license, which was encoded on 
the CD-ROM disks and also printed in the manual, also appeared on every user's screen every 
time the software ran, and would not let the user proceed without indicating acceptance. 
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The Appellate Court stated that ‘although the district judge was right to say that a 
contract can be, and often is, formed simply by paying the price and walking out of the store, 
the UCC permits contracts to be formed in other ways.  ProCD proposed such a different way, 
and without protest Zeidenberg agreed.’
131
  Moreover, it was held that according to Art 2-606 
of the UCC, which defines ‘acceptance of goods’, a buyer accepts goods under Art 2-606(1)(b) 
when, after an opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection under Art 2-
602(1).
132
  Since ProCD extended such an opportunity to the buyers should they find the 
license terms unsatisfactory, and Zeidenberg did not exercise the option to return it, his act of 
opening the package and retaining the product was also indicative of his consent.
133
  
The Appellate Court distinguished ProCd v Zeidenberg from earlier cases that 
considered shrink-wrap agreements to be invalid on the ground that they did not deal with 
consumer transactions.  The earlier cases included Step-Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse 
Technology,
134
 in which the United Sates Appellate Court held that the terms of a shrink-wrap 
agreement were not part of the parties’ sales agreement.  In another case, Arizona Retail 
Systems Inc v Software Link Inc,
135
 the US Court of Appeal stated that a shrink-wrap agreement 
would be invalid unless it obtained express consent from both parties.  In this latter case, 
however, the court found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing the 
software. 
Overall, enforceability of shrink-wrap agreements in Tanzania will depend on an 
individual court's decision on whether it will be influenced by the ‘ticket-cases’.  Even so, 
since reliance on courts to develop the law may not always be advisable, legislation may be 
needed. 
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(d) Problems regarding Time and Place of Contracting 
The nature of electronic communications makes it difficult to establish the time when such 
communications are ‘sent’ or ‘received’, and from where exactly they were sent.  Establishing 
the time and place of contracting is, however, an important issue.  Apart from resolving 
questions about when the parties’ mutual rights and obligations become effective or when title 
or risks pass from one to another,
136
 this aspect determines which law should govern the 
contract, especially if the parties are based in different jurisdictions.
137
 
Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer is governed by the expedition theory or the 
information theory, depending on the nature of communications used.  These theories and the 
rules they support have been tested in courts in response to older technologies, such as the post, 
telephone or telex.  The advent of the Internet and its application in global e-commerce, 
however, has created concerns regarding the utility of these theories. 
(i) The Information Theory 
According to s 4(2)(b) of the Law of Contract Act, communication of acceptance is complete 
as against the offeree when it comes to the knowledge of the offeror.
138
  In the same way, 
revocation of an acceptance does not become effective until the offeror knows about it.
139
 
Furthermore, once the offeree revokes her acceptance, she cannot recall her revocation.
140
  The 
offeror will only be bound after knowledge of the revocation, and this must be before she 
knows of the acceptance.
141
  
This section indicates the application of the information theory, which applies 
irrespective of whether the parties are physically before each other (inter praesentes) or where 
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they are apart (inter absentes), provided they are engaged in an instantaneous communication, 
such as telephone, or an almost instantaneous communication, such as fax or telex, a chat room 
or window messenger.
142
  The theory also applies inter absentes where a contract is concluded 
by non-instantaneous means of communication other than post, (for instance, where a letter of 
acceptance is sent by a messenger to be delivered to the offeror).
143
  In such circumstances, 
however, one must consider whether the messenger acts as an authorised agent of the offeror.  
If the messenger is authorised only to transmit the acceptance letter to the offeror, then the 
acceptance will become effective when the offeror is informed of its content.
144
 
Acceptance under the information theory is governed by the general rule - that a 
contract will be formed when acceptance is brought to the attention (knowledge) of the 
offeror.
145
  Since this rule requires knowledge of the acceptance on the part of the offeror, 
fulfilment of this requirement demands that the person concerned must read, learn, hear or take 




The information rule seeks to ensure that the offeror knows whether her acceptance 
has been received, and, if not then react immediately to clear up any misunderstanding.
147
  The 
English case of Brinkibon v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandels GmbH
148
 firmly supports this 
view.  In this case the parties entered into negotiations for the sale of a quantity of steel bars.  
While accepting the terms of the sale offered by the sellers, the buyers, an English company, 
sent a telex from London to Vienna.  The contract, however, was not performed and the buyers 
sued, claiming damages for breach of contract.  The court had to decide on the jurisdiction 
under which the contract fell on the basis of an acceptance by telex, which had been sent from 
London but received in Vienna.  
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The court concluded that the contract was not formed in London but in Vienna since 
telex constitutes a form of instantaneous communication.  Hence, the contract came into 
existence where the telex was received, not where it was sent.  The court stated that, ‘where the 
condition of simultaneity is met, and where it appears to be within the mutual intention of the 
parties that contractual exchanges should take place in this way ... it is a sound rule.’
149
  The 
court was quick to observe, however, that this notwithstanding that rule is not universal, since 
‘no universal rule can cover all such cases …. [T]hey must be resolved by reference to the 
intention of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a judgement where the 
risks should lie.’
150
  This observation indicates that the information theory is not a ‘one size fits 
all’, and, therefore, it may be inappropriate for certain situations, taking into account that 
technology is constantly changing, and these changes transform the way parties interact or their 
manner of conducting business.  
With the development of new technologies, such as the use of e-mails and SMSs, it 
becomes problematic to decide whether the information theory will apply.  Should an e-mail be 
treated in the same way as a fax or a telex?
151
  When and where can it be said to have been 
communicated?  If one regards this theory as applicable to e-mail communications, acceptance 
by e-mail will be effective only when the e-mail comes to the knowledge of the offeror (ie, 
actually read).  If so, does that not amount to putting the offeree at the mercy of a dishonest 




In view of the above questions, it is clear that s 4(2)(b) of the Tanzanian Law of 
Contract Act, (which envisages the information theory) does not offer answers.  Consequently, 
there is a gap that needs to be addressed.  
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(ii) The Expedition Theory 
The expedition theory, and its rule governing acceptance by post, was developed in England in 
1818 in Adams v Lindsell.
153
  In this case the court was called upon to resolve when exactly a 
contract was formed where parties used the postal mode of communication.  
Chitty on Contracts prescribes four possibilities under which acceptance sent by post 
could take effect.
154
  These are: (i) when it is actually communicated to the offeror,
155
 (ii) when 
it arrives at his address,
156
 (iii) when it would in the ordinary course of post have reached 
him,
157
 and, (iv) when it is posted.
158
  This final option was preferred in Adam v Lindsell.
159
  In 
English law, therefore, the general rule concerning acceptance according to the expedition 
theory is that, in the absence of a prescribed mode and where parties are not ‘to all intent and 
purposes in each other's presence’, the contract is formed when the letter of acceptance is 
posted.
160
  This rule applies only if the offeror chose to rely on the post.  If so, the contract 
becomes binding on both parties as soon as a letter of acceptance, correctly addressed and 
stamped is posted.
161
  The term ‘posted’ means, for that purpose, the letter is put in the post 
office's control and hence out of the offeree's control.
162
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Although, according to the postal rule, the offeree seems to enjoy an advantageous 
position over the offeror in the contract formation process,
164
 it also seems to deny her the 
chance to revoke her acceptance by a speedier means, such as telephone.
165
  Even so, there are 
reasons behind its wide acceptance, one of these being the need to finalise the contracting 
process.
166
  Treitel suggests that the rule was developed to ‘bring a rationale of necessity and 
predictability in contract, that is, if the contract were to come into force it can best be achieved 
on sending the acceptance.’
167
  In order to measure the effectiveness of this rule, therefore, one 
should consider its cognisance of ‘both the business convenience of the offeree and the fair 




Further rationalisation of this rule regarded the post office as an agent of the parties.
169
 
This line of thinking, however, is incorrect since a post office cannot be agents of the 
offeror.
170
  Be that as it may, a closer scrutiny of the rule from a consensualist perspective 
argues that such rationalisation defies the basic contractual notion of consensus ad idem, since 
the offeror is bound even before he realises that the offeree had accepted the offer or before the 
promises had been exchanged.
171
  This includes the situation where the letter of acceptance 
does not reach him at all.  In Fourways Travel Services (Nairobi) Ltd v Associated African 
Dock Enterprises (Kenya) Ltd,
172
 the East Africa Court of Appeal pointed out that lack of a 
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residential address in Kenya, unlike in England, was a notable problem worthy of consideration 
as to the effectiveness of applying the postal rule in a developing country like Kenya. 
In Tanzania, however, the law sets down different rules on postal communication 
from those derived from the common law.  Section 4 of the Law of Contract Act, which deals 
with the rules regarding completion of the communication of offer and acceptance, reveals this 
difference.
173
  While under the common law the general rule is that a contract is made 
immediately when the letter of acceptance, correctly addressed and stamped, is posted,
174
 s 4 of 
the Law of Contract Act provides that where an offeree posts his letter of acceptance, thus 
putting it beyond his power, the offeror is bound, but not the offeree.
175
  Nditi submits that this 
means ‘a contract has been concluded in as far as the proposer is concerned but an acceptor is 
not bound until his acceptance comes to the knowledge of the proposer.’
176
 
Consequently, whereas in Tanzania
 
the offeree can revoke his acceptance by a faster 
means before it is communicated to the offeree,
177
  English authors submit that ‘no authority 
exists under English law on whether a posted acceptance can be revoked by, say e-mail, telex 
or telephone which reaches the offeror before, or at the same time, as acceptance.’
178
  Chitty 
has submitted that under English law revocation by a speedier means will have no effect, 
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Academic discussion regarding whether a letter of acceptance is revocable under 
English law is unsettled.  Some scholars argue that it is not possible to retract (or overtake) a 
postal acceptance,
180
 while others consider it possible to do so, provided the offeror is not 
prejudiced.
181
  Stone supports the view that, once the letter of acceptance is posted, a contract is 
made, and thus a revocation is impossible, but he indicates that this general rule has been 
modified in respect of certain consumer contracts, such as those relating to consumer credit.
182
  
This is the case, for instance, where the law provides consumers with a ‘cooling-off’ period’ 
after concluding a consumer contract.
183
  In view of this, Stone argues that the traditional rule 
that an acceptance is irrevocable is no longer a hard and fast rule.
184
 
With the advent of the Internet, some authors have argued that the postal rule should 
be abandoned.
185
  Murray proposes its re-formulation or re-statement for the twenty-first 
century, focusing on the instantaneous nature of Internet communications.
186
  Although this 
reasoning may be correct, it does not apply to all Internet communications since they are not 
always instantaneous.  Certainly, it is possible under modern technology for parties to 
communicate inter praesentes.  Chat rooms and video conferencing, for instance, represent this 
scenario, and here the postal rule is not relevant.  What seems to be debatable is whether 
communication via ordinary e-mails can be construed as communication inter praesentes.  
Suppose an online merchant communicates his acceptance of a customer’s offer to 
buy by e-mail.  Is the e-mail a form of instantaneous communication?  When and where exactly 
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is the contract between the merchant and the customer formed?
187
  Is it formed immediately 
when the offeree presses the ‘send’ button on his computer or when the offeror's network 
receives the message?  Is it formed when the e-mail is downloaded and read by the offeror?  
Which rule or theory will be relied upon by the courts to determine when and where the 
contract was formed?  These issues have never been considered by courts in Tanzania and the 
Law of Contract Act does not offer an answer to them. 
Tuma & Ward argue that e-mail is an instantaneous means of communication,
188
 but, 
their position is erroneous given the process through which an e-mail may travel, the possibility 
of it being delayed in a server and the fact that not everybody accesses e-mails in real time.  In 
view of such difficulties, Chissick and Kelman have argued differently, equating e-mails with 
ordinary mail and therefore proposing the application of the postal rule to all e-mail-based 
contracts.
189
  Although this proposition may appear convincing there are clear differences 
between an e-mail and an ordinary letter.  
As discussed earlier, where parties rely on postal communication and the offeree sends 
a letter of acceptance leaving it in the post office for further transmission, the contract will arise 
immediately.
190
  Relying on existing case law, such as Bryne v Van Tienhoven
191
 or Household 
Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance,
192
 if a letter of acceptance is lost the contract will still 
be intact.  Unlike the case with lost letters, it is well known that an undelivered e-mail bounces 
back to notify the sender.  Considering this possibility, should the sender (offeree) of an e-mail 
which was not delivered, and whe e this fact has come to his knowledge, still be able to rely on 
the above case law to hold that there was a contract binding on the offeror?  
Take, for instance, a situation where the offeror’s e-mail specifies the time within 
which an acceptance must be communicated.  What will be the position if the offeree 
communicates the acceptance and goes offline without knowing that the e-mail was never 
received by the addressee within the deadline?  Should the court equate this with a situation 
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where the offeror insisted that acceptance should be made by way of post, but issued a wrong 
address, and the letter of acceptance was duly sent by the offeree using that address?  
Furthermore, what is the position if the server failed to deliver the e-mail in its completeness?  
Unlike an ordinary letter, which comes in its complete form, an e-mail may be delivered in a 
garbled form for some technical reasons or transmission problems.  
All issues raised here may well engage courts in Tanzania in the absence of statutory 
clarification since one may argue that pressing the ‘send’ button is akin to dropping a letter off 
at a post office.  The sorting and transmission is a matter beyond the sender, just as the 
electronic transmission of an e-mail is beyond the sender’s reach.
193
  
4. Problems Raised by Formality Requirements 
In Tanzania, the Law of Contract Act defines a contract as an agreement that is legally 
enforceable.
194
  Such an agreement may be oral
195
 or written, bilateral (where both parties 
exchange promises) or unilateral (where a promise is exchanged for an act).  Some contracts, 
however, may involve certain formality requirements, which must be fulfilled before a legally 
enforceable contract is created.
196
  For instance, the law governing contracts of hire purchase 
requires all contracts falling within its ambit to be in writing or to be evidenced in writing for 
them to be enforceable.
197
  Similarly, the Land Act
198
 requires certain contracts, such as 
mortgage instruments or lease agreements, to follow a prescribed form with signature and other 
formal requirements.
199
  Section 25(1)(a) of the Law of Contract Act further provides that an 
agreement made without consideration (for instance, on the basis of love and affection between 
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parties standing at near relation to each other) will only be enforceable if it is expressed in 
writing and duly registered.
200
  
Unless and until a contract meets the formality requirements, for example, until it is 
written, signed and/or registered, parties are not contractually bound.
201
  Hodgin has argued, 
however, that, where a statute requires a contract to be evidenced in writing, this does not 
necessarily mean that it must be in a special written form.
202
  A note or memorandum ‘signed 
by the party to be charged or by his agent in that behalf’ may suffice.
203
  Section 6(1) of the 
Sale of Goods Act,
204
 which contains this phrase, requires any contract for the sale of goods 
where the purchase price exceeds Tsh. 200/= to be evidenced in writing.
205
  In Leslie and 
Anderson (Nairobi) Ltd v Kassam Jivraj & Co Ltd,
206
 however, a written contract of sale that 
was signed by an agent could not be enforced because it failed to identify the principal.  The 
court was of the view that, since the writing did not contain the name or description showing 




There are two questions that need to be addressed.  The first arises when contracts, 
which must be in writing, must also be signed by the parties. The requirement of the signature 
of the maker of a particular document or a contracting party is not a novel idea.  It varies, 
however, according to the context, the nature and subject matter of the transaction, the 
communication media used and the normal practices in a market governing the particular 
industry.
208
  In certain transactions the law makes written signature mandatory.
209
  Statutes 
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concerned with disposition of land
210
 or hire purchase,
211
 for instance, have such mandatory 
requirements.  In that case, would an e-signature fulfil the signature requirement?  The second 
is whether, in the course of creating such specific contracts, parties may rely on electronic 
means such as the Internet, and whether such contracts will fulfil the writing requirement.  In 
other words, will an electronically formed contract be regarded as equal to an oral or an 
ordinary written contract under the current law in Tanzania?  
Contracting electronically is a new phenomenon in Tanzania, and issues of form 
requirements in an electronic setting have neither been tested in courts nor legislated for. 
Consequently, although there is a growing consensus internationally that contract formation 
over the Internet should follow the general rules regarding formation of contracts,
212
 this does 
not absolve e-contracting from legal difficulties,
213
 at least in the Tanzanian context.  
The two questions raised above also have further ramifications.  Although all other 
contracts may be formed orally or in writing, the parties normally memorialise their 
agreements in writing to avoid the difficulties which may be associated with oral contracts (for 
example, proving that a particular term was orally agreed upon).  Can such an exercise also be 
accomplished electronically?  The absence of specific legal provisions
 
under the existing law in 
Tanzania to govern e-contracts raises important concerns which need to be addressed in order 
to create the necessary equivalence between contracts that must be in writing and those formed 
electronically. 
5. Online Mistakes (Wrong Pricing) 
Mistakes in the contracti g scenario can either be mutual or unilateral.
214
  The law on mistakes 
in contracts is settled both in Tanzania and the common law.  Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the 
Tanzanian Law of Contract Act deal with the issue.
215
  Section 20 caters for mutual mistakes 
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that nullify the consent of the parties, and mistakes that relate to a matter of fact essential to the 
contract.  This section, read together with s 10 and 13,
216
 renders a contract, tainted with 
mutual mistakes, void.
217
  Section 22 deals with unilateral mistakes.  These are also a vitiating 
factor that goes to the formation of a contract.  Under English law it was held in Bell v Lever 
Brothers Ltd
218
 that a common mistake, which totally undermines a contract, renders it void.
219
  
Further, in Solle v Butcher
220
 it was held that a serious common mistake in contract formation, 
which nevertheless falls short of totally undermining the contract, gives the adverse party a 
right to rescind the contract.  
The use of e-agents has exacerbated the problem of unilateral mistakes.  E-agents that 
operate autonomously make it impossible at times for web merchants to detect mistakes 
occasioned by them in the course of transactions.  Several examples can be cited of the kind of 
problems that may arise.  
Ismail et al, for instance, pointed out an incident which took place in the United 
Kingdom where an e-merchant erroneously posted a £3.99 price tag for a TV set on the web 
instead of £399.00, the actual price.
221
  The computer error was discovered after selling more 
than 20,000 TV sets and the site had to be closed immediately.
222
  Leng has also noted that 
United Airlines mistakenly posted a San Francisco to Paris flight for US $24.98, and 
Staples.com offered a US $40 attache case for 1 cent.
223
   
                                                                                                                                                          
because it was caused by a mistake as to any law in force in Tanzania; but a mistake as to a law not in force in 
Tanzania has the same effect as a mistake of fact.  Section 22.Unilateral mistake. A contract is not voidable 
merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact.’ (See also ss 8 
and 60(2) of the Sale of Goods Act Cap 214 [R.E.2002]. 
216
See also s 8 of the Sale of Goods Act Cap 214 [R.E. 2002]; Leslies & Anderson Ltd v Vallabhads Kalidas & Co 
Ltd (1950) 17 EACA 30 (U). 
217
See also s 56(1) of the Law of Contract Act, Cap 345 which states that ‘[a]n agreement to do an act impossible 
in itself is void.’ [R.E.2002]. See also Sheikh Bros Ltd V Ochsner [1957] EA 86. Under s 65 of the Law of 
Contract Act, whoever had benefitted from a void contract must compensate the other party The section provides 
that ‘[w]hen an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has 
received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to 
the person agreement from whom he received it ….’ 
218
See Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161.  See also Couturier v Hastie (1856) 5 HL Cas 673 where the 
subject matter of the contract had perished. 
219
A common mistake in Contract Law is one shared by both parties to the contract.  For more analysis of this 
under the common law, see D Capper ‘Common Mistakes in Contract’ (2009) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
457. 
220
See Solle v Butcher [1950] 1KB 671. 
221
See I A Ismail & V R Kamat ‘Evaluation of legal risk for e-commerce in construction’ (2006) 132 Journal of 
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In 2001, Kodak advertised digital cameras on its website at £100 instead of £329 each.  
Many people placed orders, and in response ‘Kodak sent an automated order confirmation 
stating that £100 would be charged to the customer’s credit cards.’
224
  In the Kodak incident the 
company had to honour the orders and accept losses to the tune of several million pounds.
225
  
Had an e-agent not concluded all these transactions a natural person would have immediately 
realised the mistake.  All these incidents raise the following questions: was there a genuine 
unilateral mistake or was it negligence and irresponsibility
226
 on the part of the e-merchant?  
Was it possible for the consumers to know about the mistake?  Perhaps a court will only be 
able to address these questions having examined the nature and surrounding circumstances of 
each case since every case must be heard on its own merits. 
The Tanzanian Law of Contract Act recognises that where one party knows that the 
other is labouring under a mistake but still proceeds with the contract, the contract will be 
unenforceable for lack of true consensus ad idem.
227
  Even so, in online transactions the 
problem of establishing whether the client knew that the trader must have been at error when a 
commodity ordinarily fetching a high price is tagged at a very low price is exacerbated by the 
fact that online merchants do undertake promotional sales or stock clearances.  Indeed, 
consumers may have thought in good faith that it was a promotion or a 'clear-the-shelves' 
exercise.  In view of that possibility, consumers may not be taking advantage of the supplier’s 
mistake to unlawfully enrich themselves as one might argue.  Much will depend on how a court 
will interpret the entire scenario and the documents or process relied upon in the course of 
creating the contract. 
The law in Tanzania, however, is unclear about the effects of unilateral mistake.  A 
reading of ss 21 and 22 of the Law of Contract Act suggests that ‘a mistake as to a matter of 
law in force in Tanzania and a mistake as to a matter of fact will not render a contract 
                                                                                                                                                          
television sets at US $99.99 instead of US $1049, and received 6000 orders.  In the same year, Amazom.co.uk 
mistakenly listed HP iPAQ pocket PCs for £7.32 instead of £287.   
224




See Rae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377 (before the High Court of Australia).  See 
also Chwee Kin Keong and Others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd (n89) where the court was of the view that it is 
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the availability of any product that is being marketed.  As most web merchants have automated software 
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  According to s 21, ‘[a] contract is not voidable because it was caused by a 
mistake as to any law in force in Tanzania; but a mistake as to a law not in force in Tanzania 
has the same effect as a mistake of fact.’  Section 22 provides that ‘[a] contract is not voidable 
merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of 
fact.’   This section is in pari materia to s 22 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972.
229
  Commenting 
on s 22 of the Indian Act, Kuchhal states that where the mistake results from a party’s own 
negligence or lack of reasonable care, then such mistake should not be allowed as a defence in 
avoiding the contract.
230
  Thus, if the unilateral mistakes caused by e-agents (as discussed 
above) had taken place in Tanzania, and, if it could be established that they had arisen out of 
the e-merchants’ negligence, then the e-merchants would have incurred loss had the customers 
opted to enforce their contracts. 
Nditi suggests that s 22 might have been mistakenly drafted, wherein the word 
‘voidable’ should have read ‘void.’
231
  For the time being, there is no case that has interpreted s 
22 of the Law of Contract Act in order to establish what Nditi has suggested.  Thus, because 
this provision is not clear, there is a need to re-examine it, bearing in mind that online mistakes 
may either be occasioned by e-merchants themselves out of negligence, human error, 
programming of software errors and so forth or errors resulting from transmission problems in 
the communication systems. 
6. Problems Regarding Proof of Contract: Authentication,232 Attribution233 and 
Repudiation
234
 of Online Contracts  
Tanzania lacks an outright definition of the term ‘signature’.
235
  The Interpretation of Laws 
Act, however, contains a definition of the term ‘sign’.
236
  According to this Act, sign ‘with its 
grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes, with reference to a person who is 
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unable to write his name, “mark”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions.’
237
  
A literal reading of this definition leaves much to be desired, since it deals with only those who 
are unable to write, and hence is unclear whether those who are able to write are covered.  
Even so, according to the ordinary practice, and, if one examines other statutes where 
signatures are required, it is clear that a transaction, which is required to be in writing, will be 




The need for authentication and attribution mechanisms in online transactions cannot 
be over-emphasised.  With modern technologies, parties no longer need a face-to-face 
encounter in order to sign and exchange papers as the traditional practice would assume.
239
  In 
view of this, online transactions present the possibility of fraud and vulnerability to impostors 
and hackers.
240
  Because a contracting party may find himself entering into a contract with an 
unauthorised person, ‘attributing an electronic message for an offer or acceptance of an e-
contract to the person who purports to send it’ is a critical issue.
241
   
A party engaging in an electronic transaction needs to be sure that online data 
messages are truly attributable to or bear the true authority of the other contracting party.  An 
inability to attribute online communications between parties creates the fear that either may 
repudiate the transaction or that their communication might be hijacked and manipulated by 
hackers.  The nature of an electronic environment makes it possible to alter an electronic 
document or data very easily and discreetly.  This possibility raises the evidential question 
regarding reliability of such a document and its contents.  Unless there is a mechanism, such as 
certification processes as used in digital signatures to ensure reliability and integrity of online 
communications, certainty of online transactions becomes compromised.  Courts will likewise 
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want to be assured of the authenticity of a particular document or message,
242
 say, for instance, 
an e-mail, which a party would want to rely on as forming part of his evidence.
243
  In Tanzania, 
however, the law is silent about mechanisms to ensure this.  
Section 69 of the Law of Evidence Act in Tanzania
244
 provides for proof of the 
signature and handwriting of persons alleged to have signed or to have written a particular 
disputed document.  It provides that: ‘[i]f a document is alleged to be signed or to have been 
written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the 
document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his 
handwriting.’   
While s 69 reiterates the need to prove authenticity, it clearly reveals that it does not 
fit in the modern digital world.  At the time, when that legislation was enacted no one 
contemplated today’s technological advance. 
It is also important to note that the Law of Evidence Act still demands the best 
evidence.  This rule requires proof of documents to be made by primary evidence, which means 
production of an ‘original’ document in court for inspection.
245
  In Tanzania, admissibility of 
electronic data messages or communications and electronic records, such as computer print-
outs, and questions whether such records should be regarded as ‘original’, are issues which 
have not been answered.
246
  The need to address them was pointed out nearly ten years ago by 
the Law Reform Commission, but the country has not made significant efforts to enact 
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In 2007, pursuant to a decision of the High Court in Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd v Le 
Marsh Enterprise Ltd and Others,
248
 the Tanzanian parliament amended the Law of Evidence 
Act, with regard to the admissibility of electronic records.  These amendments, however, were 
mostly restricted to criminal proceedings.
249
  In respect of civil proceedings, they are relevant 
only with regard to banking transactions, ie, when a document in question falls under the 
definition of a ‘banker’s book’.
250
   
These recent amendments to the Law of Evidence Act are thus inadequate since they 
do not provide for mechanisms for establishing authenticity of an electronic document or 
record.  It must be borne in mind that admissibility of electronic data as evidence in any 
proceeding must be accompanied by a mechanism to ensure security, reliability and credibility 
of the electronic data in question.  No provision is made for this too under the current Law of 
Evidence Act.  Consequently, admissibility of electronic evidence in civil proceedings 
generally has not been adequately addressed.  
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7. Lack of Rules on Consumer Protection 
The term ‘consumer’ has no uniform definition.
251
  Instead, it has been conceived in both broad 
and narrow senses.
252
  Viewed broadly, consumer includes ‘any person who buys or hires 
goods or services, or any person who uses such goods or services’
253
 or ‘any person, who is 
affected by the use of goods or services, whether or not he or she bought, hired or used 
them.’
254
  The Tanzanian Fair Competition Act
255
 contains a definition that falls between the 
broad and the narrow meanings.  It defines a consumer as ‘any person who purchases or offers 
to purchase goods or services otherwise than for the purpose of resale but does not include a 
person who purchases any goods or services for the purpose of using them in the production or 
manufacture of any goods or articles for sale.’
256
   
The EC Directive on Distance Contracts opted for a narrower meaning and defines a 
consumer as ‘a natural person who is acting for purposes outside his or her trade or profession, 




The concept of consumer protection, as considered here, entails the safeguards, legal 
or otherwise, which are put in place to shield the interests of a class of people who are in an 
economically weak bargaining position.
258
  Such safeguards are designed to discourage abuse 
of the superior bargaining power by suppliers of goods and services, thereby serving as safety 
measure against unfairness between suppliers and consumers.
259
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In the online environment, businesses to consumer (B2C) contracts are occupying a 
significant portion of day-to-day e-commerce.
260
  With this increase there have been a number 
of concerns regarding consumer protection.  One of the concerns raised is the extent to which 
the existing laws have fully taken into account issues of fairness and access to justice when a 
consumer is involved in an online transaction.  Moreover, it is doubtful whether poor, 
inexperienced and unsophisticated consumers will be able fully to protect their interests in e-
contracts with suppliers.  Understandably, contractual anonymity, technological inscrutability 




Colossal problems beset consumers and accentuate the need for their effective 
protection in the wake of Internet technology and globalised markets.  According to a study 
conducted by Consumers International (CI), out of 151 items ordered online from Internet sites 
in 17 countries, one in every 10 items never arrived.
262
  Furthermore, a total of 44% of the 
contracted suppliers delivered the goods without issuing a receipt, while a total of 25% never 
indicated their physical contact addresses or phone numbers on their web sites.
263
   
As stated in Chapter I,
264
 the Tanzanian Embassy in Japan issued a press statement 
advising Tanzanians to be careful when buying cars online, because it had received several 
complaints from Tanzanians who were defrauded to a total of US$91,554.
265
 
Reports from car dealers in Japan show that some companies involved in the supply of 
used motor vehicles to developing countries in Africa, such as Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique, have warned against companies engaged in fraudulent practices. 
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For instance, a B2B Japanese car dealer company’s website (www.tradecarview.com) had the 
following information (see Table 2 below) concerning unscrupulous companies.
266
  
Table.2 Internet companies engaging in fraudulent practices.  
S
N 
Company Information Nature of Complaints Date Listed 
1
. 
Global Trading Co., Ltd 7-1-24 Ohashi-Dori 
Nakamura Kochi 787-0033. 
Telephone:+81880345050. 
President: Noriyuki Miyoshi. 
Person(s) in charge: Yuu Tamura, Jun 
Yoshida and Satoshi Kawazoe 
 No shipment after payment. 
(Reported from Kenya, 





Dragon Create.Japan Co. Ltd 702-18, simizu toyoba. 
Toyoyama-chou, Aichi City 480-0202 Japan. Tel.+81-
90-9946-7495 
Name of President: Junsho Ohe 
 Document (B/L) not received 
after shipment. 
 No response after payments 
 No shipment after payments 
Reported from Tanzania, New 




Advance next 2407 Nakasima, Kurasiki-city Okayama-
pref, Japan. Tel.+81-86-4860712 
Name of President: Koji Iwase 
Person in charge:  
Yoshihiko Sakamotonoriyuki Miyoshi 
 Clients received a different or 
damaged car. 
 No shipment after payments. 
 No response after 
payments. 





Y’s Trading 11-43, Hamacho Daitoh Osaka, 
Japan.  Tel.+81-90-2192-8359. 
Name of President: Yoshita Kamoto 
 Document (B/L) not 
received after shipment. 
 No response after payments. 




UCT Company 3-45-102 Nishi 6, Kita 40, Kita-ku, 
Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido, 001-0040 or 10-2 Inamoto, 
Miuchi, Aomori-shi, Aomori-ken.  
Tel +81-90-7513 8662.  
Name of President: Kenichiro Yoshizaki 
 After buyers transferred 
money to the seller they lost 
contact with Mr.Yoshizaki. 
Reported from South Africa). 
 
17/11/2008 
(Source: http://www.tradecarview.com (as accessed on 4/10/2009). 
The facts in Table 2 above, and those highlighted by Consumers International,
267
 
indicate the important role that governments play in protecting online consumers.
268
  Goldsmith 
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and McGregor note that, although ‘businesses favour a self-regulatory approach to buying and 
selling on the Internet’ the effectiveness of such approach is uncertain.
269
   
Nevertheless, a different approach may be necessary to regulate online activities, 
‘especially for business novices who may not have considered all the aspects of consumer 
protection’,
270
 and also due to the fact that the Internet allows the operations of businesses 
ranging from sole traders working from their homes to well-known multinational corporations.
 
Legislative protection of consumers in Tanzania is diverse, embracing both private 
and public law controls.  The Law of Contract Act,
271
 the Sale of Goods Act,
272
 the Fair 
Competition Act
273
 and the common law of torts are important means by which a consumer 
may find remedies in private law.  The Law of Contract Act was considered earlier in this 
chapter, particularly with regard to online standard form contracts, such as shrink-wrap and 
browse-wrap agreements, and its inadequacies concerning consumers were pointed out.
274
   
A limitation of the general law of contract in Tanzania, which is detrimental to 
consumers, is evident in the doctrine of privity of contract.  In terms of this doctrine a stranger 
to a contract between ‘X’ and ‘Y’ is barred from benefiting from that contract even if she might 
have furnished the necessary consideration to the promisor.
 275
  Under s 2(1)(d) of the Law of 
Contract Act, a stranger can furnish consideration but the law is silent as to whether she can 
sue on the contract.
276
  Since the law is silent, the common law position will fill the gap 
according to the Judicature and Application of Laws Act.
277
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In Tanzania the Sale of Goods Act is also deficient in protecting consumers engaging 
in e-commerce.  The Act defines a ‘buyer’ as ‘a person who buys or agrees to buy goods’.
278
  
This definition does not show whether she should be the immediate user or any other user of 
the goods so purchased.  It is also evident that the reference to ‘goods’ (with no mention of 
‘services’) reflects the time of its enactment, when tangibles rather than intangibles were 
contemplated.  This is also evident from the title ‘Sale of Goods Act’.  As many consumers are 
involved in online contracts with service providers, it is necessary to reform this law to make it 
more responsive to commercial realities. 
The Sale of Goods Act also gives effects to the doctrine of privity of contract. Hence 
an affected consumer, who is a beneficiary or a third party, (such as a child of the buyer) may 
not sue a manufacturer or supplier of a defective product in contract.
279
  In other jurisdictions, 
privity of contract is no longer a bar to such claims.
280
  The law in India, for instance, defines a 
consumer to include a person who benefits from goods bought by or services supplied to 
another person who furnished consideration for such goods, provided that the goods were not 
bought for resale or for any other commercial purpose but solely for consumption.
281
 
Because the current market economy and its socio-economic structure is far more 
complex than before, there is a need to reform the existing contractual legal framework in 
favour of consumers.
 282
  Moreover, under the Sale of Goods Act, any breach of a contract term 
that is not severable can only be treated as a breach of warranty and not as a ground for 
rejecting the goods or treating the contract as repudiated, unless there is an express or implied 
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contract term to that effect.
283
  Given recent technological advancements, the common law 




The Tanzanian Fair Competition Act
285
 has an entire part devoted to consumer 
protection.
286
  According to its preamble, this law seeks to ‘promote and protect effective 
competition in trade and commerce, and to protect consumers from unfair and misleading 
market conduct.’  Under this law, issues that are relevant to cross-border consumer contracts, 
notably, conflicts of laws, have been addressed.
287
  The Act provides that any term (or terms of 
contract incorporated by reference) that purports to exclude, restrict or modify the application 
of the provisions of the Act (specifically those seeking to protect consumers), or contract terms, 




The Fair Competition Act requires that all terms and conditions in standard form 
consumer contracts falling within the purview of the Act must be registered with the Fair 
Competition Commission in accordance with regulations made under the Act.
289
  A closer 
analysis of this Act, however, reveals that, although it was enacted after the development of the 
Internet, it does not sufficiently contemplate the protection of online consumers.  Indeed, 
although it takes into account supply of services including the provision, use or enjoyment of 
facilities for amusement, entertainment, recreation, education or instruction, there is no direct 
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mention of services offered online through websites.  The fact that the Act does not provide 
any clue why online transactions are not covered, is a serious shortcoming.  
It is also clear that the definition of the concept ‘consumer’ under this Act omits a 
third party who may have furnished consideration or is affected by goods or services ordered 
by another for consumption.
290
  Thus, similar arguments on matters of privity to contract, as 
those raised above, apply.   
From the above discussion, it is also clear that online consumers in Tanzania are not 
given the full protection they deserve.
291
  In particular, the existing legal framework do not 
provide for disclosure requirements in online transactions.  Because e-commerce is not a face-
to-face encounter, ‘timely [and] effective disclosure of important information such as terms of 
a deal is essential.’
292
  Apart from helping to minimise deception, it enables customers to make 
informed decisions before they commit themselves to a transaction.
293
  Indeed, as Sommer 




It is important to note, however, that, although disclosure of certain information 
regarding online merchants, such as their full names and physical addresses, telephone 
numbers (and other contact details), their legal status and adequate description of the kind of 
goods or services they offer is useful, it is not sufficient to guarantee consumer protection in 
online transactions.  As Table 2 above indicates, even when disclosure of such basic 
information is at hand, the information can be false, or if not false, the business concerned can 
be unscrupulous or down right fraudulent in its dealings.  While such instances do not 
undermine the importance of disclosure requirements in an online environment, they reflect the 
difficulties of protecting consumers in this era of electronic commerce, and the reason why 
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The above discussion also reveals that the existing legal framework does not 
guarantee important rights to an online consumer, such as the right to review, cancel or 
withdraw from an online contract before it is concluded with a supplier, or rights to a secure 
payment system.  Other important issues, such as privacy, protection against spam, identity 
theft or fraud in online environments, are also pertinent issues which are not covered under the 
existing law.  Discussion of the conflict of laws issues under the Fair Competition Act will be 
deferred until Chapter IV. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified problems in the current law of contract in Tanzania, which can 
potentially affect development of e-commerce in this country because they create uncertainty 
in contract.  Such problems include: 
 establishing consensus ad idem in the course of e-contracting, difficulties arising 
from use of e-agents,  
 problems regarding offers: whether marketing on a website is an offer or an 
invitation to treat, 
 establishing the time and the place where an e-contract is concluded,  
 formalities (including use of e-signatures),  
 lack of authentication mechanisms and attribution of data messages.  
In view of the above issues, the discussion in this chapter reveals that the existing law 
is inadequate to handle online transactions.  As a result, it exposes parties to an e-contract to 
unnecessary risks and uncertainty.  The current legal framework, therefore, needs to be 
reformed to accommodate modern commercial realities. 
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Lack of effective consumer protection rules is also a problem identified in this 
chapter.  Consumers have been exposed to multitude of risks in the wake of Internet 
technology and globalised markets.  Consequently, rules that are capable of addressing their 
plight in an online environment must be promulgated.  Such rules need to reflect existing 
international best practices. 
Finally, since e-commerce is a cross-border phenomenon, issues concerning conflicts 
of laws also constitute problems that demand attention.  These issues, and the necessity to 
adopt rules that effectively facilitate and promote not only online domestic but also cross-















CHAPTER THREE: E-CONTRACTS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS– THE 
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
1. Introduction 
Although the world formally seems to be ‘compartmentalised’ into independent territorial legal 
units, people interact across boundaries and perform acts which create legal relations.
1
  These 
interactions have been far more complex in the light of the Internet technology.  The advent of 
this technology has levelled the old barriers to trade and commerce,
2
 and has made the modern 
international and political boundaries more porous
3
 (though not invisible).
4
  Such boundaries 
are easily ‘crossed’ by people
5
, transactions and events.
6
  The levelling effect resulting from 
this technology has also given individuals who previously were unable to take part in the 
international markets, now to do so electronically.
7
  And, in addition, those who do so are 
sometimes unaware that they have traversed terrains outside their h me country.
8
  With such 
increased cross-border interactions, especially through e-commerce, there has been additional 
‘opportunities for the creation of difficult jurisdictional problems.’
9
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As e-commerce becomes a widely popular mode of transacting business, consumers, 
being naturally weaker parties in online contracts demand assurance that ‘they will not have to 
bear the (financial) burden of litigation in a distant forum’ when disputes with e-merchants 
arise.
10
  Furthermore, because web-sites are accessible in multiple jurisdictions, e-merchants 
are equally concerned about the risks of being dragged into multinational litigation.
11 
  The two 
scenarios create a need to reconcile and to protect the interests of all participants in e-
commerce without compromising efforts to promote its growth or the development of the 
Internet technology.  In view of this, clarity and simplicity of rules which provide 
foreseeability and certainty to cross-border online transactions have been important issues.
12
 
The current and the next chapter seek to examine conflict of laws rules in light of the Internet 
and e-commerce. 
Conflict of laws is a subject derived from situations where courts need to know which 
rules, from two or more territorially conceived systems of law, should be applied to solve a 
particular dispute.
13 
 From a global economic perspective, it ‘provides a regulatory framework 
for the facilitation of cross-border commerce’,
14
 and, protects individuals or companies from 
‘being exposed to multiple and conflicting obligations.’
15
  In addition, it is there to protect or 




There are three main issues regarding conflict of laws: (i) jurisdiction, (ii) choice of 
law, and (iii) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
17
  In this study, however, only 
the first two elements will be considered.  The third aspect (ie, recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgements) will not be considered due partly to limitations on the permissible length 
of this thesis but also to the fact that e-commerce seems to presents most problems in areas of 
jurisdiction and choice of law.  
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This chapter addresses the first issue concerning the question: which court has 
jurisdiction to determine an e-contract dispute?  It examines the effects that the Internet and 
other related technologies have had on jurisdiction, and questions whether the traditional rules 
on jurisdiction can effectively apply to the modern e-contract disputes.   
Overall, this chapter adopts a global welfare approach, arguing that since many of 
Internet-based transactions assume an inter-jurisdictional character,
18
 and because contracts 
arising out of these transactions will have a lot to do with conflict of laws,
19
 then, 
harmonisation of rules is imperative to achieve a goal of uniform decision making.
20
  It is 
submitted that harmonisation will enhance certainty and predictability of the governing 
jurisdiction and choice of law rules.
21
  It will also improve collaboration in not only the 
practice of formal law making but also that of codification of trade usage.
22
  Moreover, it will 
create ‘general consistency in substantive outcomes’ which, from the viewpoint of commercial 
law, instils a higher level of confidence in those who transact in a global market place.
23
  
In terms of its structure, the chapter is organised in three parts.  Part one sets out the 
purposes and scope of this chapter.  Part two discusses the concept of jurisdiction, the 
theoretical basis of jurisdiction rules and their challenge in the context of e-commerce.   
Part two also considers jurisdictional rules over foreign defendants from four different 
legal regimes, namely, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the USA and the European Union.  As 
Tanzania’s legal system is derived from the British colonial legacy of the common law, it, 
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therefore, follows the English conflict of laws rules.
24
  There is, however, a dearth of material 
regarding the conflict of laws in the area of contract law in Tanzania, hence, the heavy reliance 
on English precedents together with those from other countries following the common law 
tradition.  Overall, the analysis of the jurisdictional rules in part two seeks to identify which 
rules seem to fit well in the context of e-commerce, and provides a better view as to possible 
future developments.  Part three concludes the discussion in this chapter.  
2. Mapping the Jurisdictional Landscape in Light of E-commerce 
Jurisdiction is an age old legal concept.
25
  It refers to ‘the power or competency of a court when 
it is called upon to determine a dispute.’
26
  Defining jurisdiction in that way, however, makes it 
suitable for a purely domestic context.
27
  In a transnational context, it connotes different or 
wider meanings depending on where it is being used.
28
  Broadly defined, jurisdiction refers to 
‘the regulatory competence or power of a State vis-à-vis other States: the right to regulate.’
29
  
In the conflict of laws context, jurisdiction refers more specifically to the power of a court to 
adjudicate cases involving foreign elements.  Exercise of this power, when examined in the 
light of the Internet and its very habit of being ‘a respector of neither geographic nor 
jurisdictional boundaries,’
30




Ordinarily, for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a civil dispute, a nexus between the 
claim, the person or property in question and the forum is an essential requirement.
32
 
Previously, the ‘physical proximity’ of most economic activities and their ‘legal effects’ were 
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matters closely connected to a particular geographically defined area.
33
  In that sort of 
arrangement, whenever parties to a disputed transaction needed judicial attention, courts would 
find no difficulty in exercising their powers.  This, however, is not the case with the Internet, 
because it has created a web of cross-border interactions, a one-to-many contact, with the 
potential to trigger the legal machinery into action from different bases.  And, as Johnson and 
Post argue, the Internet seems ‘to undermine the relationship between legally significant 
(online) phenomena and physical location’, thus, creating problems to the traditional elements 
that define a State's geographical boundary, ie, ‘power, effects, legitimacy and notice.’
34
  
(a) Theoretical Bases of Jurisdiction 
Three theoretical bases justify states’ authority to regulate jurisdiction.  These are:  
(i) Sovereignty  
The classical doctrine of sovereignty considers each state all powerful within its political 
boundaries.  Under this doctrine the courts’ power to subject persons to legal process is 
considered a sovereign's ‘right and might’ confined within its boundaries.
35
   
Ordinarily, on the strength of the doctrine of sovereignty, courts are debarred from 
asserting jurisdiction in circumstances that amount to an interference with the internal affairs of 
other sovereign states.
36
  The nature of his restriction derives from public international law, the 
principle of sovereign equality.
37
  ‘Sovereignty demarcates the line between one nation state 
and others in an international system.’
38
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Under traditional international law ‘rules relating to jurisdiction and competence incorporate a 
notion of territoriality’,
39
 ie, law and regulation are organised on the assumption that all 
activities are geographically limited to the territory of a state.
40
  A better understanding of this 
principle can be drawn from the history of public international law by which all states are 
regarded as territorial entities.
41
  The 1648 Peace of Westphalia Treaties,
42
 which brought to an 
end the Thirty Years war, finally introduced a legal order based on individual state sovereignty 
and respect for the principle of territorial integrity.
43
  The principle of territoriality seeks ‘to 
protect the territorial integrity of a state against encroachment from others.’
44
   
Ever since, jurisdictional rules have been territorially based,
45
 and, as a general rule, a 
state's law applies throughout its territorial borders’ not elsewhere.
46
  This rule means that 
national courts can competently exercise their powers over everything situated in, and over 
every person present within their territorial borders.
47
 
The courts’ jurisdictional powers can thus be categorised as in rem or in personam.  
Jurisdiction in personam relates to the exercise of a court's power over a defendant in an inter 
partes action (that is to say, action in personam ‘designed to settle rights of the parties as 
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  Dicey and Morris define an action in personam as one ‘brought 
against a person to compel him to do a particular thing, for instance, the payment of a debt or 
damages for breach of contract or for tort, or the specific performance of contract; or to compel 
him to do something, eg, when an injunction is sought.’
49
  
In rem jurisdiction, on the other hand, relates to the power of the court over real or 
movable property located within the territory, typically, of course, land.
50
  Under the English 
law, an action in rem determines the status of the thing itself.
51
  Such actions are common in 
Admiralty courts against a ship or a cargo associated with it.
52
  Our concern in this chapter is 
primarily with jurisdiction in personam in e-contracts since actions in rem concerning such 
contracts are only rare. 
As will be elaborated upon later in this chapter, the Internet and globalisation, 
however, have destabilised the concept of territorial state and the principle of sovereignty.
53
 
(iii)Physical Presence  
This principle overlaps with that of territoriality.  Physical presence of a foreign defendant 
within a state is an age old basis for a court’s exercise of jurisdiction.   
However, establishing whether the foreign defendant has a physical presence within 
the courts’ jurisdiction when the Internet has been used as a business tool becomes far more 
intricate, posing a problem for establishing this component of the nexus required to establish 
jurisdiction. 
The following hypothetical case will demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional 
underpinnings of establishing jurisdiction, and thus jurisdictional uncertainty that ensues with 
the advant of e-commerce.   
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Andy, a computer software dealer and specialist in Madagascar operates his online 
company named 'Andy’s Compuserv', a purely virtual company.  The e-company is not 
registered but maintains an interactive website: 'http: //www.Andy/CompServ/Cons.Com' hosted 
by servers located in South Africa and in the Maldives.  From the website, buyers can buy 
various computer software programs and effect payments online by credit cards, payments 
being wired and deposited in Andy's account in Mauritius.   
Matembele, a local researcher in Tanzania comes across Andy's web page and finds an 
advertisement concerning new research software.  Matembele is interested and makes an online 
purchase after signing a click-wrap agreement while in an Internet Café in Zambia.  Two days 
after installing the programme Matembele's Lap Top, which contained four year’s of work on a 
data project worth US$ 50,000 assigned to him by the World Bank, and which was on the brink 
of final submission, was corrupted irretrievably due to the malfunctioning of the software he 
had purchased from Andy.   
Upon visiting Andy's website he found a warning and a regret note to buyers that the 
programme was discovered to be fatally defective and that they are advised to uninstall it 
immediately and replace it with an ‘approved’ version.  Matembele also found an e-mail from 
Andy in his inbox as an apology to all customers who purchased the software programme and 
the advice to uninstall the programme and replace it with the ‘approved’ version.  Jacobs in 
Australia, Dede in Brazil and Morris in Singapore suffered similar problems to Matembele’s. 
In conclusion, then, the establishment of jurisdiction, in general terms, requires a close 
connection between the defendant, the act in question and the forum.
54
  The following sections 
will demonstrate, via an analysis of the relevant law in Tanzania, England, the USA and the 
EU, that the nexus required for jurisdiction in personam may be founded on either the residence 
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A1 Exercise of Jurisdiction in Personam in Tanzania 
Jurisdiction of the courts in Tanzania is a statutory issue.
56
  For purposes of civil jurisdiction 
the relevant statutes include the Judicature and Application of Laws Act, 1961,
57
 the 
Magistrates Courts Act, 1984
58
 and the Civil Procedure Act, 1966.
59
  These enactments limit 
the jurisdiction of the courts to their localities, and within the Tanzania mainland territory
60
 to 
the exclusion of Zanzibar (which has its own laws and a separate court system).
61
  
Because Tanzania adheres to the common law legal system, its jurisdictional rules on 
the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant have also been determined by the common 
law.
62
  For instance, and as discussed in the chapter, the common law principles of natural 
justice, are an important element when courts exercise jurisdiction against a defendant in 
Tanzania.  
According to section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, courts in Tanzania have jurisdiction 
to hear all suits of a civil nature unless otherwise expressly or impliedly barred from doing so. 
Section 18 of the same Act provides that ‘every suit must be instituted in a court within the 
local limits of whose jurisdiction:’  
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time 
of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or 
personally works for gain; 
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(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of commencement 
of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works 
for gain; provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, the defendants 
who do not reside or carry on business, or personally works for gain, acquiesce in such 
institution; or  
(c) the cause of action wholly or part arises. 
(a) An Analysis of section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act 
An analysis of s 18 indicates that the close connections required for the exercise of courts’ 
jurisdiction in personam is founded on i) residence of the defendant, or ii) submission to the 
court’s jurisdiction, or iii) the place of performance. 
(i) The Concept of ‘Residence’ 
While the term ‘residence’ is not defined in the Act, it is important to note its difference from 
the concept of ‘domicile’.
63
  Although the two are regarded as connecting factors in conflict of 
laws they should not be confused.   
According to well established English cases, such as Whicker v Hume,
64
 domicile 
means a ‘permanent home’.  This concept has been defined as ‘the act of residence and the 
intention to remain there permanently.’
65
  As a matter of legal definition, every individual must 
be a domiciliary of a particular place,
66
 and no person can have more than one place of 
domicile at any one time.
67
 
By contrast, ‘residence’ is relevant where a person does not intend to stay at a place 
permanently.
68
  In IRC v Duchess of Portland,
69
 it was defined to mean physical presence ‘as 
an inhabitant.’  Physical presence, however, is less than residence, because a person may be 
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physically present in a state ‘A’ but resident in state ‘B’.
70
  Mere presence is therefore not 
sufficient: there must be some degree of permanency.
71
   
Thus, reference to where the defendant ‘actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on 
business, or personally works for gain’ in s 18, refers to residence adopted by the defendant 
voluntarily and for some purposes.  Such purposes, however, must have a certain degree of 
permanency within the jurisdiction, for instance, a known place of habitation, place of business 
or employment.  
Defendant's residence according to section 18 applies to individuals as well as 
corporate entities, even if the business may be headquartered outside the country.  The 




As s18(b) of the Tanzanian Civil Procedure Act indicates, a defendant’s –including a foreign 
defendant’s - voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction with a view to enter appearance 
to defend the case amounts to acquiescence to both the institution of a suit against him and the 
jurisdiction of the court.  A foreign defendant may acquiesce to the institution of a suit if, for 
instance, he appears to defend the case on merits or engages an agent to do so on his behalf. 
However, appearance for the purpose only of contesting the jurisdiction of the court, 
however, is not submission.
73
  Similarly, choosing a particular law to govern the parties' 
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contract does not amount to submission.
74
  In Adams and Others v Cape Industries Plc & 
Another,
75
 the court insisted that a defendant's voluntary submission or agreement to submit to 
the court must be based upon consent: '[a]n actual consent is, in principle, necessary.'
76
  
(iii)Place of Performance: ‘Where the Cause of Action Wholly or Partly 
Arises’ 
Section 18(c) of the Civil Procedure states that a Tanzanian court will have the power to 
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if the cause of action wholly or partly arose in Tanzania. 
(b) Service of the Court Process and Oder V of the Civil Procedure Act  
Although s18 provides three foundations for establishing jurisdiction in personam, under 
English common law, which also applies in Tanzania, the competency of a court to hear cases 
is closely connected to a procedural requirement that the defendant is properly served.  In fact, 
Nyng and Davies baldly state that service of the claim is the foundation of jurisdiction in 
personam,
77
 and Chissick and Kelman succinctly sum up the importance of this further factor 
by stating that the key issue is ‘whether the defendant can be physically served with a writ.’
 78
 
Generally, the purpose of service of the court process to either defendants who are 
within the jurisdiction of the court or to foreign defendants is to give them notice of pending 
suits so that they are not taken by surprise,
79
 a requirement likened to the principle of fair 
hearing.  In Alhaji Aminu Altine & Northern General Contractors Ltd v Afribank Plc, the 
Nigerian Court of Appeal once stated that, ‘where a defendant has not been served with the 
writ of summons and has no knowledge, actual or constructive, that he has been sued by a 
plaintiff, cannot be said to be aware of the existence of a suit against him.’
80
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In Tanzania, Order V of the Civil Procedure Act governs matters of service of court 
process generally.  Accordingly, where a suit has been duly instituted, the defendant may be 
summoned to appear to answer the claim on a specified day.  This summons may either be a 
‘summons to appear’ or a ‘summons to file a defence’.
81
  If a defendant is within the 
jurisdiction, according to the common law practice, the court will have automatic power over 
him provided he has been duly served.
82
   
Service to a defendant who is present within the jurisdiction is seldom a problem.
83
 
The difficult issue in respect of service of process, but relevant to conflict of laws, is when the 
defendant happens to be outside the territorial limits of the issuing court (ie, outside Tanzania). 
Procedurally, service outside the country, other than in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and 
Zambia, is governed by a procedure detailed under Order V rule 33 and it is based on the 
discretion of the court.
84
  Order V of the Civil Procedure Act also governs the mode or 
transmission of the summons to the defendants who are within
85
 and those who are outside the 
country.
86
  Order V rule 33 links to s 18(b) of the Civil Proc dure Act since this section 
indicates that, in situations other than where a foreign defendant submits to the jurisdiction of 
the court, exercise of jurisdiction over him is possible only if ‘leave of the court is given’.   
The plaintiff must, in the first place, apply ex parte for leave to serve the court process 
to the defendants outside the country before the procedure detailed in Order V rule 33 applies.  
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This is evident in the words ‘leave has been given’ in sub-rule 1(a) and (b) of rule 33.  Such 
terms appear also in section 18(b) of the Civil Procedure Act.  It therefore means that the court 
must determine whether to grant orders sought or not, and, in the course of doing so, it will 
have to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the defendant to warrant issuing a summons.  
In this regard, the court enjoys discretion to grant the application or reject it.  
The courts’ discretion needs to ‘be exercised with extreme caution and with regard in 
every case to the circumstances’
87
 because service outside the jurisdiction ‘conflicts with the 
general principles of comity between civilised nations.’
88
  A court should not unnecessarily 
‘interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the foreign country where service 
is to be effected.’
89
  This position will certainly be followed in Tanzania since service outside 
the country is not automatic but depends on the plaintiff’s application and on the judicious 
exercise of the court’s discretionary powers.
90
 
If leave of service outside Tanzania is granted, Order III rule 3(1) of the Civil 
Procedure Act provides that service on a foreign defendant may be made to his recognised 
agent if any.
91
  Such a service will be deemed effectual as if it had been served on the party in 
person, unless the court otherwise directs.
92
  The defendant may also appoint in writing any 
person within the jurisdiction to be his agent to accept service.
93
   
From the above analysis, one needs to ask whether the Tanzanian rules on jurisdiction 
can effectively handle issues arising out of Internet transactions, especially e-consumer 
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  No cases on contract law relating to the conflict of laws in Tanzania are reported, 
at least before or in the course of this study, which is some indication that Tanzanian courts 
have not been seized with jurisdictional problems involving cross-border contracts.
95
  English 
or other foreign cases will be persuasive authorities, so what follows next is an analysis of 
jurisdiction in personam in other jurisdictions, elected for the purpose of this thesis, to 
adjudicate whether these fare better in this regard.  
B1  The English Common Law Rules on Exercise of Jurisdiction over a Foreign 
Defendant  
As a general rule, - and as will become evident, the Tanzanian legislation mirror the common 
law in this regard - courts in England will exercise jurisdiction in personam on the basis of the 
following: (a) where the defendant is present in England,
96
 (b) where the defendant submits to 
the jurisdiction
97
 or (c) where the court exercises its assumed jurisdiction under the Civil 
Procedure Rules, which allows the court, upon an application made by the plaintiff, to order 
service of summons to a defendant who is outside the jurisdiction of the court.
98
  However, 
according to Dicey and Morris, the English court ‘has jurisdiction to entertain an action in 
personam if, and, only if, the defendant is served.’
99
  Deciding whether a foreign defendant 
should be subjected to the adjudicatory power of the court, however, has never been a simple 
thing,
100
 especially when he is outside England.
101
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It is, however, important to note that ‘[s]ince 1987 a series of instruments taking effect 
in English law and operating alongside the traditional rules, has radically altered the 
jurisdiction of English courts in civil and commercial matters.’
102
 
Specifically, the English rules on jurisdiction have been altered by the Brussels 
Convention (now Brussels Regulation I).
103
  Nevertheless, the English traditional rules on 
jurisdiction still apply if the EU related instrument is wholly inapplicable.
104
  In other words, 
the traditional English rules on jurisdiction are left to fill the gaps only.
105
  If, however, the 
Brussels Regulation confers jurisdiction on an English court, the service of court process may 
be made as of right, within England or outside England (provided that the appropriate 
certification of the court's jurisdiction under the Regulation is obtained).
106
  The Brussels 
Regulation I, which also applies in the UK, will be discussed later when examining the EU 
developments. 
But where the Brussels Regulation I is not applicable, generally, the foundation of 
jurisdiction in personam by an English court is service of a writ, and the English courts are 
competent to try an action in personam against a foreign defendant on three main grounds: (a) 
where there has been service of the claim to the defendant; (b) where the defendant has 




These three grounds will be analysed in greater detail, specifically with e-contracts in 
mind. 
(a) Service of the Claim on the Foreign Defendant who is in England 
A foreign defendant's presence, which makes him amenable to service of the court process, 
may result from a voluntary submission to the court or mere presence therein, even if for a 
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short duration of stay.
108
  This is the case ‘even though the cause of action has no factual 
connection with England.’
109
  The manner of service to the defendant, according to the Civil 
Procedure Rules, includes personal service, service by post, or by certain electronic means.
110
 
Authors have doubted the effectiveness of exercising jurisdiction on the basis of 
‘temporary presence’ of the defendant (sometimes referred to as tag jurisdiction) arguing that 
‘a judgment given in the action will be a brutum fulmen unless followed up by proceedings’ in 
the defendant's foreign court.
111
   
Notwithstanding their argument, and with regard to natural persons, the English Court 
of Appeal in HRH Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v Wieldenste,
112
 held that 
English courts will have jurisdiction to entertain an action in personam against any defendant 
who can be found within the jurisdiction so that service upon him can be effected.
113
  In the 
case of a corporation, it was held, in South India Shipping Corporation Ltd v Export-Import 
Bank of Korea,
114
 that, it suffices ‘only to see whether the corporation is “here” the best test 
[being] ascertain[ing] whether [its] business is carried on here and at a defined place.’
115
  In 
this regard, a place of businesses denotes a fixed and definite place.
116
 
(b) Submission of the Foreign Defendant to the Jurisdiction of the Court and 
Choice of Forum Clauses in E-Contracts 
When discussing s 18 of the Civil Procedure Act of Tanzania, it was noted that a foreign 
defendant may submit to the court’s jurisdiction by agreeing to a choice of forum clause.  In 
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some instances, and indeed in many 'shrink-wrap' or 'click-wrap' agreements, there are clauses 
designed specifically to subject any dispute between the parties to a particular forum.  Clauses 
of this sort are referred to as ‘choice of forum clauses.’
117
 
The value of such clauses in modern commerce has been commented on by a number 
of scholars.
118
  They have been called ‘Janus-headed’
119
 because, on the one hand, they endorse 
submission to the jurisdiction of the contractual forum, while on the other exclude any other 
jurisdictions.
120
  How courts treat such clauses in a discretion-based system like the common 
law is not uniform as it all depends on the nature of the clause itself. 
It is argued that courts must uphold the clauses in order to achieve certainty and 
predictability of contracts, these being the basic needs of international commerce.
121
 
Commercial interests would indeed require that the sanctity of an agreement be honoured by 
all, and the law should uphold the justified expectations of the parties to help them assess the 
risks of their venture.
122
  For his part, Taylor argues that a ‘forum selection clause presents an 
opportunity to serve both private and judicial interests of economy and efficiency.’
123
 
Despite the above support, the validity of forum selection clauses poses certain 
problems, the solution of which has never been straightforward.
124
  In most cases, the practice 
has been to rely on the law of the forum (the lex fori) to decide the question.
125
  A quick 
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solution is necessary because, once the forum is decided it might just as well apply its own law 
to determine the validity of such choice of forum or law clauses.
126 
Under the common law, a choice of forum is considered valid if consented to unless 
there are strong reasons to the contrary.
127
  Establishing consent in e-contracts, however, 
depends on the mode of acceptance, and, as argued in Chapter two, in some web-based 
contracts, such as the so-called browse-wrap agreements, consent has been problematic.  Such 




In conventional practice, consumers are used to signing contracts as evidence of their 
consent.  Although this may seem to be a common practice, not all consumers are aware of 
different legal methods of signifying the signature.  When it comes to e-contracts, for instance, 
a simple clicking or a mere browsing or even the act of downloading may be a sufficient 
indication of consent.  To an ordinary consumer, however, given the lengthy nature of terms 
and conditions in most web-based contracts, clicking a button or downloading software may 
mean no more than an ordinary online process.
129
  Nevertheless, these acts have far reaching 




Equally, e-contracting relies on the proper functioning of the technology used by the 
parties.
131
  That being the case, failure or a mistake occasioned by the system during 
transmission, or a virus in the computer programme can potentially affect the authenticity of 
the consent, and hence render a jurisdictional clause useless.
132
  The inability to localise or 
identify the nature of e-commerce transactions is also an issue that may affect a consumer's 
consent.  A jurisdictional clause in an e-contract, for instance, may generally subject a dispute 
‘to the court of the place of business [or] the place where the contract was made’ without 
                                                 
126
See Tang (n31) 135. See U Drobnig 'Substantive Validity' (1992) 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 
635. 
127
See Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Egyptian Navigation Co (‘The El Amria’) [1981] Lloyd’s Rep 119, CA.  See also 
Bishop & Lee (n118) 20. See also a recent Kenyan case of Raython Aircraft Credit Corporation vs Air Al-Faraj 
Ltd [2005] 2 KLR 47. In this case the Kenya Court of Appeal held that the courts will not disregard private 
international law on the status of law and exclusive jurisdiction clauses in international commercial agreements.  
See also T M Yeo ‘The Effective Reach of Choice of Law Agreements’ (2008) 20 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 723, 724. 
128
 See Tang (n31) 121. 
129




See Tang (n31) 137. 
132















exactly specifying the locality of that place of business or the conclusion of the contract.
133
  In 
the e-commerce scenario, these locations are not easy to establish, not only by an ordinary 
consumer but by even the courts themselves.
134
  Consequently, in the absence of clarification, a 
consumer may argue that he did not properly consent to the choice of jurisdiction clause. 
(c)  Discretion to Service outside England and Presence of the Foreign 
Defendant 
Service out of the jurisdiction is discretionary, and it is governed by the Civil Procedure 
Rules.
135
  According to Part 6 of the United Kingdom's Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), Practice 
Direction 6B, an application to the court to sanction service to a defendant outside the 




(i) the claim is made in respect of a contract where the contract – (a) was made 
within the jurisdiction; (b) was made by or through an agent trading or residing 
within the jurisdiction; (c) is governed by English law;
137
 or (d) contains a term to 








(iii) A claim is made for a declaration that no contract exists where, if the contract 
was found to exist, it would comply with the conditions set out in paragraph (6).
140
  
It would seem therefore that, provided the applicant has shown an arguable case, the 
courts will exercise their discretion.
141
 
                                                 
133




 See Rule 6.20 of the Civil Procedure rules, previously Order 11, rule 1(1) of the Rules of Supreme Court.  
136
Other grounds generally include showing that each pleaded claim falls within the letter and spirit of one or more 
paragraphs of rule 6.20 (see Mercedes-Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] 1A C 284, 286 (PC); England being the proper 
place (see the CPR, rule 6.21 (2A), and there being reasonable prospects of success on merits (CPR, rule 6.21 
(1)(b). All these need to be distinctly established. 
137
See Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] A C 50; Bank of Baroda v Vysya Bank 
Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd's Report 87; Chevron International Oil Co v A/S Sea Team (The TS Havprins) [1983] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 356. 
138




See Rule 6 B para 3.1 (7). 
140















B2 The Appropriate Forum Tests 
(a) Forum Conveniens and E-contracting 
Notwithstanding this discretionary power, English courts will not in principle permit service 
outside unless convinced that England is the forum conveniens.
142
  Similarly, where the matter 
involves foreign immovable property, taxation, rights or liabilities arising under a foreign penal 
law or where the same case is pending in a foreign court (lis albi pendens),
143
 the court will 




Lord Goff, in Spiliada Maritime Co v Cansulex Ltd,
145
 summarised the factors to be 
observed when a court wants to ascertain whether it is an appropriate forum.  These include 
convenience or expense (such as availability of witnesses), but also factors such as the 
governing law relevant to transactions and the places where the parties reside or carry out 
business.
146
  Four issues need to be considered under the appropriate forum test: (i) the 
personal connections of the parties (for instance their habitual residence or domicile), (ii) the 
factual connections (as between the event and the particular court), (iii) the applicable law, and 
(iv) the choice of forum agreement (if any).
147
 
In practice, the appropriate forum test, viewed in the light of e-contracting between an 
ordinary consumer and an e-company, seems to favour e-companies rather than e-
consumers,
148
  because e-companies have the potential to ‘control the location of some 
factors.’
149
  For instance, an e-company may selectively locate its website or its e-agents or 
servers in a location that is favourable to its interests.
150
  It may also choose how the contract is 
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concluded, the manner of performance, and, of course, it may unilaterally insert a jurisdiction 
clause into such a contract with little regard to the convenience of the consumers.
151
  The effect 
of all these possibilities is that the e-company will enjoy a better chance of bringing 
proceedings in the most convenient jurisdiction.
152
  
The difficulty in an e-commerce context, and for the purpose of service of a summons, 
comes where an e-company, for instance, a Japanese car exporting company, is registered in 
Japan or China or elsewhere, but its website is accessible in the jurisdiction of another country, 
let us say in England or in Tanzania.  Equally, the e-company, though not registered, let us say, 
in England or Tanzania, may have its servers hosted there.  Dicey and Morris argue that a 
foreign corporation carrying on business in England but without having complied with the 
registration requirements of a person authorised to accept service may be served at its place of 
business within the jurisdiction.
153
  This was the position at common law, and in South India 
Shipping Corp Ltd v Export-Import Bank of Korea,
154
 the foreign bank was held to be duly 
served even if it did not conclude any banking transaction in England but had only some 
facilitating external and preliminary undertakings with other banks.  
None of the above addresses the jurisdictional problem that a purely e-company may 
experience.  One interesting question, for instance, is whether a web server accessed in a 
particular jurisdiction should be regarded as constituting a ‘place of business’ in that 
jurisdiction.  If the e-company is not registered in England, but has its servers located there, 
should these servers be regarded as its place of business or its agent?  Although this issue is 
vital it remains unclear whether an e-agent or a server should be regarded as a place of 
business, a branch, or other establishment.
155
 
Earlier suggestions indicated that, in the case where a foreign company physically sets 
up a web server in a country and directs its activities to customers in that particular country, its 
servers might constitute a ‘place of business’.
156
  Indeed, it has been suggested that servers 
should be considered as ancillary branches of a registered e-company, although their degree of 
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  This 
position finds support from Catchpole, who considers servers to be equipment with physical 
location.
159
  He argues that, if one combines the server with other websites' software, which 




Whereas a server may fall within the definition of what constitutes a company's 
branch or an agency (which definition even so befits the physical world),
161
 Catchpole 
contends that, viewed on the user's computer, e-commerce websites cannot sufficiently create a 
virtual branch.
162
  He submits that an ‘e-commerce operator may have neither premises nor 
staff within the jurisdiction and the user's computer is only used temporarily.’
163
  Arguably, 
however, the fear has been that the ‘web server as place of business rule’ will create 
‘inconsistencies and, in some cases, might undermine the ability of the courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over companies [with] web servers elsewhere.’
164
 
Chissick and Kelman argue that, because e-companies ‘place their web-servers all 
over the world … the physical location of the web-servers has nothing to do with, and is 
‘completely irrelevant to the contract being formed.’
165
  Taking the cue from this view, a 
website operator who permits his website to be accessed in a particular jurisdiction would be 
deemed to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts wherever the website is accessed.  This is an 
arguable issue, although the authors consider that it is impractical to regulate web transactions 
in this way, and ‘a State [should] not regulate web transactions based solely on the local 
accessibility of the website.’
166
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From the above analysis of the common law approach it is clear that establishing a 
place of business of an e-company or the status of its server are difficult issues.  Reliance on 
some previous court decisions, such as Adams v Cape Industries,
167
 which lay emphasis on 
degree of permanence, does not help much since these decisions conflict.
168
  For instance, some 
hold that 'establishing a place of business' is different from 'carrying on business',
169
  the former 
meaning that ‘place of business should be a local habitation.’
170
  It is acknowledged that, 
according to the existing common law authorities, although a summons may be served to a 
defendant's place of business, what constitutes ‘place of business’ being a question of fact, 
there have been wide and flexible interpretations.
171
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, establishing sufficient connections is important if a 
court is to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.  Thus, considering the extraterritorial 
nature of the Internet, it has been contended that courts have to determine what types of 
Internet activity create sufficient contacts within a forum to justify ‘asserting jurisdiction over a 
defendant.’
172
  Some authors have argued that a server can be a place of business of an e-
merchant's website ‘if it is rented by the website owner or it is relocated in a country only for a 
couple of months.'
173
  Furthermore, if the server is held to constitute a place of business in line 
with the English requirements, the courts will be able to exercise jurisdiction based on the 
‘presence’ of the defendant.
174
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The analysis in Adams v Cape Industries,
175
 however, does not clearly establish a 
solution for what ‘presence’ should mean with regards to websites because the Internet knows 
no boundary and how its servers should be treated is unsettled.  It is also important to note that 
in England service of summons outside the jurisdiction is conditional.  In a contracting 
scenario, it will depend on whether: the contract was made in the forum or by agent trading or 
residing there; it is governed by English law, or has a choice of law or jurisdiction clause 
choosing England;
176
 or the breach of contract took place in England.
177
  These grounds 
constitute key connecting factors between the contract and the forum, although establishing 
some of them (for instance, the place where a contract was made) may be problematic in e-
commerce. 
(b) Forum (non) Conveniens and Forum Shopping 
Even if a court has jurisdiction, it may refuse to exercise it, and stay the proceedings upon an 
application by the defendant proving that the forum is inappropriate.
178
  This is the forum (non) 
conveniens rule.   
Forum shopping and forum (non) conveniens are related notions in conflict of laws.  
The former has been defined as a ‘lawyer's act of seeking the forum that is most beneficial to 
his client's interest.’
179
  The act of forum shopping, however, is a debatable evil, especially 
during an era when commerce occurs in a ‘global village’ and parties aspire to greater 
freedom.
180
  Those who support it feel that it should be upheld, unless there are ‘egregious 
circumstances,’ as where a suit is filed in a remote forum that lacks ‘connection to the issues 
involved in the law suit.’
181
  Opponents of this view argue that it is unfair to the defendant, as it 
gives more benefits to the plaintiff and creates uncertainty and increases litigation costs.
182
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While one may question the wisdom of allowing the plaintiff to enjoy the freedom to 
‘shop for’ the best remedy,
183
 the forum (non) conveniens doctrine acts as a shield in favour of 
the defendant.  This doctrine is considered a defence against a forum that is available to the 
claimant, but which, in the specific circumstances of the case, is not appropriate.
184
  It entitles a 
defendant to request the forum to refrain from hearing a matter because a distinctly more 
appropriate forum exists elsewhere.
185
  Whether the forum will grant a stay of the proceedings 
or not depends on exercise of its own discretion.
186
  
Earlier, according to St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd,
187
 the 
defendant had to prove that ‘continuance of the action would work an injustice because it 
would be oppressive or vexatious or would be an abuse of the process of the court in some 
other way.’
188
  In addition, he was required to prove that a stay would not cause an injustice to 
the plaintiff.
189
  These conditions were later modified in The Atlantic Star v Bona Spes,
190
 
where it was held that a stay would be granted if continuance of the proceedings would, ‘in a 




Application of forum (non) conveniens was well settled in Scottish law and in the US 
Courts before being accepted in the English law.
192
  Under the English law, although The 
Atlantic Star v Bona Spes
193
 was the first case to consider the doctrine, it was given a firm and 
unequivocal acceptance in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Canusulex Ltd.
194
  In this case, which 
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stands as a leading authority,
195
 Lord Goff held that, the defendant may apply to the court for a 
stay of the proceedings, and the court, on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
may exercise its discretion to stay such proceedings.
196
  The court stated, however, that there 
must be ‘some other tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried 
more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.’
197
  The acceptance 
of this doctrine in England also opened doors for its application in other countries, which in 
one way or another follow the common law tradition.
198
 
In East Africa, for instance, its application can be observed in American Express 
International Banking Corporation v Atul.
199
  This case involved a foreign company with most 
of its operations in Singapore.  The respondent, a resident in Singapore, had guaranteed 
repayment of a loan advanced to a company.  At the time of the suit, however, he was residing 
in Uganda.  Due to a default in repayment of the loan, a suit was filed in Uganda against the 
respondent.  The respondent challenged the action on the ground that the proper forum was not 
Uganda but Singapore.  On appeal by the appellant, the court held, inter alia, that, for a 
defendant to succeed, he must satisfy the Court that there was another forum to whose 
jurisdiction he was amenable, and in which justice could be done between the parties at 
substantially less convenience or expense.  Moreover, he had to show that the stay did not 
deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate, personal or jurisdictional advantage, which would be 
available to him if he invoked the jurisdiction of the Court in Uganda. 
(c) The Ends of Justice Test 
The appropriate forum test, however, is not the only one which a court can rely upon in finding 
whether a jurisdiction is the forum conveniens.  Courts in England also consider the ends of 
justice, an approach which seems to be basically a test of public policy.
200
  Thus, in case of 
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service outside the jurisdiction, the court may be persuaded to grant an order to serve the 
defendant if the judicial path of a foreign forum (which may be the appropriate forum) is not 
free from external interference or where the forum lacks competence to handle the dispute.
201
 
Similarly, where a plaintiff is likely to suffer prejudice due to lack of security
202
 or 
discrimination, which will deny him a fair trial, the court may, on the basis of the justice test, 
decide to issue service of a writ outside, even if it is not itself an appropriate forum.
203
  It is 
however argued that this kind of approach may not fully guarantee the necessary protection to 
e-consumers, since what they ‘worry about is the possibility of access to justice, which would 
be hampered by their weaker financial power.’
204
 
B3  Concluding Assessment of the English Law of Jurisdiction and Cross-border E-
contracts 
In conclusion, as regards jurisdiction under English law, one may state that certain rules 
forming the basis of the courts’ competence, such as the principle of presence, do not measure 
up to the current developments because they are territorial in conception.  In Carrick v 
Hankock,
205
 it was stated that: 
‘the jurisdiction of a court was based upon the principle of territorial dominion, 
and that all persons within any territorial dominion owe their allegiance to its 
sovereign power and obedience to all its laws and to the lawful jurisdiction of 
its courts.’
 206
   
Be that as it may, as indicated earlier in this chapter, establishing the ‘presence’ of a 
web merchant is a difficult issue since websites are accessible in all jurisdictions at a time.  In 
essence, the Internet defies jurisdictional or political boundaries, and hence it is difficult for 
states, for instance, to assert jurisdiction over a purely e-based company, merely because its 
website is accessible in their jurisdiction. 
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Because of the nature of e-commerce and the difficulties it poses when locating the 
proper jurisdiction for a particular transaction, the common law approach (which includes the 
traditional appropriate forum test and the non-biased justice test) ‘is insufficient to provide 
certainty and fairness to e-consumer contracts.’
207
  Similarly, the traditional close and 
substantial connection analysis is no longer effective.
208
  These approaches need to be updated 
by taking into account ‘only factors that affect the substantial interests of the parties as well as 
the material efficiency of the proceedings.’
209
 
It may also be argued that the appropriate forum test is inappropriate for e-commerce 
because e-commerce involves different and new techniques of transacting business.
210
  Even if 
one should rely on the traditional rules, such as the postal rule, to determine grounds that will 
entitle a court to assert jurisdiction, in the e-commerce scenario, the exercise may be 
complicated, and separation between the postal rule and information rule leads to inconsistent 
and sometimes unpredictable results.
211
  This difficulty largely rests on the means of 
communication used by the parties.
212
 
It is also obvious that, since most e-commerce contracts are unilaterally drawn up, 
businesses have the opportunity to insert terms or conditions most favourable to their 
interests,
213
 including a choice of the most favourable forum and its applicable law.  The 
burden is then on the other party, the consumer, to prove that he did not consent to the 
choices.
214
  Furthermore, regarding the validity of choice of forum clauses, the common law 
approach, which rests on consent of the parties in order to hold a choice of forum clause valid, 
is subject to criticism for being unrealistic in an e-commerce scenario.  Given the lengthy 
nature of the terms and conditions in most e-contracts, it is common practice that consumers do 
not read everything before indicating acceptance.
215
 
The common law approach is also considered uncertain as it contains different 
methods to decide the enforceability of such clauses.
216
  Consumers who participate in e-
                                                 
207

































commerce need protection not only as weaker parties but also the assurance that they will not 
have to bear the financial burden of litigating in a foreign country.
217
  Such assurance, 
however, is not clear with the common law approach.
218
  It neither provides for 'specific 
concerns for consumer protection'
219




C1 The US Approach to Jurisdiction in Personam and its Bases  
The existence of many companies in the USA that rely on the Internet technology has perhaps 
made litigation involving the Internet more prevalent.
221
  And, many US businesses have 
continued to widen their online presence worldwide, thus making them accessible anywhere 
around the globe.  Whether or not such e-companies should be subjected to the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts, where their websites are accessed, has been a debatable issue in the US courts.  
Since the early 1990s, American courts have been called upon to decide issues 
regarding the Internet and personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
222
  A clear policy was 
not developed, although some of the judges who presided over Internet cases held that 
subjecting a foreign defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, because its website was accessed 
in the forum, was undesirable.
223
 
As in many other countries, jurisdiction in personam in the USA ‘rests on the doctrine 
of actor sequitur forum rei.’
224
  Several classical bases for in personam jurisdiction (recognised 
also by the common law) exist and continue in effect today.
225
  These include ‘in-state service 
of individual defendant, voluntary appearance, and consent – as well as those based upon the 
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The contemporary law in the USA regarding the exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant, however, has its roots in International Shoe Co v Washington,
227
 
which revised an earlier case of Pennoyer v Neff.
228
  The latter case held that ‘in-state service 
was a fundamental prerequisite to a state court’s jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.’
229
  
It was further suggested that ‘such was not only the product of the international public law 
limitations on state sovereignty but also a requirement of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.’
230
  The Supreme Court in the former case, however, set ‘aside the 
“presence” test as a meaningful determinant of corporate jurisdiction’
231
 in favour of an 
assessment ‘whether the exercise of jurisdiction was fair, given the nature and quality of the 
defendant's forum activities and their relationship to the dispute.’
232
 
In view of the above developments in International Shoe Co v Washington,
233
 exercise 
of in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants is currently possible if two 
requirements are fulfilled: first, statutory satisfaction, notably, a long-arm statute, which refers 
to a law that allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, provided that 
the latter has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum; and second, ensuring that the 
statutory assertion of jurisdiction accords with the constitutional due process requirement.
234
 
While courts have continued to regard the due process clause as core to the exercise of 
in personam jurisdiction,
235
 clause requirements have been refined.  Currently, the due process 
requirement is based on ‘purposive availment’ of the defendant, ie, the defendant has 
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deliberately established minimum contacts with the forum.
236
  In addition, exercise of in 
personam jurisdiction is required to be reasonable, meaning that it must not violate the 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’
237
 
Overall, exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in the USA can 
be discussed as either ‘general’ or ‘specific’. 
(a) General Jurisdiction 
The concept of general jurisdiction refers to ‘assertions of territorial jurisdiction that do not 
depend upon the character of the dispute between the parties.’
238
  Like the ‘predominantly 
general’ common law bases of jurisdiction, this type of jurisdiction is also general ‘in the sense 
that it applies generally [and] independent of the nature of the dispute between the parties.’
 239
  
In other words, it permits the exercise of the court’s powers over a foreign defendant even if 
the cause of action has no connection to the forum.
240
  The only important thing is that the 
foreign defendant’s contacts with the forum are of such a pervasive and extensive nature that 
these contacts must have made him expect to be subject to suit in the forum, and without, 
however, causing him to suffer any inconvenience from defending the suit there.
241
 
To be able to establish the amount of the defendant’s activities needed to satisfy the 
substantial, systemic and continuous test in e-contracts, however, may be a too rigorous 
demand.
242
  Indeed, Scoles et al consider the ‘continuous and systematic contacts’ test to be 
‘[t]he most analytically difficult issue.’
243
  If analysed in terms of contact between an e-
company and the state, contacts could be established either ‘through the servers or through 
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  As discussed earlier in this chapter, however, e-companies pose a 
jurisdictional problem because they have no 'place of business' in the real sense, and rely on the 
Internet servers hosted in different countries.  If an e-company simply chose to locate its 
website in a particular state, such act alone may not satisfy the substantial, systemic and 
continuous requirements of general jurisdiction.
245
  As such, ‘a State [should] not regulate web 
transactions based solely on the local accessibility of the website.’
246
 
Indeed, courts in the USA have held that mere access alone may not be a solid ground 
upon which to found general jurisdiction.  In Millennium Enterprises v Millennium Music,
247
 
the court refused to exercise general jurisdiction based on the mere access of an Internet 
website in the forum, holding that it was unaware of a case in which a courts ever did so.  A 
similar approach was taken in ESAB Group Inc v Centricut LLC,
248
 where the court, in South 
Carolina, declined to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation merely because it 
had been maintaining a web page and sold products that infringed the plaintiff's patent.  Even 
so, as it will be seen later, not all courts have taken such an approach and some have developed 
new tests. 
In view of the above discussion, whether the ‘systemic and continuous contact’ 
requirements under general jurisdiction are to be satisfied or measured by a significant period 
of time through which a website is accessible in a forum, or through the number of people who 
access it, or whether the number of contracts concluded should be taken into account, are issues 
that may be difficult to answer.
249
  Overall, it is difficult to establish general jurisdiction over 
internet connections.  For that reason, it has been argued that ‘general jurisdiction cannot play 
an important role in e-commerce.’
250
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(b) Specific Jurisdiction 
Specific jurisdiction on the other hand, refers to the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant’s 
obligations arising ‘out of or related to the defendant’s contracts with the forum.’
251
  This type 
of jurisdiction can be invoked when the foreign defendant's contacts within the forum state are 
the source of the dispute at hand.  Such a source, for instance, may be a breach of contract or 
other ‘single act, such as a tortious act committed by a foreign defendant in the forum state.’
252
  
In view of this, exercise of specific jurisdiction is dispute-specific because it is limited to the 
cause of action resulting from the defendant's contacts with the forum.
253
 
Two factors determine whether specific jurisdiction exists or not, namely, ‘whether 
the contacts are “related” to the dispute’ and, if so, ‘whether the contacts are “constitutionally 
sufficient”.’
254




As regards whether the contacts are ‘constitutionally sufficient’, the matter turns on 
the understanding of the minimum contacts test, as demanded by International Shoe v 
Washington (discussed above).  Courts in the US have consistently held that ‘the sine qua non 
of specific jurisdiction is the defendant’s “purposive availment” of the benefits and the 
protections of the forum.’
256
  In Word-wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson,
257
 for instance, it 
was stated that, where the claim in question arose from the defendant's contacts with the forum 
state, the court still has to evaluate the constitutionality of specific jurisdiction in two steps: (i) 
whether the foreign defendant acted in such a way that he purposefully availed himself of the 
privileges of conducting activities within the forum state,
258
 and (ii) whether jurisdiction over 
the defendant would be reasonable.
259
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In exercising specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, such defendant must, 
through his conduct with respect to the forum, anticipate the possibility of being sued in that 
forum.  In other words, ‘th[e] ‘purposive availment’ requires that the defendant has not only 




When considered in light of the Internet development, it is clear that the US courts 
have not been in full agreement about specific in personam jurisdiction.  Some have been 
unwilling to accept the mere accessibility of a website as a ‘minimum contact’ sufficient to 
establish specific in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
261
  This approach is 
supported by authors who argue that ‘it is unlikely that the existence of a defendant's website, 




Nevertheless, several cases have emerged, involving various claims ranging from torts 
and breach of contracts
263
 to intellectual property infringem nts,
264
 and, where they involve 
websites accessed in a forum state, specific in personam jurisdiction has been an intricate 
issue.
265
  Consequently, in contract cases, to be able to subject a defendant to the specific 
jurisdiction of the court, the entire course of the dealing, including ‘prior negotiation and 
contemplated future consequences’ which establish that the defendant had ‘purposefully 
established minimum contacts with the forum’, will need to be examined.
266
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C2 Innovative Approaches to Establish ‘Purposive Availment’ in Specific in Personam 
Jurisdiction 
Building on the existing principles and tests, courts in the USA have developed different 
approaches to wrestle with the problem of establishing specific in personam jurisdiction 
regarding online activities.
267
  Such innovative approaches represent not only the attempts to 
address the dilemma concerning ‘what constitutes the ‘purposive availment’ of business 
through establishing a website’ but also the efforts of courts to exercise discretion in order to 
bolster confidence in e-commerce.
268
  They include the (a) ‘effects’ test as applied in Calder v 
Jones,
269
 (b) the 'targeting test' as applied in Bancroft & Masters Inc v Augusta Nat’l Inc,
270
 and 




(a) The Effects Approach  
The ‘effects approach’ adopts a theory of objective territoriality.
272
  It applies in cases where an 
action takes place outside the territory of the forum state, but its primary effects are felt within 
the forum state.
273
  The test, therefore, determines the competence of a forum through an 
analysis of where the actual effects occurred.  Three important things need to be established: (i) 
that the defendant's action was intentional, (ii) that the action was expressly aimed at the 
particular state, and (iii) that it caused harm in that state.
274
  
The effects test in Calder v Jones (and the case in general) was not about an e-
contract.  The court said nothing as to whether the test applied to contracts.  Indeed, some cases 
have ruled out the applicability of this test to contractual obligations arguing that it is better 
suited to tortious claims,
275
 although this has never been a rule of thumb.
276
  Tang, however, is 
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of the opinion that the test could apply also to contract, by asking whether the defendant's 




(b) Subjective Availment (Target) Approach 
The subjective availment approach is used when a foreign defendant deliberately targeted the 
forum in question.  It focuses on the subjective purpose of the business rather than its 
‘objective purpose shown on the website.’
278
  For instance, if 'S' company (in State 'X') sells its 
product on auction on eBay, and 'B' buys them while in another state 'Y', 'S' cannot be said to 
have 'purposefully availed' itself of the privileges of doing business in 'B's forum state ('Y') 
because the aim of an auction was to fetch the highest bidder.
279
  In Winfield Collection v 
MacCauley
280
 it was held that the choice of the buyer is beyond the control of the seller.
281
 
Even if eBay was ‘an active website,’ the court has to evaluate whether the seller deliberately 
targeted the individual buyers in particular states.
282
 
Similarly, it has been argued that, ‘mere placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without doing anything more, is not an act of the ‘‘defendant purposefully 
directed’’ towards the forum state.’
283
  Certain acts, such as advertising or marketing in the 
forum state, may fulfil the deliberate availment requirement although one has to ‘establish 
proof that the defendant inclined to serve the particular market.’
284
 
(c) The Sliding Scale approach 
Earlier, courts in the USA had established that in order to assert personal jurisdiction of the 




In the course of examining the traditional requirements for exercise of jurisdiction 
over the defendant, the court in Zippo Manufacturing Company v Zippo Dot Com Inc,
286
 stated 
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that, where the general rule of jurisdiction does not apply, a court may resort to the application 
of specific in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
287
  Such application, however, 
must be on activities related to the forum and the relationship between the defendant and the 
forum must be within the framework of 'minimum contacts’ as established in International 
Shoe Co v Washington.
288
  In this regard, the court determined the exercise of jurisdiction in 
the Internet related cases on the basis of ‘the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the 
exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.’
289
  In so doing, it introduced a sliding 




Lanza has summed up eleven factors that frame the sliding scale analysis.
291
  These 
are (a) whether the defendant makes sales in the jurisdiction; (b) whether the defendant 
maintains a toll-free telephone number that is advertised on the web site and is accessible from 
the jurisdiction; (c) whether the website includes a disclaimer as to the areas in which the 
defendant will sell merchandise; (d) the level of interactivity permitted by the website; (e) 
whether the website permits a visitor to the site to sign up for an interactive 'mailing list' with 
information about the defendant's products or services; (f) whether the website provides 
information about the defendant's specific commercial activities in the forum in which it is 
sought to be sued; (g) whether there have been interactions or sales through the website with 
residents of the forum in which the action is brought; (h) the likely market for the products or 
services being sold; (i) the market that the website itself explicitly or implicitly indicates it is 
targeting; (j) whether the website permits orders to be placed on-line; and (k) whether the 
defendant has otherwise marketed its services in the jurisdiction. 
While emphasising the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
whose activities were interactive in the forum, the court stated further that, the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction may also be proper ‘if the defendant enters into contracts with residents of 
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a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files 
over the Internet.’
292
   
By contrast, if the defendant has merely posted information on his Website accessible 
to users in other jurisdictions, such web service is passive and ‘does little more than make 
information available to those who are interested in it.’
293
  Consequently, its accessibility 
cannot be a ground for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 
294
  The court noted, however, 
that Zippo’s case involved ‘doing business over the Internet.’
295
  For that reason, if a non-
resident defendant consciously choses to transact business with the residents of a forum state, it 
presupposes that he has clear notice that he is subject to suit there.
296
  In other words, the 
defendant voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
297
 
Although the sliding scale approach has been followed in a number of cases,
298
 it has 
not been universally accepted.
299
  In Howard v Missouri Bone and Joint Centre Inc,
300
 the test 
was rejected, and the court held that the defendant had done nothing more than advertise and 
solicit business in Illinois, conduct which, in and of itself, was insufficient to give rise to 
personal jurisdiction.  It was stated further that the sliding scale approach in Zippo’s case was 
arbitrary and Zippo’s web page’s level of interactivity is irrelevant.
301
  The court observed that 
there was no a striking difference between an interactive website and telephone or mail 
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C3 ‘Purposive Availment’ and E-commerce 
Overall, the US approach on 'purposeful availment' and the various tests that have been 
developed to suit to e-commerce have not all been unreservedly accepted, although some, for 
instance, the target approach, have proved more popular.
303
  The courts have shown, however, 
varying degrees of preference. 
A close examination of the existing tests reveals that, when they are applied to e-
consumer contracts, they focus on the seller's purpose.  None of them took into account the 
intention and expectations of the buyer.
304
  Consequently, the tests could only be used where a 
court wanted to decide whether an e-company's online activities with a consumer in another 
state ‘purposefully availed it of the benefits of the consumer's home which gives the State 
personal jurisdiction over the business.’
305
  The same, however, cannot be used where an e-
company wants to sue a consumer.  This could perhaps be the reason why most US e-
merchants trading with consumers ‘routinely include an arbitration or a choice-of-forum term 
in their standard form contracts to limit their exposure to litigation in remote forums, class 
action lawsuits, and punitive damage awards.’
306
 
C4  Concluding Comments on Jurisdiction in Personam regarding Foreign Defendants 
In conclusion, it is clear that courts in the USA have had opportunity to tackle important issues 
regarding exercise of in personam jurisdiction over foreign defendants.  While the traditional 
bases upon which a court may exercise jurisdiction in personam over a foreign defendant still 
apply,
307
 the more contemporary approach is based on the ‘minimum contacts’ test – a test 
based on the satisfaction of the Due Process Clause –, and the ‘purposive availment’ of the 
defendant.  These tests are rooted in the International Shoe case.
308
  From this case two types 
of jurisdiction in personam –to which the minimum contacts and the purposive availment tests 
apply– have been developed: the general jurisdiction (which rely on systemic and continuous 
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contacts of the foreign defendant with the forum) and specific jurisdiction (which rely on 
purposive availment of the foreign defendant).
309
  
With the development of the Internet and e-commerce, a new, but challenging 
dimension has been added to the difficulties regarding the exercising of the powers of courts 
over a foreign defendant.  In other words, the application of either general or specific 
jurisdiction to foreign defendants’ e-transactions has never been easy.  It is, for instance, too 
rigorous and difficult to establish the requirements of foreign defendants’ substantial, 
continuous and systemic contacts with the forum as required under the general jurisdiction.
310
  
And, as a result, the role of this type of jurisdiction in e-commerce has been ruled out as being 
insignificant.
311
  Most courts in the USA, therefore, have declined to establish general 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants on the basis of internet connections.
312
  
In the course of determining whether a court can exercise specific jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants, however, courts, in the exercise of their discretion, have strived to expound 
what ‘purposive availment’ may amount to in cases involving the Internet.  From such efforts, 
several innovative tests, some of which are discussed above, have evolved.  
It is clear, however, that, although the innovative tests discussed are useful, they have 
not been exhaustive or completely effective.
313
  Moreover, courts have been shifting from one 
test to another, either endorsing one, while rejecting the other.  In such a balance-shifting 
approach, and from a perspective of conflict of laws, it becomes difficult to enhance certainty 
and predictability of electronic transactions.  And, uncertainty and unpredictability of 
transactions, as stated before, is what ought to be avoided.
314
   
Overall, existing pole-shifting exercises in search of an appropriate test to be applied 
in determining jurisdiction in personam in cases involving e-commerce, is a further indication 
of the weaknesses that may exist in a discretionary approach.  
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D1 Exercise of in Personam Jurisdiction in the European Union 
The EU’s approach to jurisdiction is also founded on the doctrine of actor sequitur forum rei, 
according to which the defendant must be sued at his place of domicile.
315
  The ECJ held in
 
Universal General Insurance Co (UGIC) v Group Josi Reinsurance Co SA
316
 that the rationale 
of this doctrine is that it makes it easier, in principle, for a defendant to defend himself.
317
  The 
doctrine, which formed the basis of Art 2 of the Brussels Convention, 1968,
318
 underlines the 
exercise of jurisdiction under Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (hereinafter ‘Brussels I 
Regulation’), which replaced the Convention.
319
  Recital 11 of this Regulation provides that 
‘rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is 
generally based on the defendant's domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this 
ground save in a few well-defined situations.’
320  
The scope of the Brussels I Regulation is set out in Art 1.  This provision confines 
itself to ‘civil and commercial matters’, and excludes matters regarding revenue, customs, 
administration,
321
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Pfeiffer & P Schlosser The Brussels I Regulation 44/2001: Application and Enforcement in the EU (2008) 24. 
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Article 2 of this Regulation sets out a fundamental principle of general application 
regarding exercise of jurisdiction in personam.  It provides that:  
1. Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, 
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State. 
2. Persons who are not nationals of the Member State in which they are 
domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals 
of that State. 
The generality of the above provision suggests that ‘it is not limited by reference to its subject 
matter or the form of the action.’
323
   
Article 5 of the Regulation, however, sets out specific cases regarding exercise of 
jurisdiction for contractual obligations, which are exceptions to the general principle set out in 
Art 2 of the Regulation.  Article 5(1)(a) of the Regulation provides for ‘special jurisdiction’ in 
matters relating to a contract (generally).
324
  Accordingly, a plaintiff may sue, in the courts of 
the place of performance of the obligation in question,
325
 since it is presumed that such court 
will have a close link to the contract.
326
  The possibility of suing in the place of domicile, 
however, remains. 
Under Art 5(1)(b) of the Regulation, unless agreed otherwise, in a contract of sale of 
goods, the place of performance for all claims is where the goods were delivered or should 
have been delivered.  It further provides that, for contract of provision of services, the place of 
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performance is where the services were provided or should have been provided, yet again 
whatever the claim of the plaintiff.  The place of performance, however, has been left to be 
determined by the rules of private International law.
327
 
Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation was recently interpreted in Falco Privatstiftung 
and Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lindhorst.
328
  First, the court held that, in order to ensure 
uniformity, and in absence of reasons to the contrary, Art 5(1)(a) should be given a scope 
identical to that of the corresponding provision of the Brussels Convention.
329
  Secondly, that 
Art 5(1)(b) must be interpreted in light of the origin, objectives and scheme of that 
regulation.
330
  Overall, when considered in the light of e-commerce, Art 5 of the Brussels I 
Regulation caters for B2B contracts and B2C contracts involving ‘active consumers’ (as 
opposed to passive consumers).
331
  The rules contained in this provision, however, provide 
general protection to consumers. 
The Regulation contains other more specific rules intended to provide additional 
protection to consumers in contracts.
332
  Article 15 of the Regulation sets out the scope of such 
protection and refers to a consumer as a person who concludes a contract for a purpose ‘which 
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can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession.’
333
  It favours the ‘country of 
destination’ approach in cases involving consumer contracts.
334
  It defines ‘consumer 
contracts’ in three categories.  The first involves ‘contract for the sale of goods on instalment 
credit terms.’
335
  The second involves ‘contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any 
other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods’.
336
  The third involves all other 
contracts, falling outside Art 15(a) and (b) of the Regulation, and which are concluded with a 




In order to ensure a balance between consumer protection and e-commerce 
development, the Brussels regime sets out limitations under which the protective jurisdictional 
approach can be exercised.
338
  Thus, apart from the additional protection offered to consumers 
as the weaker parties in contractual relations,
339
 the limitations set out under Art 15 of the 
Brussels I Regulation are important prerequisites for balancing the interests of the market and 
the consumer.  
Article 15(1)(c) of the Regulation, provides that:
 
in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues 
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer's 
domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to 
                                                 
333
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several States including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope 
of such activities. 
This Article is regarded as a ‘catch all’ provision,
340
 and is more important in an e-
commerce scenario.
341
  It embodies the ‘targeting effect’, meaning that it is the seller who 
targets (and solicits or prompts) the consumer, through the interactive website accessed in the 
consumer’s domicile, to conclude a distance contract, which is then actually concluded.  In 
effect, it introduces a new criterion, reframing the old one provided for under Art 13(3) of the 
Convention.
342
  Firstly, it does not tie application of the protective rules to a specific 
classification of contracts, and secondly, it is centred on the activities of the business.
343
   
Although Art 15(1)(c) applies to e-commerce activities, the requirements in this 
provision are fulfilled when a website is active, (that is to say, when the consumer concludes 
the contract directly online).  Thus, it does not apply when a website merely provides 
information that leads to the conclusion of the contract in another c ntext offline.
344
  
According to the EU Commission, its integral concepts of ‘activities pursued in’ or ‘directed 
towards’ a member state are intended to make clear that Art 15(1)(c) ‘applies to consumer 
contracts concluded via an interactive website accessible in the State of the consumer’s 
domicile.’
345
  The Commission stated, however, that ‘[t]he fact that a consumer simply had 
knowledge of a service or possibility of buying goods via a passive website accessible in his 
country of domicile will not trigger the protective jurisdiction.’
346
  Thus, the distinction 
between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ website (which has featured in other jurisdictions, for instance, 
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Essentially, Art 15(1)(c) consists of two types of activities entitling a consumer to its 
benefits.  The first governs commercial or professional activities of a business that are 
‘pursued’ in the consumer’s domicile.  It is uncertain, however, what exactly is meant by the 
activities ‘pursued’ in the consumer’s domicile.  Some commentators have argued that it 
requires the business to physically carry out its commercial activity in the state at which it is 
aimed.
349
  However, since Art 15(1)(c) is intended for e-commerce transactions this argument 
may be erroneous because in an e-commerce environment physical presence in the strict sense 
is not necessary.
 
The second type of activity under Art 15(1)(c) refers to a situation where commercial 
or professional activities are ‘directed’ towards the consumer's domicile.
350
  Once either of the 
two limbs is established in a consumer contract, the consumer concerned is entitled to institute 
proceedings either in the courts of the member state in which the other party is domiciled, or in 
the courts of the state of the consumer’s domicile.
351
  If the suit is against a consumer, 
however, as a rule, the action must be brought in the forum of his domicile.
352
  
Hess et al note, however, that ‘some national courts have had difficulties in finding 
out whether under specific circumstances the activity of the other party was ‘directed’ to the 
country where the consumer had his residence.’
353
  In 2009, for instance, an Austrian court 
made a request to the ECJ regarding the correct interpretation of this Article.
354
  Specifically, 
the question laid before the ECJ was whether mere accessibility of a website, through which a 
consumer concluded a contract in his state of residence, can be sufficient to justify a finding 
that an activity is being ‘directed’ there, within the terms of Art 15(1)(c). 
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In its ruling on the matter,
355
 the ECJ, while agreeing that ‘the mere accessibility of 
the trader’s or the intermediary’s website in the Member State in which the consumer is 
domiciled is insufficient’ to justify such a finding,
356
 held that: 
[i]n order to determine whether a trader whose activity is presented on its website 
or on that of an intermediary can be considered to be ‘directing’ its activity to the 
Member State of the consumer’s domicile, within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) 
of Regulation No 44/2001, it should be ascertained whether, before the conclusion 
of any contract with the consumer, it is apparent from those websites and the 
trader’s overall activity that the trader was envisaging doing business with 
consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, including the Member State 




The court provided a list of matters which, although not exhaustive, can be relied on to 
provide evidence from which an inference may be drawn to the effect that the particular 
trader’s activity is directed to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile.  The relevant 
matters include: 
the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries from other Member 
States for going to the place where the trader is established, use of a language or a 
currency other than the language or currency generally used in the Member State in 
which the trader is established with the possibility of making and confirming the 
reservation in that other language, mention of telephone numbers with an 
international code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order 
to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers 
domiciled in other Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of 
the Member State in which the trader is established, and mention of an international 
clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member States. It is for the 
national courts to ascertain whether such evidence exists.
358
 
Another important aspect of the Brussels I Regulation is the provision on party 
autonomy in choice of forum.  While Art 23 allows parties to designate the court or courts to 
determine their disputes,
359
 Art 17 sets out certain limitations in the case of consumer contracts.  
The latter provides: 
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In this regard Art 23(3) provides  that ‘[w]here a forum agreement clause has been validly entered by the 
parties, only the court chosen by them will exercise jurisdiction and any other court of the Member States will do 















[t]he provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement:  
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or 
(2)  which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than 
those indicated in this Section; or 
(3) which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, 
both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or 
habitually resident in the same Member State, and which confers 
jurisdiction on the courts of that Member State, provided that such an 
agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State. 
Article 23 also sets out requirements for testing the validity of choice of forum 
clauses.  These are mainly concerned with consent and safeguards in relation to it.
360
  Thus, the 
choice of forum clause must either be in writing or evidenced in writing, or must be in regular 
usage between parties, or it must be in common usage in the particular trade or commerce.
361
 
In recognition of the functional equivalence between the traditional paper-based 
concept of writing and the use of electronic records and e-signatures, Art 23(2) provides that 
‘[a]ny communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement 
shall be equivalent to ‘writing’.’ 
3 Concluding Analysis of E-contracts and Conflict of Laws – the Question of 
Jurisdiction 
Deciding where to litigate has always been an important issue in cross-border transactions.  
The reason for this is that disputes involving cross-border transactions have foreign elements 
that attract the conflict of laws process.  Conflict of laws rules, however, are not universal. 
Thus, in the absence of a clear agreement regarding where to litigate, parties in a cross-border 
transaction may find themselves in trouble since not all domestic rules always provide 
predictable results in dispute resolution.  The common law rules on jurisdiction, for instance, 
provide room for exercise of discretion when a court seeks to establish whether it can assert 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.  Moreover, the place where a case is litigated can 
potentially determine its result, regardless of the merits. 
The development of the Internet as a medium through which commercial transactions 
can be undertaken and the increased economic globalisation oblige parties to cross-border 
transactions to carefully plan how their transactions should be carried out and how disputes 
                                                 
360
 Cases held by ECJ have ensured that consent requirements are met. See ECJ, 12/14/1976C-24/96, Estas Salotti 
v Rüwa ECR 1976, 1831; ECJ 12/14/1976, Serguorav v Bonakdarian ECR 1976, 1851; see also ECJ 03/16/1999, 
C-159/97, Trasporto Castelletti v Trumpy SpA ECR 1999 I-1597. 
361















should be settled.  From a business point of view, the importance of such prior planning is 
obvious.  Primarily, it is not in the interest of parties that they should experience uncertainties 
and bear additional costs of litigating in a foreign land. 
In an online environment, consumers, owing to their weak position, are at an even 
higher risk of being subjected to litigation in a foreign state than e-merchants.  This chapter has 
considered rules from various jurisdictions regarding the exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
in e-commerce. 
It should be noted, however, that problems regarding the exercise of jurisdiction in 
cross-border disputes were not created by the new technology.  Instead, because of its disregard 
of territorial borders, the Internet and e-commerce have simply exacerbated already existing 
jurisdictional problems in cross-border transactions. 
This chapter has examined the relevant rules as they apply in Tanzania, England, the 
United States, and in the European Union.  From the discussion, it is clear that the absence of 
harmonised rules on jurisdiction in personam to regulate e-commerce is a critical legal problem 
that affects predictability – and will have a detrimental effect on the development of this form 
of business.  The existing approaches to jurisdiction and the rules they support, especially in 
countries relying on common law, are inadequate.  
It was also observed that, in both Tanzania and England, apart from a foreign 
defendant's presence in the forum state, service of the court process is a significant requirement 
for determining jurisdiction.  This is also the case in the United States, although different 
concepts, such as ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘purposive availment’ are used.  The gist of the 
matter is that the defendant must be served in order to ensure a fair hearing in accordance with 
the principles of natural justice.  
For an individual who is a defendant, resident within the forum state, or a registered 
company within the jurisdiction of the forum, exercise of jurisdiction in personam may not 
create specific problems for e-commerce, since it will be easy to effect service personally (or if 
it is a registered company, service can be done at its place of business or to an appointed 
agent).  This is the case in Tanzania under Order V rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Act, and ss 
124-127 of the Companies Act, 2002.
362
  A similar position may be observed in England, for 
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instance, under s 725(1) of the Companies Act 1985.  The same rule is broadly applicable if a 
corporation is registered abroad but has its branch office or a place of business within the 
forum’s jurisdiction.  Again, effectiveness of service of summons may not be difficult.  The 
jurisdictional problem, however, concerns e-companies that have no 'place of business' in the 
true sense of that term, and rely on the Internet servers hosted in different countries.  There is 
still no settled answer to serving court process to such companies.  
As observed in this chapter, where parties have not inserted a choice of forum clause 
in their contract, at least two different approaches have been adopted to ascertain jurisdiction.  
The first is discretion-based, while the second is rule-based.  The former, which is applied 
under the English common law tradition, lacks specific rules for consumer protection.  
Consumers, as the weaker party in an online contract may find themselves being forced to 
litigate away from their home countries.  
As the Internet continues to stimulate cross-border activities, parties to e-contracts 
should be encouraged to draft clauses choosing where to submit their disputes in order to ease 
jurisdictional problems.  Although they should be at liberty to do so, courts should, especially 
in discretion-based systems like the common law, subject choice of forum clauses to careful 
scrutiny in order to protect consumers.  It is submitted here that discretion-based clauses should 
be rejected for good reasons, for instance, lack of proper consent.  This study, however, prefers 
adoption of clear rules that will offer protection to the weaker party, the rules in the EU 
Brussels Regulation being a good example. 
In summary, the EU's efforts to harmonise jurisdictional rules within the region seems 
to be more effective in dealing with e-commerce transactions than the common law approach, 
which is purely discretionary.  The merits of the rule-based EU system arise out of the fact that, 
apart from dealing with e-contracts generally, it contains specific protective provisions for 
consumers.  Hence, in the EU, consumers engaging in online contracts within the region have 
to face fewer obstacles when they wish to litigate in a local forum.  In view of this, the EU’s 
approach should serve as a basis upon which further developments in Tanzania might be based. 















jurisdiction in cross-border disputes
363
 and in SADC to develop a model law on e-commerce.
364
  
The EU Brussels Regulation I offers good guidance for such processes.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DETERMINING CHOICE OF LAW IN E-
CONTRACTS 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines choice of law issues.  It assesses whether, and the extent to which 
traditional choice of law rules can effectively apply to e-contracts.  Given the cross-border 
nature of many e-contracts, in any dispute arising, the court will need to determine the 
applicable law.
1
  Ascertaining choice of law in e-contract is a complex issue due to the 
autonomy that parties enjoy and the diversity of connecting factors that may be involved.
2
  
These connecting factors are territorial in nature.   
Moreover, conflict of laws is not an international set of rules, but is domestic in 
nature, ie, every state has its own rules.  This chapter, therefore, argues in favour of 




The chapter is divided into five parts.  Part one, as introduction, examines the choice 
of law problem through a hypothetical case study.  Part two considers the choice of law rules 
applicable to contracts in Tanzania.
4
  Because Tanzania adheres to the common law legal 
system, its choice of law rules follow the ‘traditional’ common law approach.  This approach 
applied in England up to 1991, after which English rules on choice of law in contract were, for 
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the provisions of this Part. (2) This Part shall apply to any type of contract made or entered between parties under 
this Act.’  As discussed in chapter two, this legislation does not cover consumer e-contracts.  Notwithstanding this 
provision (ie, s 26 of Act 8 of 2003), English rules on choice of law will still apply as relevant source of law with 















the most part, supplanted by an EU Regulation.
5
  Part two of this chapter will therefore 
examine the choice of law rules from a traditional common law perspective. 
Part three analyses the doctrine of party autonomy.  It examines how this doctrine 
applies in the e-contracting scenario, existing debates on the doctrine and its limitations.  In 
particular, part three addresses the question whether parties to an e-contract can avoid 
otherwise applicable mandatory laws.  Part four examines developments regarding choice of 
law in the EU.  It specifically examines the Rome I Regulation and the solutions it has created 
as part of efforts to remove uncertainty in cross-border commerce.  Additionally, part four 
examines how this Regulation deals with consumer contracts.  Part five concludes the 
discussion in this chapter.  
2. Choice of Law and its Significance for E-contracts  
‘The discipline of choice of law,’ writes von Mehren, ‘is concerned with the identification and 
systematic handling of situations in which the persons concerned and the interests and policies 
at stake have significant connections with more than one community.’
6
  As a cross-border 
activity, e-contracting touches persons, interests, and policies of more than one state.  
Consequently, understanding which law applies in an e-contract with foreign elements may 
lead to a difficult choice of law question.  Compliance with the law is impossible ‘without an 
understanding of whose law (or laws) is (or are) applicable.’
7
  Once again, the overarching 
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As the Internet pushes past the traditional barriers of commerce, on-line activities, 
including those in the nature of consumer contracts, have grown substantially.
9
  Once a 
computer is connected to the Internet it becomes easier for anyone to access a ‘website and 
conclude an electronic contract.’
10
  Online consumer contracts therefore form a significant 
proportion of contracts concluded over the Internet.
11
 
Although the Internet may have introduced simplicity in contract making, which is an 
important breakthrough in commerce, it has complicated both transaction and litigation 
planning,
12
 thereby creating more conflict of laws problems.
13
  This is so precisely because it 
has brought together people from different legal traditions,
14
 and, as one author asserts, 
‘wherever you find people you are bound to find disputes.’
15
  As indicated in chapter three, 
however, opinions vary about the right approach to solve cross-border internet issues.
16
  The 
complexity inherent in cross-border disputes may be due, partly, to parties’ failure to choose an 
applicable law, and partly to the diversity of connecting factors
17
 (which imply the multiple 
geographic locations of an activity).
18
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Tracing, identifying, or distinguishing an e-commerce transaction adds to the 
complexity due to its often anonymous nature.
19
  Its effect on the choice of law process is that 
‘some of the traditional connecting factors… such as the place of contracting or performance 
can become fortuitous in an on-line environment.’
20 
 
Consider the following scenario.  A seller from country ‘A’, contracts to supply goods 
to a merchant in country ‘B’.  The goods that are the subject of this contract are to be shipped 
from country ‘C’.  Their contract is formed electronically via the Internet while the merchant 
from country ‘B’ is on vacation in country ‘D’.  Payments for the goods are arranged and made 
by the merchant through his bank situated in country ‘E’.  The goods are to be delivered to the 
merchant’s subsidiary company situated in country ‘F’, two weeks from the date of the 
contract.  They are not delivered, hence a dispute arises.   
The dispute in the above example has many foreign elements.  To resolve it, the 
following factors will need to be considered: the place of business or domicile of parties,
21
 the 
place of contracting, the places of performance,
22
 the situation of the subject matter, the place 
of breach, and the place where the action relating to the contract is brought, ie, the forum.
23
  
Given the character of the Internet, however, continuing to rely on territorial connecting factors 
to select a law to be applied may be inappropriate.
24
 
3. Choice of Law Rules in English Common Law and Tanzania  
Tanzania inherited the English common law approach to Choice of Law rules, and since 
nothing more specific to Tanzania can be added on the topic, the current discussion, will 
consider Choice of Law principles in relation to the English common law approach ( for the 
moment leaving aside the UK's position under the Rome I Regulation).   
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The English common law approach is based on judge-made law.  Given its slow 
development, its ability to effectively respond to the changes in the methods of international 
trade is questionable.  This is especially the case in the light of the Internet and e-commerce.  
Conflict of laws rules with regard to e-consumer contracts, for instance, are not clearly 
developed.
25
  Nevertheless, the traditional choice of law rules have never lost their relevance
26
 
(as some might argue).
27
  
Under the common law jurisdictions, where courts follow a hierarchy of rules, there 
are at least three basic choice of law principles.  First is the principle of party autonomy, which 
gives parties freedom to choose the law governing their contract.
28
  Second, and in the absence 
of parties’ choice, is the legal system with which the contract is most closely connected,
29
 
called ‘the proper law’.  Notwithstanding the proper law, the application of ‘the mandatory 
rules and public policy of the relevant states to ... protect the fundamental order of the forum or 
international society’
30
 may also come into consideration. 
 
It is perhaps best, however, to start by elaborating on the concept of Proper Law, that 
is, the law that will apply if the parties did not choose any law to govern their contract.
 
(a) The Concept of Proper Law under Common Law 
Under the common law, the proper law governs most matters affecting a contract.
31
  This 
concept has received varied definitions.  In Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian 
Temperature & General Mutual Life Assurance Society,
32
 for instance, it was referred to as 
‘that law which the English court or other court is to apply in determining the obligations under 
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  It is also regarded as that system of law which the parties themselves intended 
should govern their contract
34
 or a system of law ‘with which the transaction [has] its closest 
and most real connection’.
35
  In Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co
36
 
it was regarded as the system of law which the court has attributed to the parties' contract.  




From its original settings, however, which can be traced back to Huber, and then 
introduced to English law, the concept of 'proper law' implied the law of the place with which a 
contract had its closest connection.
38
  Thereafter, two theoretical views were developed in 
determining how to interpret the concept.  The first was subjective, and was based on the 
intention of the parties, whether express or implied.  The second, which was supported by 
authors such as Westlake, was objective, and was based on localisation of an agreement in a 
specific jurisdiction.
39
  Localisation was to be evidenced by the grouping of a contract’s 
elements as reflected in its formation and terms.
40
  By doing so the country in which its 
elements are most densely grouped becomes its natural seat.
41
  The localisation theory, 
however, discouraged express selection of a governing law ‘if it conflicts with the natural seat 
of the contract as disclosed by the grouping of its elements.’
42
  
The intention and the localisation approaches bore significant implications for the 
choice of law process.  On the one hand, the subjective approach commences the process by 
ascertaining the parties' actual intention,
43
 and, if necessary, allows them to choose the 
applicable law.  If parties did not select a governing law, then the court has to impose the law 
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that, in the circumstances of the case, the parties would have selected as reasonable people.
44
  
The subjective approach, however, was considered ‘an unsustainable myth’
45
 because the intent 
of man cannot be tried, not even by the Devil himself, for he cannot know it.
46
 
Given the unsuitability of the subjective and objective approaches, the English courts 
sought a middle ground.  In that compromise a three-stage approach emerged.  First, the court 
had to look at the terms of the contract in an attempt to discover whether the parties had 
expressly provided what law was to apply.
47
  Where no clause indicated the chosen law, the 
second stage was for the court to investigate the parties’ conduct to see whether a proper law 
could be inferred.
48
  In effect, ‘the courts read an implied term into contracts purporting to 
represent the [parties'] common intention.’
49
  If this inquiry also failed, then the court would 
proceed to the third stage, which involved determination of ‘the system of law with which the 
transaction had its closest and most real connection.’
50
  
The second stage of inquiry, however, attracted criticism at three levels.  First, the 
purpose of implying terms in a contract is to give a transaction business efficacy.
51
  Whereas a 
court may, with good reason, state that the parties intended their contract to be valid (on the 
basis of the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat), business efficacy might be indifferent to 
the implication of law ‘A’ rather than law ‘B’.
52
  Secondly, ‘it is a complete myth to regard the 
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ultimate decision of the court as a fulfilment of the [parties'] common intention’,
53
because, 
when parties appear before the court, each has his own view.  Thirdly, the process of 
discovering an implicit intention is not only artificial and tortuous, but is also a duplication of 
the third phase.
54
  These objections eventually induced the English courts to abandon the 
second stage of the inquiry.
55
 
In Tanzania, if parties have expressly chosen which law will govern their contract, 
courts honour their choice unless it contravenes the provisions of a mandatory law.
56
   
Karachi Gas Co Ltd v H Issaq,
57
 though originating from Kenya, depicts the position 
in Tanzania, since the East African Court of Appeal (which decided the case) was by then 
serving all East African countries, including Tanzania.  The case involved a contract of sale of 
pipes to a buyer in Karachi ‘f.o.b Mombasa’.  Payment was to be effected in Pakistani currency 
a month following delivery.  Later, the appellant cancelled the order because it failed to obtain 
import clearance under Pakistani laws governing exchange restrictions.  The respondent 
(plaintiff) successfully sued for breach of contract.  The app llant appealed seeking the East 
Africa Court of Appeal's decision as to what should have been the proper law of the contract.  
In the course of adjudicating the matter, it appeared to the court that the contract was 
split into two parts and was governed by two laws.  Kenyan law was to govern shipment and 
delivery (as the place of delivery was at Mombasa, and, hence, the contract was formed there), 
and Pakistani law governed importation into Pakistan and payment of the purchase price. 
Consequently, it was clear that the Kenyan law was the proper law, since the goods were in 
Kenya, the plaintiff was residing in Kenya, and the delivery was to be made in Kenya.  
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(b) Discovering the Proper Law 
Under the English law of contract, establishing whether a contract has really been formed is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  It is a question of fact where, for instance, one wants to 
establish whether there was consensus ad idem, but the issue becomes a question of law if one 
is to establish the existence of a valid offer and its acceptance.
58
  In a cross-border e-contract 
the legal issues will have to be determined by a single system of law.
59
  
Determination of an objective proper law requires reference, inter alia, to the places of 
performance (locus solutionis) and contracting (locus contractus), both of which may be 
difficult to identify in the case of e-contracts.
60
   With regard to the former, although this has 
the advantage of always having substantial connection with the contract, this too has its 
problems, for instance, in the case of bilateral contracts where each party has to perform in a 
different country.  To put it in other word: Callies states that, if a contract creates mutual or 
multiple obligations, adherence to the lex loci solutionis approach may lead to the application 
of different laws to the same contract.
61
  With regard to latter, as the interactions between 
merchants and buyers located in different countries increase, however, it becomes more 
difficult to identify the place of contracting.
62
  The answer is therefore dependent on which 
party happens to be the offeror and which the offeree; once this is determined, the place of 
contracting can be identified.
63
   




divergent theories governing 
communication of acceptance in contract are a further potential ground for challenging e-
contracts, and often the resolution of which law will apply to a contractual dispute is for courts 
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Having ascertained the proper law, the possible areas of its application must now be 
considered.  Murray asserts that ‘in a cross-border contract choice of law issues appear in three 
levels.’
66
  These are the issue regarding formal validity, ie, examining whether ‘all necessary 
formal requirements have been complied with’,
67
 the question of substantial (material) validity, 
ie, ‘whether the contract has actually been formed and is legally valid, according to the laws of 
the jurisdiction which apply to the contract’,
68
 and, finally issues regarding capacity, 
interpretation, performance and the consequences of breach of contract.
69
  Since most e-
contracts are of an informal nature, formal validity is generally not a problem.  Capacity may 
be referred to lexi loci contractus or domicilii. 
As for performance of the contract, the traditional approach is that the law of the place 
where performance is to take place will take precedence.  Cheshire and North argue that 
‘[w]hen the proper law and the lex loci solutionis are not identical, performance being a matter
 
of substance, will be governed by the proper law.’
70
  The lex loci solutionis, however, will 
apply to ‘matters connected with the mode and manner of performance, as contrasted with 
those that affect the substance of the contract.’
71
 
4. The Doctrine of Party Autonomy  
Parties to international transactions usually state the system of law to govern their contract, and 
courts generally give effect to such an express choice provided it is clear and capable of easy 
reference.
72
  Clarity is important otherwise the court will decline to give effect to the choice.  In 
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation,
73
 for instance, 
clause 13 of a contract for the shipment of crude oil from one Tunisian port to another provided 
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that ‘this contract shall be governed by the laws of the flag of the vessel.’  The Court of Appeal 
declined to give effect to the clause and held that a number of different vessels, flying different 
flags, would be engaged in transporting the oil, making the proper law too variable.  
Choice of law clauses are common in contracts concluded over the Internet, usually 
being made part of the standard form.  Inclusion of such clauses is an aspect of freedom of 
contract, and courts in common law jurisdictions accept that parties are free to select the 
governing law.
74




(a) Academic Criticisms about Party Autonomy 
Despite its special relevance to international contracts, the principle of party autonomy has 
been a subject of much academic debate and criticism.
76
  Bauerfeld has, for instance, argued 
that it should be abandoned because it is inadequate when analysed from the perspective of 
traditional conflict of law values.
77
  Other academic commentators have also had grave 
reservations.  They argue that to give parties freedom to choose the applicable law allows them 
to escape the mandatory provisions of an otherwise applicable legal system.  Thus, ‘Beale 




In the USA, Beale's objection o party autonomy is that ‘in point of theory … it 
involves permission to the parties to do a legislative act.’
79
  Other scholars contend that ‘the 
validity of the choice of law clause must itself be tested by some legal system.’
80
  The 
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argument here is that ‘the chosen law cannot perform this task, because, if the choice of law 
clause is invalid, there can be no chosen law.’
81
   
As will be seen later, for instance, Art 10 of the Rome Regulation has disposed of a 
major criticism of party autonomy.  It provides that the validity of an express choice of law is 
to be tested by the law chosen by the parties.  For this specific purpose, the proper law is 
presumed to have been validly chosen (the ‘putative’ proper law).  However, under Art 10(2) 
of the Rome Regulation, a party may rely on the law of his or her habitual residence to 
establish a lack of consent, if it appears from the circumstances that it would be unreasonable 
to determine the effect of his or her conduct by the putative proper law. 
The doctrine of party autonomy, however, if examined from an e-commerce 
perspective, overcomes most– if not all– the difficulties that e-commerce causes in a traditional 
conflict of laws setting.
82
  The doctrine avoids the problem of localising and identifying places 
of contracting and performing.
83 
  
Critics have nevertheless argued that party autonomy has the potential to work 
negatively on consumers' rights, unless specific consumer protection concerns are properly 
taken into account.
84




In most ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-wrap’ agreements, for instance, the terms or 
conditions governing the contract are imposed unilaterally.  A choice of law (or forum) clause 
is thus, in fact, a unilateral choice, and is imposed on the consumer.  In view of this, the ‘clause 
could be one with the obvious intention to deprive the consumer of his legal rights, eg, a 
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business chooses the law with the lowest standard of protection for consumers.’
86
  Businesses 
also tend to prefer their own forum law, due to familiarity or convenience, a fact which 
commentators find potentially prejudicial to foreigner consumers because it forces them to 
litigate abroad.
87
  Consequently, states, conscious of the need to protect their consumers in an 
e-commerce environment, have sought to assert jurisdiction over e-transactions
88
 or to limit the 
autonomy doctrine by ensuring that consumers, as weaker parties, are protected.
89
 
Despite the above criticisms, proponents of party autonomy maintain that, where the 
choice does not affect a third party or lead to market failures, it should be upheld, since it 
enhances predictability and promotes international commerce, especially in B2B settings.
90
  In 
essence, where parties have inserted choice of law and choice of forum clauses in their 
contracts these reduce uncertainty.
91
  This means that, apart from simplifying the judicial task, 
party autonomy may often have the virtue of ‘fulfilling the parties' reasonable expectations.’
92
  
(b) Party autonomy and Mandatory Rules 
Generally, within the context of international contracts, the first objection to party autonomy, 
as discussed above, still remains a serious problem.
93
  Can parties avoid an otherwise 
applicable law simply by selecting a law that better suits their purposes?  In other words, are 
they free to evade mandatory rules of an otherwise applicable law?
94
  This issue has attracted a 
vigorous debate.
95
   
Some scholars have, for instance, argued that, under the doctrine of party autonomy, 
parties enjoy not only the liberty to choose the applicable law but also the freedom to ‘remove 
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the state organs almost completely from the process of adjudication.’
96
  The autonomy rule, 
therefore, requires courts to honour parties' choices without restriction.
97
  With such a 
proposition, however, does it mean that mandatory rules play no role in determining the parties' 
rights and duties?  Does it mean that their freedom is absolute?  Before considering these 
questions it is pertinent to consider what mandatory rules are and how are they treated. 
Mandatory rules can be defined as rules of the law of a particular country, which 
cannot be derogated from by contract.
98
  They are considered ‘immutable’
99 
and are intended to 
protect certain disadvantaged groups or national security or a state’s economy.
100
  Although 
contracting parties are free to choose the applicable law, the general principle is that, if ‘the 
contract has a sufficiently close connection to another country, mandatory rules of that country 
can be invoked to override the applicable law which remains applicable outside the scope of 
those mandatory rules.’
101
  The non-derogable nature of mandatory rules is justified where, for 
instance, a state wants to protect parties within the contract, or parties outside the contract.
102
 
In Tanzania, for instance, in case of a contract for supply of goods or services to a 
consumer, s 27(1)(d) of the Fair Competition Act
103
 prevents suppliers from restricting, 
modifying, or excluding by way of a clause in their contracts of supply, a consumer's right to 
rescind such contracts.
104
  This is an immutable rule that cannot be sidelined by the parties’ 
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agreement.  Consequently, mandatory rules displace freedom of contract and seem to be a 
modern tool that creates a limitation on party autonomy.
105
  
(c)Avoidance of Mandatory Rules  
As is well known, a contract is a legal conception that arises out of private arrangements.  It is 
therefore a matter of private law with privately-created rights and obligations which, as Ware 
contends, may potentially replace ‘whatever government-created rights and duties would 
otherwise apply.’
106
  This being the case, there is no reason why the parties may not choose to 
avoid application of a particular system of law to their contract.  Where this choice amounts to 
evasion of mandatory rules of an apparently applicable legal system, however, such as the rules 
that protect consumers, courts will not enforce it since not all relationships are ‘privatisable.’
107
 
One of the very few English cases in which a discussion regarding potential evasion of 
mandatory rules arose was Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Co.
108
  English law was 
expressly chosen, although neither the parties nor the contract had any connection with this 
jurisdiction.  On appeal to the Privy Council, it was held that the contract was valid, even 
though it failed to take account of mandatory rules of n otherwise applicable law. The 
decision on the express choice of proper law was the crux of the judgment.  Lord Wright held 
that whatever intention was expressed in the contract would be conclusive.
109
  He further stated 
that, although this principle might be considered too broad, ‘it is difficult to see what 
qualifications are possible, provided the intention expressed is bona fide and legal, and 
provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy.’
110
 
While English law had no apparent connection with the transaction, the Privy Council 
held that this was not a fatal defect, because there might nevertheless be certain associations 
with the chosen law.  The venture might, for instance, have been financed or insured in 
England, and English law might have been chosen because its rules on maritime matters were 
more highly developed.  According to the Privy Council, a contract valid by its proper law 
would be valid everywhere.  In the Vita Foods case, the validity of the choice of proper law 
was tested by the lex fori.  (An alternative approach, adopted in Art 8 of the Rome Convention 
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–now Article 10 of the Rome I Regulation– however, tests the choice by the putative proper 
law).   
The court held, however, that even if English courts were to judge the contract valid, 
the forum was not obliged to hold likewise.  In other words, it was assumed that a forum might 
be obliged to apply its own mandatory rules.  As it happens, the English courts have given 
expression to their own mandatory rules under the rubric of public policy: application of a 
foreign law is refused if it runs counter to English ideas of policy, morality or boni mores.
111
 
Now, however, policy may intrude at another stage of the choice of law process.
112
  
A major problem in this regard is how to determine whether a mandatory rule applies 
only to domestic relationships or to international relationships.
113
  In deciding this question 
courts refer to two criteria.  The law in question may indicate whether it applies internationally: 
it may contain an express clause to that effect or one may be implied by a process of 
interpretation.
114
  Exchange control regulations are typical of mandatory laws intended to apply 
internationally.
115
   
Alternatively, reference may be made to the substance of the statute, which involves 
distinguishing between public and private laws.
116
  The former are supposed to apply only 
within the territory of the enacting state, whereas the latter may apply internationally.
117
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Because so many ostensibly public laws now serve private interests (and vice versa), however, 
this type of distinction is not always helpful.
118  
Generally speaking the forum should ask, first, 
whether the law in question demands application, and secondly, whether there was a close 
connection between the legal relationship and the enacting country, and thirdly, whether the 
latter was in a position to implement its law (which suggests that property or a propositus is 
situated within its jurisdiction).
119
  Finally, the foreign law should not offend the forum’s ordre 
public,
120
 a matter to be discussed below. 
English courts also give effect to the mandatory rules of the lex loci solutionis.  The 
leading case in this regard is Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sotoy Aznar.
121
  This case 
concerned an English company that had chartered a Spanish ship to carry a cargo of jute from 
Calcutta to Barcelona.  Under English law, the proper law of the contract, freight was fixed at 
£50 per ton, one half to be paid by the owners in London when the vessel sailed and the other 
half to be paid at Barcelona on arrival.  While the ship was under way, the Spanish government 
passed a law fixing the maximum freight on jute at 875 pesetas a ton and imposing penalties 
for breach of this limit.  The forum, an English court, held that: 
[w]here a contract requires an act to be done in a foreign country, it is, in the absence 
of very special circumstances, an implied term of the continuing validity of such a 




One interpretation of this judgment was to regard enforcement of Spain’s legislation 
as a matter of fact, which could then be pleaded under the doctrine of frustration of contract.  
This line of argument is perfectly reasonable since foreign law is deemed to be fact by the 
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  Thus, a performance illegal under the lex loci solutionis would be a fact that must be 
taken into account when the forum determines the parties’ liability.  
Ralli Bros received indirect support from Kleinwort Son & Co v Ungarische 
Baumwolle Industrie
124
 and more recently in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co.
125
  
In this case the court held that performance of a contract is excused if it necessarily involves 
doing an act that is unlawful by the lex loci solutionis.
126
  The principle was again reiterated in 
Apple Corps Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (No Challenge: Preliminary Issue).
127
 
The Rome Convention went even further than the English common law to give the 
forum discretion to apply the mandatory rules of other applicable foreign laws.  Article 7(1) 
provided that: 
[w]hen applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to 
the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a 
close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules 
must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract....
128
 
(d) Public Policy Limitations 
Public policy is another ground upon which courts may limit the operation of an express choice 
of law.
129
  When used in conflict of laws, public policy ‘denotes a justification or excuse for 
not applying, or recognising the application of an otherwise applicable rule of law.’
130
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Application of public policy in choice of law has inclusive and exclusive effects.
131
 
The inclusive effects are shown when the forum accepts application of a foreign law either 
because the foreign law on the point is similar to that of the forum
132
 or where the court applies 
the foreign law as a matter of international comity.
133
  The exclusive effects of public policy, 
however, occur when a court excludes the application of a foreign law.
134
  This happens when 
it is clear that application of foreign law will lead to a violation of ‘some fundamental policy of 




Although conflict cases are subject to the doctrine of public policy, courts
 
are 
generally reluctant to invoke it.  In Richardson v Mellish,
136
 Judge Burrough, nearly two 
centuries ago, referred to it as ‘a very unruly horse and once you get astride it, you never know 
where it will carry you.’
137 
 Lord Nicholls, in Kuwait Airways v Iraqi Airways (Nos 4 and 5),
138
 
stated that, only in certain exceptional and rare cases, will ‘a provision of foreign law be 
disregarded when it would lead to a result wholly alien to fundamental requirements of justice 
as administered by an English court.’
139
   
Carter contends, however, that, unlike other areas of law, public policy has been more 
successfully invoked in the choice of law ‘relating to commercial contracts, an area in which 
English choice of law rules are more internationalist.’
140
  For that reason, invoking it may result 
in the refusal to enforce contracts that involve restraint of trade,
141
 trading with the enemy,
142
 
defrauding a foreign revenue authority
143
 or breaking the laws of friendly foreign countries.
144
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5. The EU Choice of Law Regime: The Rome I Regulation 
The EU approach to choice of law is not discretionary but rule-based.  With the primary aim of 
harmonising conflict of law rules,
145
 the EU enacted a major legal instrument to govern choice 
of law in contracts:
146
 the Rome I Regulation.
147
  According to Calliess, the Rome Regulation 
reflects the desire to create ‘uniform European rules of the conflict of laws with regard to 
contractual… obligations.’
148
  The initiative to bring about such a unified system is further 
inspired by the already established goal of creating an environment in which freedom, security 
and justice play a significant role of strengthening and maintaining the proper functioning of 
the EU’s internal market.
149
  It is also seen as a means to limit the effects of forum shopping.
150
 
Consequently, and, while paying attention to the need to protect proprietary rights and 
to facilitate private ordering and effective and low-cost contract enforcement as important 
pillars that support commerce,
151
 the Rome I Regulation has preserved the parties’ freedom to 
choose the law that will govern their contract.
152
  Article 3(1) of this regulation requires the 
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choice to be expressly made or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case.  It provides that: 
[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be 
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable 
to the whole or to part only of the contract.
153
 
Apart from giving preference to party autonomy, which is regarded as ‘one of the 
cornerstones of the system of conflict of law rules in the matters of contractual obligations’
154
 
the Regulation also offers protection to consumers.
155
  Extension of consumer protection to 
cross-border contracts was one of the contentious issues during the earlier discussions leading 
to the adoption of this Regulation.  Safeguarding consumers’ interests, however, has been an 
important concern in Europe.
156
   
With the development of Internet and e-commerce it has been necessary for conflict of 
laws rules to address choice of law questions in online consumer contracts,
157
 particularly to 
provide online consumers with the protection of being able to rely on their law of habitual 
residence to govern disputes with e-merchants.   Moreover, given the inherent difficulties of 
determining an appropriate choice of law in online transactions, adopting the Rome I 
Regulation was an opportune moment ‘to precisely define an effective connecting factor 
[which entitles a court] to apply the law of the consumer’s domicile.’
158
 
The most important rules in the Rome I Regulation are the following. 
(i) Parties are free to choose the law governing their contract.
159
  This rule, however, is limited 
by either the operation of mandatory rules or other particular policy considerations. 
                                                 
153
 Art 3(1) of Rome I Regulation. 
154
 See Recital 11 of the Regulation. 
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Recital 23 provides that for ‘contracts concluded with parties regarded as being weaker, those parties should be 
protected by conflict of- law rules that are more favourable to their interests than the general rules.' 
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 See L E Gillies Electronic Commerce and International Private Law: A Study of Electronic Consumer 
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Cyberspace Utopianism’ (1999) 44 Indiana Law Journal 893. 
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 Ibid, at 118.  
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(ii) Where parties did not expressly chose an applicable law the applicable law must be 
determined in accordance with the rules provided for in Art 4 of the Regulation. Such 
determination is to be done objectively, and, in most cases, ‘the objective connecting factor is 
the habitual residence.’
160
  Article 4(1)(a), (b), (d), (e) and (f), provide rules governing choice 
of law for the sale of goods, provision of services, franchises or distribution.  In these cases, the 
applicable law will be determined according to the country of habitual residence of the party 
effecting characteristic performance.
161
   
Article 4(1)(a), for instance, provides that in absence of a choice by the parties, ‘a 
contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has 
his habitual residence.’  Furthermore, if the contract involves provision of services, then 
Art4(1)(b) provides that such contract ‘shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
service provider has his habitual residence.’  As a residual rule Art 4(2) provides that a contract 
is governed by the law of ‘the country where the party required to effect the characteristic 
performance of the contract’ resides.  
Generally, in order to stenghthen legal certainty and predictability, the list of specified 
types of contracts in Art 4 of the Regulation does not grant courts much flexibility in the course 
of determining the applicable law.
162
  Nevertheless, Gebauer argues that the Regulation has 
brought simplicity of application to persons who are not specialised in conflict of laws.
163
  
(iii) Where a contract is more closely related to a country other than provided for by Art 4(1) 
and (2), the Regulation provides that the law of that country will be applied.
164
  However, if the 
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 See M Gebauer ‘Article 4: Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice’ in Calliess (n61) 87. 
161
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Nielsen ‘The Rome I Regulation’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review1687, 1704. 
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See Art 4(3) of Rome I Regulation. Art 4(1) and (2) provides as follows:  
‘(1) [t]o the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3 and 
without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law governing the contract shall be determined as follows: (a) a contract 
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the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual residence in the same country; (f) a franchise contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the franchisee has his habitual residence; (g) a distribution contract shall 
be governed by the law of the country where the distributor has his habitual residence; (h) a contract for the sale of 















law applicable cannot be determined in accordance with what Art 4(1) and (2) provides, then, 
the contract is governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected.
165
   
Treatment of consumer contracts under the Regulation is given special attention.  As 
Art 6 of the Rome I Regulation indicates, the Regulation ensures that the applicable law is that 
of the consumer's country of habitual residence, provided that this is also the country where the 
supplier directed his professional or commercial activities.
166
  Article 6 is considered to be ‘a 
logical extension of the limitations on the freedom of contract which in domestic contract law 
are associated with consumer protection.’
167
  Generally, it therefore reflects the requirement in 
Recital 23 of the Regulation, which reflects the general principle that weaker parties shall ‘be 
protected by conflict of laws rules that are more favourable to their interests.’ In view of this, 
Art 6(1) provides that, subject to certain conditions, where a contract is ‘concluded by a natural 
person for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the 
consumer) with another person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the 
professional) shall be governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence.’ 
Article 6(1)(b) of the Rome I Regulation is more relevant to e-commerce transactions.   
This Article provides as follows: 
1. Without prejudice to Articles 5 and 7, a contract concluded by a natural person 
for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the 
consumer) with another person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the 
                                                                                                                                                          
determined; (i) a contract concluded within a multilateral system which brings together or facilitates the bringing 
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the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.’ 
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Obligations in Europe (2009) 29, 33. 
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regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the consumer) with another person acting in the exercise of his 
trade or profession (the professional) shall be governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his 
habitual residence, provided that the professional: 
(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence, or  
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries including that country, and the 
contract falls within the scope of such activities.’ 
 (See also (generally) Arts 5-8 of the Regulation).   
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professional) shall be governed by the law of the country where the consumer has 
his habitual residence, provided that the professional: 
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries 
including that country, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
The above Art 6(1)(b) lays down one of the conditions that entitle consumers to rely 
on the laws of their own place of habitual residence if the e-merchant ‘by any means, directs 
such activities to that country or to several countries including that country, and the contract 
falls within the scope of such activities.’  Parties are permitted, however, to enjoy freedom of 
choice and may agree to apply a law of another country, save that the law chosen should not 
provide lesser protection than the protection that the consumer should have enjoyed in his 
country of habitual residence.
168
 
Overall, apart from enhancing harmonisation, and hence promoting certainty and 
predictability of the choice of law rules in contracts, the protective mechanism adopted in 
Rome I Regulation in favour of the law of consumer’s habitual residence is a useful tool to 
regulate cross-border transaction.  It is important to note that, although consumer protection is 
currently an issue of global concern and a policy to that effect has been put in place,
169
 there 
has never been a global convention to protect their rights and approaches and the levels of 
protection differ in each country. In the area f conflict of laws, the harmonisation approach 
adopted in the EU is therefore beneficial as it guarantees that consumers will not have to bear 
the burden of litigating away from their place of habitual residence.  This thesis submits thus 
that this approach should be adapted in a global context. 
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As indicated in this chapter, every international contract must be governed by a particular 
system of law.  This law may be expressed by parties or determined by court through the 
conflict of laws rules as the ‘proper law’.  Under the English – and hence Tanzania– conflict of 
laws, whenever parties determine the proper law to govern their contract, their choice will be 
respected unless it is not bona fide or legal, or it is contrary to public policy or contravenes the 
mandatory rules.  The problem, however, arises when parties have not expressly chosen the 
governing law.  If that happens to be the case, the court needs to determine the applicable law– 
a difficult exercise.   
In an e-commerce scenario, the problem is even more complicated, because e-
commerce transactions cannot be easily tied to a particular location.  For instance, determining 
what amounts to an online advertisement or specific invitation to a consumer in a foreign state 
(the dematerialisation factor) is sometimes problematic.  Similarly, it is also becoming difficult 
to determine the location and identity of the parties, a fact which complicates the application of 
special protection rules to be afforded to consumers.   
Consequently, some of the traditional tests developed by courts to help determine the 
applicable law, especially in the common law countries, such as the place of contracting or 
performance are difficult to apply in an online environment given the diversity of connections 
which transactions may have.  In the context of contract formation, for instance, while 
establishing when and where a contract was concluded is helpful in determining the applicable 
law, doing so is not easy as regards Internet-based contracts.  Clarity on the applicable law is 
thus necessary, and, as will be observed in the subsequent chapter, the UNCITRAL approach 
on the time (when) and the place (where) an e-contract is said to be formed may be helpful. 
With the cross-border character of e-commerce, it is also quite possible for online 
suppliers to deal with buyers from all over the world.  In view of this, international trade is no 
longer a preserve of big companies (as it used to be), but has, as of late, embraced a significant 
number of consumer transactions.  Involvement of consumers in such transactions, however, 
has made consideration of legal issues, such as the applicable law in case of a contractual 
dispute, the extent to which mandatory rules can be avoided by parties, the extent to which 
courts may rely on public policy, and the extent to which protection should be extended to 















As stated in this chapter, while the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law has 
been widely accepted, the extent of their freedom, especially in consumer contracts, is 
questionable.  In particular, when consumers are involved in contracts one has to be more 
cautious, given the possible inequality of bargaining power.  In most cases, if such contracts 
are upheld without taking into account the position which consumers occupy, there seems to be 
a high possibility to favour the merchants than consumers.  In most consumer contracts with 
choice of law clauses, for instance, it is the merchants who (due to their stronger position) draw 
up such contracts and insert such clauses unilaterally.  Hence, the merchants gain the advantage 
of deciding in which forum to litigate, and may exploit the consumer’s weak bargaining power 
to choose the law with lowest standards of consumer protection.   
The problem of protecting consumers is further exacerbated by the fact that, whereas 
there may be a requirement that a choice of law clause in a contract must be consented to, (this 
being part of the informed consent requirement) it is far from truth to state that online 
consumers do indeed make an informed consent when they transact online.  This is because 
most e-contracts, such as click-wraps, will require a consumer to click the consent button to 
proceed with the transaction.  Given that the choice of law clauses in such a contracts are 
always fused with others forming a long detailed list of terms and conditions (which not all 
consumers will read to the end) it is not correct to say that a consumer who clicks the ‘I accept’ 
button has sufficient knowledge or made an informed consent.   
In order to protect consumers’ interests, many jurisdictions therefore contain rules that 
are mandatory in nature, meaning that they cannot be avoided by contracting parties.  Some 
such rules provide that a contract may not deprive the consumers of certain rights they are 
entitled to thereby limiting the parties’ freedom by subjecting all contracts affecting 
consumer’s rights under the law of the consumer.   
In view of the potential for e-contracts to cause cross-border disputes, triggering a 
conflict of laws dispute, this chapter argues that, whereas parties are at liberty to design the 
terms of their contract and the law to be applied, conflict of laws rules relating to choice of law, 
and the effectiveness of the parties’ chosen law vis-à-vis the avoidance of mandatory rules of 
an otherwise applicable law, remain issues of priority to e-commerce.   
It has also emerged from the discussion in this chapter that there is a need for clear 















certainty of the existing legal environment, without compromising consumer's rights.  In the 
absence of an express choice of law in a contract, the proper law may be determined either 
subjectively or objectively.  While the subjective approach attempts to impute an intention of 
the parties by examining the terms of the contract or its surrounding circumstances, the 
objective approach ascertains the law through the closest connection test.  In both approaches, 
however, the quest for certainty and predictability may be frustrated.  
On the one hand, as regards the subjective test, no one can truly say with confidence 
what a party had in mind.  On the other, although the objective approach, which attempts to 
localise the contract by determining the factors to which it has ‘closest and most real 
connexion’ would seem preferable, it too is not without difficulties.  In the e-commerce 
scenario the traditional connecting factors, such as the place of contracting, the place of 
negotiation or performance are not easy to locate.  Attempts to establish, for instance, the place 
of contracting in an electronic environment may be a daunting exercise.  Reliance on some 
factual connecting factors, such as the location of the servers may be less helpful because such 
severs may be located in states that have no real connection with the contract.  
There is yet another argument in favour of clarity of the choice of law rules in the light 
of current developments.  It is evident that most of the rules relied upon in Tanzania are based 
on the traditional English common law approach.  This approach is however problematic given 
its slow development, and this casts a shadow of doubts regarding its ability to effectively 
respond to the contemporary changes in the methods of international trade.  In view of the 
developments in the EU this approach now seems to be outdated. 
 
First, the common law rules 
were designed to cater for face-to-face and paper based contracts.  Second, cases relating to 
choice of law in contract in Tanzania are rare, which is an indication that the area has not seen 
much development.  With e-commerce promising wider external engagements, it is necessary 
to consider adopting more flexible rules, including rules that take into account the need to 
promote consumer protection.  
As indicated in this chapter, the EU approach to choice of law rules, as envisaged in 
the Rome I Regulation, presents a model which may further be advanced for global application.  
This option may be useful since it accommodates concerns of individual consumers without 
unduly hindering party autonomy or the continued application of new technologies.  Because 















harmonisation of choice of law rules in a global or regional economic community, such as the 
East African Community of which Tanzania is a member.   
The next chapter examines the need for a more harmonised approach to trans-border 
















CHAPTER FIVE: GLOBAL INITIATIVES ON E-COMMERCE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines efforts to create a global and harmonised regulatory environment for e-
commerce.  It argues that such an approach is the only viable solution to ensure the smooth 
development of e-commerce, to address the inadequacies in domestic legal frameworks (which 
hinder e-commerce growth) and to assist the developing countries in joining the digital 
economy.  
The chapter has nine parts, including this introductory part.  Part two examines the 
necessity for regulating e-commerce internationally.  Part three analyses the debates regarding 
Internet regulation.  Part four examines the ‘agreed’ regulatory approaches, while taking into 
account the role of harmonisation as a strategic platform for successful regulation.
1
   
Building on part four, parts five, six, seven and eight consider some of the global and 
regional e-commerce regulatory initiatives.  These include efforts made by UNCITRAL (as a 
global example), the EU and USA initiatives (representing developed countries) and lastly 
African and East Asia initiatives (which represent the developing countries).
2
  All these 
initiatives are useful because they help to facilitate international trade
3
 and enhance global and 
regional economic integration.  Moreover, they provide mechanisms to address existing legal 
inadequacies hindering domestic e-commerce growth in most developing countries.  Part nine 
concludes this chapter. 
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For more about harmonisation see M Boodman ‘The Myth of Harmonisation of Laws’ (1991) 39 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 699; J A Esterella-Faria ‘Future Directions of Legal Harmonisation and Law 
Reform: Stormy Seas or Prosperous Voyage? (2009) Unification Law Review 1. 
2
 The role played by UNCITRAL in the creation of uniform private law rules that promote functional equivalence 
between online and conventional modes of transacting business reveals its contribution in the promotion of 
international trade through e-commerce.  More about UNCITRAL's role will be considered in part 5 of this 
chapter, the key interest being the Model Law on e-commerce and the UN Convention on E-contracts.  The Model 
Law and the Convention were developed under the auspices of this organisation. 
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governmental organisations), has been quite significant.  For more on this see I J Lloyd Information Technology 















2. Why Regulate E-commerce Internationally?  
The international demand for e-commerce regulation arose from the need to address cross-
border problems that affect e-commerce and the future development and use of the Internet 
technology.
4
  The cross-border nature of the Internet required sensible regulatory approaches 
that would create a balanced environment suitable for varied competing interests.  These 
included: (i) a need to promote equivalence between online transactions and the traditional 
paper-based transactions, (ii) a need to protect contractual autonomy while ensuring consumer 
protection,
5
 and (iii) a need to promote technological advancement (by avoiding unnecessary 
restrictive regulation that would inhibit growth of the Internet and e-commerce).
6
  
As discussed in chapter three, even though e-commerce may take place within the 
sovereign borders of a state, it is largely a cross-border phenomenon.
7
  Attempts to regulate it 
through individualised strategies may lead to inconsistencies, hence, hindering its 
development.
8
  Successful regulation, therefore, rests on international or trans-border solutions, 
an approach that requires measures to support harmonisation.
9
  
In order to avoid inconsistent and isolated regulatory efforts, the current chapter 
supports UNCITRAL initiatives, as reflected in the Model Laws on Electronic Commerce and 
E-signature (adopted in 1996 and 2001 respectively) and the UN Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 2005 (to be referred hereafter as ‘the 
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See H Farrell ‘Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce: The EU-US Safe Harbor 
Arrangement’ (2003) 57 International Organization 277, 278.  The author points out the difficulties posed by the 
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from each other’ and the negative external effects which may result from an individual state's efforts to regulate 
these technologies.  
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American Business Law Journal 575.  See also F Damanpour ‘E-business E-commerce Evolution: Perspective and 
Strategy’ (2001) Managerial Finance 16, 23.  
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 See S K Thomas ‘The Protection and Promotion of E-Commerce: Should there be a Global Regulatory Scheme 
for Digital Signatures’ (1998-1999) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 1002.  See also (generally) K Jamal, 
M Maier & S Sunder ‘Privacy in E-Commerce: Development of Reporting Standards, Disclosure, and Assurance 
Services in an Unregulated Market’ (2003) 41 Journal of Accounting Research 285. 
7
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Principle of Establishment’ (2001) 9 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1. 
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 Ibid at 4.  See also H D Gabriel ‘The Fear of the Unknown: The need to Provide for Special Procedural 
Protections in the International Electronic Commerce’ (2004) 50 Loyola Law Review 307, 308. 
9
See J Huffmann Consumer Protection in E-Commerce: An examination and comparison of the regulations in the 
European Union, Germany and South Africa that have to be met in order to run internet services and in particular 
online-shops (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, University of Cape Town 2004) 10. See also D Satola, R 
Sreenivasan & L Pavlasova ‘Benchmarking Regional e-Commerce in Asia and the Pacific and Assessment of 
Related Regional Activities’ in Harmonisation of Legal and Regulatory Systems for E-Commerce in Asia and the 
Pacific: Current Challenges and Capacity Building Needs (2004). (Available at 















UN Convention on E-contracts’).  These instruments, however, were developed amid heated 
controversy regarding whether the Internet should be regulated, and if so, to which extent and 
in what manner. 
3. Should the Internet be Regulated?  
(a) The Regulatory Debates 
Any discussion regarding regulation of the Internet, whether at international, regional or 
national levels, inevitably affects e-commerce.  Generally, two important issues form the basis 
for debates concerning its regulation: whether it should be regulated and, if so, what regulatory 
form should be used.
10
  Some authors, a cyber-libertarian group, oppose using existing rules to 
regulate the Internet, arguing that such rules are unsuitable for the new environment.  They 
contend that the Internet should be left to regulate itself.
11
  Others, however, who hold a cyber-
paternalist view, have argued that the Internet and its economy can and should be regulated.
12
   
(i) Cyber-libertarians and the Distinct Place Theorists 
The cyber-libertarians
13
 argue in favour of freedom from state regulation.
14
  Their earlier 
arguments were farfetched, to the extent that they declared certain laws, such as those 
regulating intellectual property, to be ‘dead’.
15
  While such early proponents of cyber-liberty 
advanced an anarchy-typology of cyberspace, latecomers to the group regarded cyberspace as a 
‘distinct place’ that behoves a distinct regulatory approach, if indeed it needs to be regulated.
16
   
Johnson and Post, for instance, argued in favour of the ‘distinct place’ approach, 
stating that cyberspace ‘radically undermines the relationship between legally significant 
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Law Review 177. 
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also re-produced in M Geist Internet Law in Canada 3ed (2002) 15-17. 
15
See J P Barlow ‘Key note Address, Symposium on “Fundamental Rights on the Information Superhighway” at 
the New York School of Law 1994’ (1994) Annual Survey of American Law 335. 
16
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(online) phenomena and physical location.’
17
  Theirs was a denunciation of regulation founded 




attempts by each nation to 
regulate would lead to regulatory inconsistency, resulting in chaos.
19
  Consequently, they 
suggested that the Internet must be freed from traditional regulation, or else rules, if any, 
should emanate only from the online community.
20
 
(ii) Against Cyber-Anarchy: The Cyber-Paternalist View 
In efforts to counter the arguments regarding the impossibility of regulating the Internet, cyber-
paternalists (or digital structuralists)
21
 argue that cyberspace is not an ‘unregulatable’ sphere, as 
is assumed.
22
  To the contrary, they say that rules be enacted to address certain cyberspace 
threats, such as children’s access to harmful materials, unauthorised collection of an 
individual’s private information without consent or infringement of intellectual property.
23
  
According to Lessig, regulation should not be conceived of only in governmental 
terms, because there are many other ways to regulate the Internet, including the norms imposed 
by the community or markets or through the use of technology architecture.
24
  Consequently, 
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the law, norms, markets, and architecture constitute four regulatory modalities able to operate 
together within real space and cyberspace.
25
   
A true regulatory concern (suggested by the earlier contenders against cyber 
regulation), however, is that, given the Internet's nature and possible accessibility in other 
jurisdictions, it may face opposing regulatory treatments, leading to confusion.
26
  For instance, 
while some jurisdictions may authorise certain online conduct, such as online gambling, others 
may restrict it, thereby creating serious legal conflicts.
27
  
(iii)The Digital or Cyber-Pragmatist Arguments 
Apart from the cyber-libertarian and paternalist views, there is a third category of scholars who 
posit a more pragmatic approach.  This takes into account the fact that economic globalisation 
and market interactions have created interdependency among online operators, individuals and 
states.  In view of this, cyber-pragmatists support technology-based and other market-driven 
mechanisms, arguing that such mechanisms can address internet problems more responsively 
and efficiently than the traditional regulatory intervention.
28
   
Viewed through an e-commerce lens, a pragmatist approach offers a suitable 
alternative to both digital libertarianism and digital structuralism.
29
  Although it sees private 
arrangements, such as e-contracting, as useful in promoting commercial relations, it recognises 
that the same can only succeed against a background set of rules and policies supported by 
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  From this understanding, and, in order to arrive at an agreed cyber regulatory 
position, the suggestion has been to devise a well harmonised regulatory approach by involving 
all interested parties.
31
  Thus, the crucial issue in regulating cyberspace is not ‘if’ regulation is 





(b) From Who Regulates to How to Regulate 
Three schools of thought have emerged regarding the form of regulation that should be adopted 
to regulate the Internet.  The first two schools, though premised on a market-based approach, 
differ regarding the preferable regulatory modes and the extent to which such approaches 
should be used to control economic activities.
34  
(i) The Self-regulation School 
Self-regulation forms part of the digital pragmatist approach, which supports market based-
mechanisms for regulating industries like the Internet.  Market-based mechanisms, however, 
need not necessarily emanate from the Internet community, as cyber-libertarians claim.
35
  
Instead, proponents argue that whoever advocates intervention must justify it by showing that 
the market has failed to regulate itself.
36
  They support self-regulation because they consider 
governmental intervention too monopolistic in nature, and any form of monopoly hinders 
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development and frustrates the market structure.
37
  Proponents also argue that market-based 
mechanisms are more responsive to changing business needs and practices than legal rules.
38
   
(ii) The Interventionist School  
The interventionist school opposes self-regulation and supports state intervention in the interest 
of the public.  It argues that, in many respects, ‘market systems [are] inherently full of 
deficiencies, inequities and classical market failures, which, as a matter of public interest, must 
be regulated.’
39
  Indeed, the current global economic recession resulting from the failing self-
regulatory controls and auditing mechanisms questions ‘the effectiveness of ... self-regulation 
and have led to increased calls for institutional controls.’
40
  This means that the need to address 
institutional and regulatory frameworks by governmental intervention is inevitable, and 
interventionists call for such steps to be taken.
41
  One challenging issue, however, is the extent 
to which governmental intervention should be allowed.
42
  The answer does not lie in sole, 
direct government intervention (in its strictest sense) but in the so-called new minimalist 
regulatory approach. 
(iii) The New Minimalist Regulatory Approach  
The new minimalist regulatory approach is a combination of the two earlier schools.  It 
supports selective public intervention to the exclusion of other aspects of regulation.
43
  This 
hybrid model represents a significant strategy relevant to Internet regulation,
44
 especially 
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because of its non-restrictiveness as opposed to the restrictive sense, which one may attach to 
the term ‘regulate’.
45
  The approach focuses on the government rather than the market and 
promotes the creation of a level playing field through deregulation and property rights 
guarantees.  The central argument is that governmental interventions should only be 
facilitative, (that is to say, it should only be limited to the establishment of the necessary 
frameworks for harmonious operations of economic activities). 
From an e-commerce perspective, the new minimalist regulatory approach creates a 
suitable environment for e-commerce development because it guarantees the autonomy of 
parties and seeks to ensure that they transact fairly.  Moreover, the approach has the potential 
to enhance technological innovation and widen or advance technology use without unnecessary 
restraints.  It provides room for further development and the adoption of harmonised rules to 
tackle some of the key Internet and e-commerce problems, by bringing together the competing 
private and government interests in the course of finding a common solution.   
Even as governments strive to regulate Internet-bas d activities harmoniously, the 
development of this technology in the hands of the private sector should not be curtailed 
through state regulation, but should be given an opportunity to continue to develop.  In order to 
ensure an appropriate balance, and while advancing the need for harmonious regulation of the 




4. E-commerce and the Need for Harmonisation of Rules 
Legal harmonisation is a  age old ideal.
47
  It implies an attempt to create a coherent framework 
within which domestic laws can be modified or updated in a uniform manner.
48
  It is also 
useful in promoting legal cooperation between different countries.  Historically, the ideal can 
be dated to as early as the ninth century AD, when a code of transnational mercantile law (the 
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lex mercatoria) developed in medieval Europe.
49
  The lex mercatoria has been extraordinarily 
successful in promoting international trade.  Instruments that embody this law draw 
indiscriminately from both civil and common law traditions.
50
   
Harmonisation of rules is, however, not always easy to achieve, given the different 
legal cultures and developments that cut across different jurisdictions.
51
  Nevertheless, as new 
relationships supported by Internet technology, such as e-commerce, continue to evolve at an 
unprecedented speed, harmonised rules become useful.  E-commerce, as a cross-border 
phenomenon, raises various legal issues such as taxation, consumer protection, the form which 
e-contracts may take and the procedures involved in their creation, to mention but a few.
52
  
Consequently, since e-commerce disputes are more likely to trigger a conflict of laws they are 
easier to address where countries apply a set of uniform rules rather than relying on domestic 
system of private international law.
53
  Despite the challenges posed by disparities in legal 
traditions, harmonisation is the only suitable vehicle to advance commerce in a technology-
driven market.
54
   
As such, various international initiatives have been directed towards creating a 
harmonised regulatory environment that will ensure not only easy enforcement of e-contracts 
but also the removal of all unnecessary restrictions.
55
  Central to the existing international 
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regulatory efforts are the reforms determined to promote functional equivalence between 
transactions conducted via the modern technologies and the conventional methods.
56
   
5. Global Efforts Through UNCITRAL  
For business and economies to flourish in the new inter-networked environment, and as called 
for by the New Minimalist Regulatory Approach, regulatory efforts must be drawn from 
different players.
57
  Building on this understanding, UNCITRAL, as the main body of the 
United Nations responsible for the development of international trade law, has contributed a 
great deal towards establishing uniform international trade rules.
58
  Its work on e-commerce 




Initially, UNCITRAL had serious doubts about the effectiveness of the traditional 
state-based rule-making regimes, and the existing domestic laws dealing with issues arising 
from e-commerce.
60
  One of the key issues to which UNCITRAL had to direct its mind was the 
existing legal requirement that documents needed to be signed or be in paper form.
61
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Considering this requirement, and ‘noting that the use of automatic data processing (ADP)’ 
was becoming a firmly established global practice, UNCITRAL recommended a review of the 
existing legal requirements for handwritten signatures or ‘other paper-based method of 
authentication on trade related documents with a view to permitting, where appropriate, the use 
of electronic means of authentication.’
62
   
In the course of implementing this recommendation, it formed a Working Group on 
Electronic Commerce (referred hereinafter as ‘the WGEC’).  This Working Group’s task was 
to prepare Model Laws, one on e-commerce (which was adopted in 1996), and another on e-
signatures (which was adopted in 2001).
63
  Later the WGEC prepared the UN Convention on 
E-contracts.
64
  Together, these instruments, as will be discussed below, represent broadly 
accepted frameworks for international legal harmonisation in the area of e-commerce.
65
  
(a) The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce 
Although the Model Law on E-commerce is not a binding legal instrument, it provides national 
legislators with ‘a set of internationally acceptable rules which detail how a number of legal 
obstacles to the development of electronic commerce may be removed, and how a secure legal 
environment may be created for electronic commerce.’
66
  Its objective is to facilitate e-
commerce by ensuring equality of treatment between users of paper-based documents and of 
electronic forms of communication.  In view of this objective, the Model Law addresses key 
issues affecting e-commerce, including notions such as 'writing', 'signature,' and 'original', 
which were formerly perceived as obstacles to successful e-commerce.
67
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In the course of addressing such obstacles, the WGEC adopted a ‘model law 
approach’ rather than an international convention, although the latter option was not ruled out.  
This approach was preferred because the main concern was to encourage modernisation of 
existing legislation in the various systems of domestic law.
68
  Owing to the diversity, nature 
and magnitude of the domestic obstacles to e-commerce, the approach seemed the most 
sensible,
69
 since it was facilitative and not strictly regulatory.
70
   
As its first priority, the Model Law seeks to promote adaptation of existing national 
legal rules to the online environment.  Since it is only a framework law, it does not take into 
account each and every aspect of e-commerce.  Aside from serving as a model for international 
and national legislation, it assists parties to a contract to formulate their agreement.
71
 
Article 1 defines its scope of application, providing that the Model Law shall apply to 
information in the form of a ‘data message’ used in the context of commercial activities.  ‘Data 
message’ is defined as ‘information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or 
similar means including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, 
telegram, telex or telecopy.’
72
  Article 5 of the Model Law gives legal recognition to ‘data 
messages’ by providing that, where information is in data form it shall not be denied legal 
effect, validity or enforceability because of its form.
73
 
In 1998 Art 5 bis was added to the Model Law
74
 to serve two purposes, namely: (i)to 
provide guidance as to how legislation aimed at facilitating the use of electronic commerce 
might deal with the situation where certain terms and conditions, although not stated in full but 
merely referred to in a data message, might need to be recognized as having the same degree of 
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legal effectiveness as if they had been fully stated in the text of that data message;’
75
 (ii) to give 
recognition to ‘consumer protection or other national and other international mandatory rules 
(eg, rules protecting weaker parties in the context of contracts of adhesion) [which] should not 
be interfered with.’
76
  In other words, states that adopt Art 5 bis may provide in their legislation 
that incorporation by reference in an electronic environment will be valid only ‘to the extent 
permitted by law or by listing the rules of law that remain unaffected by article 5 bis.’
77
  
The Model Law adopted three basic principles to support the application of modern 




(i) The Functional Equivalence Principle 
The functional equivalence principle is based on an analysis of the purposes and functions of 
the traditional paper-based requirements and the extent to which they can be met 
electronically.
79
  Its adoption resulted from thorough work on the best way to adapt paper- 
based legal transactions to an electronic world.
80
  The principle, however, does not suggest that 
technical and factual differences would disappear merely by stating that paper and electronic- 
based communications are equivalent.
81
  Rather, it sets out requirements that should be fulfilled 
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For the principle of equivalence to apply under the Model Law certain conditions must be 
satisfied.
83
  Satisfaction of a legal requirement that information must be ‘in writing’, for 
instance, will be achieved through use of a data message if the information contained therein is 
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.
84
  Thus, to establish whether a particular 
data message still retains its integrity, the Model Law requires such information to be verified 
to establish whether it has ‘remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any 
endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and 
display.’
85
   
(ii) The Technology Neutrality Principle 
The technology neutrality principle promotes non-discrimination between types of 
technologies.
86
  Important issues dealt with by this principle include the traditional 
requirements regarding the form of legal transactions, that is to say, requirements for ‘writing’, 
‘signature’ and ‘original document’.
87
  Since technology is changing fast, the neutral approach 
leaves room for new innovations without necessitating frequent changes in the legal 
framework.  This allows
 
technology developers to operate freely without being restricted to 
                                                                                                                                                          
appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the 
circumstances, including any relevant agreement.’  The principle of functional equivalence has also been 
recognised in other areas of law, for instance, in matters relating to consumer protection.  For example, the 
Australian e-commerce policy framework adopted in 1999, being mindful of the challenges which consumers are 
confronted with as a result of technology developments, embraced five principles which include the principle of 
equivalency and that of technology neutrality.  See Australian Treasury: Review of building consumer sovereignty 
in electronic commerce: A best practice model for business Discussion Paper November 2003 (available at 
http://www.ecommerce.treasury.gov.au/bpmreview/content/_download/BPM_Review.pdf (as accessed on 
23/7/2007)). 
83
 See Art 6 and 8 of the Model Law on E-commerce. 
84
See Art 6(1) which provides that [w]here the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement is met 
by a data message if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. 
(Italics added).  Art 8(1)(a) and (b) further provides that such information must be presented or retained in its 
original form.  According to Art 8 for such information to retain its originality: ‘(a) there exists a reliable 
assurance as to the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as a data 
message or otherwise; and (b) where it is required that information be presented, that information is capable of 
being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.’ 
85
See Art 8(3)(a) of the Model Law on E-commerce. The verification process is important since, as earlier stated 
in chapter two, the online environment is vulnerable to possible manipulation by hackers or impostors, who 
exploit the existing problems of anonymity.  Problems which may be encountered from impostors have long been 
experienced even in the ordinary contracting process if one considers Cundy v Lindsay [1897] AC 456. 
86
Such an idea is contained in Arts 5, 6 and 8 of the Model Law on E-commerce. 
87 See J D Gregory ‘Technology Neutrality and the Canadian Uniform Acts’ 4th International Conference on law 




 October, 2002- available at 
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/conf/conf2002/actes/gregory.html (as accessed on 24/07/2007). The author argues 
that the principle allows users of the modern technologies ‘to decide what is appropriate to them, in expense, in 

















  thereby encouraging competition and innovation and improving 
the manner through which technology may be used to achieve specific legal requirements.
89
 
(iii)The Party Autonomy Principle  
Party autonomy is an important principle contained in the Model Law on e-commerce.
90
  This 
principle is well established in contract law as well as in private international law.
91
 
Notwithstanding the debates considered in chapter four regarding party autonomy,
92
 it suffices 
to state here that, in the area of e-commerce, the Model Law favours its application.  The 
Model Law does so by upholding the importance of the contracting parties’ freedom to choose 
not only the mode of concluding their contract but also the technology to be relied upon to 
authenticate the contracting process.  Consequently, the principle applies to chapter III of part 1 
of the Model Law, which deals with formation and validity of contracts, recognition by parties 
of data messages, attribution of data messages, acknowledgement of receipts and time and 
place of dispatch and receipt of data messages.
93
  
(b) The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-signature 
The development of e-commerce has created a concern over the reliability of the existing 
authentication mechanisms, such as the requirement for written signatures.
94
  The values 
protected by such requirements (for instance, the need to prevent fraud) have not lost their 
importance even in an electronic environment.
95
  In view of this, the WGEC was tasked to 
develop uniform rules on issues regarding authentication, attribution and non-repudiation of 
electronic transactions.  In 2001 this task was accomplished following the adoption of a Model 
Law on e-signatures.
96
  Its adoption resolves the questions regarding the legal effect of e-






See Art 4 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce and Art 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
signatures. See also the Guide to the enactment (n67) paras 19-21. 
91
See D S L Kelly ‘International Contracts and Party Autonomy (Based on Golden Acres Ltd v Queens Estate Pty. 
Ltd)’ (1970) 19 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 701.  See also ‘Conflict of Laws: Party 
Autonomy in Contracts’ (1957) 57 Columbia Law Review 553. 
92
See 'Conflict of Laws: Party Autonomy in Contracts’ (n91). 
93
Chapter III of part 1 of the Model Law covers issues relating to communication of data messages. 
94
 For a more discussion on this see part 6 of chapter two of this thesis concerning authentication.  
95
 In fact, the demand for secure transactions in an online environment is much higher than it may have been in the 
traditional face-to-face or paper-based environment.  See P Latimer ‘Signatures, Squiggles and Electronic 
Signatures’ (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601169 (as accessed on 23/8/2010)). 
96
 See UNGA Res. A/RES/56/8 of 24/12/2001 (available at http://daccess-dds-















signatures and the necessary rules which ensure that parties involved in an e-transaction do not 
repudiate their communications.  
The Model Law on e-signature seeks to build upon the fundamental principles behind 
Art 7 of the e-commerce Model Law.
97
  Its framers were of the view that ‘the use of electronic 
signatures in a manner acceptable to states with different legal, social and economic systems 
could contribute to the development of harmonious international economic relations.’
98
  




The Model Law defines an ‘e-signature’ to include ‘data in electronic form in, affixed 
to or logically associated with, a data message, which may be used to identify the signatory in 
relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory’s approval of the information 
contained in the data message.’
100
  The principles of functional equivalence and technology 
neutrality are also fundamental to this Model Law.  Article 3 embodies these principles by 
prohibiting unnecessary exclusions, restrictions or deprivation of ‘legal effect of any method of 
creating an electronic signature that satisfies the requirements referred to in article 6, paragraph 
1, or otherwise meets the requirements of applicable law.’
101
 
Furthermore, Art 6(3) enshrines the concept of reliability for the purpose of satisfying 
any legal requirement of a signature.
102
  It is not advisable to confine e-signatures to a 
particular technology that keeps changing.  Hence, the Model Law offers freedom to the parties 
to choose any authentication technology they consider appropriate, thereby affirming the 
                                                 
97
 As noted earlier in this chapter, Art 7 of the Model Law on E-commerce seeks to promote reliance on electronic 
signatures in an electronic environment by giving such reliance a functional equivalence to the handwritten 
signatures.  See also Campbell (n59) 836, 843. 
98
See the preamble to the Model Law on E-signature (n96). 
99
Ibid, Art 1 of the Model Law. 
100
Ibid, Art 2 of the Model Law. 
101
Ibid, see Art 3 of the Model Law on e-signature.  Article 6(1) of this Model Law, to which reference is made 
under Art 3, provides that '[w]here the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a 
data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the 
data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant 
agreement.’ 
102
 The Article provides (in sub-article 3) that for an e-signature to be reliable as required under sub-article 6(1) of 
the Model Law it must be shown that ‘(a) the signature creation data are, within the context in which they are 
used, linked to the signatory and to no other person; (b) the signature creation data were, at the time of signing, 
under the control of the signatory and of no other person; (c) any alteration to the electronic signature, made after 
the time of signing, is detectable; and (d) where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide 
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that information after the 























(i) Background and Purpose  
The work done by the WGEC did not end with the adoption of the Model Laws discussed 
above.  The need to further harmonise the national laws on e-commerce necessitated the 
drafting of a more binding instrument in the form of an international convention.
105  
Although 
the Model Laws were a significant development, they were no more than UNCITRAL 
recommendations to national law-makers.
106
  Essentially, UNCITRAL did not envisage a 
formal adoption or notification process to be followed in case a particular state adopted 
them.
107
  Nevertheless, since many domestic statutes have followed the kind of reforms 




he drafting of a binding convention reflects 
the positive effect of these Model Laws.
109
   
                                                 
103
See J A Estrella-Faria ‘e-Commerce and International Legal Harmonization: Time To Go Beyond Functional 
Equivalence?’ (2004) 16 South Africa Mercantile Law Journal 529, 530–531.  
104
The Convention was adopted in 2005 by the General Assembly.  See G.A. Res .60/21, UN Doc/ Res/60/21 (9
th 
Dec. 2005) (available with its accompanying explanatory notes at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf (as accessed on 3/6/2009)). 
105
Several countries had expressed the need to have a binding instrument.  See for example the United State 
proposed for an international convention on electronic commerce (contained in the General Assembly doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.77 (available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/4Electronic_Commerce.html (as accessed on 
30/07/2007)).  See also the proposal by France contained in UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP 93 (available from 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5064899.html (as accessed on 30/7/07)); C Connolly & P Ravindra ‘International 
e-commerce regulation: First UN Convention on e-commerce finalised’ (2006) 22 Computer Law & Security 
Report 31.  
106
 See Connolly & Ravindra (n105) 31-32.  These authors argue that the non-binding nature and flexibility to 
implement the Model Laws has resulted in ‘reduced uniformity [and lessened] certainty and harmonisation of 




To ascertain the current number of countries that in one way or the other have implemented provisions of the 
Model Laws in their Legislation visit the UNCITRAL website at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html (as accessed on 
30/07/2007). 
109
See Connolly & Ravindra (n105) 31-32.  As earlier stated in this chapter when the Model Laws were being 
formulated, e-commerce was still in its infancy stage, and UNCITRAL’s soft law approach was appropriate to the 
times.  However, they have proved to be a highly successful, in light of the many states that have adopted them.  
Consequently, the‘increased familiarity, use and acceptance of [their] legal provisions [to reflect] an increased 
desire in the international community for harmonisation and greater predictability in e-commerce.’ (See Connolly 















The UN Convention on e-contracts is the first of its type to deal with e-commerce, 
especially B2B e-commerce.
110
  It seeks to ‘offer practical solutions for issues related to the use 
of electronic means of communication in connection with international contracts.’
111
  Drawing 
from the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980)
112
 (referred 
hereafter as the ‘CISG’) and the UNCITRAL Model Laws,
113
 it contains useful interpretive 
rules for the use of electronic communications in negotiating and forming contracts. Such rules 




Additionally, the rules of the UN Convention on e-contracts complement those 
contained in the earlier conventions on international trade,
115
 notably the CISG.
116
  Its adoption 
was hence an important step in the development of e-commerce.
117
  It bridges a regulatory gap 
in the existing frameworks for international trade and provides an additional but new lifeline to 
international commerce.
118
   
(ii) Structure and Scope  
The UN Convention on e-contracts is framed in four chapters and consists of 25 articles.  The 
most relevant part of the Convention to this discussion is its chapter III, which deals with the 
use of electronic communications.
119
  Like the Model Laws, the Convention embraces the 
principles of functional equivalence, technology neutrality, and party autonomy
120
  (including 
freedom of form).
121
  The fifth paragraph to the preamble of this Convention states that 
‘uniform rules should respect the freedom of parties to choose appropriate media and 
technologies, taking account of the principles of technological neutrality and functional 
                                                 
110
See P P Polanski 'International electronic contracting in the newest UN Convention' (2007) 2 Journal of 
International Commercial Law and Technology 112. 
111
See para 3 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the E-contracting Convention (n101).  
112
April 11, 1980 S Treaty Doc No.98-9, 1489 UNTS 3 (1984). 
113
See Mazzotta (n81) 251.  
114
See Connolly & Ravindra (n105) 31.  See also part IV –chapter 1 of the Convention’s explanatory notes by 
UNCITRAL Secretariat, para.53 on substantive scope of application (available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf (as accessed on 30/7/07)). 
115
See Art 20(1) of the e-contracting convention.  See also Mazzotta (n81) 252.  
116
 The earlier conventions were basically developed at a different period, ‘the era of faxes and telegrams’ and did 
not contemplate the Internet-based commerce. See Polanski (n110) 112. 
117




See Arts 8-14 of the Convention (n104). 
120
See for instance, Art 3 of the E-contracting Convention which provides that '[t]he parties may exclude the 
application of this Convention or derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.'  
121
See Art 9(1) which provides that '[n]othing in this Convention requires a communication or a contract to be 















equivalence.’  Paragraph 4 of the accompanying explanatory notes, however, states that the 
Convention establishes uniform rules for substantive contractual issues relating to the use of 
electronic communications only.   
The Convention’s scope of application is limited to ‘the use of electronic 
communications in connection with the formation or performance of a contract between parties 
whose places of business are in different States.’
122
  It applies ‘when the law of a contracting 
state [is] the law applicable to the dealings between the parties.’
123
  The explanatory note to the 
Convention provides that, if the parties have not validly chosen the applicable law, the rules of 
private international law of the forum state should be used to determine the applicable law.
124
  
Where a dispute involves a party from a contracting state to the Convention and 
another party from a non-contracting state (and the forum engaged is that of the latter), the 
Convention should be applied if that forum’s rules of private international law indicate that the 
law of a contracting state is applicable.
125
  Similarly, if a ‘party seizes the court of a contracting 
state, the court would equally refer to its own rules of privat  international law and, if they 




Unfortunately, unlike the Model Law on E-commerce, the scope of the Convention 
does not cover e-consumer contracts.
127
  Rather, it deals with the B2B e-contracts save for 
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See Arts 1 and 2 and para 5 the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the E-contracting Convention ((n104). See 
also P P Polanski 'Convention on E-Contracting: The Rise of International Law of Electronic Commerce?' A paper 
presented at the 19th Bled eConference eValues Bled, Slovenia, June 5 - 7, 2006, at 3, (available at 
http://domino.fov.uni-mb.si/proceedings.nsf/0/48ecfcae60f83bf6c12571800036bae9/$FILE/49_Polanski.pdf (as 
accessed on 13/7/2010). 
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In that regard, the convention would apply as part of that foreign state’s legal system.  In other words, ‘if a party 
seizes the court of a non-contracting state, the court would refer to the private international law rules of the State 
in which it is located, and if those rules designate the law of a contracting State to the Convention, the Convention 
would apply as part of the substantive law of that State, notwithstanding that the State of the court seized is not a 
party to the Convention.’  See para 65 the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the E-contracting Convention 
(n104).  
126
Ibid. The explanatory notes to the convention provides, however, that at all times courts which may be seized 
by parties as in the above scenarios, must consider ‘any possible declarations made pursuant to article 19 or 20 by 
the contracting State whose law applies.’ 
127
 See Art 2(1)(a) of the Convention and para 72-74 of its explanatory note by the UNCITRAL secretariat. 
Although the Model Law does not expressly state that it applies to consumer contracts, Art 5bis of the Model Law 
was intended to give recognition to ‘consumer protection or other national and other international mandatory rules 
(such as rules protecting weaker parties in the context of contracts of adhesion) [which] should not be interfered 
with.’ See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (n67) para 46-47.  In the 
course of deliberating on the adoption of a law on e-commerce in Brazil, the UNCITRAL Secretariat was of the 















transactions involving ‘electronic financial services and international transferable documents 
such as bills of exchange.’
128
  Its provisions, therefore, do not create any rights or obligations 
for online entrepreneurs with respect to consumers.  A reason for this lacuna is said to be the 
existence of exclusive consumer protection in many modern legal systems, from which parties 
may not derogate by contract.
129
  
(iii)Its Essential Features  
Despite its limitations, the UN Convention on E-contracts provides an important regulatory 
environment for B2B e-commerce.
130
  It has addressed the important questions regarding 
‘whether web-based contracts are valid, whether a website should be regarded as a binding 
offer or not and … the consequences of input error.’
131
  Its other relevant features for cross-
border e-contracting include rules that determine a party’s location or place of business when 
involved in a B2B contract.   
As discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, establishing a place of business in e-commerce 
is not only difficult but also a critical connecting factor in conflict of laws cases.
132
  The UN 
Convention has solved the matter by providing, in Art 6, which place should be regarded as the 
place of business of the parties.
 133
  In the absence of a clear indication by a party, the 
Convention adopts the closet connection approach.
134
 
                                                                                                                                                          
order not to affect the predictability of the law of electronic commerce and its underpinning principles.’ It was 
reiterated that Art 14 of the Convention, regarding input errors made by human interacting with automated 
message systems might fulfil also a consumer protection function.  See ‘Background Note: Contribution of the 
UNCITRAL texts to Brazilian legislation on Electronic Commerce’ para 8, (available at 
http://forumdocomercioelectronico.files.worldpress.com/2010/03/uncitral-background-notebrazil.pdf (as accessed 
on 25/8/2010)). 
128
See Polanski (n110) 114.  See also Art 2(1)(a) and (b) of the UN Convention on E-contracts. 
129
See Polanski (n54) 4. 
130
Certainly, as some commentator points out, the rules contained in the e-contracting convention will not only 
produce more predictability and certainty in the business world but also resolve important questions that arise in 
the context of electronic contracting. See Mazzotta (n81) 258. 
131
See Polanski (n122) 5. See Polanski (n110) 115. 
132
See Tang (n52) 15, 79 who argues that ‘existing common law authorities suggest that the place of business may 
have a wide and inflexible meaning.'  See also J Catchpole 'The Regulation of Electronic Commerce: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Issues Surrounding the Principles of Establishment' (2001) 9 International Journal of 
Law and Information Technology 7, 10; Polanski (n54) 4.  
133
 See Art 6(1) of the Convention which provides that ‘[f]or the purposes of this Convention, a party’s place of 
business is presumed to be the location indicated by that party, unless another party demonstrates that the party 
making the indication does not have a place of business at that location.’ 
134
Article 6(2) provides that ‘[i]f a party has not indicated a place of business and has more than one place of 
business, then the place of business for the purposes of this Convention is that which has the closest relationship to 
the relevant contract, having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time 















Article 4 defines the place of business to mean ‘any place where a party maintains a 
non-transitory establishment to pursue an economic activity other than the temporary provision 
of goods or services out of a specific location.’
135
  The Convention rejects the determination of 
an e-merchant’s place of business by reference to the location ‘where equipment and 
technology supporting an information system used by a party in connection with the formation 
of a contract are located; or where the information system may be accessed by other parties.’
136
 
Two basic principles can be deduced from Art 4(h) and Art 6(4) and (5).
137
  Firstly, it 
is clear that issues regarding where servers are located and their status, or the domain name of a 
party’s Internet address are immaterial and do not apply in the course of establishing an e-
contracting party’s place of business.
138
  Secondly, the Convention ‘is primarily concerned 
with click-and-mortar companies that pursue both traditional and online outlets.’
139
   
Regarding the form of contracting, the UN Convention on E-contracts endorses the 
‘freedom of form principle’.
140




Article 8(1) of the UN Convention on E-contracts states that ‘[a] communication or a 
contract shall not be denied validity or enforceability on the sole ground that it is in the form of 
an electronic communication.’  The framing f Art 8(1) was inspired by Art 5 of the Model 
Law on E-commerce, with a view to promoting the functional equivalence approach.
142
  A non-
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See Art 4(h) of the UN Convention on E-contracting.  See also para 118 of the accompanying Explanatory 
Notes to the UN Convention on E-contracting (n104).  It is important to note, however, that although the e-
contracting convention defines what the 'place of business' means, its definition does not take into account the so-
called ‘virtual companies’. 
136
See Art 6(4) of the UN Convention on E-contracting. 
137
 Article 4(h) was cited above.  Article 6(4) and (5) provided as follows ‘[a] location is not a place of business 
merely because that is; (a) where equipment and technology supporting an information system used by a party in 
connection with the formation of a contract are located; or (b) where the information system may be accessed by 
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138
See para 119-121 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the UN Convention on E-contracting (n104).  
According to Polanski, what is relevant is only the ‘actual physical location at which a business is run and which a 
party should have indicated.’  See Polanski (n54) 5.  See the definition of business branch, agency or 
establishment given by the ECJ in Case 33/78 Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] ECR 2183 where the degree 
of permanency was contemplated.  Tang has argued, however, that since 'e-commerce was not developed at the 
time it is reasonable to presume that the ECJ did not intend to cover virtual appearance.' (Tang (n52) 68  
139
See Polanski (n54) 5.  
140
See Mazzotta (n81). 
141
See Art 11 of the CISG Convention (n112) above. 
142
See General Assembly Official Records 66
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form requirement is also expressed in Art 9(1).
143
  The two provisions, however, do not 
‘override the form requirements [which may be] set out in national legal systems.’
144
  
Similarly, the provisions do not absolutely insulate e-contracts from possible invalidity 
‘because there may be reasons that may render the electronic communication invalid.’
145
  
Article 9(2) is also a reflection of Art 6(1) of the Model Law on E-commerce, which sets out 




Unlike the Model Laws, treatment of electronic signatures under Art 9(3) of the UN 
Convention on E-contracts ‘underlines the intention rather than approval of the content.’
147
  
Article 9 provides the criteria for fulfilling the electronic equivalent of ‘writing’, ‘signature’ 
and ‘original’.   Polanski notes that, although Art 9 of this Convention embraces a broad 
approach to the techniques of e-signature, its ‘signature reliability test (“as reliable as 
appropriate”) cannot be invoked to invalidate the entire contract, if the identity of the signer is 
unquestionable.’
148
  In view of this, Art 9 may create uncertainty for merchants because the 
legal validity of an electronic signature is to be determined by the applicable national law and 
not by the Convention.
149
  
Other important features relevant to e-commerce are rules about formation of e-
contracts, such as the treatment of offer and acceptance in an online environment, and the 
ascertainment of time and place of contracting.  Unlike the Model Law on E-commerce,
150
 the 
                                                 
143
 Article 9(1) states that ‘[n]othing in [the] Convention requires a communication or a contract to be made or 
evidenced in any particular form.' 
144
See Polanski (n110) 115. 
145
Ibid, citing Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the work of its forty-second session 
(Vienna, 17-21 November 2003) (A/CN.9/546, para 41) (available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V03/904/75/PDF/V0390475.pdf?OpenElement (as accessed on 20/8/2010). 
146
Ibid, para 56.  Article 9(2) provides that '[w]here the law requires that a communication or a contract should be 
in writing, or provides consequences for the absence of a writing, that requirement is met by an electronic 
communication if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.' 
147
See Polanski (n110) 115. 
148
See Polanski (n110) 115, citing Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 
work of its thirty-eighth session 4-15 July 2005 (A/60/17, para. 65).  
149
See Polanski (n110) 115, citing para 28) of Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce: Explanatory Note on the 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts ' Note by the Secretariat, United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Thirty-ninth session New York 19 June-7 July 2006, 
(A/CN.9/608/Add.2). 
150
See Article 11(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on e-commerce.  It provides that in the course of forming e-
contracts, ‘unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an offer and the acceptance of an offer may be expressed by 
means of data messages.’  Since the Model Law recognises use of data messages as valid in contract formation 
(see Arts 5, 9 and 13), Art 11(1) restricts invalidation or non-enforceability of a contract on sole on the sole 
ground that a data message was used to create such a contract.  It is crucial to point out that Art 11 of the 















Convention has addressed these issues.
151
  Since various jurisdictions apply different rules to 
determine the time when acceptance of an offer becomes effective, the time factor was a 
difficult issue for the drafters of the Convention.  According to the explanatory note ‘[t]he 
essential question before UNCITRAL was how to formulate rules on time of receipt and 
dispatch of electronic communications that adequately transpose to the context of the 
Electronic Communications Convention the existing rules for other means of 
communication.’
152
   
As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, a distinction between ‘instantaneous’ and 
‘non-instantaneous’ communication of an offer and acceptance or between communications 
exchanged between parties present at the same place and time (inter praesentes) or 




Under the common law tradition, if parties rely on postal communication, the postal 
rule (also referred to as dispatch or mailbox rule, which falls under the ‘expedition’ theory) 
brings the contract into existence once a letter of acceptance is posted.  The ‘information 
theory’, however, requires knowledge of the acceptance of an offer for a contract to be 
formed.
154
  Consequently, and mindful of the different approaches adopted by the various legal 
systems, the drafters of the UN Convention on E-contracts avoided providing for ‘a rule on the 
time of contract formation that might be at variance with the rules on contract formation of the 
law applicable to any given contract.’
155
   
Although Art 10 of this Convention deals with time and place of dispatch and receipt 
of electronic communications, it does not give a rule on time and place of the formation of a 
contract.
156
  Rather, it provides only guidance with a view to allowing ‘the application, in the 
context of electronic contracting, of the concepts traditionally used in international conventions 
                                                                                                                                                          
this Model Law points out, seeks to ‘promote international trade by providing increased legal certainty as to the 
conclusion of contracts by electronic means.’  The article has thus combined not only formation criterion but also 
the form which an offer and its acceptance may take.  See para 76 of Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, (n67). 
151
 See Arts 10-14 of the E-contracting Convention (n104). 
152
See para 171 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the E-contracting Convention (n104). 
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See para 175 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to E-contracting Convention (n104).  See also 
A/CN.9/528, para 103; and A/CN.9/546, para 119. 
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and domestic law, such as “dispatch” and “receipt” of communications.’
157
  Polanski has 
argued that the absence of a rule governing time and place of contract is still an outstanding 
problem, the solution of which will have to depend on the rules of private international law, 
that is, the law applied by a forum state.
158
   
According to Art 10, an electronic communication is said to be dispatched ‘when it 
leaves an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on 
behalf of the originator.’
159
  Concerning the time of receipt, the UN Convention on E-contracts 
endorses ‘the time when [the communication] becomes capable of being retrieved by the 
addressee at an electronic address designated by the addressee.’
160
  Article 10(3) provides that 
the place from where an electronic communication is dispatched or received is ‘the place where 




Article 11 of the Convention distinguishes an offer from an invitation to treat in an 
electronic environment.
162
  This distinction eliminates the contentious issue regarding the 
extent to which parties offering goods or services through an Internet website are bound by 
advertisements made in this way.
163
  An unresolved problem, however, is whether unsolicited 
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See Art 10(1) of the E-contracting Convention. 
160
See Art 10(2) of the E-contracting Convention.  According to Polanski correctness of an ‘electronic address is 
important, because the time of receipt at another address is when the addressee becomes aware that a message has 
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161
 Article 10 of the convention reflects what Art 15(1) and (2) the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce 
provides.  Art  15 states that (1) ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the dispatch 
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and the addressee, the time of receipt of a data message is determined as follows: (a) if the addressee has 
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the data message enters the designated information system; or (ii) if the data message is sent to an information 
system of the addressee that is not the designated information system, at the time when the data message is 
retrieved by the addressee; (b) if the addressee has not designated an information system, receipt occurs when the 
data message enters an information system of the addressee.’  According to the Guide to enactment of the Model 
Law, the rationale behind Article 15 is to ensure that the location of an information system is not the determinant 
element, and that there is some reasonable connection between the addressee and what is deemed to be the place 
of receipt, and that that place can be readily ascertained by the originator.’  (For more discussion see Sorieul et al 
(n78) 114.)  See also para 105 of the Guide to enactment of the Model Law on E-commerce. 
162
 Article 11 of the convention provides that a proposal to conclude a contract made through one or more 
electronic communications which is not addressed to one or more specific parties, but is generally accessible to 
parties making use of information systems, including proposals that make use of interactive applications for the 
placement of orders through such information systems, is to be considered as an invitation to make offers, unless it 
clearly indicates the intention of the party making the proposal to be bound in case of acceptance. 
163
See para 197 of the Explanatory Notes to the E-contracting Convention (n104).  See also Report of the Working 















marketing of goods and services directly addressed to an individual e-mail account should be 
considered an invitation rather than an offer.  Nevertheless, the rule of thumb is that all e-




For the above rule to apply, however, two conditions need to be fulfilled.
165
  First, the 
web-merchants ‘should not address electronic communications to one or more specific persons, 
and secondly, they should not clearly indicate the intention to be bound in case of 
acceptance.’
166
   
Dealing with mistakes occasioned in online transactions is another important feature 
addressed by the UN Convention on E-contracts.  The Model Law on E-commerce did not 
sufficiently address the role of e-agents and the mistakes occasioned by them in the course of 
e-contracting.
167
  It was considered necessary to address these issues in the Convention because 
several jurisdictions had enacted similar provisions in domestic legislation on electronic 
commerce.
168
  Consequently, Art 12 of the Convention provides that all contracts ‘formed by 
the interaction of an automated message system and a natural person or by the interaction of 
automated message systems’ are valid and enforceable.
169
  Moreover, ‘the Convention 
regulates the question of who should bear the risk of input error in electronic communication 
[although] it only provides for consequences of input error.’
170
  
(iv) Criticisms of the UN Convention on E-contracts 
The UN Convention on E-contracts is subject to criticisms.  Firstly, its scope is too narrow, as 
it does not take into account B2C e-contracts.  Secondly, Art 11 of the Convention (dealing 
with offer and invitations) failed to take into account the fact that many e-companies would 
require prior registrations, and, once that was done, communications are directed to specific 
                                                                                                                                                          
76 (available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V02/527/26/PDF/V0252726.pdf?OpenElement 
(as accessed on 21/8/2010)). 
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What the Model Law dealt with in Art 13(2)(b) was to provide for a general rule on attribution.  See para 209 
and 226 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to E-contracting Convention  (n104). 
168
See para 210 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the E-contracting Convention (n104).  See also 
A/CN.9/546, para. 124-126. The issue of e-agents is covered under Art 12 of the Convention while that of 
mistakes in e-contracts fall under Art 14 of the Convention. 
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  Maelik argues that since ‘diverse websites require a log-in or registration this could 
lead to the qualification as binding offers, as they would be addressed to a specific group of 
persons (who are registered or logged-in).’
172
   
A third criticism relates to Art 14 of the Convention.  This Article provides for errors 
in electronic communications and provides that:  
1. Where a natural person makes an input error in an electronic communication 
exchanged with the automated message system of another party and the 
automated message system does not provide the person with an opportunity to 
correct the error, that person, or the party on whose behalf that person was 
acting, has the right to withdraw the portion of the electronic communication in 
which the input error was made if: 
(a) The person, or the party on whose behalf that person was acting, 
notifies the other party of the error as soon as possible after having learned 
of the error and indicates that he or she made an error in the electronic 
communication; 
and 
(b) The person, or the party on whose behalf that person was acting, 
has not used or received any material benefit or value from the goods or 
services, if any, received from the other party. 
2. Nothing in this article affects the application of any rule of law that may 
govern the consequences of any error other than as provided for in paragraph 1. 
Clearly, this Article seems to be more appropriate to consumer e-contracts than B2B e-
contracts, despite the fact that the scope of the convention is limited to B2B transactions.
173
   
Finally, Art 19 and 20(2) of the Convention, which allow parties to make declarations 
excluding certain matters to which the Convention would have otherwise applied, are also 
criticised
174 
since they may be used by states to set up barriers ‘to the international 
harmonisation of legal rules surrounding e-commerce.’
175
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174
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See Connolly & Ravindra (n105) 33.  See para 277 of the accompanying Explanatory Notes to the UN 
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6. Efforts in the Developed World  
(a) The EU Initiatives through EU Directives 
In chapters three and four, this thesis dealt with the EU’s efforts to harmonise jurisdiction and 
choice of law rules governing cross-border contracts (among other issues).
176
  In order to 
benefit from the single market framework enjoyed in the EU the need to promote widespread 
adoption of e-commerce has been an important priority for that trading block.
177
  E-commerce, 
in the European context, is widely described as ‘a unique opportunity to create economic 
growth, a competitive European industry and new jobs.’
178
  In view of the need to enhance 
consumers’ trust and confidence in e-commerce, and in order to avoid inconsistencies in 
domestic regulation, the EU has adopted a series of Directives with direct effect on e-
commerce development.
179
   
(i) The EC Directive on Consumer Distance Contracts  
The Distance Selling Directive
180
 applies only to B2C transactions.  It covers consumer 
distance contracts, which include contracts concluded by traditional means of distance 
communication, such as telephone shopping, and the more modern ones, ie mobile phone 
commerce (m-commerce) and the Internet (e-commerce).
181
  The salient features of this 
Directive include its scope,
182
 the sellers’ obligations towards consumers and the consumers’ 
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 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts (1997) O.J. (L 144) 19. 
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 Article 2(d) of this Directive defines a ‘consumer’ as any natural person who, in contracts covered buy this 
Direction, is acting for the purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession. 
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 See Art  2(a) ‘any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a supplier and a consumer under 
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  Because this Directive covers B2C transactions, it has a number of 
protections for the benefit of consumers.
184
  In the recent past, however, the Internal Market 
and Protection Committee of the European Parliament (IMCO) adopted a proposal for a new 
Consumer Rights Directive, which seeks to establish a clear and harmonised set of rules on 
consumer rights, thereby increasing 
 





(ii) The E-Commerce Directive  
The E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC
186
 applies to service providers that operate 
‘information society services’ within the EU.
187
  It provides that the place of business for such 
operators is the place where a company, providing such services, pursues its economic activity 
and not the place where its servers are located or where its websites are accessed.
188
   
The European Commission had earlier indicated in one of its proposals that e-
commerce cannot fully develop if e-contracting is hampered.
189
  It pointed out three elements 
that are essential for a functioning e-commerce environment.  These were the need to remove 
legal barriers to the use of electronic contracts, the need to embrace functional equivalency or a 
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 See A Schwab Report A7-0038/2011 ‘Consumer rights (final vote) COM (2008)0614 – C6-0349/2008 – 
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prejudice to the level of protection for, in particular, public health and consumer interests, as established by 
Community acts and national legislation implementing them in so far as this does not restrict the freedom to 
provide information society services. 
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 See Art 2(c) of the Directive.  Recital 19 states that ‘[t]he place at which a service provider is established 
should be determined in conformity with the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which the concept of 
establishment involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite 
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establishment of a company providing services via an Internet website is not the place at which the technology 
supporting its website is located or the place at which its website is accessible but the place where it pursues its 
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non-discriminatory (medium neutral) approach to e-contracts, and the need to create legal 
certainty in the laws governing e-contracts.
190
   
In view of the Commission’s proposals, the E-commerce Directive creates a legal 
framework that takes into account certain aspects of electronic commerce in the internal 
market, such as e-contracts formation and liability of intermediaries (Internet Service 
Providers).
191
  Consequently it is also referred to as the Legal Framework Directive.
192
  It seeks 
to ensure legal certainty and to build consumer confidence and trust
193
 and complements other 
directives which promote consumer protection.
194
  Key features of this Directive include the 
principle of establishment and information requirements (which include exclusion of prior 
authorisation requirements for those who wish to take up or pursue an activity of the nature of 
an information service provider).
195
   
As regards the requirement of information, the E-commerce Directive obliges service 
providers to disclose certain information to recipients of their services in an easy, direct and 
permanently accessible way.
196
  Article 6 of this Directive further provides that ‘[i]n addition to 
other information requirements established by Community law,’ commercial communications 
must comply with conditions set out in the Directive.
197
   
Another important feature in this Directive is the treatment of contracts and the 
technical information requirements necessary to the formation of e-contracts.
198
  While 
member states are required to promote e-contracting,
199
 an information service provider is 
required to provide, clearly and unambiguously, the necessary steps to be followed to conclude 
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 Ibid, at 7, 8 and 11. 
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must lay down a clear and general framework to cover certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal 
market.’ 
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 Ibid, see recital 10-11. See Art 1(3). 
195
 See Arts 4(1) and Art 5 of the E-commerce Directive. 
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 See Art 5 of the E-commerce Directive.  
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an e-contract, including, among others, the technical means of correcting all input errors.
200
  
Overall, this Directive provides an important framework for e-commerce regulation within EU.  
(iii)The EC Directive on Data Protection
201




The power with which technology can intrude into the private life of an individual in this 
information age is unprecedented.  Given the nature of e-commerce, the need to protect 
personal data retained in the course of e-commerce transactions has become very important.  In 
order to address this issue, the EU Directive on Data Protection seeks to protect, inter alia, ‘the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular the right to privacy with 
respect to processing of data.’
203
   
In order to ensure that each EU member state takes responsible steps to protect 
individual data, the Directive requires them to prohibit transfer of personal data to non-member 
states, unless such other third country already ensures an adequate level of protection in this 
regard.
204
  Additionally, it contains a number of principles concerning data quality and 
regulates the circumstances in which processing of personal data is allowed (for instance, 
consent of the data subject).
205
  
A complementary Directive, ie, Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy of Communications 
(as amended by Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006), was also adopted to govern the 
processing of personal data related to electronic communication services that are available in 
open networks, like the Internet.
206
  In effect it translates the principles set out in Directive 
95/46/EC into specific rules for the electronic communications sector.
207
  It lays down the rules 
applicable to processing, by network and service providers of traffic, and location data, 
generated by using electronic communications services.  These rules cover issues such as 
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(b) The US Initiatives to Regulate E-commerce 
(i) The Framework Paper 
In 1997, the US government issued a ‘Framework Paper for Global Electronic Commerce’ 
describing the revolutionary and economic potential of the Internet.
213
  The then Vice 
President, Al Gore, noted that the world was on the verge of a revolution, and that soon 
electronic networks were going to ‘allow people to transcend the barriers of time and distance 
and take advantage of global markets and business opportunities not even imaginable today, 
opening up a new world of economic possibility and progress.’
214
  
The Framework Paper sets out five vital principles for global e-commerce 
development, namely: (1) allowing the private sector to take the lead in the industry, (2) 
avoiding undue government restriction on electronic commerce, (3) ensuring governmental 
involvement (but at minimal levels, that is to say, only with the view to ‘support, and enforce a 
predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce’), (4) ensuring 
full governmental recognition of the unique quality of the Internet, and (5) ensuring that e-
commerce is facilitated on a global basis.
215
  
With these goals in its sights the US government took a major step forward to 
establishing a legal framework for e-commerce.  This framework consists of the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA)
216
 and the Uniform Electronic Transactions 
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 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) (2002) (available at 

















  These uniform statutes were prepared by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to provide a set of standard rules to 
regulate electronic transactions,
218
  demonstrating the need for uniformity of the law whilst not 
impeding e-commerce growth. 
(ii) The UCITA  
As a model contract law statute, ‘designed to deal with the new information economy’,
219
 the 
UCITA applies to ‘contracts relating to software and other forms of computer information 
transactions.’
220
  It defines ‘computer information’ to mean ‘information in electronic form 
which is obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of being 
processed by a computer.  The term includes a copy of the information and any documentation 
or packaging associated with the copy.’
221
  It also defines a ‘computer information transaction’ 
to mean ‘an agreement or the performance of it to create, modify, transfer, or license computer 
information or informational rights in computer information (...), [and] [t]he term does not 
include a transaction merely because the parties’ agreement provides that their communications 
about the transaction will be in the form of computer information.’
222
  Presently, this Act has 
been adopted by two states only, namely, Virginia and Maryland.
223
  
(iii)The UETA  
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) came much earlier than the UCITA.  Like 
the UCITA, the UETA was promulgated in response to the perceived need to support the new 
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  Unlike the UCITA, however, the UETA has been adopted in many states.  It deals 
with electronic records and messages and builds a foundation for their use in e-transactions.
225
   
In terms of its scope (set out in s 3) the UETA ‘applies to electronic records and 
electronic signatures relating to a transaction.’  Its scope is, however, limited to ‘transactions 
related to business, commercial (including consumer) and governmental matters.  
Consequently, transactions with no relation to business, commerce or government would not be 
subject to this Act.’
226
  Overall, the Act seeks to remove barriers to e-commerce, support legal 
neutrality with regard to mediums or technologies used to effect transactions, and it supports 
the principle of functional equivalence.
227
   
7. Developing Countries’ Initiatives to Develop E-commerce  
Initiatives to build e-commerce frameworks have also been underway in the developing world.  
This section assesses these initiatives, particularly in Africa and East Asia (the ASEAN 
Countries).
228
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(a) The ASEAN Countries’ Initiatives 
(i) The ASEAN Platforms for E-commerce Growth 
In 1997, the ASEAN heads of state unveiled a development strategy, the 2020 vision.  The 
vision accentuates the need to create an integrated ASEAN economy.  Recognising the 
importance of ICT in economic growth, it underscores the need to establish a ‘regional 
information technology network and centres of excellence for dissemination of and easy access 
to data and information.’
230
  Two initiatives were launched to achieve this purpose: the e-
ASEAN Initiative and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). The former seeks to 
‘develop a broad–based and comprehensive action plan, including physical, legal, logistical, 
social and economic infrastructure needed to promote ASEAN e-space as part of ASEAN 
positioning and branding strategy.’
231
  The importance of this initiative to e-commerce 
development in this region is its focus on ‘establish[ing] a regional-wide approach [for] 




In 2000, through the e-ASEAN Initiative, the member states entered into a framework 
agreement to facilitate the setting up of the ASEAN Information Infrastructure (AII).  This 
agreement supports efforts to ‘adopt electronic commerce regulatory and legislative 
frameworks that create trust and confidence for consumers and facilitate the transformation of 
businesses [in the region.]’
233
  It also encourages adoption of national laws and policies that 
promote e-commerce transactions on the basis of international norms, mutual recognition of 
digital signature frameworks, secure regional electronic transactions, and payments and 
settlements through mechanisms, such as electronic payment gateways.
234
 
Since 2001, the ASEAN countries adopted a common reference framework for e-
commerce legislation.
235
  This common framework aims at assisting member countries that 
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Investment No. 54 (ST/ESCAP/2348) (2004) 81 (available at 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/tipub2348_party1v.pdf (as accessed on 2/8/2007)). 
231




Ibid at 83 
234
 See R Quimbo (n230). 
235
Ibid at 87. The laws that form the reference framework are- Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) of Singapore; 















have not developed e-commerce laws to do so in harmony with international norms.  In 2000, 
the 4
th
 ASEAN Informal Summit held in Singapore endorsed the launching of the ASEAN 
Integration Initiative (IAI) in order to improve e-commerce and to ensure a harmonised 
economic growth in the region.
236
  Key programmes under this initiative include infrastructure, 
human resource development, information and communication technology and capacity- 
building for regional economic integration.
237
  
(ii) The ASEAN Legal Harmonisation Strategy – Asian Member States Lead 
the Way 
The role of law in Asian economic development has been well documented.
238
  Given its 
contribution to the economic life of the ASEAN states, these countries have taken steps to 
‘overhaul or effect amendments to their existing laws to deal with the emerging legal issues 
that electronic commerce raises.’
239
  The different levels of economic growth and different 
legal systems of the Asian states, however, necessitated the adoption of a harmonised 
regulatory approach.  Consequently, the UNCITRAL Model Laws on E-commerce and E-




                                                                                                                                                          
Electronic Transactions Order of Brunei Darussalam and Draft Electronic Transactions Bill (ETB) of Thailand. 
All these are said to have drawn heavily from the UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce and Draft 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures, as well as the e-commerce and electronic signature laws used by some states 
in the United States (such as Utah and Illinois) and by some countries in Europe (such as Germany.) (See Quimbo 
(n230). 
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(b) E-commerce Development Initiatives in Africa  
(i) The African Information Society Initiative (AISI) 
Unlike the Asian region, Africa still lags behind in terms of ICT infrastructures 
development.
241
  Even its basic infrastructures, which could support robust commercial 
activities, are underdeveloped, thus limiting the growth of trade and commerce in the region.
242
  
These problems are compounded by other factors, such as lack of harmonised policies and 
laws.
243
  Consequently, if e-commerce is to develop on the continent successfully, state laws 
must be harmonised with those of the major trading partners.
244
  
In terms of individual country ICT developments, some African countries have made 
progress towards designing and adopting policies.
245
  Nonetheless, only a few have formulated 
electronic transaction legislation.
246
  Although there are difficulties to be encountered, 
assessment of Africa's e-commerce potential by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa's reveals that the continent can potentially benefit from export-oriented services.
247
 It is 
argued, for instance, that the continent may consider: ‘[e]xport-oriented online teleservices, eg, 
call centres; [b]usiness-to-business offline e-businesses, eg, digitisation services, translation 
services; [d]iaspora-oriented e-businesses, eg, facilitating [d]iaspora communication with 
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family at home, and [g]overnment, [p]an-African institutional or regional e-procurement 
activity.’
248
   
The fact that Africa can potentially tap into new developments should be an added 
incentive to create an enabling environment that stimulates and develops niche markets.  
Questions therefore arise regarding the means which Africa should use to ensure the 
development and diffusion of ICT within its economic mainstream so as to reap the benefits of 
e-commerce.
249
  One clear fact is that Africa needs ‘good information and communications 
infrastructure, essentially, the Internet, [if it is] to participate in e-commerce.’
250
  
Since 1995, initiatives meant to address the information and communication 
technology gap in Africa have been underway, especially after the African Information Society 
Initiative (AISI) was conceived.
251
  In 1999, AISI facilitated the African Development Forum 
(hereafter ‘ADF’99’) Conference.  The conference aimed at promoting an information 
technology development agenda in the context of globalisation and the so-called digital 
economy.
252
  In order to address the problems identified by the ADF’99, and to facilitate 
Africa’s integration into the new knowledge-based economy, governments were urged to 
develop appropriate policy and legislative frameworks.  Such policies ought to be able to 
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address a range of issues relevant to e-commerce, for instance, enhanced connectivity, privacy 
and intellectual property protection.
253
  
Overall, although e-commerce activities are emerging in most African countries, their 
growth has been slow due to the limited communication infrastructure, low levels of bandwidth 
connectivity (and entire Internet penetration), and the lack of awareness about the existing 
opportunities offered by e-commerce.
254
  Consequently, governments need to adopt new 
strategies and legal or regulatory frameworks that are conducive to e-commerce growth.
255
  
The African Union’s efforts through the NEPAD initiative to address some existing e-
commerce development constraints are a highly commendable strategy.
256
  NEPAD promotes 
the need to embrace ICT for the growth of e-commerce so as to bridge the digital divide.  In 
recognising the role played by ICT in socio-economic development and its ability to facilitate 
intra-regional trade, NEPAD established an e-Africa Commission in 2001.  This was mandated 
to oversee the ICT development in Africa.
257
  In general, because the rapid growth of the 
Internet serves as the basis for global socio-economic transformation and the development of 
the knowledge-based economy, the requisite infrastructure for e-commerce has been a priority 
issue.
258
  In 2003, the Tunis E-commerce Conference emphasised the use of ICT, e-business 
and e-commerce as powerful tools for integrating African countries into the world economic 
system.
259 
(ii) Initiatives through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
Regional economic communities, such as the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), have a critical role to play in bringing about 
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integration and harmonisation of laws and policies that foster e-commerce.  In view of this, 
African states should seize the available opportunities in these structures to develop their ICT 
infrastructure for e-commerce transactions.
260
 
Within the East African Community, for instance, efforts to create an environment 
that is conducive to e-commerce have long existed.
261
  Although no specific regional model 
law on e-commerce has been adopted, a Task Force, known as the East African Community 
(EAC) Task Force on Cyberlaws, was created to address cyber law issues.
262
 The Task Force, 
in collaboration with UNCTAD, has managed to develop a Phase I Framework for Cyberlaws 
(“Framework”) which was adopted by the 2nd Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the EAC Sectoral 
Council on Transport, Communications and Meteorology in May 2010.
 263
   
Although the EAC Phase I Framework for Cyberlaws is not itself a model law it 
reflects the available international best practice envisaged in existing ‘model laws and other 
instruments of public international law’ with an overall objective of facilitating ‘the use of 
electronic means of communication to enter into and execut  legal acts.’
264
 Because it is meant 
to create a basis for a harmonised legal regime for the effective functioning of e-commerce and 
an e-governance system in the region, the Framework envisages reform of national laws on five 
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(accessed on 21/11/2011)). 
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key areas namely: electronic transactions, electronic signatures and certification services, data 
protection and privacy, consumer protection and computer crime.
 265
    
Under the Phase I Framework, the term ‘electronic transactions’ is regarded as  not 
only including  transactions of  commercial value  such as ‘agreements for the purchase goods, 
products or services’ but also ‘interactions with government and administrative bodies, in 
either a commercial or non-commercial context.’
266
  In order to ensure effective reform process 
within the region, the Task Force issued a total of 19 recommendations which need to be taken 
into account by the EAC member states when reforming their domestic legislation. These 
recommendations include the following:  
 that, because governments, when adopting a measure on electronic transactions, have 
certain aims and objectives that should be achieved, eg, to ‘facilitate domestic and 
international electronic commerce by eliminating legal barriers and establishing legal 
certainty’  or ‘to encourage the use of reliable forms of electronic commerce’,  the 
preparation, adoption and interpretation  of electronic transaction legislation must 
assume a purposive approach;
267
  
 that, in order to  avoid unintended consequences with regard to the application of an e-
commerce legislation, it may be necessary to include provisions specifically detailing 
the areas in which the law is intended to apply. In view of this, it is recommended that 




 that, in order to maintain freedom of contract, private entities should be given the 
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 that, in order to ensure clarity and avoid uncertainty regarding the meaning of certain 
technology based terms, a comprehensive set of statutory definitions should be 
incorporated in the electronic transactions legislation;
270
 
 that, ‘[p]rovisions should be drafted recognising the validity of electronic 
communications as meeting as requirement for a ‘writing’, ‘signature’ or ‘original’ and 
all areas where the law requires a person to file paper documents with public bodies 
including licensing, certification.’ However, such validity may be subject to certain 
conditions being met and exemptions may be made for certain specified legal acts.’
271
  
In this regard, the  Task Force recommended  that the wording used in the United 
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (2005) be adopted;
272
 
 that, regarding validity of contracts formed by way of data messages or by using e-
agents, the time and place where such contracts are deemed to be formed, and whether 
incorporating certain terms of such contract by way of hypertext links meets the legal 
requirements,  are issues that need to  be expressly addressed in the electronic 
transactions law and the wording used in the United Nations Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts (2005), in particular Art. 8, 11-
13 is  recommended;
273
 
 that, as regard evidential matters the electronic transaction law adopted by any 
member state should ‘[facilitate] electronic record-keeping and permits the admission of 
electronic records as evidence before a judicial, administrative or dispute resolution 
body, subject to certain conditions.’
274
 
Overall, it is important to note that during the preparation of the EAC Framework for 
Cyberlaws (Phase I), the responsible Task Force adopted a comparative analysis of the 
Commonwealth Model Law on Electronic Transactions (2002), the UNCITRAL Model Laws 
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on Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures (1998 and 2001 respectively) and the 
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (2005).
275
  The Task Force’s approach is commendable because it creates 
complimentarity and avoids conflicting versions which may be adopted by EAC member states 
such as Tanzania.  Its recommendations will thus offer a useful guidance to Tanzania’s law 
reform process.  
In the SADC region, similar initiatives to promote economic growth have been 
underway.
276
  In a bid to promote economic integration through trade and investment, 
development of e-commerce has been one of SADC’s top priorities.
277
  In August 2001, for 
instance, SADC adopted an ICT Declaration that emphasised the need to remove e-commerce 
barriers within its member countries in order to exploit the opportunities and benefits of the 
technology.
278
  The ICT Declaration is a stepping stone towards further development and 
adaptation of new technologies that will enhance e-commerce capability, and thereby integrate 
the region into the global economy.
279
  It asserts SADC member states’ commitment in five 
major areas, namely: 
 the regulatory environment for Information and Communications Technology; 280 
 infrastructure for ICT development;281 
 community participation and governance in ICT development; 282 
 ICT in Business Development; 283 and 
 human resource capacity for ICT development.284  
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 See  e-SADC Launch Meeting  05 – 06 October 2009,  ECA/SA/E-SADC/2009/Info.1 (available at 























Being fully aware of the existing paradigm shift to digitisation, SADC, in its 2004 
strategic plan, reviewed and re-focused its development strategies.  Emphasis has been laid on 
the need to utilise ICT aggressively, as a catalyst for socio-economic development and 
prosperity.
285
  In view of this, several projects have been underway, including the so-called dot-
GOV Southern African ICT and Policy Reform Support (SIPRS) Project.  This project, which 
was funded in partnership with the USAID, aimed at developing a harmonised legal framework 
for electronic commerce in the region.
286
 Through this project, a Draft SADC Model Law on E-
commerce was tabled at a SADC Workshop on Harmonisation of E-commerce Laws held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in November 2003.
287
  This Draft Model Law, follows the 
UNCITRAL approach,
288
 thus endorsing the principle of non-discrimination between media (or 
media neutrality), and functional equivalence as between paper documents and electronic 
messages.
289
  Other matters considered in the Model Law are electronic transactions, electronic 
signatures, cyber crimes, data protection and privacy.
290
    
In February 2004 a revised version of this Model Law was submitted to the 
Telecommunications Regulators Association of Southern Africa (TRASA) and ‘a  Legal and 
Policy Affairs Working Committee was formed at the 7
th 
AGM, specifically to review the draft 
Model Law for ways to strengthen issues of data protection, electronic transactions (digital 
signatures) and convergence of technologies.’
291
  
Although the Draft SADC Model Law was expected to be finalised in 2004,
292
 no 
further developments have been reported to date, and it is not clear whether there are any 
ongoing efforts to finalise it.  The only problable conclusion is that the proposed SADC Model 
Law has remained a ‘draft model law’ that was never released to the public nor finalised.  In 
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view of this, it is clear that more efforts to harmonise e-commerce rules in the region, and 
indeed, the entire continent, should be considered a key priority in order to facilitate trade and 
enhance economic growth. 
Other important developments in the region include the adoption of an e-SADC plan 
which was developed in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) in 2010.
293
 This plan, which was  supported by UNECA, focuses ‘on the role 
of ICTs in transforming SADC into an information-based economy and aims to address all 
major aspects of e-applications including e-government, e-parliament, e-commerce, e-
education, e-health and e-agriculture.’
294
 
Since June 2011 SADC also adopted ICT Consumer Rights and Protection Regulatory 
Guidelines ‘meant to assist decision makers in the ICT Sector to ensure that consumer 
protection becomes an integral part of their developmental objectives in the SADC region.’
295
 
These ‘Guidelines aim to:  
(i) encourage regional policy harmonization on consumer protection issues’;  
(ii) facilitate achievement or maintenance of adequate ICT consumer protection in 
SADC region; 
(iii)encourage high levels of flow of information to consumers to allow them to make 
informed choices;  
(iv) encourage high levels of ethical conduct by ICT service and product providers;and 
(v) encourage availability of effective consumer redress.’296  
In addition, the Guidelines provide seven key principles on consumer protection which a 
service provider is required to observe. In particular the seven principles require service 
providers:  
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 ‘to make sure that all services and products meet the specifications as 




 ‘not to discriminate against consumers on the basis of race, gender, ethnic 
background, sexual orientation or special needs’; 
299
 
 ‘to assist consumers when they need information and guidance with regard 
to their products’; 
300
 
 ‘to keep consumers’ personal information confidential’;301  
 ‘to handle consumer complaints promptly, correct mistakes and inform them 
how to take their complaints forward if they are still not satisfied; and’
302
 
 ‘to train their staff to make sure that the procedure they follow reflect the 





 the SADC Draft Model Law was never finalised, and the EAC 
Framework (Phase I) is just a framework to guide the EAC member states in their efforts to 
enact e-commerce legislation.  As such, although the current efforts in both regions are useful 
they are still not sufficient to guarantee harmonisation of e-commerce rules among their 
member states.  Because e-commerce is a cross-border activity, and since some countries, for 
instance, Tanzania maintain membership in both regional entities, more efforts are needed to 
develop effective and complemetary systems of harmonised binding rules to govern e-
transactions in the two regional communities.  Such rules, which constitute one of important 
attributes to a successful economic integration, must also include rules intended to resolve 
conflict of laws issues.    
Overall, since the SADC Draft Model Law was never finalised, the paucity of efforts 
towards the harmonisation of e-commerce rules within the SADC region, and indeed, the entire 
continent, is lamentable in light of its role to facilitate trade and enhance economic growth.  It 
has been noted, for instance, that there has been an increasing trade volume in services in many 





























countries within the SADC region.
305
  In 2007, for instance, ‘the services sector accounted for 
59.3% of SACU’s Gross Domestic Product.’
306
  The table below reveals the trends and, in my 
view, suggests that enhanced regional economic integration through adoption of a harmonised 
e-commerce legal framework will further boost the growth of trade in services and other 
products.  
Table 3: Total services exports and imports of the EU (27), US $ million 
 Exports (2006) Imports (2006) 
Africa 32 242 36 132 
Botswana 115 56 
Lesotho NA NA 
Mozambique 171 207 
Namibia 114 307 
South Africa 6 655 5 466 
Swaziland 59 38 
Source: Cronje307 
8. Conclusion 
The rapid growth of ICT has not only been a central theme in economic development agenda, 
but also a legal issue for both developed and developing countries.  Currently these 
technologies serve as the basis for global socio-economic transformation and development of 
the knowledge-based economy.  To harness their potential, however, appropriate strategies, as 
well as effective legal frameworks are necessary.  Law has an important facilitative role to play 
in meeting the increasing demands of a technology-driven society.  Its importance hinges on 
the crucial role it plays as a regulatory infrastructure.  A good legal framework helps to 
establish an environment that is conducive to economic growth.  With this in mind, concerns 
have arisen regarding the need to ensure that global, regional, or domestic legal frameworks 
that regulate e-commerce are harmonised in order to avoid regulatory inconsistencies.  
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See J B Cronjé ‘Trade in services and the regional integration process in southern Africa’ in C McCarthy, J B 
Cronjé, W Denner,T Fundira, W Mwanza & E Bursvik Supporting Regional Integration in East and Southern 
Africa – Review of Select Issues Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (2010) 94-114. 
306
Ibid at 95. 'SACU' stands for Southern African Customs Union.  For more on the statistics on total services 
exported and imported within the region visit http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LEVEL (as accessed 
on 13/10/2010). 
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As the Internet and e-commerce assume greater importance in global business, this 
chapter has analysed various global and regional efforts that aim at ensuring harmonised 
regulation of e-commerce, this being a suitable strategy to guarantee its continued growth.  As 
noted in this chapter, such efforts include the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Laws on e-
commerce and e-signature and the UN Convention on E-contracts.  These instruments have 
been useful to various countries because they provide rules that can be relied upon to address 
the existing inadequacies in most domestic laws.  The Model Laws and the Convention, 
therefore, provide new avenues for further development of the domestic legal regimes and 
enhance the possibilities of harmonisation.  In addition, the rules contained in these instruments 
are vital in promoting regional economic integration, facilitating international trade and 
creating the circumstances needed to help developing countries join the global market.   
Owing to the facilitative role that the UNCITRAL Model Laws and the UN 
Convention on E-contracts play in creating a harmonised regulatory environment for e-
commerce, this thesis supports them, notwithstanding their failure to address some key issues, 
such as rules regarding conflict of laws.  Overall, these instruments can still be used to ease 
cross-border disputes because of their approach to enhance harmonisation of e-commerce rules.  
This study submits, therefore, that Tanzania and other developing countries should seek to 
embrace the existing regulatory developments, especially the UNCITRAL Model Laws and the 
UN Convention on E-contracts.  For instance, most of the legal problems identified in chapter 
two of this thesis can satisfactorily be resolved by adopting the Model Laws and the E-
contracting Convention.   
While the discussion regarding the UNCITRAL’s contribution to the development and 
regulation of e-commerce presents a global picture, this chapter has also examined other 
initiatives meant to regulate e-commerce regionally.  Such initiatives include developments in 
the EU and in the US, as well as efforts in Africa and the ASEAN region.   
The EU and the US initiatives represent the legal developments in the developed 
countries.  E-commerce in these regions is in a more advanced stage.  The discussion on these 
regions was essential because it reveals the steps which they have adopted to promote effective 
development and regulation of e-commerce.  The EU’s approach, however, presents a more 
suitable way of regulating e-commerce, because it has rules that are more elaborate on the need 
to enhance consumers’ confidence and trust in the online environment.  Consumer protection, 















number of Directives some of which have the direct effect of protecting consumers when they 
transact online.  The rules contained in the Directives may be useful to the developing 
countries, especially in areas where the UNCITRAL Model Laws and the UN Convention on 
E-contracts do not provide for effective remedy.  The South African e-commerce legislation, 
for instance, represents a good example of how the EU rules may be useful to a developing 
country.  As will be seen in the next chapter, apart from relying on the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws, South Africa also relied on the EU Directives in the course of developing its e-
commerce legislation.  
The Africa and ASEAN initiatives to develop and regulate e-commerce represent 
some of the efforts in the developing countries.  The discussion regarding these regions reveals 
the existing barriers to e-commerce in developing countries and reflects on how the current 
international developments may be adopted to address these barriers.  In particular, the efforts 
of the ASEAN region portray the usefulness of the UNCITRAL Model Laws on e-commerce 
and e-signature for developing countries, since these Model Laws have been pivotal to the legal 
harmonisation process in this region.   
Compared to the developments that have taken place in the ASEAN region, Africa 
however, remains the least developed region as regards the regulation of e-commerce, and e-
commerce is still in its formative stage in this region.  This is partly due to poor infrastructure, 
including ICT infrastructure, and lack of effective legal frameworks that are conducive to e-
commerce growth.  As noted in this chapter, however, several efforts to address these problems 
are underway through important initiatives, such as the NEPAD and the existing Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), such as the EAC, the ECOWAS and the SADC.  The RECs 
provide not only a suitable avenue to address the barriers that prevent e-commerce 
development among member states, but they are also important vehicles in the overall process 
of integrating Africa into the global economy.  
Overall, the discussion in this chapter provides one important lesson, that is, 
successful e-commerce and e-contracting developments demand a harmonised legal 
environment.  This is clearly reflected in a number of ways, including the need to promote 
functional equivalence between transactions conducted via the Internet and those carried out 















As indicated in this chapter, the existing global legal developments, such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Laws, the UN Convention on E-contracts, as well as the rest of 
developments in the EU and in the US, point towards the need to create an environment that is 
conducive for e-commerce development, not only internationally, but also domestically.  The 
















CHAPTER SIX: RESOLVING DOMESTIC E-COMMERCE 
PROBLEMS– A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines country-based or domestic legal efforts aimed at resolving e-
commerce problems.  In a broader context, the previous chapter examined international 
efforts to regulate e-commerce.  It analysed some of the leading international instruments, 
most notably the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
Model Law’) and the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications 
in International Contracts, (hereafter referred to as ‘the UN Convention on E-contracts’).
1
    
The chapter established, inter alia, that many countries around the world have relied on the 
Model Law to enact legislation to regulate e-commerce domestically.  South Africa is one 
such country. 
This chapter examines the legislative developments in South Africa, a country 
selected because, firstly, although it is a Roman-Dutch legal system, its common law of 
contract shares some similarities with that of Tanzania because for historical reasons it has 
been considerably influenced by English law.
2
  Another reason for selection is that, prior to 
the year 2002, like Tanzania, South Africa lacked rules to regulate e-commerce.
3
   
A third reason is that, like Tanzania, South Africa is a developing country and a 
member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  As an economic 
                                                 
1
The Model Law was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 and amended in 1998. See 
UNICITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, Part I, Resolution 51/162 adopted 
by 85th General Assembly at plenary meeting (December, 1996) (available at http://www.unicitral.org/en-
index.htm (as accessed on 15/6/2008)).  See also UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Resolution 
56/80 adopted by the 85th plenary meeting of the General assembly (December 12, 2001), (available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (as accessed on 15/6/2008)).  In 2005, the UNCITRAL adopted a 
Convention on the use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts. See Resolution 60/21 adopted 
by the General Assembly at 60th session (December, 2005) (available at http://www.unicitral.org/en-index.htm 
(as accessed on 20/10/2010)). 
2
 See R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5ed (2007) 2. The author notes, however, that such 
influence ‘has fortunately not extended so far as to make a knowledge of English legal history necessary for a 
proper understanding of [South African] law.’ As pointed out in Chapter two of this thesis, the Tanzania 
contract law is based on the English common law. While there are some differences between these laws, for 
instance, the need for consideration as an essential element in contract formation under the Tanzanian law, 
(which is not the case in South African law), to a large extent the legal regime governing contract in both 
countries follows similar principles.   
3
 One of the applied principles in comparative law approach is that ‘[l]ike must be compared with like.  Like is 
defined as countries in the same evolutionary stage’. (See H Xanthaki ‘Legal Transplants in Legislation: 



















Fourthly, because South Africa is one of the first countries in Africa,
5
 and in the 
SADC region, to enact a law on e-commerce, analysis of its legislation can provide useful 
guidance to the legal reform of other SADC member states, like Tanzania. 
As further discussed in this chapter, the new legislation in South Africa has 
introduced additional rules to govern electronic offers and acceptances and the time when and 
place where an electronic contract is formed.  These features create some differences between 
the South African law and the Tanzanian law, since, by adopting additional rules to cater for 
the online transactions, the former has the advantage of promoting and regulating e-
commerce.  For comparative reasons, therefore, it is useful to examine its law in order to 
understand the path that Tanzania may wish to choose in reforming its law.
6
 
Lastly, South Africa is one of the biggest economies in Africa, where e-commerce is 
thriving.
7
  Analysis of its regulatory efforts, therefore, helps to contextualise the prospects 
                                                 
4
 See ‘CyberLaw Development and Harmonisation within SADC: Report on the Seminar held in Mbabane, 
Swaziland, 5-8th April, 2005’ CESPAM Executive Training Programme, available at 
http://www.cespam.net/documents/events/swaziland2005/cyberlaw%20development%20&%20harmonisation.p
df (accessed on 28/3/2011). See also A Vere ‘Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for the Knowledge Economy-
Concept Paper’E/ECA/CODIST/1/15 26 March 2009, para 38 (available at 
http://www.uneca.org/codist/codist1/content/E-ECA-CODIST-1-15-EN.pdf (as accessed on 22/2/2011). 
5
 South Africa was the third country in Africa (as a continent) and 2
nd
 in the Sub-Saharan African region to have 
enacted a law to regulate electronic transactions.  Overall, other pioneer African states with legislation 
governing e-transactions include Mauritius (2000), Tunisia (2000), Cape Verde (2003), and Egypt (2004).  See 
Vere (n4) para 10-11.  Recently, Ghana (2008), Zambia (2009) and Rwanda (2010) have joined the list. (See the 
current status of the UNCITRAL Model Law available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html (as accessed on 
22/2/2011). 
6
 The enactment of the law in South Africa marks a difference between its law of contract and the law in 
Tanzania because, as will be shown in this chapter, the new law has removed uncertainties concerning the use of 
data messages to form contracts. When considered in terms of the existing legal position in Tanzania, these 
differences are useful in analysing the latter’s problems and possible solutions.  As Xanthaki points out, 
‘contemporary comparatists support the view that … differences enhance our understanding of law in a given 
society …. [E]mphasis can [therefore] be placed both on differences and on similarities.’ (See Xanthaki (n3) 
661.  
7
 See L Kasekende, K Mlambo,V Murinde & T Zhao ‘Restructuring for Competitiveness: The Financial 
Services Sector in Africa’s Four Largest Economies’ in The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 World 
Economic Forum (2009) 49 (available at 
(http://www.workinfo.com/Workforce/21821_africa_competitiveness.pdf (as accessed on 4/5/2011)).  See also Y 
Daya & E Steenkamp ‘Trade Potential Between South Africa and Nigeria’ Directorate International Trade: 
Trade Research Desk Department of Agriculture, Pretoria (2005) (available at 
http://www.daff.gov.za/docs/researchP/NigeriaStudy.pdf (as accessed on 4/5/2011).  According to Maswera et al 
survey of literature about e-commerce in the Sub-Saharan Africa shows that this activity is concerntrated in 
South Africa. See T Maswera, R Dawson & J Edwards ‘E-commerce adoption of travel and tourism 















and challenges of developing and regulating e-commerce in the context of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.   
As will be seen in this chapter, in the course of enacting its legislation, South Africa 
considered international developments, such as the UNCITRAL Model Laws on E-commerce 
and E-signature, and the developments of e-commerce and its regulation in the European 
Union.
8
  It is important to note, however, that, although the Model Law forms the basis of the 
South African law on e-commerce it was not adopted in its entirety, rather selectively.
9
  In 
particular, the drafters took a broader approach and considered developments in other 
regions, including domestic legislation that were already in place in countries like Canada, 
and which they thought had better provisions.
10
  Consequently, the analysis here assists to 
establish the extent to which the Model Law and developments in other regions, such as the 
European Union, and in countries such as Canada influenced the enactment of the law in 
South Africa.   
In the course of analysis the chapter attempts to address the following questions: (a) 
what did South Africa do to develop or amend its laws? (b) did it adopt the Model Law in its 
entirety or was it selective? (c) are there any legislative shortfalls that need to be avoided?  
For comparative reasons, such analysis of the legal developments in South Africa will afford 
                                                 
8
 See the Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for South Africa, Coordinated and compiled by the Department 
of Communications, Republic of South Africa, November (2000) at pages 76-81, referring to EU developments 
in consumer protection, for instance. (The Green Paper is available at 
http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2004/6/green_paper_on_electronic_commerce.pdf (as accessed on 
26/2/2008)).   
9
 For instance, while chapter I to III of the Model Law partly form the basis of  the legal development in South 
Africa, issues regarding the effects of e-commerce on specific areas such as carriage of goods – and which 
appear in Arts 16 and 17 of the Model Law– were left out.  This is perhaps due to the fact that these issues could 
be covered by other legislation such as the Sea Transport Document Act, 65 of 2000.   As will be seen in the 
subsequent discussion in this chapter, some provisions in the South African law on e-commerce were borrowed 
from other foreign legislation.  In the course of this research, I consulted Mr Wim Mostert– who was the 
chairperson of the drafting committee–, on 12/5/2011, and asked him why the committee preferred a selective 
approach.  He had the following to say: ‘[w]e took a selective approach using UNCITRAL as basis but amended 
as and when we thought other laws, including Canada, were superior.’ Moreover, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
is considered a standard framework meant only to guide states but that does not mean that a country intending to 
develop its e-commerce law is bound to follow its provisions to the letter. (See para 1and 2 of the Guide to 
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996)). 
10
 According to Mortsert other countries from which information was obtained include the USA, the UK, 
Australia, Brazil, Hong Kong, Belgium, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Mexico, 
Philippines, and Singapore.  According to Mortert references were made to, for instance, the UK Electronic 
Communications Act (2000), and, s 6, that defines ‘cryptography service’, was adopted verbatim in the South 
African law.  Likewise, in the course of defining ‘advanced electronic signature’ the reference to ‘a process’ as 
it appears in the South African law was derived in part from the wording of s 8 of the Singapore Electronic 
Transactions Act of 1998.  The definition of an ‘automated transaction’ was also adopted verbatim from the US 















an opportunity to evaluate the legislative shortcomings, and the lessons which Tanzania may 
learn from in spite of its different legal background.
11
   
The chapter is divided into ten parts.  Part one consists of this introduction.  Part two 
sets out the historical background to e-commerce development in South Africa.  Since e-
commerce is technology driven, this part examines the journey towards adopting the Internet 
technology in South Africa.  It also examines subsequent efforts towards creating an enabling 
environment for e-commerce, which include the adoption of the Green Paper on e-commerce 
in 2000.  Part three examines the purpose of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act (hereinafter ‘the ECTA’) and the principles it has embraced.  This part also considers the 
status of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the context of the ECTA and the South African 
Constitution.  
Parts four to nine carry out an analysis of the problems that the ECTA addresses in 
order to facilitate e-transactions in South Africa.  In particular, part four examines how the 
ECTA has dealt with matters pertaining to formation and validity of e-contracts. This 
includes the role of e-agents in e-transactions, the validity of certain web-based contracts, 
issues regarding offer and acceptance in online scenarios and the problem of determining the 
time and place of contracting.  Part five examines matters regarding compliance with form 
requirements in an electronic environment.  
Part six considers how the ECTA has addressed issues regarding proof of an e-
contract (including establishing the identity of e-contracting parties, authentication and other 
evidential requirements).  Part seven deals with online mistakes or input errors, while part 
eight addresses consumer protection rules in online transactions.  This latter part examines 
the ECTA’s mandatory requirements for online suppliers when they contract with a consumer 
and how consumers’ personal data are protected online.  Part nine examines questions 
regarding conflict of laws (particularly which court has jurisdiction and which law should be 
applied) and finally, part ten concludes this chapter.  
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 As noted in part 1 above, although South African common law of contract is based on Roman-Dutch legal 















2. The Historical Development of E-commerce in South Africa 
(a) Building an Enabling Environment 
Like many other developing countries, South Africa is experiencing profound socio-
economic changes resulting from the application of ICT.  Moving from the era of ‘telegraph 
wire’ to ‘broadcasting’ ICT is said to form the third pillar of communication media in this 
country.
12
 During the apartheid era, however, ICT developments were limited as the country 
was far more isolated and its post and telecommunication sector was still a monopoly of the 
government of the day.
13
  
According to some authors, the historical development of the Internet in South 
Africa commenced in 1987 through the work done by the Foundation for Research 
Development (FRD), especially when one of its leading members took an active interest in 
the formation of a computer network.
14
  Although a number of Universities in South Africa 
had, at that time, embarked on a study of networking needs, it was Rhodes University which, 
for the first time, drilled the hole from which the future of the Internet wells could bubble in 
South Africa.
15




It is also important to note that in the 1980s and early 1990s South Africa had 
embarked on the use of EDI technology.
17
  At this time, since EDI was thought to be a 
potential technology to advance international trade, major EDI projects were being supported 
with a view to creating standardised formats for its global application.
18
  In South Africa, 
                                                 
12
 See D van der Merwe ‘Telecommunications Law’ in D van der Merwe, A Roos, T Pistorius & S Eiselen 
Information and Communications Technology Law (2008) 10. The author notes that in 1950s only one or two 
scientific institutions owned a mainframe computer model, and this could fill an entire room.  
13
See ‘Negotiating the Net: The case for South Africa’ (available at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ntn/summary_files/v3_document.htm (as accessed on 22/9/2008)). 
14
 See N Zantsi & M Eloff ‘Guide to South African Law’ (available at 
http://icsa.cs.up.ac.za/issa/2003/Publications/001.doc (as accessed on 23/9/2008)). See also Van der Merwe 
(n12) 14.  See also R Buys & J Rothmann ‘Internet: An Overview’ in R Buys (ed) Cyberlaw@SA1ed (2000) 35. 
15
 See Zantsi & Eloff (n14). 
16
See M Lawrie ‘The History of the Internet in South Africa: How it began’ (1997) (available at 
http://osdir.com/ml/operators.ioz/2006-06/msg00001.html (as accessed on 23/9/2008)).  See also D van der 
Merwe (n12) 14; Buys ‘South African Internet time line’ in R Buys (ed) Cyberlaw@SA1ed (2000) 1-9; Buys & 
Rothmann (n14) 35.  
17
 See S Eiselen ‘E-commerce’ in D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 
(2008) 142.  For a discussion of EDI in the context of international trade see J Coetzee ‘Incoterms, Electronic 
Data Interchange, and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act’ (2003) 15 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 1. 
18















such efforts were sponsored by the South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO) and 
later by the South African Bureau of Standards.
19
  As the Internet became commercialised 
from the 1990s and onwards,
20
 its usefulness and transformative power made it essential to 




The 1990s were also marked by fundamental political and socio-economic 
transformations which finally lowered the apartheid curtain and gave way to a new 
constitutional and democratic order.  In the light of these changes, development of ICT 
infrastructure in South Africa has become an important goal, since the country needs to fully 
participate in the new information economy.
22
  As van der Merwe and van Vuuren once 
cautioned, ‘countries that do not take time now to create appropriate infrastructures that 
support the Internet will find their economies plummeting in a matter of years ….’
23
  
Efforts to enhance ICT development and application have gone side by side with the 
need to create a more conducive environment that is competitive, along the lines of market 
economy requirements.  According to the Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) the 
current number of Internet Service Providers in South Africa, who are members of the 
association, is 179.
24
  The 2009 South African Internet Usage and Marketing Report shows 
that Internet users in South Africa reached 5.3 million (amounting to a 10.8 percent of 
penetration rate among the population).
25
 
Law reforms in a number of areas that influence positive growth in the ICT industry 
have also been necessary.
26
  These reforms have involved enactment of new legislation in the 
area of telecommunications in order to do away with the monopolistic attitude that 
characterised the industry.
27
  In 1992, for instance, the telecommunication services were 
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 See Eiselen (n17) 142. 
20
 See Lawrie (n16). 
21
 See Eiselen (n17) 143. 
22
See the Green Paper on E-commerce (n8). See also M van der Merwe & F J van Vuuren ‘Internet Contracts’ in 
R Buys (eds) Cyberlaw@ SA 1ed (2000) 155-192, 156. 
23
See Van der Merwe & Van Vuuren (n22) 155.  
24
 See http://www.ispa.org.za/membership/list-of-members (as accessed on 10/8/2010). 
25
 Source: Internet World stats: available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/za.htm (as accessed on 
10/8/2010).  For entire current Internet usage statistics in Africa by country visit 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (as accessed on 10/8/2010). 
26
 See Van der Merwe (n12) 9-33, discussing various reforms in the area of telecommunications law in South 
Africa including important legislation affecting this area. 
27
 Ibid. These reforms include the Radio Act of 1952 which was repealed in 1996 by the Telecommunications 















‘corporatised’ under the state-owned company (Telkom SA Ltd), which was given an 
exclusive mandate to provide landline services, Internet services, data transfer services and 
wireless communication.
28
  In order to liberalise the market, more reforms were needed and 
these came about when new telecommunications legislation was enacted in 1996.
29
  This new 
law was a stepping stone for the converging technologies
30
 and introduced a new regulatory 
authority –the South African Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (hereafter SATRA) 
which was later replaced by the Independent Communication Authority of South Africa 
(hereafter ICASA), following the enactment of the ICASA Act in the year 2000.
31
  
These legal reforms in South Africa were necessary to stimulate wider participation 
in the telecommunications market and to meet the country’s commitments under the WTO 
fourth Protocol on Basic Telecommunications.
32
  Moreover, there was also a need ‘to 
accelerate the use of ICTs for service delivery in all governmental spheres; to facilitate 




                                                                                                                                                        
as well as the Post Office Act 44 of 1958. For more about the reforms in the telecommunication sector in South 
Africa, see also M Zlotinik ‘Telecommunications Monopoly in South Africa: Some Human Rights Aspects and 
Options for Future Regulation’ (1999) 43 Journal of African Law 214. 
28
See G Makhaya & S Roberts ‘Telecommunications in developing countries: reflections from the South 
African experience’ (2003) 27 Telecommunications Policy 41, 46. See also M Ayogu & J Hodge 
‘Understanding Telecom Sector Reforms in South Africa: A Political Economy Perspective’ (2002) 20 Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies 275.  As a state owned company, Telkom was granted exclusivity in the sector 
by virtues of section 7(2) of the Post Office Act 44 of 1958 which provided that Telkom ‘shall ... have the 
exclusive power to conduct the telecommunication service ....’  
29
See Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996.  The Act repealed the Radio Act of 1952. 
30
Section 2(r) provided that the Act intended to ‘promote and facilitate convergence of telecommunication, 
broadcasting and information technology.’  Technology convergence has been defined as ‘the merging of 
telephone, broadcasting and computing technologies, industries and cultures.’  See Van der Merwe (n12) 10. For 
more on this concept, see Suping et al ‘What is Convergence’ in L Thornton,C Ysmin, M Patric & R Pippa 
(eds) Telecommunications Law in South Africa (2006) 246.  See also  L Emery, A Gordon, G Krieshok & A 
Pompe Information Policy Country Report: South Africa Foundations of Information Policy Analysis and 
Design (2009) 2 (available at 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64841/1/IPOL%20Country%20Report%20-
%20South%20Africa%20 (2009).pdf (as accessed on 14/10/2010.)) 
31
 Act 13 of 2000 (as amended by Act 3 of 2006).  The new law dissolved the SATRA and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) which was earlier created by Independent Broadcasting Act, Act 153 of 1993.  
32
See the WTO summary of country’s commitments at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres97_e/bt-
summ3.htm (as accessed on 16/3/2008). 
33
See an Annual Report of the Department of Communications in terms of the Public Finance Management Act, 
1999; submitted by the Director-General of the South Africa Department of Communication on 21
st
 September, 
2007, introducing the 2006-2009 Strategic plan of the department (at 6).  The Report is available at 
















(b) The Green Paper on E-commerce 
While these legislative reforms were necessary to ensure smooth ICT infrastructure 
development, a more comprehensive policy and regulatory framework to facilitate South 
Africa’s entry into the new Internet economy was needed.  With EDI, and later e-commerce, 
in place, consumers and the business community were anxious about the legal validity and 
consequences of relying on the increasing electronic technologies to conclude online 
transactions.
34
  The adequacy of the existing law to provide for and regulate online contracts, 
for instance, was integral to their concern.
35
  This anxiety, however, was not only felt in 
South Africa
36
 but was also a global issue.
37
  
To resolve the problem, a due diligence report on e-commerce legal issues was 
prepared and a Discussion Paper on the subject was issued in July 1999.
38
  The Discussion 
Paper sought views from the public on how best to develop e-commerce in South Africa.
39
  
One of the recommended options was that South Africa should refer to the Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce
40
 as a basis for its legal developments in this area.
41
  Other instruments 
that were also recommended include the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
                                                 
34
 See Eiselen (n17) 143.  See also T Pistorius ‘The Legal Effects of Input Errors in Automated Transactions: 
South African Matrix’ (2008) 2 Journal of Information, Law & Technology (JILT) at 3, available at 
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 See Chapter III of the Green Paper (n8).  See also T James (ed) An Information Policy Handbook for Southern 















Context of E-commerce (hereafter the OECD Guidelines)
42




While an analysis of these international documents was necessary to draw on, South 
Africa, being a country with ‘strong First World and developing world components’ needed 
to consider its own special position in the course of developing its e-commerce policy.
44
  
Issues considered unique to South Africa included understanding and resolving the needs of 
‘the so-called “unbanked society” whose economic wealth is referred to as “mattress money”: 
not kept in saving accounts but rather under mattresses.’
45
  Infrastructure development, access 
challenges and regional integrative issues were also important and had to be taken into 
account.
46
  Eventually, in November 2000, the discussions and consultations led to the 




The Green Paper acknowledged that the on-going globalisation process and the new 
technology revolution through ICT have made e-commerce an integral component of the 
current information economy (also referred to as the ‘new economy’).  Consequently, to 
ensure that South Africa fully harnesses the advantages of e-commerce, the Green Paper 
addressed a number of pertinent e-commerce issues.  These include taxation, security and 
privacy, protection of intellectual property, content development and regulation, electronic 
payment systems, standards and interoperability.
48
   
The Green Paper was based on a set of fundamental principles, which promise to be 
particularly helpful to other countries that seek to develop e-commerce policy frameworks. 
One of the guiding principles relevant to e-contracting is the need to ensure that any reform 
of the existing law is consistently aligned or is in harmony with existing international 
                                                 
42
 See OECD ‘Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce’ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,2340,en_2649_34267_1824435_1_1_1_1,00.html (as accessed on 
13/8/2010).  It is also important to note that although South Africa is not a member of OECD it participates in 
its conferences and seminars as a non-member.  
43
 For more on the EU’s e-commerce policy development see C Kye ‘EU’s Ecommerce Development –E-
commerce in the EU: Bridging Businesses and Consumers Abroad’ (2001) 17 Computer Law & Security Report 
25. 
44
 See M Groenewald ‘Towards an electronic commerce policy for South Africa’ in R Buys (ed) 
Cyberlaw@SA1ed (2000) 98, 107. 
45
 Ibid, at 108. 
46
 Ibid, at 109. 
47
See the Green Paper (n8). 
48















standards.  Consequently, South Africa needed to develop its e-commerce regulatory 




In view of the above requirement, chapter two of the Green Paper underscored 
several key areas within the existing legal framework which demanded prompt attention.
50
  
These may be summarised into eight major groups, namely:
51
   
 issues relating to e-contract formation;   
 time and place where an e-contract is concluded.  (This includes 
information of material significance to confirm or enforce certain 
obligations to both dispatcher and recipient of goods or services, such as 
the time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic information, 
verification of dispatch and acknowledgement of receipt);   
 issues regarding formalities;   
 questions about proof of an e-contract (ie, matters regarding authenticity 
and integrity of electronic communications, and admissibility of 
electronic evidence); 
 online mistakes or input errors; 
  protection of online consumers (including issues such as data protection 
or management and retention of records);  
 jurisdictional question in online disputes; and  
 choice of an applicable law to an online transaction.  
A closer observation of the above problematic areas of the law identified in the 
Green Paper reveals a similar pattern of problems to those identified in chapter two 
(regarding the legal inadequacies in the Tanzanian legal framework).  This suggests that 
African, or rather developing countries, share similar problems regarding e-commerce 
development despite their different legal systems.
52
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In view of the problematic areas noted in the Green Paper, South African legal 
framework needed prompt attention not only because of the need to promote e-commerce, but 
also the need to facilitate growth and development of SMMEs as well as improving their 
sustainability through the development of new applications.
53
  Consequently, the ECTA had 
to be enacted. 
3. The ECTA’s General Objectives and Relationship with the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(a) Its General Objectives  
As a product of the earlier discussions initiated through the Green Paper, the ECTA was 
signed into law on the 31st of July 2002.
54
  According to its preamble and s 2, it seeks, inter 
alia, to remove barriers to electronic communications and transactions in the Republic,
55
 and 
to promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic communications and 
transactions.
56
  It also seeks to promote technology neutrality in the application of legislation 
to electronic communications and transactions, whilst ensuring that electronic transactions in 
the Republic conform to the highest international standards.
57
   
The Act also provides for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions, and seeks to promote universal access to electronic 
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communications and transactions and the use of electronic transactions by SMMEs.
58
  
Generally, all these functions are pertinent to the development of a digital economy.
59
 
(b) Its Relationship with the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce 
As indicated above,
60
 the Green Paper on E-commerce recommended the adoption of the 
Model Law’s approach for developing South Africa’s legal framework on e-commerce.
61
  
Doing so was advantageous since the Model Law on E-commerce had already simplified the 
legislative process.  The only task was to acclimatise what was already available 
internationally to suit the local circumstances.
62
  The ECTA accordingly replicated some 
provisions of the Model Law verbatim and developed other provisions to suit the needs and 
peculiarities of South Africa.
63
   
Being influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law, the ECTA embraced its basic 
principles, ie, functional equivalence, technology neutrality and party autonomy.
64
  It is, 
however, important to note that, while the Model Law applies to data messages used in 
commercial matters,
65
 the ECTA is broad and includes other essential issues, such as cyber-
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crimes, domain name authority and administration, personal data protection, policy issues 
regarding e-government developments, and other issues regarding liability of service 
providers.  
(c)The Status of the UNCITRAL Model Laws in the South African Legal Context 
Although the Model Laws on E-commerce and E-signature have been influential as a blue 
print for e-commerce laws in many countries (including South Africa), they are not binding 
documents, and, hence, do not have the status of an international agreement.
66
  Hofman 
suggests, however, that their incorporation in a number of statutes in different countries gives 
them the status of customary international law.
67
  In view of this, he argues that courts in 
South Africa can rely on them for a reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the ECTA 
in terms of s 233 of the Constitution.
68
   
Hofman further suggests that, even if the Model Law on E-commerce is not an 
international agreement, because chapter 3 of the ECTA was based on it, one may argue ‘that 
chapter 3 of the ECTA is ... a uniform statute’ to be inter reted ‘according to the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties.’
69
  He thus concludes that the ECTA should be 
interpreted in conformity with the Model Laws.
70
 
Hofman’s views have found support in cases that have discussed the application of 
the ECTA in contract law, such as Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife.
71
  In this case the court 
stated that:  
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[a]s many states also import the content of electronic communication law from the 
Model Law with little change, the unification of electronic communication law is 
both multilateral and complete.  By adopting the Model Law, implementing states 
have thereby internationalised electronic communication law.  The significance of 
the first lesson of the comparative enterprise ... is that South Africa has incurred 
international law obligations and ... court[s] must give effect to them.
72
 
4. Issues Regarding Contract Formation 
One of the problems identified in chapter two of this thesis (with regard to the law of contract 
in Tanzania) related to validity of contract formation in an online environment.  The crux of 
the matter was the requirement of consensus ad idem, this being an integral part of a valid 
contract.
73
  The current discussion in this section examines issues similar to those of chapter 
two, but in the context of South African e-commerce law, the ECTA.  
As regards e-contracts formation, the ECTA needed to address three important 
issues.  The first was the question of validity, ie, whether a contract can be validly concluded 
between parties using the Internet or other modern electronic communications technologies.  
The second, and closely tied to the first, seeks to address issues pertaining to validity of 
online offers and acceptances.  The third relates to the role of e-agents in e-contracting, and 
whether contracts formed by them are valid.  All these issues will inevitably bring to the 
forefront consensus ad idem, which is a basis of contract making in South Africa.
74
  
(a) The Question Regarding Validity of Online Contracts 
While it is acknowledged that the South African common law is flexible enough to address 
new situations, technologies or business methods, the rapidity with which e-commerce and 
the modern technologies evolve makes it an unsuitable vehicle for change.
75
  Technology 
advancements have, in most cases, left common law lagging behind.
76
  The unsuitability of 
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common law development is exacerbated by the fact that such development is a slow process, 
reactive rather than proactive.
77
  
The evolution and use of electronic technologies, including use of data messages and 
encryption data technologies in business, have been rapid and are constantly changing from 
one form, method or device to another.
78
  Currently, EDI, e-mails, sms, VOIP and the World 
Wide Web (www), are some of the techniques relied upon to conclude contracts.  Their 
application in facilitating business transactions in South Africa, however, raised certain 
questions.  One of these, as regards use of e-mails, was whether an e-mail, which is in the 
form of a data message, was adequate to express the necessary intent to be contractually 
bound.
79
  Additionally, uncertainty existed whether a mere click of an icon on a vendor’s 
website was sufficient to signify the consent legally required to consummate a contract.
80
  All 
these issues were pertinent, since consensus ad idem forms one of the bases of contract in 
South Africa too,
81
 and, for true consensus to be established, a party’s communication to 
another must be capable of adequately conveying the intent to be bound.
82
 
Prior to the enactment of the ECTA, South Africa did not have a specific law to 
address whether e-contracts were valid and enforceable or whether data messages could 
satisfy writing requirements or performance of certain juristic acts associated with 
commercial process, such as signature.  Similarly, there were no authoritative cases upon 
which a party could confidently rely to shed light on the above issues.
83
  
With the advent of e-commerce as a business practice that takes place in a borderless 
environment, and which does not fall within the paper-based regulatory framework, there was 
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a need to enact a statute to ensure its smooth development.  Of particular importance was the 
need to create functional equivalence between transactions conducted in the cyberspace and 
those conducted in the physical world.  The ECTA was therefore enacted to achieve this goal, 
and it resolved uncertainties regarding validity of electronic agreements by granting a legal 
recognition of ‘data messages’.  Specifically, Chapter III of the ECTA developed default 
rules to regulate the use of data messages.
84
  
Being based on the Model Law on E-commerce, Chapter III of the ECTA adopts the 
principle of equivalence.  Computer-generated documents are placed on the same footing as 
traditional paper evidence.
85
  Section 1 of the ECTA defines a ‘data message’ to mean data 
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means, and this includes voices, where the 
voice is used in an automated transaction and a stored record.
86
  This will therefore include 
any Internet content, e-mails or sms (to mention but a few).  The section also defines ‘data’ to 
mean ‘electronic representations of information in any form’.  Thus the definition of a data 




Section 11(1) of the ECTA provides that ‘[i]nformation is not without legal force 
and effect merely on the grounds that it is wholly or partly in the form of a data message.’ 
This section, as read with s 22(1) of the ECTA, confirms the validity and enforceability of e-
contracts. Consequently, the ECTA eliminates the former legal uncertainties.
88
  
Section 11(1) of the ECTA is a direct reflection of Art 5 of the Model Law on E-
commerce.
89
  Article 8(1) of the UN Convention on E-contracts also provides for a similar 
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position, stating that ‘[a] communication or a contract shall not be denied validity or 
enforceability on the sole ground that it is in the form of an electronic communication.’ 
Similarly, s 22(1) (as shown above) reflects what Art 11(1) of the Model Law partly 
provides.  The Model Law stipulates that ‘[w]here a data message is used in the formation of 
a contract, that contract shall not be denied validity or enforceability on the sole ground that a 
data message was used for that purpose.’
90
 
Two observations, however, need to be made in respect of the ECTA definition of a 
data message. In the first place, the Model Law on E-commerce defines a ‘data message’ to 
mean ‘information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means 
including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, 
telex or telecopy’.
91
  Article 4(c) of the UN Convention on E-contracts adopts a similar 
definition.  It is important to note the inclusion of the words ‘similar means’ in the definitions 
of the Model Law and in the UN Convention, because ‘similar means’ stand as a ‘catch-all’ 
for futuristic techniques or approaches and takes into consideration the continuous evolution 
of new technology applications in e-commerce.  
Unfortunately, however, the words ‘similar means’ do not feature in the ECTA’s 
definition of a data message.  The omission indicates a restrictive approach to the definition 
of a data message, one which is not suitable in a fast changing technological environment, 
and may be problematic in future.  In this regard, and in view of Christie’s caution, given the 
pace with which technological changes and innovations take place, the law may soon find 
itself rendered unrealistic.
92
  Nevertheless it may be argued, as Pistorius does, that the aim of 




The second observation, concerning the ECTA’s definition of a data message, is that, 
although voice messages are considered part of the definition, it excludes ‘real-time 
conversations such as telephone conversations, even where the message or record is stored as 
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  The definition regards voice as a data message only where it is used in 
automated transactions.
95
  It is unclear why the drafters of the Act adopted such a restrictive 
approach.  Perhaps it may be due to the fact that the Act regards electronic communications as 
indirect forms of communication.
96
  Consequently, the definition of a ‘data message’ is 
considered narrow
97
 compared to the one adopted in the Model Law and the UN Convention 
on E-contracts.  It is also important to note that, while the term ‘electronic’ is integral to both 
the meaning of ‘data’ and ‘message’, this term too is not defined under the ECTA.
98
   
(b) The Use of E-agents in E-contracting 
The second question regarding e-contract formation is whether automated computer software 
(hereafter referred to as e-agents) can form valid online contracts.  This issue is important 
because these new evolving technologies are complicating the conventional practices of 
negotiating and reaching consensus ad idem.
99
  
In Chapter II of this thesis, issues concerning the use of e-agents were discussed with 
regard to the law in Tanzania.  It was stated that, because e-agents can perform intellectual 
activities, such as searches, certifications, transactions or communications, human 
characteristics, such as intelligence, autonomy or cognitive and cooperative abilities, are 
attributed to them.  However, whereas business entities everywhere are relying more often on 
e-agents to form contracts, there are uncertainties regarding not only their capability to form 
the necessary consensus but also their status.
100
  
At least four questions arise regarding use of e-agents in a commercial landscape.
101
 
The first is whether e-agents can form the necessary intent to be bound.  In the event of a 
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negative response to this issue, the second is whether lack of intent at the time of executing 
communication affects the legal validity of their transactions.  However, if the first issue is in 
the affirmative, then, the third is: in what capacity do the e-agents act and who takes 
responsibility?  The final related issue is the legal effects of mistakes or input errors in e-
contracting.   
The concept of automated transaction is an important feature of the ECTA.  As 
argued in chapter two, the increasing reliance on e-agents and the legal questions regarding 
the validity of their transactions, create a need for clarity concerning their recognition and 
regulation.
102
  Although the Model Law (which forms part of the ECTA) does not expressly 
address e-agents,
103




For its part, the ECTA provides for not only a definition but also an elaborate 
specific provision on e-agents.  Section 1 of the ECTA defines an ‘automated transaction’ to 
mean ‘an electronic transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in part, by means of data 
messages in which the conduct or data messages of one or both parties are not reviewed by a 
natural person in the ordinary course of such natural person's business or employment.’  In 
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simple language, they are transactions conducted by software or e-agents.  This encompasses 
software able to function independently by initiating an action or responding to data 
messages or performances in whole or in part, in an automated transaction.  
ECTA has resolved the issues of the capacity of e-agents, ie, whether they can form 
intent to be bound in contract and whether their actions have legal effects.  According to s 
20(a) and (b) of the ECTA, e-agents are capable of forming legally binding agreements,
105
  
which come into existence if all parties or only one use e-agents.
106
  This recognition adheres 
to the international principle of functional equivalence, meaning that electronic transactions 
and conventional transactions should be treated the same.
107
  
As regards the issue of who should take responsibility where an e-agent performs a 
particular transaction, the debate (observed in chapter two) revolved around the question of 
the agency-principal relationship.
108
  As shown in chapter two, some authors have argued that 
e-agents should be considered agents of the parties.
109
  Kilian, commenting on Art 12 of the 
UN Convention on E-contract, shares this view, arguing, however, that assignment of 
responsibility will depend on the organisational structure of the communication process.
110
  
According to him ‘the person or the organisation responsible for the coordination of the 
communication process for a given purpose is the actor or the principal.’
111
  This being so, a 
principal who relies on an agent, whether human or electronic, should, in theory, bear the 
responsibilities and risks.
112
  This will be the case whether such a principal knows the details 
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of the e-agent’s activities or not.  He cannot be excused from responsibility since the choice 
to rely on an automated system was his.
113
  
Section 20(c) of the ECTA has taken a similar position.
114
  It provides that a party, 
(for instance, an e-merchant) who relies on an e-agent to execute online contracts, will be 
bound by the terms of the agreement formed by the e-agent ‘irrespective of whether that 
person reviewed the actions of the electronic agent or the terms of the agreement.’  This 
means that if an e-merchant uses an e-agent to form a contract, but has erroneously 
programmed its working environment in such a way that it assigns a lower price than the e-
merchant intended, the latter should bear the outcome, ie, any contract concluded will be 
binding and the e-merchant must honour it.  In view of this strict rule, all merchants who rely 
on e-agents will have to act diligently.  
The strict rule under s 20(c) is, however, qualified by s 20(d).  This provides that ‘[a] 
party interacting with an electronic agent to form an agreement is not bound by the terms of 
the agreement unless those terms were capable of being revi wed by a natural person 
representing that party prior to agreement formation.’  Thus a buyer who interacts with an e-
agent must be able to fully review the terms constituting the agreement.  It has, however, 
been argued that, since s 20(c) of the ECTA deals with the legal position of the person on 
whose behalf the e-agent operates, its reference to paragraph (d), which deals with a party 
interacting with an e-agent, is nugatory.
115
  
Section 20(d) of the ECTA has also been criticised on the ground that its legal 
effects, in terms of the words ‘not bound’ as they appear in the section, is unclear.  Whether it 
means that the contract is void or voidable is uncertain.  Pistorius suggests that s 20(d) should 
be construed restrictively.
116
  According to this author, while the contract should remain 
valid, its standard terms and conditions should not be enforceable since the section dilutes the 
requirements of s 11(3) of the ECTA (regarding incorporation by reference).
117
  This dilution 
affects contracts with natural persons because such persons will be bound to the terms and 




 According to Pistorius (n34) 9 this position is similar to attribution under South African the common law.  
See also S v Swanepoel 1980 (1) SA 144 (NC).  
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(c)Issues Pertaining to Offers and Acceptances Made Electronically 
Whether offers and acceptances can be validly made electronically is an important issue in 
the formation of contracts in an online environment, because the validity and effect of data 
messages in commercial communications lacks precedent.
119
  The current issue may be sub-
divided into two, namely, what constitutes an online offer, as opposed to an invitation to 
treat, and what constitutes a valid acceptance in certain web-based contracts, such as browse-
wrap and shrink-wrap, and whether such agreements are enforceable. 
(i) Is an Online Offering of Goods an ‘Offer’ or an ‘Invitation to Treat’?  
Chapter two discussed the controversial question whether marketing on a website constitutes 
an offer or an invitation to treat.
120
  Some merchants, who operate online businesses, can 
structure their websites in such a way that they ‘offer goods’ for sale to customers while 
others use their websites to invite or solicit offers from customers.
121
  While solicitation by 
the latter group is not different from a normal advertisement or shop display of goods (except 
for minor differences, such as the extent of its reach),
122
 it is, nevertheless, possible within the 
technology interface to fuse display and the actual sale on the website.
123
  Consequently, this 
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may lead to problems when deciding whether what was presented to customers was an offer 
or a mere invitation to treat.
124
  
A contract in South Africa, as in Tanzania, is concluded where two or more parties 
agree to be bound contractually.
125
  The parties’ consent is often constituted by an offer made 
by one party and its unqualified acceptance by the other.
126
  For an offer to be valid, it must 
be made with intent to form a binding agreement if accepted, short of which it will be a mere 
invitation to treat.
127
 Whether electronic communications should be regarded as offers or 




According to the South African law of contract, as elsewhere including Tanzania, an 
invitation to treat is not an offer but a mere advertisement, or a call to make an offer; it does 
not constitute an offer in the strict sense.
 129
  South African law also distinguishes an offer 
from a mere statement. One’s statement may amount to an offer if it manifests a firm 
intention to contract (animus contrahendi) either expressly or impliedly.
130
  
Drawing the fine distinction between an offer and an invitation in an online 
environment may, however, be tricky.  Thus online merchants ought to be cautious, since a 
purported advertisement on a website may be constructed as an offer which, if accepted, 
constitutes a binding contract.
131
   
Restating the common law position is important because neither the ECTA nor the 
Model Law specifically address the distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat.  
However, the UN Convention on E-contracts does.  Article 11 of the Convention states that: 
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[a] proposal to conclude a contract made through one or more electronic 
communications which is not addressed to one or more specific parties, but is 
generally accessible to parties making use of information systems, including 
proposals that make use of interactive applications for the placement of orders 
through such information systems, is to be considered as an invitation to make 
offers, unless it clearly indicates the intention of the party making the proposal 
to be bound in case of acceptance.
132
 
Both the ECTA and the Model Law, however, make it clear that an offer can be 
made electronically.  In terms of the ECTA, s 24(a) (read together with 22(1) and s 1 of the 
ECTA) are clear to that effect.
133
  Section 24(a) provides that an offer, being an expression of 
the offeror’s intent to enter into a binding agreement with the offeree, may be expressed 
electronically.
134
  This provision is based on Art 11(1) of the Model Law, which provides that 
‘[i]n the context of contract formation, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an offer and 
the acceptance of an offer may be expressed by means of data messages.’  
Section 24(a) of the ECTA prohibits denying an expression of intent or other 
statement legal effect simply because it is in a form of a data message.  This section attempts 
to maintain the common law position: that an offer can be made orally and accepted 
electronically unless otherwise stipulated by the offeror.
135
  What should be crucial is a firm 
intention (animus contrahendi) to create binding relations.
136
  
While these provisions in the ECTA clearly foresee that an offer can be made 
electronically, one should also be mindful of the difficulties which the distinction between an 
offer and a mere invitation to treat may pose in an electronic environment.  The term ‘offer’ 
as used in s 43(1) of the ECTA (to be further discussed below) is, however, problematic 
because one may construe it to mean ‘offer’ in its strict sense.
137
  In view of this, it is 
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necessary, and in keeping with the spirit of ECTA (ie, ensuring predictability and certainty of 
global e-commerce transactions),
138
 to consider amending ECTA in accordance with Art 11 
of the Convention on E-contracts.  
(ii) Can Acceptance of an Offer be Communicated Electronically (by an E-
mail or Short Message Service)? 
The following discussion will first consider acceptance of offers in contracts made by e-mail 
and/ or short message service (sms) and thereafter the enforceability of certain web-based 
contracts, such as browse-wrap and shrink-wraps. 
 Communication of Acceptances Using E-mails and SMSs  
An acceptance is an unequivocal indication that the offeree has consented to be bound to the 
contract, and his consent constitutes one of the main components of a valid contract.
139
  In 
both Tanzania and under the South African common law, the general rule is that, for a 
communication to amount to a legally binding acceptance, it must be a clear, unequivocal and 
unambiguous conscious response to the offer.
140
  In other words anybody should be able to 
infer that the offeree’s message amounts to an acceptance and nothing else.
141
  It is also a 
requirement that an acceptance should correspond to the offer.
142
  
However, does an acceptance of an offer sent by email or sms result in a valid 
contract?  The legal position in terms of s 24(a) and (b) of the ECTA (as discussed above) is 
that an otherwise valid acceptance of an offer expressed electronically is valid and can 
constitute a valid contract.
143
  This was one of the key issues considered in Jafta v Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife,
144
 and reference was made to both the ECTA and the South African common 
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law of contract.  The court held that acceptance can be inferred from the offeree’s conduct 
and does not exclude electronic communications such as e-mail or sms.
145
 
But what if the offeror has prescribed the mode of acceptance?  The general rule 
under the common law of contract is that, if the offeror has insisted on a mode of acceptance 
the offeree is bound to adopt such mode.
146
  Section 21 of the ECTA has maintained this 
common law position.  It provides that Part 2 of the ECTA (which deals with, among other 
things, communication of data messages) will apply only if the parties involved in a contract 
have not agreed otherwise how their transaction should be communicated.  This means that, if 
parties have agreed to communicate acceptance in a different mode other than electronically, 
the rules under Part 2 of the ECTA will be inapplicable to their contract. Consequently, 
communicating acceptance by means other than electronically will be the only accepted 
means, and it must be unconditional or unequivocal, made by the person to whom the offer 
was addressed, and it must comply with any formality which may be required by statute.
147
 
 Web-based Agreements: Their Enforceability and the Issue Regarding 
Consent  
The issue of acceptance is also pertinent to web-based agreements, such as shrink-wrap and 
browse-wrap agreements.  Shrink-wrap agreements in the software industry have been around 
for quite a long time as a safeguard against software infringements.
148
  Browse-wrap and 
click-wrap agreements, however, are more recent developments following the widespread use 
of the Internet for commercial purposes.
149
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As stated in chapter two, validity and enforceability of these agreements, especially 
browse-wrap agreements, have been controversial.
150
  They have been considered invalid in 
some quarters because they do not strictly adhere to the ordinary principle that a contract 
should only bind a party who has specifically consented to it.
151
  Most browse-wraps, for 
instance, may contain a mere statement that: ‘by browsing this site you accept its terms and 
conditions.’  In view of such a statement, one may argue that it amounts to an attempt to 
impose a contract on those who browse the websites before they specifically consent to its 
terms.  While uncertainty concerning their enforceability still exists in Tanzania, it only 
existed in South Africa prior to the enactment of the ECTA.
152
  
All web-based agreements are standard form or adhesion contracts. These are not 
new, and the common law of contract had evolved certain principles to govern the so-called 
ticket cases.
153
  By their nature these contracts exclude the possibility of negotiating their 
governing terms or conditions.
154
 
It is common for web-based contracts to contain links or hypertext links (sometimes 
at the bottom of the web page and in small print) referring the other contracting party to terms 
or conditions that form part of the agreement.  This method, known as incorporation by 
reference, is often encountered in standard form contracts and it is therefore not a new 
phenomenon in South Africa.
155
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Section 11(3) of ECTA governs incorporation by reference in electronic 
transactions.  The section provides that:  
[i]nformation incorporated into an agreement and that is not in the public 
domain is regarded as having been incorporated into a data message if such 
information is  
(a)  referred to in a way in which a reasonable person would have noticed the 
reference thereto and incorporation thereof; and 
(b) accessible in a form in which it may be read, stored and retrieved by the 
other party, whether electronically or as a computer printout as long as such 
information is reasonably capable of being reduced to electronic form by the 
party incorporating it. 
For incorporated terms within a shrink-wrap or browse-wrap to be valid they must 
therefore be referred to in such as way that they can be reasonably noticed by the other party, 
and such other party must be able to access, read or store or retrieve them electronically or as 
a computer printout.  What will amount to sufficiently reasonable notice is, however, an 
elusive issue with no fixed answer.  It is an issue subject to an objective assessment based on 
reasonableness.
156
  Important factors to note in this regard include the accessibility and 
availability of the referred information, integrity of the particular data, and the extent to 
which those terms are subject to later amendment.
157
  The conditions set out in s 11(3) create 
a higher threshold regarding incorporation in an online environment than what the common 
law usually requires in a paper-based environment.
158
  
Despite the above observations, it may be said that the ECTA did not sufficiently 
address the controversial question regarding a demonstrable act of consent, especially in 
browse-wrap agreements.  These agreements bind a party who merely browses a particular 
website or downloads a particular software or document to his or her computer without 
asking him or her to indicate his or her consent.  In other words, the act of mere browsing or 
download of software is regarded as sufficient consent.  
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As discussed in Chapter two, some cases in other jurisdictions, such as Specht v 
Netscape Communications Corporation,
159
 held that a defendant who had downloaded 
software from a plaintiff’s website without being asked, in the first place, to consent to the 
terms of the software licence agreement was not bound by such terms.
160
  Lack of a positive 
act of consent to these agreements is what makes them subject to challenge.  
Pistorius has, however, argued that, although such a positive requirement for consent 
is considered necessary in other jurisdictions such as in the USA, the law in South Africa is 
distinguishable since it has clearly made web-based agreements valid and enforceable 
provided they satisfy the requirements of s11(2) and (3) of the ECTA.
161
  Certainly, the 
ECTA set out the conditions to be satisfied, such as conspicuousness of the incorporated 
terms or conditions, their accessibility, retrievability and readability.  But the point is that in 
most of these agreements it is not always possible for a consumer whose interest is to 
download particular software to be mindful of the terms and conditions embedded in another 
hypertext link.  
Under the common law, and also in Tanzania, one of the techniques discussed above 
is to see whether the supplier reasonably brought the incorporated terms to the customer’s 
notice.  This applies, for instance, in click-wrap agreements whereby customers cannot 
proceed with a particular transaction unless they declare that they have read and agreed to the 
terms.  Such a requirement is quite reasonable, and adheres to the principle that a party 
should not be forced into a contract.  At the very least the ECTA should have simply stated 
that a party to such contracts, apart from being notified of the existence of the incorporated 
information, must be required to indicate his or her consent to such information.  This would 
have resolved the browse-wrap dilemma.  Any party, who indicates consent by either a click 
of a button, as in click-wrap agreements, will still be bound despite not having read the terms.  
This will be equivalent to signing a document without reading it.  
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The importance of ensuring that a party to a web-based contract has indeed 
consented to its terms also lies in the fact that these agreements are often drafted to be 
beneficial to businesses at the expense of consumers, and often contain oppressive or 
unreasonable terms, which can easily escape the attention of unsuspecting contractants.  
Moreover, these agreements sometimes contain choice of jurisdiction and choice of law 
clauses referring disputes to a particular state and particular applicable law which, in most 
cases, favour the merchant.
162
  
Consequently, and as stated in chapter three of this thesis, consumers, as naturally 
weaker parties in typical e-commerce transactions, ‘need to be assured that they will not have 
to bear the (financial) burden of litigation in a distant forum if something goes wrong while 
they are shopping online.’
163
  The possible abuse of a weaker party in most web-based 
agreements, as in many standard form contracts, is a matter of serious concern, and the law 
must make sure that one has indeed voluntarily agreed to be bound by the contract.  
Currently, in order to protect weaker parties in consumer contracts, ss 48, 49 and 50 
of the Consumer Protection Act (hereafter referred to as ‘the CPA’),
164
 contain certain 
mandatory requirements regarding such contracts.  According to s 48, suppliers are prohibited 
from contracting with consumers on terms that are unfair, unreasonable and unjust.
165
  This 
means that consumers can challenges such terms.
166
  Suppliers are also barred from requiring 
a consumer or a person to whom goods or services are supplied at the direction of the 
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consumer to waive any rights, assume any obligation, or waive any liability of the supplier, 
on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or impose any such terms as a condition of 
entering into a transaction.
167
 
Section 49 of the CPA protects consumers against terms or conditions that affect 
their rights and which were not brought to their attention in a conspicuous manner and form.  
Subsection 1 of this section provides that:  
any notice to consumers or provision of a consumer agreement that purports to  
(a) limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other person, 
(b) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer,  
(c)  impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any 
other person for any cause, or 
(d) be an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer,  
must be drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that 
satisfies the formal requirements of subsections (3) to (5). 
It is also provided under s 49 that ‘if a provision or notice concerns any activity or 
facility that is subject to any risk of an unusual character or nature, or risks of which the 
consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware of, or which could result in serious 
injury or death, the supplier has to specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of the 
risk to the attention of the consumer in the prescribed form and manner.’
168
  In addition, the 
consumer must consent to that provision or notice by signing or initialling the provision or 
otherwise acting in a manner consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of 
the risk and acceptance of the provision.
169
 
Section 49(3) requires all provisions, conditions or notices contemplated in 
subsection (1) or (2) to be written in plain language, as described in s 22.
170
  Section 49(4) 
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further places a duty on the suppliers to draw to the attention of the consumers, and in a 
conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert 
consumer, the fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice contemplated in subsection 1. 




Section 50 contains the plain language requirement that applies to all written 
contracts.  Section 50(2)(b)(i) of the CPA provides that ‘[i]f a consumer agreement between a 
supplier and a consumer is in writing … the supplier must provide the consumer with a free 
copy, or free electronic access to a copy, of the terms and conditions of that agreement’ in 
plain and understandable language.
172
  The plain language requirement is intended to enable 
‘an ordinary consumer (for whom a notice, document or representation is intended), with 




Apart from the above prohibitions and requirements, the CPA contains a list of 
expressly prohibited transactions, agreements, terms and conditions.
174
  This black list 
includes, but is not limited to, transactions, agreements, terms and conditions intended to 
defeat the purpose and policy of the Act, mislead or deceive consumers, or subject consumers 
to fraudulent conduct.
175
  Any agreement that contravenes s 51 is void to the extent that it 
contravenes this section.
176
  Additionally, s 120(1)(d) of the CPA empowers the responsible 
Minister to make regulations relating to unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms.  On 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a notice, document or visual representation is in plain language if it is 
reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the notice, document or 
visual representation is intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer of the 
relevant goods or services, could be expected to understand the content, significance and import of the notice, 
document or visual representation without undue effort, having regard to— 
(a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the notice, document or visual representation; (b) the 
organisation, form and style of the notice, document or visual representation; (c) the vocabulary, usage and 
sentence structure of the notice, document or visual representation; and (d) the use of any illustrations, 
examples, headings or other aids to reading and understanding. 
(3) The Commission may publish guidelines for methods of assessing whether a notice, document or visual 
representation satisfies the requirements of subsection (1)(b).   
(4) Guidelines published in terms of subsection (3) may be published for public comment.’ 
171
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 2011, the government published the long awaited consumer protection regulations.177  
Regulation 44 contains a grey list of presumptively unfair and unreasonable clauses. 
(d) Resolving the Problems Regarding Time and Place of Contracting 
When and where does an e-contract take effect?  Which theory should be followed to 
determine the time when and the place where an e-contract was concluded?  These issues are 
important in the law of contract generally and in e-contracts in particular,
178
 because they 
help to allocate risks between the parties and determine whether a contract can still be 
revoked.
179
  The place of contracting is also significant because a contract may have to 
comply with certain requirements of that law (the lex loci contractus).
180
  In addition, it may 
also be an important factor in determining the proper law and jurisdiction in case of a dispute 
between parties.
181
   
At common law parties have the opportunity to settle any uncertainty regarding the 
time when and place where their contract comes into effect.
182
  If they did not do so, 
however, the time when and place where a contract took form is established by examining the 
rules governing offer and acceptance.
183
  For instance, if the offeror prescribes that 
acceptance should be made through postal means, the contract will come into existence the 
moment the letter of contract, properly addressed, is handed to the post office.
184
  The theory 
which applies here is the expedition theory (discussed earlier in chapter two).  
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In South Africa the expedition theory, which also applies in Tanzania, was 
considered in Cape Explosives Works v Lever Bothers SA Ltd.
185
  This theory, however, has 
been considerably criticised.
186
  Van der Merwe et al have noted that, in Kaap 
Suiwelkoöperasie Bpk v Louw,
187
 the court simply disregarded it and stated that the 
agreement was concluded upon receipt of the letter of acceptance.
188
 Nevertheless, this theory 
has never been overruled. 
Another principle, which determines when acceptance takes place in both South 
Africa and Tanzania, is the information theory.
189
  This principle applies irrespective of 
whether the parties entered into a contract inter praesentes or inter absentes.
190
  In such a 




Internet technology, however, has its own complexities which may make the 
determination of the exact time of conclusion of a particular e-contract technical.  E-mails, 
for instance, rely on servers that may be located in different jurisdictions, and, if an e-mail is 
sent by the offeree's computer, it does not necessarily enter the offeror's server in the form it 
was originally sent because it is normally routed in small packets.  For that reason, it may be 
a purely technical problem to establish when data messages are deemed dispatched (sent) or 
received.
192
   
Prior to the enactment of the ECTA, the legal position in South Africa, as regards 
determination of the time when and place where a contract is concluded, was dominated by 
either the information or expedition theory.
193
  Given the technical difficulties which may be 
associated with electronic communications, it became necessary to adopt a different 
approach.  In view of this, the ECTA introduced a third approach, namely the reception 
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theory.  Sections 22(2) read together with section 23 of the ECTA govern issues regarding 
time and place of communications, dispatch and receipt of data messages. Accordingly, a 
contract comes into effect when the acceptance reaches the offeror’s address. 
Section 22(2) of the ECTA provides that ‘an agreement concluded by parties by 
means of data messages is concluded at the time when and place where the acceptance of the 
offer was received by the offeror.’
194
  The offeror under this section is regarded as the 
originator of the data message, while the offeree is the addressee of that message.  




Section 23 of the ECTA further elaborates where and when data messages may be 
regarded as having been dispatched or received.  The section provides that:  
[a] data message-  
  (a) used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be regarded as having 
been sent by the originator when it enters an information system outside the control 
of the originator or, if the originator and addressee are in the same information 
system, when it is capable of being retrieved by the addressee; 
  (b)  must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the complete data 
message enters an information system designated or used for that purpose by the 
addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee; and 
  (c) must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual place of business or 
residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual place of business or 
residence. 
Before going into the details of the section, it is necessary to state at the outset that 
there is a problem regarding its wording, especially the wording of sub-section (a), when 
compared to the rest of the sub-sections.  It is clear that the phrase ‘used in the conclusion or 
performance of an agreement’, which appears in that sub-section, should have been part of 
the preamble, after the words ‘data messages’.  In its currently reading, the sub-section 
restricts the operation of the ‘sending of a message’ to form or execute a contract, but the 
same qualification does not apply to its opposite (receipt) in subsection (b) or to subsection 
(c).  It is submitted that it would be appropriate to restrict all three subsections to instances 
where the parties to the communications are about to or have entered into an agreement, 
because s 21 of the ECTA requires rules contained in Chapter III Part 2 of this Act to be 
                                                 
194
 See Van der Merwe et al (n74) 75. See also UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce with Guide to 
Enactment (n1) Art 15(4) and para 55-56.  
195















applied only if the parties involved in generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise 
processing data messages have not reached agreement on the issues provided for therein.  
Section 23(a) of the ECTA is based on Art 15(1) of the Model Law, which provides 
that ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the dispatch of a 
data message occurs when it enters an information system outside the control of the 
originator or of the person who sent the data message on behalf of the originator.’
196
   
While the notion of ‘entry’ into an information system in both the Model Law and 
the ECTA is an important factor in determining when a data message is dispatched, s 23(a) of 
the ECTA, unlike Art 15(1) of the Model Law, goes further to address a situation where the 
sender and recipient share the same information system.  In such a scenario s 23(a) provides 
that a data message will be deemed sent ‘when it is capable of being retrieved by the 
addressee.’
197
  Because the drafters of the ECTA referred to legislative developments in other 
countries including Canada, s 23(a) reflects a position similar to that of s 23(1) of the 
Canadian Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (UECA).
198
  In contrast, the European Directive 
on E-commerce (discussed in chapter 5) adopts a neutral position on time of contracting, 
since it does not interfere directly with the general principles of national contract laws.
199
 
Concerning the time when a data message is regarded as having been received, s 
23(b) of the ECTA provides that it is ‘regarded as having been received by the addressee 
when the complete data message enters an information system designated or used for that 
purpose by the addressee, and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the 
                                                 
196
 Article 15 of the Model Law, however, uses the term ‘dispatch’, instead of ‘send’ to refers to the 
commencement of the electronic transmission of data.  According to para 101 of the Guide to enactment of the 
Model Law, in case the term ‘dispatch’ has an established meaning in a particular jurisdiction, Art 15 will be 
supplementary to the  national rules on dispatch, rather than displacing them. See Pistorius (n61) 180, 187; C 
Glatt ‘Comparative Issues in the Formation of Electronic Contracts’ (1998) 1 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 34, 57.  Article 10 of the UN Convention on E-contracts also refers to the concept of 
dispatch.  
197
 See s 23(a) of the ECTA. 
198
 Section 23(1) of the Canadian UECA (also based on the Model Law) provides that ‘[u]nless the originator 
and the addressee agree otherwise, an electronic document is sent when it enters an information system outside 
the control of the originator or, if the originator and the addressee are in the same information system, when it 
becomes capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee.’ See also Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
(n71) paras 83-90 comparing the two provisions of these two statutes and Art 15 of the Model Law. 
199
See Pistorius (n61) 199.  However, the early proposals for this directive had adopted definite rules for the 
time a contract should be deemed formed. See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on 
certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market -COM (1998) 586 final [1999] OJ C301/4. 
See also A D Murray ‘Entering into contracts electronically: the real W.W.W.’ at 11 (footnote 57) (available at 

















  This provision is based on sub-article 2(a)(i) of Art 15 of the Model Law,
201
 
although there are some differences.  For instance, s 23(b) of the ECTA, unlike Art 15 of the 
Model Law, does not provide for ‘receipt’ in a situation where the addressee has no 
information system designated or used for that purpose.  What the section envisages is receipt 
into ‘an information system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee.’  This is a 
gap that needs to be addressed, as it creates uncertainty.
202
   
In contrast, s 23(2)(b) of the Canadian UECA provides that ‘if the addressee has not 
designated or does not use an information system for the purpose of receiving documents of 
the type sent, [receipt occurs] when the addressee becomes aware of the electronic document 
in the addressee's information system and the electronic document is capable of being 
retrieved and processed by the addressee.’
203
   
It is important to note, however, that the ECTA departs from the Canadian statute on 
the receipt of a data messages.  The latter considers an electronic document as having been 
received when it enters an information system designated or used by the addressee for the 
purpose of receiving such a document and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the 
addressee.
204
  Whereas the Canadian position is that of a document being ‘capable of 
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 the ECTA requires the ‘completeness’ of data message in question for it to be 
‘received’.
206
  This means that ‘unless the message is complete and intact, receipt of the data 
message cannot be said to have taken place.’
207
  This fact may, however, be problematic. 
Commenting on the ECTA’s ‘completeness rule’, Pistorius says ‘[it] will create a 
disparity between electronic contracting and the general principles of contract law in a paper-
based environment.’
208
  She argues that ‘in terms of the general principles, a message can be 
considered to have been received even if it is never received and it will be deemed to have 
been received even though it is not intelligible to the addressee or not intended to be 
intelligible to the addressee.’
209
  In that regard, she concludes that readability of a data 
message should be considered a separate issue from whether it was received.
210
  
Regarding the place of dispatch or receipt, the ECTA regards all data messages sent 
or received by the originator or addressee as ‘having been sent from the originator’s usual 
place of business or residence and as having been received at the addressee’s usual place of 
business or residence.’
211
  This is in line with the approach adopted in the Model Law which 
recognises the fact that parties to an e-contract may communicate without knowing the 
location of information systems through which communication is operated.  Even if they do, 
the systems may change without either party being aware of the changes.  Consequently, the 
Model Law regards the location of information systems irrelevant in determining the place 
where data messages are dispatched or received and sets forth a more objective criterion, 
namely, the place of business of the parties.
212
  A caveat is provided, however, to the effect 
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 See s 23(2)(a) of UECA. 
206
 See s 23(b) of ECTA.  In Australia, Electronic Transactions Act, 1999 (as amended by Act No. 21 of 2007) is 
liberal as it provides in section 14(3) that the time of receipt of the electronic communication is the time when 
the electronic communication enters that information system.’ This is therefore irrespective of whether it is 
capable of or available for processing. 
207
 See Pistorius (n61) 190.   
208
 See Pistorius (n61) 190.  See also Household Fire & Carriage Insurance Co v Grant (1879) 4 ED 216. This 
case, quoted also in J T R Gibson & C J Visser (ed) South African mercantile and company law 8ed (2003) 42, 
held that once a letter of acceptance has been posted, the contract comes to effect even though the letter never 
reach the offeror, provided the requirements for the expedition theory are met. 
209
 See Pistorius (n61) 190, citing para 103 of the Guide to the enactment of the Model Law. See also Household 
Fire & Carriage Insurance Co v Grant (n208). 
210
 See Pistorius (n61) 190. 
211
See s 23(c). The ECTA, however, has not defined what does ‘place of business’ or ‘residence’ mean. This is 
important for those companies which are purely e-companies with no physical place of business (but rather 
virtual existence). 
212
 See Art 15(3) of the Model Law which provides that ‘[p]aragraph (2) applies notwithstanding that the place 
where the information system is located may be different from the place where the data message is deemed to be 
received under paragraph (4).’ Para 4 of the Model Law provides that ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed between the 



















Controversy has also existed among scholars concerning whether e-mail messages 
should be regarded as instantaneous or non-instantaneous communications, this being an 
effort to determine which theory should govern such communications.
214
  Sections 22, 23 and 
26 of the ECTA, which reflect the reception theory, regard e-mail communications as non-
real-time communication.  Although certain forms of communications by data messages are 
sometimes in real time, (for instance, video conferencing or chat rooms), since the ECTA 
adopts the reception theory for all electronic communications, the ‘[d]ifferences between 
real-time communications which prefer the information theory, and the expedition theory, 
which applies to non-instantaneous communications, have now been set aside.’
215
  
In Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife
216
 the court stated that, with the application of the 
modern technology such as the Internet, the old postal rule (which states that contracts are 
concluded when a letter or telegram of acceptance is handed to the post office) is outmoded, 
and cannot apply to acceptance by emails or smss.  Because the forms of communication 
under the modern technology differ substantially from the way post offices operate, it was 
clear to the court that, ‘the old common law presumptions about when an acceptance of an 
offer is sent and received have been supplanted by statute.’
217
  
In the course of justifying why the reception theory should be favoured in e-
contracting in South Africa instead of the information theory, van der Merwe et al argue that 
the possibility that electron c declarations may be truncated, lost or delayed by 
                                                                                                                                                        
place of business, and is deemed to be received at the place where the addressee has its place of business. For 
the purposes of this paragraph:  
(a) if the originator or the addressee has more than one place of business, the place of business is that which 
has the closest relationship to the underlying transaction or, where there is no underlying transaction, the 
principal place of business;  
(b) if the originator or the addressee does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to its habitual 
residence.’ 
213
 See the Guide to enactment of the Model Law (n1), para 100. 
214
 See D L Kidd & W H Daughtrey ‘Adapting contract law to accommodate electronic contracts: overview and 
suggestions’ (2000) 26 Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal 215, 261-262.  See also J Beatson 
Anson’s law of contracts 28ed (2002) 43; R Stone The Modern Law of Contract 8ed (2009) 81. See also 
Pistorius (n61) 201-205, discussing the common law position.  
215
 See Meiring (n54) 98. See also Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (n71) para 80 where the court held that 
‘section 23 supplants the general rule of the common law that an acceptance of an offer must come to the 
knowledge of the offeree for a contract to arise.’  
216
 See Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (n71) para 79-80. 
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intermediaries, or even by the failure of an addressee to retrieve an electronic message, do not 
favour retention of the information theory in the context of electronic communications.
218
  
Similarly, in Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife
219
  Justice Pillay gave elaborate reasons 
as to why the information theory is unworkable for e-contracts. The court stated that in a 
typical electronic contract, such as a click-wrap agreement, the contract comes to effect 
immediately ‘when an offeree clicks on “accept” or “I agree” on a website that offers goods 
for sale. The acceptance of the offer may not even come to the attention of the seller if the 
thing sold is packaged and delivered automatically or through a dispatch service.’
220
  The 
other reason identified by the court in favour of the reception theory to e-contracts is that the 
offeree should not be left at the mercy of the offeror by waiting until the offeror 
acknowledges receipt of the acceptance.
221
  It was held that doing so would be putting the 
offeree at the mercy of a dishonest offeror if the offeror receives and destroys the acceptance, 
pretending not to have received it.
222
  
5. Obstacles Raised by Formalities Requirements 
Although the ECTA does not deal with each and every legal aspect arising from online 
transactions,
223
 it removes legal barriers to and enhances certainty.
224
 This breakthrough, 
however, is not without difficulties including those related to certain form requirements 
ordinarily associated with paper-based transactions.  As discussed in Chapter II there are 
usually three formalities which may be imposed either by statute or the parties to a 
transaction, namely, ‘writing’, ‘signature’ and notarial execution.
225
  The reasons for such 
formal requirements in certain transactions may include ‘the legal certainty (provided by 
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 See Van der Merwe et al (n74) 74. See also Pistorius (n80) 288; L Davies ‘Contracts formation on the 
Internet: Shattering a few Myths’ in L Edward & C Waelde (eds) Law and the Internet: Regulating Cyberspace 
(1997) 97-120, 111.  The reasons given by Van der Merwe et al (n74) 74 can also apply in Tanzanian situation. 
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As regards electronic evidence, for instance, Professor Hofman asserts that the ECTA (section 15) ‘has not 
resolved all the problems with electronic evidence ….’  See Hofman (n54) 677. See also the SALRC Issue 
Paper No.27 (n78). 
224
See ss 2(1)(d) and (e) and 12(a) and (b) of the ECTA. 
225
 See Eiselen (n17) 163. See also Eiselen ‘Electronic Commerce and the UN Convention on Contracts for 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) 1980’ (1999) 6 EDI Law Review 21, 35-36; Eiselen ‘Electronic Commerce 
and the CISG: Formation, Formalities and Validity’ (2002) Vindobona Journal of International Commercial 















writing), identification, attribution, assent and authentication.’
226
  ‘In general, legislative 
formalities provide a party with an opportunity to reconsider (locus poenitentiae) before the 
execution of the agreement in writing.’
227
  
Generally, and similar to the law of contract in Tanzania, the South African law does 
not require special formalities in the course of contract formation.
228
  Contracts can be 
formed either orally or by conduct.
229
  In White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd 
230
 the court 
was called upon to decide whether a written contract was required as a formality or whether it 
was merely required for the purposes of proof.  Referring to Goldblatt v Fremantle,
231
 the 
court held that, unless it is clear that the parties intended the writing to be a formality, it is 
only presumed to facilitate proof of the parties’ agreement and is not an essential 
requirement.
232
  This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions, which include 
formalities prescribed by a statute
233
 or, as indicated in Goldblatt v Fremantle,
234
 those 
intended by the parties.  As will be seen below, the ECTA has taken into account statutory 
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 See Eiselen (n17) 163. See also Van der Merwe et al (n74) 164 stating that statutes which prescribe 
formalities may do so for various reasons, such as promoting certainty of certain transactions or discouraging 
fraud.  
227
 See Van der Merwe et al (n74) 165, citing Davis v Executors Estate WP Prinsloo (1899) 6 OR 64; Jolly v 
Herman’s Executors 1903 TS 515.  The UNCITRAL Working Group points to eleven reasons for the writing 
requirement. (See para 48 of the Guide to the enactment of the Model Law on E-commerce (n1). These reasons 
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acceptable to public authorities and courts, (viii) the need to finalise the intent of the author of the ‘writing’ and 
provide a record of that intent, (ix) to allow for the easy storage of data in a tangible form, (x) the need to 
facilitate control and sub-sequent audit for accounting, tax or regulatory purposes, and (xi) to bring legal rights 
and obligations into existence in those cases where a ‘writing’ was required for validity purposes. 
228
 See Christie (n2) 105. See also Van der Merwe et al (n74) 152; Eiselen (n17) 163.  The only important 
exception in the law of contract in Tanzania, which nevertheless is not connected to formality requirements, is 
the need for consideration as one of fundamental ingredients for a valid contract.  
229
 See Christie (n2) 105. See also Van der Merwe et al (n74) 152. 
230
 2005 (6) SA 384 (LC). 
231
1920 AD 123 at 128. 
232
See White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd (n230) at 390C. See Timoney & King v King 1920 AD 133, 144. 
Where Innes CJ stated that even an acceptance of a contract ‘may be inferred from conduct.’ See also Meiring 
(n54) 103. 
233
 See, for instance, the Alienation of Land Act, Act 68 1981; the General Law Amendment Act, Act 50 of 
1986 (requiring contracts of suretyship to be in writing and signed by the surety); the Matrimonial Property Act, 
Act88 of 1984 (requiring authorisation of a person married in community of property for certain transactions to 
be in writing and attested by two witnesses); and the Mining Titles Registration Act, Act 16 of 1967 (which 
require certain mining rights and leases to be in writing). 
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  Concerning respect for the parties’ intentions, principally this Act recognises 
their autonomy to decide how their transactions should be carried out.
236
  
As stated earlier, the ECTA has adopted the Model Law’s principles, including the 
principle of functional equivalence.  According to this principle, formal requirements which 
were long considered a stumbling block to e-commerce, such as the legal requirements 
derived from statutes, for instance, those demanding that a document should be ‘in writing’, 
‘signed,’ or be in the ‘original’ form, can, subject to certain statutory exceptions, be met 
electronically by data messages and e-signatures.  Thus, in order to give documents created 
electronically a sense of functional equivalence to those in the traditional paper-based form, 
the ECTA addresses the problematic concepts, such as ‘in writing’, ‘signed’ or be in the 
‘original’ form in ss 12, 13 and 14.  
(a) Fulfilling Writing Requirement Electronically 
According to s 12 of the ECTA a requirement in law that a document or information must be 
in writing can be fulfilled by data messages.
237
  Such a requirement, however, will only be 
satisfied if a data message is ‘accessible in such a manner that it may be used for future 
reference.’
238
  Readability, accessibility, and/or retrievability of such information are 
important aspects which this section seeks to guarantee.  According to Van der Merwe et al, 
if these qualities are guaranteed ‘there is little warrant for exclusion from the ambit of the Act 
of transactions relating to the alienation of land.’
239
  Despite this view it is clear, however, 
that s 4(4) of the ECTA excludes such contracts from the scope of the ECTA.   
It may be argued, nevertheless, that, although s 12 provides for a functional 
equivalence between conventional writing and data messages,
240
 the requirements associated 
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 See s 4(3), (4) and (5) of the ECTA. 
236
 For instance, s 4(2) of the ECTA provides that its provisions should not be construed as compelling parties to 
a contract to use a particular mode of signature in the course of their transactions or create their contract in a 
particular way.
 
These are matters that are within the parties’ freedom.  See also s 21 of the ECTA which 
provides that Part 2 of the ECTA (which deals with formation of e-contracts, among other issues) will apply 
only if contracting parties have not reached an agreement which would otherwise vary the application of the 
rules contained in this part.  
237
 See Sihlal v SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd (n71) 1485 where the court, referring to section 12 of the 
ECTA stated that communication by sms is communication in writing. See also Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
(n71).  See also Le Roux & Others v Viana No & Others (n71) at 175 para 10; Mncube v Transnet (n71) 703. 
238
 Section 12(a) and (b) of the ECTA provides that ‘[a] requirement in law that a document or information must 
be in writing is met if the document or information is in the form of a data message; and accessible in a manner 
usable for subsequent reference.’ 
239
 See Van der Merwe et al (n74) 168. 
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with the electronic version of ‘writing’ are stricter than those under common law, for 
instance, regarding incorporation by reference.
241
  The approach adopted in s 12 of the ECTA 
corresponds to that envisaged in Art 6(1) of the Model Law on E-commerce.
242
  (The same 
approach is envisaged in Art 9(1) and (2) of the UN Convention on E-contracts).
243
 
As indicated in the foregoing discussion, the ECTA does not compel parties to 
perform transactions electronically.  What it does is to avoid discriminatory treatments 
between paper-based documents and those created electronically.  Section 4(3) of the ECTA, 
however, limits the application of ss 11, 12, (discussed above) and ss 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 
and 20 (to be discussed below) in certain transactions affecting certain laws.  For instance, all 
these sections will not apply to transactions governed by the Wills Act.
244
  Similarly, ss 12 
and 13 are excluded for contracts governed by the Alienation of Land Act
245
 or the Bills of 
Exchange Act.
246
  In addition, ss 11, 12 and 14 of the ECTA do not apply to transactions 
governed by the Stamp Duties Act.
247
 
Consequently, s 4(4) denies validity of all electronic data or transactions that purport 
to (a) constitute agreements for alienation of immovable property as provided for in the 
Alienation of Land Act of 1981,
248
 (b) constitute an agreement for the long-term lease of 
immovable property in excess of 20 years as provided for in the Alienation of Land Act,
249
 
(c) evidence the execution, retention and presentation of a will or codicil as defined in the 
Wills Act
250
 and (d) amount to the execution of a bill of exchange as defined in the Bills of 
Exchange Act.
251
  The exclusion of these transactions is based on public policy.   
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 See Eiselen (n17) 165. 
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The Model Laws provide for internationally accepted standards which a data message should meet to satisfy 
the requirements of the law.  According to Art 6(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce, for 
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 Act 7 of 1953. See s 4(3) of the ECTA (as read with I schedule to the ECTA). 
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st
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 schedule to the ECTA). 
247
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 schedule to the ECTA). 
248
 Act 68 of 1981. See s 4(4) of the ECTA (as read with item number 1 of the 2
nd
 schedule to the ECTA). 
249
 Act 68 of 1981. See s 4(4) of the ECTA (as read with item number 2 of the 2
nd
 schedule to the ECTA). 
250
 Act 7 of 1953. See s 4(4) of the ECTA (as read with item number 3 of the 2
nd
 schedule to the ECTA). 















Policy considerations were also a factor taken into account by the UNCITRAL 
Working Group when drafting the Model Laws.  For instance, being mindful of the fact that 
certain legal requirements in certain transactions may require stricter rules governing 
‘writing’, ‘signature’, or ‘original form’ as part of national public policy, Arts 6(3), 7(3), 8(4) 
and 11(2) of the Model Law on E-commerce provide for room to exclude certain transaction 
from application of electronic data messages permitted under those Articles.   
According to paragraph 80 of the Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law, it was 
found that certain national laws have strict form requirements that reflect considerations of 
public policy, such as the need to protect certain parties or warn them against specific risks.  
Whereas the above functions may be met electronically, as already envisaged under the 
provisions of the ECTA, one may argue that these similar considerations, coupled with public 
policy reasons, underlie the basis for the stricter rules in s 4(3) and (4), which exclude 
transactions enumerated in the second schedule to the ECTA.  
Whether the above restrictions are necessary or not is controversial.  In matters 
regarding conveyancing agreements and other matters affecting real property, however, 
efforts are currently under way in South Africa to enable such transactions to be concluded 
electronically.
252
  By doing so, South Africa will be joining other countries, such as England, 
                                                                                                                                                        
be admitted has been a debatable issue. See, for instance the views of Barclays Bank PLC (Singapore) on 
whether such wills should continue to be excluded in the Singaporean e-transaction law, available at 
http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/policies%20and%20Regulation/Policies_and_Regulation_Level2/papers/ETA_Stage
_2_BarcklaysBank.pdf (as accessed on 8/8/2010). It is argued in this document that the strict requirements 
should be retained as they ensure freedom of the maker of the will a safeguard which could easily be removed if 
wills are to be made electronically.  However, in Rioux v Coulombe (1996) 19 ETR (2d) 201 (Que. SC), the 
Canadian  Supreme Court (Quebec province) held that depending on a case to case basis an electronically-
recorded will may be admissible to probate. See BCLI Report, No 45-- Wills, Estates and Succession: A 
Modern Legal Framework.’ Prepared by members of the Succession Law Reform, British Columbia Law 
Institute (2006) 32. This Report is available at 
http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/public/pubdocs/bcdocs/404296/succession_report.pdf (as accessed on 9/8/2010). 
251
 Act 34 of 1964. 
252
See H Mostert ‘Tenure Security Reform and Electronic Registration: Exploring Insights from English Law’ 
(2011) 14 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 85 (available at 
http://www.journals.co.za/WebZ/ej/AdvancedQuery?sessionid=01-52982-1704359156 (as accessed on 
27/7/2011). See also M B Shange A system-based approach to land registration analysis and improvements. A 
case study of the KwaZulu-Natal Deeds Registration system (Msc Dissertation, (Environment and 
Development), University of KwaZulu-Natal (2010) 47-52 (available at 
http://dspace.ukzn.ac.za:8080/jspui/handle/10413/644 (as accessed on 25/5/2011).  See also Chief Registrar of 
Deeds and Law Society of South Africa, Policy Document on the Electronic Deeds Registration System (E-Drs) 
(Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Pretoria 2009) available at 
www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/.../E_DRS/SADJ%20Artical%20on%20e-
DRS%20POLICY%20DOCUMENT.doc (accessed on 10/7/2010) 1, 9. See further the Department of Rural 

















where conveyancing has moved from a paper-based system to one that is entirely 
electronic.
253
  It will also mean that even the other restrictions contained in s 4(4) of the 
ECTA, as read together with the second schedule to the Act, may need to be reviewed.  
(b) Satisfying a Requirement for Signature  
A requirement for signatures in an agreement may be statutory.  For instance, s 2(1) of the 
Alienation of Land Act
254
 provides that ‘[n]o alienation of land …shall…be of any force or 
effect unless it is contained in a deed of alienation signed by the parties thereto or by their 
agents acting on their written authority.’ 
Whereas previously signatures were manually written by parties, technology has 
made the use of electronic signatures possible.  Consequently, as part of the effort to resolve 





 and the UN Convention of E-contracts
257
 fully support the use of electronic 
signatures as the equivalent of manually created signatures.  Thus, in certain instances, a 
                                                                                                                                                        
accessed on 28/10/2010) 33. According to the Department of Land Affairs Strategic Plan 2005-2010,titled: 
“Sustainable Land and Agrarian Reform: A Contribution to Vision 2014” March 2005,( see page 24) 
replacement of current paper-based processing of deeds and documents with fully electronic system (the e-
Cadastre system) is expected to improve the property market substantially.  The Strategic Plan is available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=127095 (as accessed on 27/10/2010). 
253
 See Law Commission/Land Registry Report: Land Registration for the Twenty-first Century, a 
Conveyancing Revolution, Her Majesty’s Land Registry, Law Com No 271 (2001). This Report is available on 
the Internet at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc271.pdf (as accessed on 11/8/2010). See also the UK Land 
Registration Act 2002(c.9) which received Royal Assent on 26 February 2002. This Act which provides for e-
conveyancing was based on the Law Commission’s Report. The Act is available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/en/ukpgaen_20020009_en_1.htm (as accessed on 11/8/2010). See also C 
S Wright ‘Electronic Contracting in Insecure World’ GIAC Legal Issue (GLEG) 2008) available at 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/legal/electronic-contracting-insecure-world_2088 (as accessed 
on 28/10/2010) at 25. 
254
 Act 68 of 1981.  
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 See Art 7(1) of the Model Law on E-commerce which provides that ‘(1) [w]here the law requires a signature 
of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if: (a) a method is used to identify that person 
and to indicate that person's approval of the information contained in the data message; and (b) that method is as 
reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the 
light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.’  
256
 The Model Law on E-signature which provides in Art 3 that ‘[n]othing in this Law ... shall be applied so as to 
exclude, restrict or deprive of legal effect any method of creating an electronic signature that satisfies the 
requirements referred to in article 6, paragraph 1, or otherwise meets the requirements of applicable law.’ 
Article 6(1) states that ‘[w]here the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a 
data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the 
data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant 
agreement.’ 
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requirement of signature may be met electronically
258




The ECTA provides for the legal recognition of electronic signatures.  Section 1 
defines two types of signatures.  The first is an e-signature that constitutes data attached to, 
incorporated in or logically associated with other data and which is intended by the user to 
serve as a signature.  This definition is wide enough to accommodate scanned signatures 
pasted to a document or even typing of the writer’s name to associate the document with the 
sender provided that such typing or pasting was intended to serve as a signature.
260
  The 
second type of e-signature, referred to as an ‘advanced electronic signature’ is an 
authenticated signature.  Section 1 of the ECTA defines an advanced electronic signature as 




According to s 13(1) of the ECTA, the formality of a signature ‘required by law’, as 
regards use of data messages, will be satisfied only by an advanced electronic signature.  This 
signature, resulting from an accreditation process by the Accreditation Authority, is presumed 
to be valid and to have been properly applied until the contrary is proved.
262
  The South 
African Accreditation Authority has already put in place the necessary regulations.
263
  Due to 
lack of a foreign recognition policy, however, it is uncertain whether s13(1) and (4) (read 




Section 13(2) of the ECTA provides that ‘an electronic signature is not without legal 
force and effect merely on the grounds that it is in electronic form.’
 265
  The inference that 
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 See Van der Merwe et al (n74) 169 noting that although a handwritten signature may be digitised and 
attached to an electronic document so as to fulfil a statutory requirement this procedure is open to abuse. 
259
 As noted in part 5(i) above s 4 of the ECTA contains a list of transactions which are excluded from the 
application of certain provisions of this Act. These include transactions involving real property.  However, 
efforts are currently under way in South Africa to enable such transactions to be concluded electronically.  
260
See s 13(3) of the ECTA. 
261
 Section 37 of the ECTA deals with accreditation services provided by an accreditation authority.  
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 See s 13(4) of the ECTA. The criteria for accreditation of authentication products and services are provided 
under section 38 of the ECTA. 
263
 See Accreditation Regulations of 2007 (GG 29995 of June 2007 (Reg. Gaz.8701) (available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=72249 (as accessed on 19/10/2010)). 
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 See the SALRC Issue Paper No 27 (n78) 39. More information about accreditation and the current status can 
be obtained from http://www.saaa.gov.za/ (as accessed on 20/10/2010). 
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 If compared to the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce, section 13 is similar to Art 















may be drawn from the wording of this subsection is that it does not preclude signatures that 
are not advanced e-signatures, if used by parties to an agreement.  
Section 13(3) of the ECTA provides for situations where parties intend to rely on e-
signatures but fail to agree which type of e-signature should be used.  In such cases the 
requirement for e-signature will be met, in relation to a data message, if two things are 
satisfied, namely: (i) the parties have used a method that can identify them and which indicate 
their approval of the information communicated, and (ii), having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances at the time the method was used, the method used was reliable and appropriate 
for the purposes for which the information was communicated.
266
  What may further be 
deduced from s 13(3) of the ECTA is that where, for instance, a party to an e-contract, such 
as a click-wrap, clicks the consent button on the computer screen, such conduct, if all other 
circumstances are taken into account, suffices to establish that he intended to be bound.  
One of the questions on which the South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) has recently invited comments from the public is whether the distinction between 
electronic signature and advanced electronic signatures (as envisaged in ss 1 and 13 of the 
ECTA) should be abolished.
267
  This issue is debatable.  It may, for instance, be argued that, 
in the light of s 13(2), there is no reason why the Act should maintain two distinct definitions, 
and doing so may lead to confusion.  Indeed, the essence of enacting the ECTA was to clear 
doubts or uncertainties so as to facilitate electronic transactions, and that spirit should be 
maintained.   
While such arguments are meritorious one should not, however, lose sight of the 
meaning of and rationale for an advanced signature.  As the foregoing discussion reveals, ‘in 
order to distinguish between signatures which a statute requires, where such signature is to be 
appended electronically, the [ECTA] created the concept of an “advanced” electronic 
                                                                                                                                                        
chapter five of this thesis. See also Art 9 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts. 
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 Section 13(3) provides as follows: ‘[w]here an electronic signature is required by the parties to an electronic 
transaction and the parties have not agreed on the type of electronic signature to be used, that requirement is met 
in relation to a data message if (a) a method is used to identify the person and to indicate the person's approval 
of the information communicated; and (b) having regard to all the relevant circumstances at the time the method 
was used, the method was as reliable as was appropriate for the purposes for which the information was 
communicated.’ 
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  What the Act envisages in this regard is the inadequacy of ordinary e- 
signatures (for instance, scanning a handwritten signature and appending it to a document, 
which is provided for under s 13(2) of the ECTA) where a statute requires signature of the 
parties to an agreement.  Consequently, the distinction between electronic signature and 
advanced electronic signature is necessary.  In addition, the scope of what constitutes 
advanced electronic signatures should be extended to include use of biometrics (such as 
physiological features) for the purpose of consent and electronic identity.
269
   
(c)Notarisation, Acknowledgement and Certification 
Closely connected to the foregoing discussion is the question of notarisation, 
acknowledgement and certification.  According to ss 17 and 18 of the ECTA, when the law 
demands these formalities they may be satisfied electronically by data message.  This 
possibility, however, is subject to certain conditions.
270
  Section 17 reiterates the need to 
ensure integrity of the information produced, which includes assessing the reliability of how 
and when it was produced, sent, or stored.  
The requirements of notarisation, certification or acknowledgement can be met by a 
data message with an attached advanced electronic signature of the person authorised to 
perform such acts.
271
  Section 19 also provides that ‘a requirement in law for multiple copies 
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 See L Michalson ‘Advanced Electronic Signatures 1.01’ (at 1) (available at 
http://www.irmsa.org.za/library/iforest/Michalsons%20Infosheet%20-
%20Advanced%20Electronic%20Signatures%201.01.pdf (as accessed on 24/2/2011). 
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specify by notice in the Gazette (a) the manner and format in which the data messages must be filed, created, 
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required;(c) the manner and format in which such electronic signature must be attached to, incorporated in or 
otherwise associated with the data message;(d) the identity of or criteria that must be met by any authentication 
service provider used by the person filing the data message or that such authentication service provider must be 
a preferred authentication service provider;(e) the appropriate control processes and procedures to ensure 
adequate integrity, security and confidentiality of data messages or payments; and (f) any other requirements for 
data messages or payments.’  
271















of a document to be submitted to a single addressee at the same time is satisfied by the 
submission of a single data message that is capable of being reproduced by that addressee.’
272
 
6. Proof of an E-contract: Authentication, Attribution and Other Evidentiary 
Requirements 
(a) Authentication and Message Attribution  
As discussed in chapter two, a party’s signature in a particular transaction may be sufficient 
proof that he or she approved the particular transaction to be carried out.  As a method of 
authentication, a signature identifies a party with the transaction or serves to attribute it to 
him or her.  One of the problems mentioned earlier,
273
 which the ECTA has fully addressed, 
is attribution of an electronic message to the person who purports to have sent it.
274
  In an 
electronic environment both consumers and businesses want to know hether they can rely 
on the fact that a message was actually sent by the purported sender and whether they can 
avoid liability in the event that a message allegedly sent by one party was actually sent by an 
impostor or a hacker.
275
   
Attribution addresses the question whether a data message was really sent by the 
person who is indicated as being its originator.
276
  This is particularly important given the 
vulnerable nature of the online environment.  For instance, a hacker may impersonate 
someone and conclude an online contract in the name of that person (to the latter’s 
detriment).  
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 Section 19 further provides that:  
‘(3) [w]here a seal is required by law to be affixed to a document and such law does not prescribe the method or 
form by which such document may be sealed by electronic means, that requirement is met if the document 
indicates that it is required to be under seal and it includes the advanced electronic signature of the person by 
whom it is required to be sealed. 
(4) Where any law requires or permits a person to send a document or information by registered or certified post 
or similar service, that requirement is met if an electronic copy of the document or information is sent to the 
South African Post Office Limited, is registered by the said Post Office and sent by that Post Office to the 
electronic address provided by the sender.’ 
273
For more about this problem see C Pacini, C Andrews & W Hillison ‘To agree or not to agree: Legal issues in 
online contracting.’ Business Horizons (2002) 43. 
274
Section 25(c) provides that a data message is that of the originator if it was sent by an information system 
programmed by or on behalf of the originator to operate automatically unless it is proved that the information 
system did not properly execute such programming. This section echoes Art 13(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on E-commerce which deals with attribution of data messages. 
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See Pacini et al (n273) 47. 
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 See T Pistorius ‘Nobody Knows You’re a Dog: Attribution of Data Messages’ (2002) 14 South African 















In order to solve this problem, Art 13 of the Model Law provides model rules.
277
  
The ECTA followed this model, and s 25(a), (b) and (c) of the Act provides for the attribution 
of electronic communications.
278
  It presumes that a data message will be attributed to its 
originator if it was sent by the originator personally or by a person who had authority to act 
on behalf of the originator.  It will, however, be a technical question of establishing that the 
denying party was indeed the originator of the data message. Section 25(b) will clearly 
support a finding that a party was the originator of a message if it was sent by another person 
on behalf of the originator.  (Whether the sender was authorised or not is an issue outside the 
scope of s 25(b), and must be considered under the rules governing agency). 
Attribution of online transactions as originating from a party to a contract also 
applies where an e-agent has been employed by a party.  Problems relating to the use of e-
agents were discussed earlier (and will further be discussed below in relation to mistakes or 
input errors during the contracting process).  It suffices here to state that, regarding the use of 
e-agents, according to s 25(c) of the ECTA (which echoes Art 13(2)(b) of the Model Law on 
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 Article 13 of the Model Law provides that: 
‘(1) [a] data message is that of the originator if it was sent by the originator itself. 
(2) As between the originator and the addressee, a data message is deemed to be that of the originator if it was 
sent:  
(a) by a person who had the authority to act on behalf of the originator in respect of that data message; or  
(b) by an information system programmed by, or on behalf of, the originator to operate automatically.  
(3) As between the originator and the addressee, an addressee is entitled to regard a data message as being that 
of the originator, and to act on that assumption, if:  
(a) in order to ascertain whether the data message was that of the originator, the addressee properly applied a 
procedure previously agreed to by the originator for that purpose; or  
(b) the data message as received by the addressee resulted from the actions of a person whose relationship 
with the originator or with any agent of the originator enabled that person to gain access to a method used by 
the originator to identify data messages as its own.  
(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply:  
(a) as of the time when the addressee has both received notice from the originator that the data message is 
not that of the originator, and had reasonable time to act accordingly; or  
(b) in a case within paragraph (3)(b), at any time when the addressee knew or should have known, had it 
exercised reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, that the data message was not that of the originator.  
(5) Where a data message is that of the originator or is deemed to be that of the originator, or the addressee is 
entitled to act on that assumption, then, as between the originator and the addressee, the addressee is entitled to 
regard the data message as received as being what the originator intended to send, and to act on that assumption. 
The addressee is not so entitled when it knew or should have known, had it exercised reasonable care or used 
any agreed procedure, that the transmission resulted in any error in the data message as received.  
(6) The addressee is entitled to regard each data message received as a separate data message and to act on that 
assumption, except to the extent that it duplicates another data message and the addressee knew or should have 
known, had it exercised reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, that the data message was a duplicate.’  
278
 Section 25 provides that ‘[a] data message is that of the originator if it was sent by (a) the originator 
personally; (b) a person who had authority to act on behalf of the originator in respect of that data message; or 
(c) an information system programmed by or on behalf of the originator to operate automatically unless it is 
proved that the information system did not properly execute such programming.’ For a detailed discussion on 



















It is important to note that, although s 25 of the ECTA is based on Art 13 of the 
Model Law, the section did not adopt Art 13 in its entirety.  Rather, the drafters of s 25 were 
selective and adopted three paragraphs only, ie, Art 13(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of the Model 
Law.  Consequently, the scope within which an e-contracting party may attribute data 
messages to his counterpart under the ECTA is limited.  For instance, Art 13(3) of the Model 
Law recognises that in certain instances parties may have agreed to adopt an attribution 
procedure to verify the person from whom an electronic message originates.
280
  This does not 
appear in the ECTA.  Under such a rule if a technical analysis is made to that agreed 
attribution procedure, and if it is verified that the other party was indeed the author of the 
disputed data messages, it will be presumed to be so, and the disputed message will be 
attributable to him or her.
281
  The presumption held under Art 13 of the Model Law (as it 
should also be under s 25 of the ECTA) is rebuttable.  Overall, however, the Model Law’s 
broad approach to attribution of data messages is more preferable than what the ECTA 
provides.  The ECTA may therefore need to be reviewed to incorporate those parts of Art 13 
of the Model Law that were excluded by the South African drafters. 
(b) Other Evidentiary Requirements  
(i) Satisfying the Requirement for ‘Original’ Document 
The legal requirement that a document be in ‘writing’ (as discussed above) is also closely 
related to the requirement for ‘signature’ and an ‘original’ document.  The ECTA has 
provided in s 14 how the requirement for an ‘original’ document can be satisfied 
electronically.  The rule in South Africa is that evidence intended to prove the content of a 
document must be the original document itself.
282
 
Section 14 of the ECTA, however, has made it possible, with certain provisos, for 
such a requirement to be met electronically.  First the information must maintain its integrity 
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 See Kilian (n99) 187. 
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 Take, for instance, the use of encryption key technology such as public-key encryption. 
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 See para 86 of the Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce (n1). 
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 See Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Creser 1982 (2) SA 104 (T) AT 106. See also Hofman (n54) 683.  A 
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throughout.  In this regard it must pass an integrity test, which, according to s 14(2), involves 
assessment of whether such information has remained in its complete and unaltered form.  
This test includes establishing whether the information has retained the purpose for which it 
was generated, and whether, having regard to all other relevant circumstances, one could 
consider it creditable.  Secondly, the requirement will be met electronically if ‘that 




Section 14 of the ECTA echoes what the Model Law provides in Art 8(1) and (3).
284
  
The concept of ‘original’ was carefully considered during the drafting of the Law, and, since 
s 14 of the ECTA drew from it, the explanatory notes to the Model Law are of assistance 
when interpreting this section.
285
  The drafters of the Model Law felt that, if the concept of 
‘original’ was to be defined to mean ‘a medium on which information was fixed for the first 
time’, it would be impossible to speak of ‘original’ data messages, because an addressee of a 
data message receives a copy thereof.
286
  
The basic issues that need to be emphasised, however, include the importance of the 
integrity of the information for its originality and the criteria set out to verify such integrity 
‘by reference to systematic recording of the information, assurance that the information was 
recorded without lacunae and protection of the data against alteration.’
287
 Consequently, 
similar arguments may be made in respect of s 14 of the ECTA, ie, that the section links the 
concept of originality to a method of authentication, and that its focus is on the method of 
authentication to meet its requirements. 
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 See s 14(1)(b) of the ECTA.  
284
 Article 8 of the Model Law provides as follows:  
‘(1) [w]here the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met 
by a data message if:  
(a) there exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the information from the time when it was first 
generated in its final form, as a data message or otherwise; and   
(b) where it is required that information be presented, that information is capable of being displayed to the 
person to whom it is to be presented.  
(2)…. 
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):  
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete and unaltered, 
apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of 
communication, storage and display; and 
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which the information 
was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.’ 
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 See Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (n71) para 1. See also paragraphs 62-69 of the Guide to the enactment of 
the Model Law (n1). 
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(ii) Admissibility of Data Messages 
Before the enactment of the ECTA, admissibility of computer related evidence was governed 
by the Computer Evidence Act (now repealed),
288
 the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act
289
 and 
the Criminal Procedure Act.
290
  The enactment of the Computer Evidence Act was in 
response to the decision in Norlis v South African Bank of Athens
291
 where a computerised 
bank statement was held inadmissible, in terms of s 34(2) and (4) of the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act, as it was not a ‘statement made by a person in a document’ according to s 
34(1) of that Act.
292
  In Ex parte Rosche,
293
 however, the court was of the view that the law 
did not require that everything retrieved from a computer should be used only after satisfying 
the requirements laid down by the Computer Evidence Act.
294
  In view of this case it was 
evident that there were still lacunae in the law that needed to be filled.
295
  The ECTA was 
therefore enacted to, inter alia, deal with this gap.
296
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Although the ECTA has moved beyond ‘computer printouts’ to embrace ‘data 
messages’
297
 has it succeeded in resolving the evidentiary problems?
 298
  The key issue is 




Section 15 of the ECTA (which is based on Art 9 of the Model Law) deals with the 
admissibility and evidential weight of data messages.  According to s 15(1)(a) and (b) of the 
ECTA, unless other grounds permit, all data held in electronic form will be legally admissible 
in evidence and, in any judicial proceeding, such data should not be denied admissibility 
under any rule of evidence merely because of their form.
300
  This provision is important in 
both criminal and civil proceedings.  For instance, where a dispute over unfair termination of 
an employee’s contract of employment by an employer occurs, and a need arises to bring into 
evidence archived e-mails to prove that there was victimisation or harassment of the 
employee by the employer, then such e-mails will be given the weight they deserve.  
The admissibility rule under s 15 of the ECTA is also significant in the light of the 
traditional common law best evidence rule.  Under this rule, the best evidence is the original 
document itself.  So, if a party wished to rely on a document, he had to bring the document in 
its original form.  This rule was seen as a stumbling block to e-commerce and needed to be 
re-evaluated to take into account modern exigencies.  Under the current position, therefore, 
much as the best evidence rule will still apply to other conventional practices, its application 
in the electronic environment has to take into account the character of e-documents, ie, by 
accepting that they are in the form of data messages.
301
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 See s 15(1)(a) and (b) of the ECTA.  This section is based on Art 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Section 
15(4), however, does not have a counterpart in the Model Law.  See Hofman (n54) 681-682, noting that s 
15(1)(a) assumes that data message may be denied admissibility on other grounds. Reasons assigned to this 
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in para 46 of the Guide to the UNCITRAL’s Model Law on E-commerce.  See also Ndlovu v The Minister of 
Correctional Services & another (n71).  
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The scope and meaning of s 15 of the ECTA, however, remains uncertain.
302
 
Consequently, questions have been raised as to ‘whether many of technology related 
evidentiary issues can be resolved or sufficiently dealt with under the existing rules and 
procedures.’
303
  This is further complicated by the fact that Art 9 of the Model Law, which 
forms the basis of s15 of the ECTA, was not intended for non-commercial matters.
304
  While 
chapter 3 of the ECTA does not have a statement to that effect, it has been argued that 
excluding non-commercial matters from its application will create lacunae in the South 
African law of evidence and will go against its objectives.
305
   
Previously, scholars were divided as to whether the ECTA makes all data messages 
admissible (including that which would ordinarily be regarded as hearsay).
306
  The Act (and 
the Model Law) defines ‘data’ to mean ‘electronic representations of information in any 
form’ while a ‘data message means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic 
means.’  Hofman argued that the definition relates to form and not content.
307
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Hofman had suggested that if a data message is used merely to establish that 
information was sent or received, it is not excluded in evidence.
308
  If such a data message is 
being used to show the truth of its content, however, unless a person responsible for it 
appears before the court for cross-examination, then it will remain hearsay (unless it falls 
under the exceptions to the hearsay rule).
309
  He thus concluded that ‘except where the ECT 




Hofman’s suggestion has found support in Ndlovu v The Minister of Correctional 
Services & another.
311
  In this case, the court was of the view that, ‘there is no reason to 
suppose that s 15 seeks to override the normal rules applying to hearsay.’
312
  In this case the 
court (in an obiter dictum) identified two types of evidence: ‘real’ computer evidence and 
‘hearsay’ computer evidence.
313
  Similarly, in S v Ndiki
314
 the court stated that: 
computer evidence which falls within the definition of hearsay evidence in s 3 
thereof may become admissible in terms of the provisions of that Act.  Evidence, 
on the other hand, that depends solely on the reliability and accuracy of the 
computer itself and its operating systems or programs, constitutes real evidence. 
What s 15 of the Act does, is to treat a data message in the same way as real 
evidence at common law.  It is admissible as evidence in terms of ss (2) and the 
court’s discretion simply relates to an assessment of the evidential weight to be 




These two decisions and the spirit of the Model Law on E-commerce convincingly establish 
that s 15 of the ECTA does not regard all data messages as admissible and, for that reason, 
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they may be denied admissibility as hearsay evidence unless they fall under the exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.
 316
   
In order to do away with the need to distinguish between what would amount to real 
evidence and what would constitute hearsay, as regards electronic records, the court in S v 
Ndiki suggested that the meaning of hearsay should be extended to include evidence that 
depends upon the accuracy of the machine.
317
  Schwikkard considers, however, that doing so 




It is clear, however, that not all computer records or data messages constitute 
hearsay.
319
  On the one hand, a computer record will constitute hearsay if it is computer-
stored information based on human-generated content (for instance, an e-mail, word-
processed document or spreadsheets) unless the person who generated the content testifies or 
unless it falls under the general exceptions to the hearsay rule.
320
  On the other hand, it will 
not constitute hearsay if such computer output was generated without human intervention.
321
  
If the probative value of a statement in the print-out is dependent upon the ‘credibility’ of the 
computer itself that is a different issue, for which the court will have to exercise its own 
discretion.  Consequently, one should consider the facts of a particular case to categorise the 
particular type of evidence.
322
  In view of that there is no need to amend the law as suggested 
in S v Ndiki.
323
 
Overall, it is important to note that issues regarding admissibility of electronic 
evidence are becoming more complex and controversial since technology is not static but 
constantly changing.
324
  Because these rapid changes lead to new forms of electronic 
                                                 
316
 See Hofman (n54) 682, 683-684. See also Van der Merwe et al (n306) 234. 
317
 See S v Ndiki (n294) para 33. 
318
 See Schwikkard (n292) 416. 
319
 See Hofman (n54) 684.   
320
 See M Watney ‘Admissibility of Electronic Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: An Outline of the South 
African Legal Position’ (2009) 1 Journal of Information, Law & Technology (JILT) (available at 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2009_1/watney (as accessed on 21/10/2010)) 9, citing S v Ndiki (n294) 31. 
321
 Ibid. Such a legal position can also be found in other jurisdictions such as the USA. See, for instance, H M 
Jarret & M W Bailie ‘Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations’ Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, United States Department 
of Justice, at 192 (available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf (as accessed on 
24/2/2011).  
322




 See S Mason & B Schafer ‘The Characteristics of Electronic Evidence in Digital Format’ in S Mason (ed) 

















 there is a growing trend towards a shift from questions regarding admissibility 
and exclusion to more technical concerns about authenticity and the suitable weight to accord 
to such evidence.
326
  The current shift is justified, given that electronic evidence is intangible 
or transient in nature, easy to manipulate, fragile, and is highly susceptible to error, accidental 
alterations or fabrications in the course of its collection or compilation for judicial use.
327
  
This means that there is a need for additional safeguards, including procedures governing the 
collection, storage and presentation of such evidence for purposes of judicial proceedings.
328
  
It has been argued, however, that lack of such procedures in South Africa further compounds 
the current evidential problems, hence bringing to the forefront the questions regarding the 
accuracy or authenticity, and hence reliability, of such evidence.
329
 
In its Issue Paper No.27, the SALRC raised some questions about assessing the 
evidential weight of a data message.
330
  One is whether it is necessary to review the principle 
of authentication, ‘in view of the nature and characteristics of electronic evidence that raise 
legitimate concerns about accuracy and authenticity’, and ‘given the fragmented nature of 
case law focusing on authentication of specific types of evidence.’
331
  Additionally, ‘while 
section 15(3) provides guidelines for assessing the evidential weight of data messages, should 
courts apply a higher admissibility hurdle in the context of authentication (as an aspect of 
relevance) for electronic evidence than for other forms of tangible evidence?’
332
  
As stated earlier in this chapter, the rule is that whoever wants to rely on a document 
in his favour must establish its authenticity.
333
  This rule applies to all documents in all forms.  
In order to avoid discriminating against forms of evidence, and in line with the principle of 
functional equivalence, there seems to be no reason why the rule on authentication should be 
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stricter in respect of electronic documents.
334
  If a court is satisfied that the document is 
authentic, it may only take judicial notice of the fact that it is an electronic document (which, 
as stated above, is ordinarily vulnerable to possible dangers of manipulations), and, with the 
help of expert opinion, proceed on the basis of s 15(3) of the ECTA to determine the weight 
to be attached to it.  It must continuously be borne in mind that the essence of the ECTA is to 
facilitate e-commerce.  
Concerning data messages produced ‘in the ordinary course of business,’ s 15(4) of 
the ECTA provides that such data message will be admissible in evidence.
335
  Hofman has 
stated, however, that despite s 15(4) it is clear that the ECTA does not contain a general 
exemption for data messages.
336
  This provision has been held to depart from the Model 
Law’s approach, as it goes against the functional equivalence principle.
337
  It has also been 
considered problematic given ‘the sheer scope of data messages made in the ordinary course 
of business that may now constitute rebuttable proof on mere production.’
338
  It is thus 
suggested that it should be given a restrictive interpretation.
339
  Indeed, in Golden Fried 
Chicken (Pty) Ltd v Yum Restaurants International (Pty) Ltd,
340
 it was held that unless a print 
out of a data message fulfils the requirements of s 15(4) its mere production as evidence is 
inadmissible and does not constitute prima facie evidence.
341
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(iii)Electronic Data Retention  
In many jurisdictions, including South Africa, there are legal requirements that certain 
information should be retained for a specific period of time before discarding it.
342
  Record 
retention requirements of that sort may apply to both the public and private sector, and in 
some instances retained data may be called upon to support a party’s allegation or denial in 
court proceedings.  Whereas data retention is important for several business reasons, (for 
instance, for accounting or tax purposes), retention of business records may not only consume 
a company’s resources, time of trying to retrieve such information when needed and storage 
space (where piles of paper files are to be kept and which space could have been utilised 
more productively) it can also be a hindrance to modern trading practices.  With the current 
advancements in technology, however, retention cost, space and time to retrieve previous 
record when needed can be greatly reduced through electronic archiving of important 
business records that are legally required to be retained for a specified period of time. 
Section 15 of the ECTA bears a relationship to s 16 of the Act regarding electronic 
data retention.  In order to ensure that records retained in electronic data form are accorded 
legal recognition, validity and treatment in a similar way as those records retained or stored in 
the conventional way, s 16 of the ECTA recognises and validates electronically retained data.  
Whereas the law permits change of format of the stored information from the one in which it 
would have originally appeared, the law does not allow alterations which will distort the 
accuracy of the particular information.  Thus, s 16(b) provides that data message must either 
be stored in a format in which it was generated, sent or received, or in a format which can be 
demonstrated to represent accurately the information generated, sent or received.  
It may however be problematic to satisfy the above requirement if data have been 
stored for a long time and if by the time they are needed, the technology used to keep them 
has become obsolete or incompatible with what might be available.  As stated earlier, 
technology is constantly changing and older technologies, for instance, removable data 
storage media such as diskettes have been rendered obsolete.  Business entities will thus have 
to ensure that data are properly kept and accurately transferred in a compatible format 
whenever the need to do so arises.  Ensuring compatibility is important due to possible data 
migration problems.  Section 16(c) adds a further requirement to the effect that retention of 
                                                 
342















information will be legally achieved if the origin and destination of such information, its date 
and the time when it was sent or received can be determined.  
7. Online Mistakes or Errors Occasioned by E-agents 
Online mistakes or input errors constitute one of the problems in online transactions 
including those associated with the use of e-agents. As discussed in chapter two, the general 
principles of contract formation also apply to online mistakes.
343
  Mistakes or input errors 
may be occasioned by either an e-agent or an online buyer (consumer).  According to South 
African law, as discussed earlier, a party who relies on an e-agent to transact on his behalf 
will be bound by its actions.
344
   
As discussed above,
345
 s 20(c) of the ECTA has made it clear that ‘a party using an 
electronic agent to form an agreement is … presumed to be bound by the terms of that 
agreement irrespective of whether that person reviewed the actions of the electronic agent or 
the terms of the agreement.’  The presumption created in s20(c) of the ECTA is, however, 
rebuttable.   
According to s 20(c), when read together with s 25(c) of the ECTA, if the party 
relying on an e-agent successfully proves that the information system malfunctioned, then he 
or she will not be bound.  Section 25(c) of the ECTA deals with attribution of data messages 
and provides that: 
[a] data message is that of the originator if it was sent by an information system 
programmed by or on behalf of the originator to operate automatically unless it is 
proved that the information system did not properly execute such programming.  
It is clear that, whereas the common law places the burden of assuming risk caused 
by a malfunctioning e-agent on the party that installed it, s 25(c) has mitigated the rule.
346
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Section 20(e) of the ECTA provides a basis upon which an agreement formed 
between a natural person and another person’s e-agent should be evaluated in case of 
mistakes or errors.
347
  According to this provision, such agreements will be null and void if, 
in the course of interactions, the natural person makes a material error and is denied an 
opportunity to prevent or correct it.
348
  After having learnt about it, that particular natural 
person must also have notified the other party of such error as soon as practicable.  Moreover, 
he or she must have taken reasonable steps to conform to the other party’s instruction, 
including the return of any performance received.  It has been stated, however, that the 
protection granted to a natural person who makes an error while interacting with an e-agent, 
as indicated in s 20(e) of the ECTA, conflicts with s 43(2) of the ECTA, concerning 
consumer protection.  This issue will be further discussed below, since s 43(2) falls under 
Chapter VII of the ECTA, and supply of goods or services offered on a website under that 
chapter amounts to electronic transactions, which entitle a consumer the protections offered 
under that chapter. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law and the UN Convention on E-contracts have also 
addressed the issue regarding errors or mistakes occasioned in an online transaction.
349
  
However, unlike the Model Law, which deals only with errors in the content of the data 
messages arising from transmission problems,
350
 Art 14 of the UN Convention on E-contracts 
is more elaborate on the issues regarding mistakes or input errors occasioned by a natural 
person interacting with an e-agent.
351
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If s 20(e) of the ECTA is compared to Art 14 of the UN Convention on E-contracts 
(as discussed below) one will find that, unlike the Convention, the ECTA requires an e-
merchant to avail a natural person interacting with an e-agent a mechanism to correct or 
prevent an error, in the absence of which the contract will be void.  For its part, Art 14 of the 
Convention applies only to errors made on an ‘interactive website’ and permits withdrawal 
from the transaction only in respect of a portion of that e-communication (hence the contract 
is neither void nor voidable).
352
  In my view, the ECTA provides a better approach. 
8. Online Consumer Protection: An Analysis of Chapter VII of the ECTA  
This section deals with online consumer protection in the context of the ECTA.  It is 
important to note that a number of statutes dealing with consumer protection have been 
enacted in South Africa,
353
 the most recent one being the Consumer Protection Act.
354
  Since 
consumer protection is a wider subject, for the purposes of coherence with the objectives of 
this thesis, the current discussion is confined only to the rules contained in Chapter VII of the 
ECTA.  Rules contained in this part of the Act are not based on the Model Law. The 
discussion in this section sets out the reasons for online consumer protection and proceeds to 
analyse and evaluate how the ECTA protects online consumers in South Africa.  
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(a) Why is it Necessary to Protect Online Consumers? 
In order to attain full realisation of the benefits of e-commerce to the economy, and to 
consumers generally, a high level of confidence in e-commerce transactions is required.
355
  
Adequate disclosure, assured privacy and security are pivotal issues.
356
  These essential 
components in online transactions can be promoted through consumer protection.  As 
indicated in chapters one and two of this thesis, e-commerce offers many benefits to 
consumers, such as increased ability to make different product choices, an easy access to 
various markets and convenience, as well as a wide spectrum of choices within which price 
comparisons can be made before placing orders.
357
  
Despite the above rewards, this mode of conducting business has its dark side.
358
  
First, globalisation, liberalisation of markets and the enhanced power of media through 
technology convergence has increased the danger of online supply of shoddy, defective and 
dangerous or substandard goods and services.  Second, given that the global nature of internet 
commerce lacks jurisdictional boundaries and face–to-face interactions, consumers who 
engage in e-commerce run considerable additional risks.  Moreover, it is impossible to expect 
poor, inexperienced and unsophisticated consumers to be able to fully protect their interests in 
on-line contracts.  
Issues of particular concern range from questions regarding consumer’s financial 
security, data protection, protection from unsolicited information, access to adequate 
information, and availability of effective and affordable redress mechanisms.
359
  All these 
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have created a need for special attention regarding online consumers hence making protective 
legal mechanisms, like those contained in the ECTA, necessary.  
(b) Analysis of Chapter VII of the ECTA 
(i) Who is a Consumer According to ECTA? 
The ECTA defines a consumer as ‘any natural person who enters or intends entering into an 
electronic transaction with a supplier as the end user of the goods or services offered by that 
supplier.’
360
  The Act, therefore, limits its definition to only natural persons.
361
  It has been 
argued, however, that ‘in view of the large number of small businesses trading in the informal 
sector of South Africa’s economy, courts should not adopt a restrictive meaning when 
interpreting the word ‘consumer’ for the purpose of chapter VII.
362
  It has further been argued 
that it may also be difficult, on the part of a supplier, to know whether the other party in a 
consumer contract is indeed a natural person so as to enable the supplier to take necessary 
steps to comply with the requirements set out in Chapter VII of the ECTA.
363
  There is also a 
concern that ‘trusts’ will be excluded from the definition of a consumer.
364
  
In view of the above definitional limitations, it is submitted that it may be better that 
courts should ignore the plain words ‘natural person’ as they appear in the Act.
365
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Alternatively, the scope of the ECTA definition of a ‘consumer’ should be reviewed to 
include small, medium and micro enterprises (hereafter ‘SMMEs’).
366
  This is especially so 
considering that many of these enterprises are involved in online transactions with big 
multinational companies, and may also be purchasing goods as end users.
367
  Indeed, since 
one of the objectives of ECTA is to support SMMEs in the electronic environment,
368
 
extending the protection provided under Chapter VII to them will boost their confidence to 
engage in e-commerce and thus contribute to their growth. 
(ii) Scope of Application of Chapter VII of the ECTA 
Because the ECTA was enacted, inter alia, to ‘promote legal certainty and confidence in 
respect of electronic transactions,’
 369
 it seeks to develop a safe, secure and effective 
environment in which online transactions can be conducted while ‘affording better protection 
to the consumer.’
370
  Its consequences for online businesses, consumers and the entire future 
of electronic commerce in South Africa are thus far-reaching.
371
  It has been stated that the 
European Directives 97/7/EC and 2000/31/EC (discussed in chapter five) ‘served the 
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Section 42(1) confines the application of chapter VII to electronic transactions 
only.
373
 For instance, if a consumer in Cape Town bought goods from a supplier in Durban, 
but arranged the deal by telephone, the transaction is outside the scope of Chapter VII of the 
ECTA.
374
  However, what if the transaction was partly concluded electronically and partly by 
other means?  According to Buys,
375
 if a problem of this sort arises, one has to apply the 




As will be discussed below, s 42(2) of ECTA also limits the scope of application of s 
44, meaning the latter does not apply to all consumer transactions.
377
  The section provides 
that ‘section 44 does not apply to an electronic transaction:   
  (a) for financial services, including but not limited to, investment services, insurance and 
reinsurance operations, banking services and operations relating to dealings in 
securities; 
  (b) by way of an auction; 
  (c) for the supply of foodstuffs, beverages or other goods intended for everyday 
consumption supplied to the home, residence or workplace of the consumer; 
  (d) for services which began with the consumer's consent before the end of the seven-day 
period referred to in section 44 (1); 
  (e) where the price for the supply of goods or services is dependent on fluctuations in the 
financial markets and which cannot be controlled by the supplier; 
  (f) where the goods-  
   (i) are made to the consumer's specifications;  
   (ii) are clearly personalised;  
   (iii) by reason of their nature cannot be returned; or  
   (iv) are likely to deteriorate or expire rapidly; 
  (g) where audio or video recordings or computer software were unsealed by the 
consumer; 
  (h) for the sale of newspapers, periodicals, magazines and books; 
  (i) for the provision of gaming and lottery services; or  
  (j) for the provision of accommodation, transport, catering or leisure services and where 
the supplier undertakes, when the transaction is concluded, to provide these services 
on a specific date or within a specific period.’ 
Furthermore, s 42(3) excludes the application of Chapter VII ‘to a regulatory 
authority established in terms of a law if that law prescribes consumer protection provisions 
                                                 
373
See s 42(1) of the Act. Buys argues that in applying chapter VII of the Act, it is necessary to examine the 
terms ‘electronic transactions’ and ‘consumer’ and further that ‘[a]lthough Section 4(1) states that the ECT Act, 
as a whole, applies to all ‘data messages’ and ‘electronic transactions’, the use of the word ‘only’ in section 
42(1) seem to exclude “data message” from application.’(See also R Buys (n363) 142; Huffman (n358) 54). 
374
 See Eiselen (n17) 183; see also De Villiers (n150) 49.  
375
 See Buys (n363) 140. See also Eiselen (n17) 183 (supporting Buy’s views). 
376
 See Buys (n363) 141. See also Eiselen (n17) 183.  However, De Villiers (n150) 41, considers that the 
definition of an ‘electronic transaction’ as suggested by Buys may be too broad. 
377















in respect of electronic transactions’.
378
  The ECTA is, by itself, a law that has created 
‘regulatory authorities’ and ‘prescribes for consumer protection in respect of electronic 
transactions.’  
This being so, does it mean that even the regulatory authorities it has established are 
excluded from the application of Chapter VII?
379
  According to Eiselen, what the section 
‘probably intended to mean [is] that when an Act subjects electronic transactions to 




There is yet another omission in the ECTA which may lead to problems.  Although 
the term ‘electronic transaction’ is used throughout the Act, it is not defined.
 381
  Section 1 
provides only a definition for the term ‘transaction’ which means ‘a transaction of either a 
commercial or non-commercial nature, and includes the provision of information and e-
government services.’  While this definition includes transactions of a commercial and non-
commercial nature, the scope of the term ‘electronic transaction’ remains uncertain.
382
    
Since a ‘transaction’ includes both commercial and non-commercial transactions, 
does every visit to a website amount to an electronic transaction?
383
  Buys is of the view that 
every visit by a consumer should not be covered by Chapter VII of the ECTA.
384
  He suggests 
rather that, for the purpose of Chapter VII, and in view of use of other terms, such as ‘goods 
or services for sale, hire or exchange’ in s 43(1), ‘payments’ in ss 43(1)(j) and 43(5), ‘return 
policy’ in s  43(1)(n) and ‘commercial’ in s 45(1), the term ‘electronic transaction’ should be 
limited to commercial transactions between a consumer and a merchant.
385
   
                                                 
378
 This provision is subject to criticism for being unclear. See De Villiers (n150) 49. 
379
 See Eiselen (n17) 183 who states that ‘this provision is poorly drafted and obscure [and it may] remain a 




In the USA the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, (UETA) §7, 7A U.L.A. 211 (2002) (available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archaives/ulc/ulc.htm#ueccta (as accessed on 3/9/2010), defines the terms 
‘electronic transactions’ and ‘electronic’ in two separate definitions. Section 2(5) defines the term electronic to 
mean ‘relating to technology having electrical, digital magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar 
capabilities.’ On the other hand, s 2(16) defines the term ‘transaction’ to mean ‘an action or set of actions 
occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental 
affairs.’  
382
See Buys (n363) 140-141.  Certain foreign legislation, however, have defined the term ‘electronic 
transactions’. See the UETA’s definition at (n381) above. 
383




















Other commentators, however, consider that the term should be given a wider 
interpretation.
386
  Thus, for the purpose of Chapter VII, ‘electronic transactions’ should be 
taken to include all data communications between web merchants and consumers whether 
they are of a contractual nature or not.
387
  This latter view seems to be correct since 
consumers may still be affected by non-contractual matters that are a result of their 
contractual undertakings, for instance, privacy infringements resulting from unsolicited 
communications of a commercial and non-commercial nature from a web-merchant.  
(iii)Informational Duties of Online Suppliers  
Chapter VII of the ECTA has set out very high protection standards for online consumers, 
which are not always offered to offline consumers.
388
  Such a high threshold, however, is 
necessary.  As stated earlier, unlike traditional consumers, online consumers lack not only the 
ability to physically inspect goods they intend to purchase but also the opportunity for a face-
to-face encounter with the provider of online services.
389
  Consequently, what is available to 
them is insufficient to satisfy or instil a sense of confidence in online retailers or a product or 
service providers.
390
  Furthermore, online transactions are subject to additional risks because, 
by reason of the technical aspects involved, the opportunities for fraud are greater in an 
online environment than they are in an offline transaction.
391
 
Section 43 of the ECTA provides for information requirements that every online 
merchant must adhere to, failing which consumers who contracted with the merchant will be 
entitled to cancel the contract within 14 days of receiving the goods or services.
392
  Section 
43(1) of the ECTA provides that: 
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 See Eiselen (n17) 182. 
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 Ibid. See also De Villiers (n150) 41.  
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See J Hofman Consumer Protection and E-Law (2002), available at http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/itlaw (as 
accessed on 24/9/2008). See also C Ncube (original text by D Collier-Reed) ‘Electronic Commerce’ in Collier-
Reed & Lehmann Basic Principles of Business Law 2ed (2010) 517; De Villiers (n150) 9-10.  
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consumer protection which South African internet users should be enjoying.’ See ‘Data Privacy and Consumer 
Protection in South Africa E-commerce’ (n371). 
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 See De Villiers (n150) 10. 
392
 See s 43(3) of the ECTA. See similar requirements in the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the 
Context of Electronic Commerce (1999) which applies to the OECD Countries. The Guidelines can be accessed 















[a] supplier offering goods or services for sale, for hire or for exchange by 
way of an electronic transaction must make the following information 
available to consumers on the website where such goods or services are 
offered:… 
The wording of this provision clearly shows that the elaborate list of requirements made 
under it cannot in any way be waived in a contract with a consumer.  However, the phrase 
‘offering goods or services for sale, for hire or for exchange by way of an electronic 
transaction,’ may be difficult to construe.  Firstly, as indicated above, the term ‘electronic 
transaction,’ though relied upon throughout part VII of the Act, is not defined under the 
Act.
393
  Secondly, the term ‘offering’ or ‘offered,’ as used in the section, has dual meanings 
and may create problems because it can refer to either an offer in the strict sense or to an 
advertisement that entices consumers to make orders.
394
  
As the earlier discussion indicated, in contract making, the effects of these two, ie, 
an offer and an advertisement, are quite different.  An offer once accepted creates a binding 
contract while an advertisement does not.  However, although an advertisement is just an 
invitation to enter into a bargain,
395
 in an online environment it may turn out to be an offer 
that sufficiently lead to an enforceable contract once accepted.
396
  For that reason, one should 
consider s 43(1) while taking into account the differences between a brochure website, which 
stands as an advertising board, and a functional e-commerce website, where orders can be 
effectively placed.  
Nonetheless, the section estricts all disclosure requirements only to a website 
offering such goods or services.
397
  Section 1 of the ECTA defines the term ‘website’ to mean 
‘any location on the Internet containing a home page or a web page’.  Disclosure 
requirements can be contained in the supplier’s terms and conditions (also referred to as a 
user agreement) or in a hyperlink.
398
  Given the wording of s 43, it is clear that a supplier 
cannot rely on an e-mail containing the information that must be disclosed.  This means that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Example under the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce 
DSTI/CP(2002)2/FINAL (2002). 
393
See The UETA (n381).  
394
See Jacobs (n64) 560. See also Huffmann (n358) 55). The author argues that ‘the term “offering” does not 
have a technical or legal meaning but a meaning of common language.’ 
395
See Chissick & Kelman (n121).  
396
 See Pistorius (n80) 282. 
397
See section 43(1) of the ECTA. See also Buys ‘How Will the Consumer Protection Provisions of the New the 
ECTA Affect Your Web Site?’ available at http://www.buys.co.za (as accessed on 6/8/2008). 
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suppliers have to tailor their websites in such a way that a consumer is able to gain access to 
the necessary information on the website of the supplier. 
The information that suppliers must disclose to consumers in terms of s 43(1) of the 
ECTA includes the following:  
 full name and legal status of a supplier, physical address and telephone number, 
the web address and e-mail address,
399
 
 membership of any self-regulatory or accredited body to which the supplier 
belongs and contact details of the body,
400
  
 any code of conduct to which that supplier subscribes and how to gain  access to 
it electronically 
401
 - a hyperlink to such code may be sufficient,
402
 
 the supplier’s registration numbers, names of its office bearers and place of 




 Suppliers are also required to provide clear description of the goods and services 
they supply to enable consumers to make informed decisions.
404
  
 They must also indicate the full price of the goods or services, including 
transport, taxes, fees and/or other costs, the manner of payment, any terms, 
including any guarantees that will apply to the transaction, and how those 
terms may be accessed, stored and reproduced electronically by consumers, 
the time within which goods will be dispatched or delivered or within which 
service will be rendered, the manner and period within which consumers can 
access and maintain a full record of the transaction, the return, exchange and 
                                                 
399
 See s 43(1)(a) of the ECTA. 
400
 See s 43(1)(b) of the ECTA. 
401
 See s 43(1)(e) of the ECTA. The Code of conduct may, for instance, be the Advertising Code of Conduct and 
the Code of SMS Marketing. See Buys (n363)143. 
402
 See Buys (n363) 143; De Villiers (n150) 50. Section 1 of the ECTA defines a hyperlink to mean ‘a reference 
or link from some point in one data message directing a browser or other technology or functionality to another 
data message or point therein or to another place in the same data message.’ 
403
 See s 43(1)(f) and (g) of the ECTA. 
404
 See s 43(1)(h) of the ECTA. A similar trend on the requirement for disclosure of certain facts is also 
provided for under the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce 



















 As regards dispute resolution, if a supplier has subscribed to an arbitration code, 
then such information needs to be disclosed and a consumer must be able to 
gain access to it. Most websites prefer arbitration of disputes and put notices 
of such a preference in their terms and conditions.
406
  In view of this, if there 
is any hyperlink to that effect, suppliers must conform to the requirements of s 
11(3) of the ECTA.
407
  
Furthermore, suppliers should: 
 disclose their security procedures and privacy policy in respect of payment, 
payment information and personal information.
 408
  In view of this 
requirement, the duty to ensure consumer safety when effecting payments to 
the supplier by way of credit cards is placed on the supplier.  The law requires 
suppliers to guarantee a payment system that is ‘sufficiently secure with 
reference to accepted technological standards at the time of the transaction and 
the type of the transaction concerned.’
409
  
Buys suggests that safety and security of an e-commerce website with a payment 
gateway can be ensured if certain technologies are used, such as 
[a] digital certificate to authenticate the web site (a small padlock appears at 
the bottom of the browser when visiting the authenticated web page), 
encryption technology that encrypts all communications between the 
consumer, the supplier and the banks in question (eg, secure sockets layer or 
SSL, indicated by https://), or use of username and password by the 
consumer to gain access to the transaction engine....
410   
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See s 43(1)(i), (j),(k), (l), (m) and (o) of the ECTA. 
406
 See De Villiers (n150) 52. 
407
 See the earlier discussion (above, and in chapter two) on browse-wrap agreements and their practical 
problems to consumers. See also De Villiers (n150) 53-56 discussing the similar issue concerning browse-wrap 
agreements. 
408
 See s 43(1)(p) of the ECTA. 
409
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The ECTA is clear that a supplier is liable for any damage suffered by a consumer 
due to the supplier’s failure to provide for a payment system that is sufficiently secured and 
up to the required standards.
411
 
 The supplier is also required, where appropriate, to state the minimum duration 
of the agreement, in the case of agreements for the supply of products or 
services to be performed on an ongoing basis or recurrently,
 412
 and 
 should state the rights of the consumer in terms of s 44 (dealing with the 
cooling off period). 
(iv) Non-compliance with Section 43(1) of ECTA 
In the course of conducting online transactions consumers must have an opportunity to 
review the entire transaction.  Section 43(3) provides that if a supplier has failed to avail a 
consumer an opportunity to review their electronic transactions, correct any mistakes or 
withdraw from the transaction (as required by s 43(1) and (2)),
413
 the consumer has a right to 
cancel the contract within a period of 14 days after receiving the goods or services.  The 
ECTA, however, requires an online consumer, who opts to exercise the right, to return the 
goods received or to stop using the services performed.  The supplier must then refund all 
payments made by the consumer (having deducted the ‘direct cost’ of returning the goods).
414
  
(v) Sections 20(e) and 42(2) of ECTA 
The supply of goods or services offered on a website under Chapter VII of the ECTA 
amounts to electronic transactions giving consumers the protection offered under the ECTA.  
The same, however, will amount to automated transactions and the website will be deemed 
an e-agent.  It is thus argued that the purchaser (also a natural person, hence a consumer) will 




 of the ECTA: first as a consumer interacting with a 
                                                 
411
 See s 43(6) of the ECTA. It is important to note that protection of consumers’ privacy is a right which they 
enjoy and if breached one can be entitled to damages under the law of tort. 
412
 See s 43(1)(q) of the ECTA. 
413
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required by s 43(1) and (2) of the ECTA. 
414
See Buys (n363) 146. See s 43(4)(a) and (b). 
415
 Section 20(e) provides that ‘[i]n an automated transaction no agreement is formed where a natural person 
interacts directly with the electronic agent of another person and has made a material error during the creation of 
a data message and-  
















website, and second, as a natural person interacting with an e-agent.
417
  Consequently, there 
is a potential conflict between the protection granted to a natural person who makes an error 




The implications of the above conflict also reveal themselves with regard to other 
provisions under Chapter VII, such as s 44, which provides for cooling-off rights, as well as 
the nature of remedies available to a consumer.
419
  Consequently, an online merchant ‘faces 
the risk that the contract could be voidable due to insufficiency of the information or voidable 
or void as a result of keystroke errors.’
420
  To resolve the existing dilemma it will be 
necessary to amend s 43 of the ECTA by substituting the word ‘website’ with a general 
phrase, such as ‘an information system’ in order to give room for generic application of other 





                                                                                                                                                        
(ii)that person notifies the other person of the error as soon as practicable after that person has 
learned of it;  
(iii)that person takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the other person's 
instructions to return any performance received, or, if instructed to do so, to destroy that 
performance; and,  
(iv)that person has not used or received any material benefit or value from any performance 
received from the other person.  
416
 Section 43(3) provides that ‘[t]he supplier must provide a consumer with an opportunity-  
(a)to review the entire electronic transaction; 
(b)to correct any mistakes; and 
(c)to withdraw from the transaction, before finally placing any order. 
417
 See Pistorius (n34) 14. 
418
 See Pistorius (n34) 14. See also Eiselen (n17) 186-187 stating that in case a consumer is, for instance, denied 
the opportunity to review the transaction and correct mistakes therein, he or she may cancel the contract in 14 
days in terms of s 43(2) or s 20 of the ECTA.  In terms of section 20 of ECTA cancellation may have 
‘retrospective effect’ and if ‘the consumer successfully relies on section 20, he or she is under no duty to pay for 
“re-transporting” of the goods.’(See Eiselen (n17) 187.) 
419
 (In terms of s 43(2) and a ‘natural person’ (in terms of section 20(e)). 
420
 Ibid, at 15. 
421
 As for m-commerce see ‘Mobile Commerce: opportunities and challenges’ A GS1 Mobile Com White Paper 
(available at http://www.gs1.org/docs/mobile/GS1_Mobile_Com_Whitepaper.pdf (as accessed on 23/10/2010). 
See also P B van der Merwe Mobile Commerce over GSM: a Banking Perspective on Security (Msc 
(Electronics) Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2003).Available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-
07202004-111814/unrestricted/00dissertation.pdf (as accessed on 27/7/2011). 
422
 Ibid, at 15. U-commerce refers to ‘the use of ubiquitous networks to support personalized and uninterrupted 
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above, and beyond traditional commerce.’ See also R Watson, L F Pitt, P Berthon & G M Zinkhan ‘U-
Commerce Expanding the universe of marketing’ (2002) 30 Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 329, 
332 (available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/~rwatson/Passau/u-comslides.pdf or 
http://www.cis.gsu.edu/~emonod/u-tour/watson-u-commerce-2002.pdf (as accessed on 23/10/2010). According 
to Watson et al, there are four Fundamental dimensions of u-commerce as described by Watson.  These are (1) 
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Online merchants may also escape being trapped by s 20 and 43(2) by ensuring that 
‘the transaction process makes adequate provision for consumers to review the transaction, 
notice any mistakes and correct them, or withdraw from the transaction.’
423
  The conflicting 
sections have caused commentators to allege that the South African legislature seemed to act 
in an over-zealous manner with regard to consumer protection.
424
  Be that as it may, one may 
note the dangers of duplication in the course of drafting, since the drafters of the ECTA 
borrowed from other countries, especially the EU, Canada and the USA.
425
 
(vi) Cooling-off Period  
Section 44 of the ECTA provides for a cooling-off period, this mechanism being ‘a feature of 
most distance selling provisions and consumer protection measures.’
426
  In essence, this 
protective mechanism entitles a consumer to reflect on the consequences of the transaction or 
to inspect the goods ordered and decide whether to proceed with a transaction, ie, by finally 
accepting the goods.
427
  Section 44 is based on cooling-off provisions of the EC Distance 
Selling Directive (discussed in Chapter V).
428
 
It has been argued, however, that because many consumers do not bother to read the 
standard terms and conditions governing their transactions, the benefits of this mechanism 
may take long to be realised.
429
  This suggests, therefore, that continuing consumer education 
is an important strategy for attaining the objectives of Chapter VII. 
According to s 44, a consumer is entitled to cancel the contract without assigning 
any reason.  This can only happen, however, within seven days after the date of the receipt of 
the goods or within seve  days after the date of the conclusion of the agreement for the 
supply of services.
430
  If a
 
consumer opts to exercise rights under the cooling-off provision he 
is entitled to a full refund of payments made under the contract within a period of 30 days of 
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the date of such cancellation.
431
  The only ‘direct costs’ that the supplier is entitled to levy on 
the consumer are charges associated with the return of goods.
432
  It is important to note, 
however, that exercise of the rights provided by s 44 of the ECTA does not bar consumers 
from pursuing any other rights they are entitled to under any other law.
433
  
One further matter may be noted concerning the exercise of rights under ss 43(3) and 
44(1).  Unlike s 46(2), which provides that cancellation under that section will be by way of 
‘a written notice’, the former two sections do not state how a consumer should cancel.  Under 
German legislation providing similar protections, for instance, cancellation must be made by 
means of a notice in ‘textual form’.
434
  
As stated earlier, the application of s 44 of the ECTA is restricted in terms of s 42(2) 
which provides that certain transactions are excluded.
435
  One notable omission from the list 
of exclusions is transactions involving supply of digital goods that are directly downloadable 
to a consumer’s computer.  Software, music, and e-books are examples.
436
  This omission is 
considered fatal, especially to software developers, music artists and e-book suppliers, and 
may encourage piracy and copyright infringement.
437
  Buys has noted the possibility that such 
‘goods’ may be downloaded  and used by a consumers for some time, and then returned 
within the seven days in exercise of their cooling-off right.
438
  In consequence, therefore, the 
market for digital goods in South African is crippled.
439
  In view of this lacuna there is a need 
to amend the ECTA. 
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(vii) Unsolicited Goods, Services or Communications  
The problem of ‘spam’ (also referred to as unsolicited communications) is considered acute 
globally.
440
  Its economic side effects are colossal.
441
  Consequently, the need to protect 
consumers from this plague through effective national legislative interventions is 
indispensable.
442
  Whereas previously some states preferred self-regulation, this approach has 
proven to be less effective, and, increasingly, legislative mechanisms are being invoked.
443
  
South Africa is one of the countries with legislation (the ECTA) which, although not 
exclusively enacted to regulate spam, sets out certain requirements.  
Despite the economic side effects which spam generates,
444
 spam is not by itself 
illegal in South Africa.  Basically, the approach adopted in the ECTA is that of regulation (an 
opt-out method, also referred to as ‘low-key approach’)
445
 rather than prohibition.
446
  The 
relevant provision in the ECTA is s 45, which provides that: 
(1) [a]ny person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to 
consumers, must provide the consumer-  
(a) with the option to cancel his or her subscription to the mailing list of that 
person; and 
(b) with the identifying particulars of the source from which that person 
obtained the consumer's personal information, on request of the consumer. 
(2) No agreement is concluded where a consumer has failed to respond to an 
unsolicited communication. 
(3) Any person who fails to compl  with or contravenes subsection (1) is guilty 
of an offence and liable, on conviction, to the penalties prescribed in section 
89(1). 
(4) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to a person 
who has advised the sender that such communications are unwelcome, is guilty 
of an offence and liable, on conviction, to the penalties prescribed in section 
89(1). 
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 See Eiselen (n17) 190. 
446
 This approach has been criticised as unsatisfactory. For more discussion on this see Sibanda (n440) 4. See 















As the section indicates, it only deals with spam as a problem partially and only with 
regard to ‘unsolicited commercial communications’, leaving out other non-commercial 
communications that may equally be objectionable.
447
  In the EU, the E-commerce Directive 
requires member states that allow unsolicited electronic communications to ensure that the 
service providers in their territory make it clear to the recipients of such communications that 
they are unsolicited commercial communications.
448
  By so doing consumers are put to early 
notice that the message is spam, and thus can be eliminated.
449
  
As stated earlier, the ECTA has adopted a soft approach, which places the burden on 
consumers to decide whether to opt-out or opt-in when it comes to dealing with spam.
450
  
This soft approach may have been adopted because, by the time the ECTA was being 
enacted, spam was not yet the plague it has become.  It is submitted that the approach may be 
too costly on consumers.
451
  Hence, it may be an opportune time to revisit the ECTA for 
stricter rules.   
It is important to note that the Consumer Protection Act
452
 contains anti-spam 
provisions.  Although it still maintains the ‘low-key’ approach envisaged in the ECTA, the 
Act ‘presents the most comprehensive set of consumer rights relating to privacy.’
 453
  Section 
11 regulates direct marketing and provides a consumer with a right to restrict, refuse or 
accept the advances of direct marketing.
454
  Accordingly, ‘a person who has been approached 
for the purpose of direct marketing may demand, during or within a reasonable time after that 
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communication, that the person responsible for initiating the communication desist from 
initiating any further communication.’
455
   
Consumers are also entitled to pre-emptively block any approach or communication, 
other than personal communication, that is primarily for the purpose of direct marketing.
456
  
According to s 11(3) consumers may register such pre-emptive blocks with a registry 
recognised by the National Consumer Commission.
457
  Direct marketers are thus obliged to 
consult the Commission’s registry, and if a consumer’s name appears therein, then they may 
not direct or permit any person to direct or deliver any communication for the purpose of 
direct marketing to that registered consumer.
458
  Section 11 further provides that ‘[n]o person 
may charge a consumer a fee for making a demand in terms of subsection (2) or registering a 
pre-emptive block as contemplated in subsection (3).’
459
 
Section 12 of this Act foresees that the Minister may by regulation restrict the time 
within which direct home marketing by a supplier may occur.  Specifically s12(1) provides 
that ‘[a] supplier must not engage in any direct marketing directed to a consumer at home for 
any promotional purpose during a prohibited period prescribed in terms of this section, except 
to the extent that the consumer has expressly or implicitly requested or agreed otherwise.’
460
   
More developments are also expected when the Protection of Personal Information 
Bill becomes law.
461
  The intended law seeks ‘to provide for the rights of persons regarding 
unsolicited electronic communications and automated decision making’ among other things.  
Section 66(1) of the Bill provides that: 
                                                 
455
 See s 11(2) of the CPA. Under s 16(3)(a)-(b) of this Act Consumers are entitled to terminate transactions 
resulting from direct marketing without reason or penalty. 
456
 See s 11(1)(c) of the CPA. 
457
 Section 11(3) provides that ‘[t]he Commission may establish, or recognise as authoritative, a registry in 
which any person may register a pre-emptive block, either generally or for specific purposes, against any 
communication that is primarily for the purpose of direct marketing.’ The National Consumer Commission is 
established under s 85 of the Act. 
458
 See s 11(4) of the CPA. 
459
 See s 11(5) of the CPA. 
460
 See s 32(1) and (2) of the CPA. Section 32(1) provides that ‘[a] person who is directly marketing any goods 
or services, and who concludes a transaction or agreement with a consumer, must inform the consumer, in the 
prescribed manner and form, of the right to rescind that agreement, as set out in section 16.’ Section 32(2) 
further states that ‘[i]f a person who has marketed any goods as contemplated in subsection (1) left any goods 
with the consumer without requiring or arranging payment for them, those goods are unsolicited goods, to which 
section 21 applies.’ 
461
 The Bill was introduced in the National Assembly and published in Government Gazette No. 32495 of 14 
August 2009. It is available at http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Protection-
of-Personal-Information-Bill/Documents/Protection%20of%20Personal%20Information%20Bill.pdf (as 















[t]he processing of personal information of a data subject for the purpose of 
direct marketing by means of automatic calling machines, facsimile machines, 
SMSs or electronic mail is prohibited unless the data subject— 
(a) has given his, her or its consent to the processing; or 
(b) is, subject to subsection (2), a customer of the responsible party.
462
 
(viii) Performance  
In terms of performance, the law requires a supplier to effect performance within 30 days 
after receipt of the order placed by the consumer unless otherwise agreed.
463
  In case of a 
failure to do so a consumer is entitled, upon written notice to the supplier, to cancel the order 
within seven days.
464
  Section 46(3) of the ECTA provides, however, that a supplier who 
finds it impossible to perform the contract in accordance with the agreed terms with the 
consumer should inform the latter immediately.  Any payment that might have been received 
under the contract must be refunded to the consumer in full within 30 days after the date of 
such notification.  (It may be argued, however, that the period of 30 days in this subsection is 
too long and unrealistic given the modern type of electronic money transfers).  
Furthermore, s 46(3) may be a Pandora’s box for all sorts of evil against a consumer 
on the pretext that it is impossible to supply the goods.  In view of this an unscrupulous 
supplier may hold a consumer’s money for 28 days only to refund on the 29
th
 or the 30
th
 day.  
This will not be doing justice to the consumer, since the online merchant’s right to terminate 
the contract lawfully creates ‘a serious inroad into the rights of the consumers’.
465
  
Commentators therefore propose that the term ‘unavailable’, as used in the provision, should 
be construed strictly, ‘meaning that the goods must be objectively unavailable, not merely 
unavailable to the webtrader.’
466
  It is also unclear what should be done to an online merchant 
who fails to comply with this provision.  As once said, ‘while it is acknowledged that 
consumers should be afforded protection, that protection must be appropriate and 
enforceable.’
467
  There is, hence, a need to review this provision in order to stipulate a shorter 
time within which a consumer should be refunded.  
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(ix) Complaints to the National Consumer Commission 
Prior to 2008, dissatisfied consumers could refer their complaints to the Consumer Affairs 
Committee in respect of any non-compliance with Chapter VII.
468
  This body has now been 
replaced by the National Consumer Commission.
469
  According to Buys, reference to ‘any 
non-compliance’ indicates that, even if some provisions in Chapter VII give consumers 
redress mechanisms in the form of civil or criminal actions, consumers can still refer the 
complaint to the National Consumer Commission.
470
  
(x) Protection of Personal Data 
Data protection has been defined as ‘a set of measures aimed at safeguarding individuals 
(data subjects) from harm resulting from the computerised or manual processing of their 
information by data controllers.’
471
  Measures to protect such data include a requirement for 
the application of certain principles on processing of personal data.
472
  Loss of consumers’ 
confidence in e-commerce is partly due to fear of misuse of their personal data for other 
unauthorised purposes, some of which may pose a threat to their privacy.  Data protection 
and protection of individual privacy in the information age has thus been critical issues.
473
 
Although protection of personal data is indirectly dealt with in Chapter VII of the 
ECTA,
474
 it is addressed more directly in Chapter VIII.  The scope of application of Chapter 
VIII is provided in s 50(1) of the ECTA.  The section provides that the ‘Chapter only applies 
to personal information that has been obtained through electronic transactions.’   
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Despite the sensitivity and the relevance of protecting personal data and other 
interests of online consumers, the provisions in Chapter VIII of the ECTA are not 
mandatory.
475
   The ECTA is therefore deficient as regards protection of a consumer’s 
personal data because the mechanisms are voluntary.  Section 50(2) provides that ‘[a] data 
controller may voluntarily subscribe to the principles outlined in section 51 by recording such 
fact in any agreement with a data subject.’  Section 51 enumerates the principles that may be 
subscribed to when a data controller electronically collects personal data,
476
  and, when a data 
controller subscribes to such principles, s 50(3) requires that he should do so to all and not 
selectively.  In case of breach of rights and obligations between the parties under any 
agreement reached in terms of s 50(2) the terms agreed upon will govern the matter.  
Because adhering to the principles set out in s 51 depends on an agreement between 
the data controller and the subject, where a merchant violates Chapter VIII, such violation 
will be a matter of breach of contract between data subjects and data controllers, with no 
external supervisory body to investigate or implement criminal sanctions.
477
  Moreover, while 
the principles enumerated under s 51 are useful, should the data controller elect to be bound 
by them, certain important requirements are missing.  These include ‘a requirement that data 
must be accurate, kept up to date, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for 
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which they are transferred or further processed.’
478
 Similarly,  there is no ‘obligation on data 
controllers to provide appropriate security measure for personal information, provision 
regarding access to or correction of personal information, the right of data subject to object to 





 the South African government has introduced a Bill – the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill
481
 – for discussion and possible adoption into law.  
The Bill seeks, among other things, ‘to promote the protection of personal information 
processed by public and private bodies’.
482
  If and when it comes into effect, it will remedy 
the existing deficiencies in the ECTA (as regards protection of personal data), since it gives 
effect to the constitutional right to privacy in a more appropriate manner than the ECTA. 
9. The ECTA and Transborder Issues: Jurisdiction and Choice of Applicable Law 
(a) The Challenging Cyber-Environment  
As stated before, consumers and the business community in general need confidence in e-
commerce transactions.  This requires, among other things, accessible and effective means of 
redress should any problem arise.
483
  As discussed in Chapters one to four of this thesis, 
access to justice in a transborder e-commerce context is bedevilled with jurisdictional and 
choice of law problems.
484
  It was further noted that, although existing conflict of laws rules 
were relevant in paper-based commerce, their application in the Internet and e-commerce 
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context is questionable, partly because of the nature of the Internet, and partly because such 
rules are primarily territorial in character.
485
   
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that international trade is no longer the 
exclusive domain of a few multinationals.  Increasingly ordinary consumers are becoming 
involved.
486
  This has created a polarised situation.  On the one hand, consumer protection 
advocates seek to ensure that consumers are not forced to litigate away from their home,
487
 
while, on the other hand, traders seek to protect their freedom to agree where to litigate and 
which law to apply.  Traders also want to avoid potential exposure to suits in numerous 
countries because of their presence on the Internet.
488
  In short, the current complexities 
emanate from the fact that, although courts traditionally exercise powers on a territorial 
basis,
489
 participants in activities conducted in the current virtually borderless market place 
cannot be confined to a particular territory.
490 
(b) The South African Position under the ECTA 
Before discussing jurisdiction and choice of law in South Africa it is important to state that, 
although the two are relevant to e-commerce transactions, they are not included in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on which the ECTA is partly based.
 491
  Consequently, the Model 
Law does not have rules like those in ss 47 and 48 of the ECTA.
492
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In chapter three of this thesis, the term ‘jurisdiction’ was defined to mean the power 
of a particular court to adjudicate a dispute.
493
  This power can be in rem or in personam.
494
  
The earlier discussion, however, was not in the context of the ECTA.  
As in Tanzania, exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on 
whether the cause of action arose in the country
495
 or whether such defendant is resident in 
the country or has voluntarily submitted to the forum.
496
  
Deciding which court should exercise jurisdiction over a dispute concerning an 
internet transaction or which law will govern such a transaction is not an easy task.  This was 
explained in chapter four (although the discussion was not concerned with the practice in 
South Africa).  Once the court is satisfied that it is competent to hear the matter, unless 
parties have chosen an applicable law, the next task is deciding which law should be applied 
to the dispute.
497
  These determinations are made on the basis of the conflict of laws rules of 
the forum (the lex fori).
498
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The applicable law in contracts is referred to as ‘the proper law’ of contract, which is 
a single system of law, ie, it must be a law of a country and not just general principles of 
law.
499
  In this regard, a South African court will consider whether the parties have expressly 
stipulated a law in their contract.
500
  If there is no express or tacit choice, the court will 
impute a choice of law to the parties.
501
  
The rules regarding choice of law in South Africa are based on the doctrine of party 
autonomy.
502
  The choice will be honoured by courts unless it is overridden by a mandatory 
rule, which applies regardless of the parties’.
503
  The ECTA is such a mandatory rule.  It 
provides in s 47 that ‘[t]he protection provided to consumers in this Chapter, applies 
irrespective of the legal system applicable to the agreement in question.’
 504
 
Section 47 of the ECTA has therefore brought to the forefront the country of 
protection principle or the lex loci protectionis.
505
  This means that, in any case where the 
question of applicable law is in issue, and in which a consumer contract based on chapter VII 
of the ECTA is involved, the court will have to decide the dispute on the basis of Chapter 
VII.  Section 48 of the Act bolsters this principle by providing that ‘any provision in an 
agreement which excludes any rights provided for in [the Act] is null and void.’  In effect, 
according to these two sections, non-South African websites and online suppliers are bound 
to the ECTA’s requirements under chapter VII when dealing with South African consumers.  
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Suppliers may not include a choice of law clause in their electronic agreements with South 
African consumers in disregard of the requirements of chapter VII of the ECTA.
506
   
Since non-South African suppliers are also brought under the requirements of 
chapter VII of the ECTA, authors have expressed their concern that it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to enforce Chapter VII against such suppliers.
507
  They even suggest that foreign 
suppliers may avoid doing business with South African consumers.
508
  Overall, critics argue 
that states must be ready to surrender some measure of sovereignty by way of legislative 
enactments encouraging e-commerce.
509
  In addition, in the light of the ECTA’s restrictive 
approach and the cross-boundary nature of Internet-based transactions, some courts may be 
improper venues to exercise personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant.
510
   
Section 47 comes into play whenever a foreign supplier concludes an e-contract 
with a South African consumer.  In order to ensure that the particular South African 
consumer is entitled to the rights, the section makes the law of the consumer’s residence or 
domicile paramount over the contractual choice of law.
511
  The strictness of the ECTA in this 
regard and the fact that the parties’ choice may not override the provisions of Chapter VII of 
the ECTA is considered an unnecessary infringement of party autonomy.  Consequently, 
even if a supplier’s law offers better protection, a court will have no option but to apply the 
South African law.  As Sibanda says, in comparison with the developments in other 
jurisdictions, such as in the European Union, South African law adopts a more restrictive 
approach to party autonomy.
512
  Nevertheless, since consumers are the weaker parties, giving 
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them priority to apply their own law is a more appropriate approach as it absolves them from 
the burden of having to litigate in a foreign state.
513
   
10. Conclusion 
South Africa is one of a few Sub-Saharan African countries that have developed a clear 
policy and legislative framework to regulate and encourage e-commerce and e-contracting.
514
  
This chapter has analysed the developments that took place in South Africa leading to the 
adoption of a law to regulate e-commerce, namely the ECTA.  The chapter has established 
that the development of the ECTA was influenced by existing international standards, 
especially the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce adopted in 1996.   
The analysis in this chapter has also revealed that, although the Model Law forms 
the basis of the ECTA, South Africa did not adopt it in its entirety but rather selectively.  
Because some countries had enacted laws or were in the course of enacting laws on e-
commerce, the drafters of the ECTA had the opportunity to examine legislative developments 
in such countries in comparison with the Model Law.  Such countries include the USA, 
Australia and Canada.  Moreover, because the Model Law did not explicitly address issues 
regarding consumer protection, the drafters of the Act were influenced by developments in 
other regions, for instance, the European Uni n (EU) to address the gap.   
The ECTA deals not only with e-contracts and consumer protection but also other 
important issues, such as cyber crimes, provision of e-government services, domain names 
registration, protection of personal information and critical data bases, and the liability of 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs).  Whereas all these issues are relevant to the new economy, 
this chapter has confined its discussion to the validity and enforceability of e-contracts and 
requirements for effective online consumer protection. 
One important lesson from this chapter is that, despite the continued application of  
the South Africa's common law of contract, it was considered necessary, in view of the 
ongoing changes brought by the Internet and other communication technologies, to enact a 
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law which will, among other things, promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of 
electronic communications and transactions.  This particular lesson should inspire other 
countries, like Tanzania to reform their law of contract to accommodate current technological 
developments.  
Secondly, the chapter has revealed how the existing international frameworks for e-
commerce regulation can be relied upon to remedy deficiencies in a domestic regime, thereby 
enabling a country to embrace the digital economy.  By relying on the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws, the EU Directives and other jurisdictions, such as Canada, the USA and Australia, 
South Africa was able to develop a legal framework that suits its own economic interests.   
It is important to note, however, that, reliance on the existing standards and foreign 
legislative developments to develop a domestic legal framework requires a careful approach 
and flexibility in order to avoid narrow interpretations that may tend to discourage innovation 
or create inability to accommodate future developments.   
As the current chapter noted, there are some deficiencies and conflicting provisions 
within the ECTA that need to be reviewed and amended for the sake of clarity.  Of particular 
importance are the difficulties that s15 of the ECTA has created with regard to admissibility 
of electronic evidence and the rule concerning hearsay.  The scope of this provision is 
uncertain considering that Art 9 of the Model Law, on which it is based, was not intended for 
application in non-commercial matters.  Courts’ decisions regarding the section, however, are 
to the effect that, since rules governing admissibility of evidence apply to data messages, s 15 
of ECTA was not intended to displace the normal rules that apply to hearsay evidence.  It 
may be necessary, nevertheless, to amend this section by inserting a subsection that reflects 
this position rather than leaving it open and subject to court interpretation.  
It is also essential to note that, because the current rapid changes in technology lead 
to new forms of electronic evidence, there is a shift away from questions regarding 
admissibility and exclusion to more technical concerns about authenticity and the suitable 
weight to accord to such evidence.  As noted in this chapter, this current shift is justified, 
because electronic evidence is intangible or transient in nature, easy to manipulate, fragile, 
and is highly susceptible to error, accidental alterations or fabrications in the course of its 
collection or compilation for judicial use.  Thus, there is a need for additional safeguards 















purposes of judicial proceedings. Such additional procedures or safeguards are currently 
lacking in South Africa. 
This chapter also points out other unclear provisions within the ECTA that need to 
be re-examined. 
(a) The need to review the restrictions imposed by s 4 of the ECTA regarding use of data 
messages in certain transactions.  With current advancements in technology, certain 
transactions, such as conveyancing are performed electronically.  As noted in this 
chapter, processes are underway to legitimise e-conveyancing.  These initiatives, 
however, should also explore other areas where the ECTA has imposed restrictions   
(b) The need to extend the definition of electronic signature.  Section 1 of the ECTA has 
two distinct definitions of what amounts to an electronic signature: an advanced e-
signature (which results from an accredited process) and an ordinary e-signature 
defined as ‘data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data and 
which is intended by the user to serve as a signature.’   
As noted in this chapter, the SALRC is concerned that having the two types of 
e-signature, while s 13(2) of the Act provides ‘[s]ubject to subsection (1), an electronic 
signature is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is in 
electronic form’, may lead to confusion, thus disrupting the intention of the Act, ie, the 
need to facilitate electronic transactions.  Subsection 1 of that section refers to the use 
of an ‘advanced electronic signature’ in all cases ‘[w]here the signature of a person is 
required by law a d such law does not specify the type of signature’ to be use.   
While the SALRC’s concerns are meritorious, in my view, the two 
distinctions need to be maintained, since what the ECTA envisages is the security 
inadequacies that an ordinary e-signature provides.  What should be done is to expand 
the scope of what amounts to an advanced signature to include the use of biometrics.  
It is also noted that, despite the frequent use of the term ‘electronic 
transaction’ in the ECTA, s 1 of this Act does not define it.  The section has only 
defined the term ‘transaction’.  This omission creates uncertainty regarding whether 
every visit to a website amounts to an electronic transaction, and also whether all data 















transactions’ even where they are of a non-contractual nature.  In the USA, for instance, 
the UETA define both terminologies.  It is suggested that the ECTA should adopted a 
similar approach.  
(c) The need to expand the definition of who is a consumer for the purpose of part 
VII of the ECTA.  As discussed in this chapter, the definition of a consumer for the 
purposes of the application of part VII of the ECTA is restricted to a ‘natural person’.  
The ECTA excludes the SMMEs.  Given that these entities are actively involved in e-
commerce and buy items from larger manufacturing companies for purely internal use, 
they should be included in the definition and regulations may be made to categorise 
the size of an SMME that is eligible to enjoy the protections offered under part VII of 
the ECTA. 
(d) As noted in this chapter, certain provisions within the ECTA are unclear and 
some create conflicting views.  The following sections require particular attention: 
 Section 20(d) of the ECTA  
This section has been criticised on the ground that its legal effects, in terms of the 
words ‘not bound’ as they appear in the section, is unclear.  Whether it means that a 
contract is void or voidable is uncertain. Other uncertain and conflicting provisions 
include s 20(e) of the ECTA, which conflicts with s 43(2) concerning protection of 
consumers.  
 Section 23 of the ECTA 
The wording of this section needs to be amended by removing the following phrase: 
‘used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement’.  This phrase should be 
inserted in the preamble after the ‘data message’. 
 Section 44(2), as read together with section 42(2) of the ECTA 
As discussed in part 8(ii) (e) of this chapter, the application of s 44 (concerning the 
exercise of the right to cooling-off) is restricted by s 42(2) as the latter provides for 
an exclusion list in certain transactions.  The exclusion list, however, omits 
transactions involving the supply of digital goods, such as e-books, music files, or 















these products warrants their exclusion from the rights that a consumer is entitled to 
under s 44.  This omission is fatal and my facilitate piracy and copyright 
infringements.  
 Section 42(3) of the ECTA needs to be reviewed as well. This section excludes 
the application of Chapter VII ‘to a regulatory authority established in terms of a law 
if that law prescribes consumer protection provisions in respect of electronic 
transactions’. The argument here is that the ECTA is, by itself a law that creates 
certain regulatory authorities and prescribes for consumer protection in respect of e-
transactions.  The wording of this subsection, thus, needs to be reviewed for the sake 
of clarity.  
 Section 43(1) of the ECTA also needs to be reviewed in order to clarify what 
the phrase ‘offering goods or services for sale, for hire or for exchange by way of an 
electronic transaction’ means.  As discussed in this thesis, the term ‘offering goods’ 
or ‘offered’ may lead to confusion as it may be construed to mean an offer in the 
strict sense or an advertising of such goods.  Since e-commerce operators need clear 
rules to guarantee the legal certainty of their transactions, the phrase needs to be 
reviewed for the sake of clarity.  Similarily, the word ‘website’ as it appears in s 
43(1) needs to be replaced by a much broader term - such as ‘information system’- 
which has the ability to accommodate emerging technologies, such as u-commerce 
and m-commerce.  
 Sections 43(3) and 44(1), which provide for certain rights to a consumer 
including the right to withdraw from a contract, needs reviewing.  These sections are 
silent regarding the means which a consumer should use to cancel a transaction with 
a supplier.  At best they should provide for such mechanism as s 46(2) provides.  
This section provides that a consumer who wants to cancel a contract with the 
supplier who fails to supply goods within 30 days can do so by way of a ‘written 
notice’.   
 Section 46(3) of the ECTA requires revision.  This section provide for 30 days 
within which a refund should be made to a consumer by a supplier who fails to 
perform the contract due to unavailability of goods.  The period of 30 days is too 















addition, this provision may be a source of all sorts of injustices against consumers, 
since unscrupulous suppliers may refund consumers only on the last day of the 
period, having profited from the funds for the period held.  In addition, the ECTA 
should provide sanctions for suppliers who fail to comply with this provision. 
 Section 45, which relates to spam or unsolicited communications, needs 
attention too.  As indicated in this chapter, spam has become a problem with huge 
financial implication to many businesses.  Countries that had earlier adopted a soft 
approach to it, such as Canada, have since resorted to a much stricter means of 
curbing spam.  In South Africa, although this problem has been recently addressed 
under the Consumer Protection Act, the opt-out or ‘low-key’ approach is still 
envisaged.  Given the cost implications from spamming activities, in my view there 
is a need to adopt a prohibitive approach.   
 Sections 50-51 of the ECTA, which deals with data protection, are also 
deficient.  Currently there are efforts to address data protection under the Protection 
of Personal Information Bill, and one can but hope that this provides an opportunity 
to address the deficiencies in these sections of the ECTA.   
(e) The chapter further notes that, although the ECTA is based on the Model Law, it has 
adopted a narrow definition of a data message compared to what the Model Law and 
the UN Convention on E-contracts envisaged.  This approach is considered unsuitable 
in a fast changing technological environment, and may be problematic in future.  The 
definition needs to be reviewed to reflect the broad approach envisaged in the Model 
Law and the UN Convention on E-contratcs. 
(f) Concerning the use of web-based agreements, such as browse-wrap agreements, it was 
noted in the above discussion that the ECTA has not been very articulate in resolving 
the problems generated by these agreements despite the conditions set out in s 11(3) of 
the Act.  It is submitted that this section needs to be reviewed in order to establish a 
more positive requirement of consent in such agreements. 
Generally, the discussion in this chapter has also examined transborder issues that 
bear relevance to e-commerce, namely, jurisdiction and choice of law.  The chapter noted that 
as in Tanzania, the traditional conflict of laws rules remain the same in South Africa.  The 
choice of law rules, for instance, gives autonomy to parties in a contract to choose a law that 















however, unlike in Tanzania where no rules exist to protect online consumers in their 
contracts with foreign suppliers, the law in South Africa has created rules to protect South 
African consumers.  In particular, exercise of party autonomy in consumer contracts in this 
country is restricted, since parties cannot derogate from chapter VII of the ECTA.  This 
means that in case of a dispute the applicable law will be the South African law.  
In conclusion, one may argue that the enactment of the ECTA has been a success, 
bearing in mind its application in resolving cases involving use of data messages, such as 
Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife,
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 to mention but a few, and the innovative protection that 
it offers to online consumers.  As was discussed in this chapter, the ECTA has addressed all 
the major problems that create uncertainty in online transactions and this is an important step 
towards promoting e-commerce and enhancing consumers’ confidence.  Similarly, it is also 
important to note that although the Act is based on the Model Law, the drafters did not just 
adopt the Model Law but, in some instances, they went further than the Model Law in order 
to cater for the peculiar needs of South Africa.   
Indeed, it is also significant to note that drafting of a law, which deals with an ever 
changing technology demands extra care and a broader understanding of characteristics of the 
particular technology in question.  To be able to do so, drafters need to examine how other 
countries have responded to the current technology developments.  According to Mostert, 
(who was by then the chairperson of the drafting committee) the drafting team considered 
legislative developments in the EU and other countries such as the UK, the USA, Canada, 
Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, India and Philipines to name but a few.  The South 
African experience can thus enrich the future efforts of other African countries like Tanzania. 
Whereas a similar approach can be adopted by other African countries such as 
Tanzania, there is a need to avoid mere copying of foreign legislation without sufficient 
analysis of the overall implications.  Certainly, while legal transplantation is not a novel idea, 
especially in today’s globalised world, thorough examination of scope, functionality and the 
extent of adoption of a legal transplant within the receiving domestic regime needs careful 
prior attention.  Failure to adopt a cautious approach may lead to enactment of a statute that 
may fail to achieve the purposes for which the transplant was intended. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
1. Summary 
Information and communication technology (ICT) is a ground-breaking tool.  From a 
business viewpoint, it enables various players in commerce to gain access to accurate and 
relevant information easily and timeously, and hence helps them to make informed decisions.  
The Internet as an ICT tool and, flowing from it e-commerce, has greatly abridged the time 
within which transactions are concluded, thus reducing costs and increasing profit-making.  
Successful use of ICTs, however, depends on, inter alia, a legal framework to support 
electronic transactions.  This study has examined the existing regulatory regime in Tanzania 
in light of the ICT revolution.  It has analysed the current statutory and common law rules, 
specifically the Law of Contract Act, the Sale of Goods Act and the Fair Competition Act.  
Because e-commerce is a cross-border issue, the analysis extended to private international 
law.  
The study sought to achieve three main objectives.  First, it sought to analyse the 
existing legal framework governing contracts, with the view to identifying inappropriate rules 
that hinder the development of e-commerce and recommending measures which could be 
adopted to address them.  It is hoped that such measures will in turn promote e-commerce 
activities, enhance free trade, strengthen the growing market-based policies and integrate the 
country into the global economy.   
Secondly, in searching for a better law, the study sought to promote consumers’ 
confidence by proposing reforms that include the enactment of rules which adequately and 
effectively protect consumers when they transact online.  The development of e-commerce, 
and in general the widespread use of ICT, has seriously affected consumers’ interests.  The 
potential for invasion of privacy and other security risks, to which online consumers are 
exposed  (in comparison to their offline counterparts), necessitates additional measures to 
secure confidence in online transactions.   
Finally, the study sought to address cross-border problems affecting e-commerce 
transactions.  This involved seeking the best strategy to enhance the coherence and 
harmonisation of rules, in order to reflect the borderless nature of e-commerce, and to ensure 















The study commenced with identifying the key areas of e-commerce activity and 
policy (notably government policy).  It then described problems in the Tanzanian law of 
contract that create legal uncertainty in e-contracting and lead to loss of consumer confidence 
and the undermining of the development of e-commerce.  Two additional problems of a 
cross-border nature were analysed: jurisdiction and choice of law.  When e-commerce is a 
cross-border issue, its successful regulation and development will no doubt rest on 
international solutions.  Such an approach will not only minimise the difficulties of resolving 
disputes but also require a harmonised strategy. 
Tanzanian law was compared with the law of e-commerce in South Africa.  South 
Africa, like Tanzania, is a country in Sub-Saharan Africa (and a SADC member), and is one 
of the few African states to have enacted legislation to facilitate e-commerce.  Hence, it was 
considered likely that Tanzania could thereby gain useful lessons for remedying its own laws. 
The analysis of e-commerce and its legal developments in South Africa involved the 
examination of problems that the country had identified through its Green Paper on E-
commerce, and the subsequent legislative framework.  This required analysis of the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (‘the ECTA’) in order to establish: (a) 
how, and to what extent the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce and developments in 
other countries were relied upon in the course of enacting the ECTA, (b) how this legislation 
successfully or effectively addressed the legal barriers to e-commerce, and (c) whether there 
are inadequacies in the Act that still needed to be addressed.   
Apart from adopting the case study strategy to deal with domestic problems 
hindering the development of e-commerce, the thesis analysed other legal initiatives aimed at 
creating an environment for promoting and regulating the development of e-commerce at 
global and regional levels.  The analysis involved two perspectives, namely, a global outlook 
(representing efforts made by United Nations agencies, especially UNCITRAL) and a 
regional viewpoint, which was further sub-divided into the perspective of developed 
countries (the EU and the US) and developing regions (Africa and the ASEAN regions).  
From these perspectives, the study identified how the various global initiatives, such as the 
Model Laws, international conventions, Directives and frameworks, could be used to solve 















The global perspective was further intended to identify rules that could facilitate 
trans-border transactions and establish a basis upon which domestic legal regimes could be 
harmonised to accommodate technological developments.   
Overall, the study argued that if e-commerce is to flourish, states must strive to 
establish a global regulatory environment that provides certainty and predictability for e-
contracts.  In addition, they must seek to promote trust and confidence among the businesses 
and consumers who participate in e-commerce by harmonising the laws.   
2. General Concluding Remarks  
As a country endowed with unique traditional products, such as, coffee, spices, Makonde 
carvings, Tanzanite gemstone, national parks and other tourist attractions, Tanzania can 
benefit from the current technological revolution.
1
  It is disturbing, ho ever, that, despite the 
many natural resources and products available in Tanzania, there is limited information about 
them in the global market.  Its unique products could be marketed electronically to the 
outside world and the country could be gaining considerably from e-commerce.  In this way, 
Tanzanian firms could secure more access to international markets.  In view of these 
observations, this study maintains that sustainable and concerted efforts to promote e-
commerce activities in the country are needed.  One such effort is the creation of a suitable 
legal framework that promotes electronic transactions.  
The study submits that any country aspiring to promote an ICT-led economy must 
endeavour to create and adopt not only a strategy to develop e-commerce, but also rules that 
support innovation, tech ology and an entrepreneurial attitude.  Therefore, developing 
countries, like Tanzania, must strive to reform their legal frameworks in order to strengthen 
the positive role that law plays in the modern economy.  They must ensure that the law 
promotes and encourages use of the modern market-based approaches, for instance, e-
commerce in order to enhance economic growth, enabling access to external markets and 
promoting business confidence.   
As submitted in this study, in order to effectively support economic growth and to 
discharge its regulatory role, the law must create and support a competitive and a fair 
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business environment if it is to provide room for further enterprise innovation and 
expansion.
2
  In an e-commerce scenario, commercial legislation must be able to enhance 
transactional enforceability, ensure technology interoperability, and protect a highly 
vulnerable group, the consumers.   
To some extent, Tanzania has taken positive steps to establish a policy and a 
regulatory environment that seeks to promote ICT-led growth.
3
  As stated in this study, 
however, there are serious deficiencies in the existing Tanzanian legal framework governing 
contracts.
4
  Such problems are not only evident in the law governing contracts but also in 
other areas, especially the legislation relevant to the enforcement of contracts, such as the 
Law of Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Act.
5
  Because the law of contract is central to 
the economic life of the society, its reform is imperative in order to increase investors’ 
confidence, build business networks and integrate Tanzanian economy into the global 
economic structure.   
To initiate a successful reform process, and to the extent discussed in this study, it is 
submitted that Tanzania should embrace reforms similar to that of the South African law on 
e-commerce (the ECTA),
6
 the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UN Convention on E-
contracts.
7
 The rules that the UNCTRAL Model Law established, and which forms the basis 
of the ECTA,
8
 and those established by the UN Convention provide solutions to e-commerce 
problems experienced in domestic legal regimes.
9
  They also offer an opportunity for a 
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7
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harmonised global regime and thereby contribute to ‘convergence of systems of municipal 
law among distinct sovereign states.’
10
  
It is also important to note that Tanzania, as a member of the East African 
Community (EAC) and SADC, is also set to benefit from the current developments regarding 
e-commerce legal initiatives in these regional communities.
11
  As discussed in chapter five,
12
 
although the EAC Framework on Cyber law is not a model law, Tanzania can still utilise it 
because it contains recommendations based on the existing international standards, such as 
the Commonwealth Model Law on Electronic Transactions (2002), the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws on Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures (1998 and 2001 respectively) and 
the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (2005).  In view of this, the Framework offers a useful guidance to the reform 
process in Tanzania and enhances complementarity of rules while avoiding the possibility of 
creating conflicting rules. 
It also suffices to note that development of e-commerce demands an internationally 
and domestically harmonised and technology conscious regulatory regime.
13
  With such 
findings, a way forward must be found to cure the current inadequacies in the law and to 
integrate Tanzanian economy into the global market.
14
  
3.  Proposal of Regulatory Reforms Internationally and Domestically   
(a) Regulatory Solution Internationally: The Need for an Effective Approach  
One important finding drawn from international legal developments, and one which serves as 
a model for Tanzania, is that the existing international frameworks for e-commerce may be 
relied upon to remedy deficiencies in the domestic regime.
15
  Despite their usefulness, this 
study submits that there is a need to establish harmonised, yet flexible, mechanisms to 
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address cross-border disputes involving e-commerce in order to facilitate such transactions 
globally. 
In particular, the analysis of the jurisdiction and choice of law approaches in both the 
EU and the US revealed that developments there may offer assistance in dealing with e-
commerce disputes, while, also taking into account the need to protect consumers.
16
  The 
approach in the EU, for instance, is that of continuing reform of the existing jurisdiction and 
choice of law rules through enhanced harmonisation.  The EU’s position seems to have paid 
attention to the view that ‘[i]f the past is any guide to the future ... rules that have reached 
their shelf life [ought to] be superseded by more flexible ones.’
17
   
Because harmonisation of substantive e-commerce rules is a vehicle through which 
e-commerce can be successfully developed and regulated, this study submits that states must 
avoid isolated efforts.
 18
   A united approach will enhance global, regional, and domestic legal 
certainty in e-commerce, since more countries will have identical rules.  With harmonised 
rules the danger of forum shopping by plaintiffs may be laid to rest, since wherever parties 
litigate the applicable laws will be the same.  The approach is therefore a suitable and an 
effective means to respond to the transnational risks that frustrate cross-border e-commerce 
transactions.   
Although the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UN Convention on E-contracts do not 
provide for global rules on conflict of laws, their effect in creating harmonised substantive 
rules for e-commerce suggests that this goal may also be achieved.
19
  Indeed, given the 
diversity of legal cultures and systems, the adoption of the UN Convention on E-contracts, 
and the fact that many countries have adopted the Model Laws, should be considered as 
sufficient incentives for Tanzania and other states to ratify, not only the UN Convention on 
E-contracts but also other global conventions, such as the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 
on Choice of Court Agreements.
20
  It is important to note, as Spigelman does, that ‘the global 
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patchwork quilt of rules …, by reason of its limited scope, [has been] a significant barrier to 
world trade and investment.’
21
   
The US (like the traditional English common law) has a more discretionary approach 
to jurisdiction and choice of law.
22
  If parties have included a choice of law or forum clause 
in their agreement, the general principle (which applies in most common law countries) is to 
give it effect unless it is illegal, contrary to public policy,
23
 made in bad faith
24
 or (as in the 
US) unconscionable.
25
  As indicated in Chapters three and four, the common law leaves room 
to courts to develop the law, an approach that has unfortunately detracted from uniformity 
and consistency.   
In the absence of a choice of jurisdiction or applicable law clause in the parties’ 
agreement, the most significant connection principle is relied upon.
26
  This approach, as 
argued in this study, is problematic.
27
  With advancements in Internet technology and the 
need to protect consumers, however, courts in the US have been grappling with the problem 
of exercise of personal jurisdiction over Internet-based contracts. 
28
 Owing to a lack of rules 
to provide for consistency, several tests have been adopted, for instance, a sliding scale test, a 
minimum contact test, an effects test and a targeting approach.
29
 
The targeting approach seems to be the most appropriate, as it can prevent fortuitous 
locations of connecting factors.
30
  As such, it is suitable for further developments as a new 
connecting factor for electronic con umer contracts.
31
  This approach is followed when a 
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foreign defendant deliberately targets the forum in question, and, out of such an intentional 
act, a contract is concluded.  In cases where a business targets consumers in a particular 




From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the EU’s harmonised rule-based approach 
is more appropriate to e-commerce, because it takes into account the doctrine of party 
autonomy and the need to protect consumers targeted by online merchants.  There is, 
therefore, a strong policy reason why this approach needs to be replicated in a global context 
for the sake of certainty and predictability of rules in the cyber environment.  As Hay et al 
point out, ‘[i]n international trade, predictability can be achieved only if the courts of all 
countries strive to establish conflicts of law rules which ensure uniform results.’
33
  
Harmonisation of conflicts rules is thus the best way of attaining this goal.  Consequently, 
this study submits that the strategy should be encouraged globally while taking into account 
the need to enhance material justice for consumers as weaker parties in trans-border e-
contracts. 
(b) Proposed Solutions to Domestic Problems: The case of Tanzania 
In order to address the problems identified in this study, Tanzania needs to be guided by a set 
of recognised principles as was followed by other countries, such as South Africa.
34
  Such 
principles include the following:  
 the principle of conformity with international standards. Since e-commerce is a 
cross-border activity, Tanzania, like South Africa, should develop its e-commerce 
policy and legal framework on the basis of existing international trends and 
international treaties. In doing so, however, Tanzania will not be hindered from 
taking cognisance of its own socio-economic requirements.  The purpose of adhering 
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to such international best practices is to promote and to ensure global consistency, 
alignment and harmonisation.
35
   
 The principle of functional equivalence.36  The drafters of Tanzanian legislation on 
e-commerce must also be guided by this principle, which seeks to ensure equal 
recognition and treatment of commercial transactions conducted through the use of 
the paper medium and those arising from the use of data messages.  Doing so helps 
to increase the overall efficiency of commercial transactions as it removes 
uncertainty.   
 The principle of technological neutrality.  Any proposed legislation to regulate e-
commerce needs to be framed in a technologically neutral manner. This helps the 
law to keep pace with technological change.
 
 In addition, it allows users of the 
modern technologies ‘to decide what is appropriate to them, in expense, in 
deployment, in security and in reliability.’
37
  
 the principle of party autonomy.  This is an important principle because it promotes 




 Finally, the principle of public-private partnership.  Since Tanzania considers the 
private sector as the engine of economic growth, and because e-commerce is an 
activity of interest to the private sector, including technology developers, it is wise 
to ensure that the process of developing a regulatory framework for e-commerce is 
all-embracing.  Involvement of the private sector and the public at large is therefore 
necessary.  This was the approach followed in South Africa.
39
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The study identified nine major problems in the existing legal framework in 
Tanzania.  These concern e-contract formation and validity, including issues such as the 
requirement of consensus ad idem in transactions involving e-agents, marketing on websites, 
acceptance in certain online agreements, and the problem of establishing the time and place 
of contracting.  The problems raised by formality requirements (such as ‘writing’ ‘signature’ 
or the need for ‘original’ documents), online mistakes, proof of contract, and the lack of rules 
on consumer protection were also analysed.  Jurisdiction and choice of law were two 
additional problems.  These, however, were considered separately because of their cross-
border nature.  This study offers solutions to these problems on the basis of the guiding 
principles set out above.  
(i) Problems Regarding E-contract Formation  
In order to form a valid contract the Tanzanian Law of Contract Act requires consensus ad 
idem.  It may be problematic, however, to achieve such a requirement in online transactions 
unless the law is reformed to address ICT-related developm nts.  In order to find an 
appropriate solution, which will ultimately ensure smooth development of e-commerce in 
Tanzania, there is a need for legislative interventions that address three important issues 
regarding contract formation.  The relevant issues are:  (a) the question of validity of e-
contracts, (b) validity of online offers and acceptances, and (c) recognition and enforceability 
of e-contracts executed with the aid of e-agent technology. 
In the course of addressing similar problems, South Africa developed specific rules 
applicable to the online environment.
40
  Specifically, such rules validate all transactions 
executed electronically, including those in which e-agents were involved.  It is important to 
note, however, that, in the course of developing rules intended to address this problem, South 
Africa did not restrict its inspiration to the UNCITRAL Model Law.  In some cases regarding 
the use of e-agents, the Model Law does not provide adequate solutions.
41
  Consequently, 
although Chapter three of the ECTA contains provisions based on the Model Law, some 
provisions were based on legislation from the developed world, such as the US Uniform 
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Electronic Transactions Act (‘UETA’) and the Canadian Uniform Electronic 
Communications Act (‘UECA’).
42
  This thesis submits that these rules are important for e-
contract formation and Tanzania should embrace them.  
In view of the above discussion, and as earlier suggested in this research, Tanzania 
should refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law on e-commerce and the South African 
legislation, the ECTA, since the two provide a good reference point.  The three issues 
mentioned above, namely: (a) the question of validity of e-contracts, (b) validity of online 
offers and acceptances, and (c) recognition and enforceability of e-contracts executed with 
the aid of e-agent technology should, therefore, be addressed as follows: 
 Validity of e-contracts 
Tanzanian law should embrace s 11(1) and 22 of the ECTA in order to address the issue of 
validity of online contracts and other transactions.  Based on the provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Model law (specifically, Arts 2, 5 and 11), the  two ECTA provisions resolved 
the existing uncertainty regarding the validity of e-contracts by providing rules that cater for 
the use of data messages.
43
  Section 11(1) adopts the functional equivalence principle and 
place computer-generated information or data messages on an equal footing with paper-based 
documents.  Section 22(1) further confirms the validity of agreements formed by use of data 
messages.   
It is important to note, however, that the term ‘data’ as defined in s 1of the ECTA is 
restrictive. Unlike the ECTA, the Model law and the UN Convention on E-contracts provide 
a broad definition by including any other information generated, sent, received or stored, by 
‘optical’ or  ‘similar means’.  The ECTA omitted this important ‘catch-all’ futuristic 
technique that enables the inclusion of any unforeseen technological developments.  It also 
considers voice as a data message only where it is used in automated transactions.  The 
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approach adopted in ECTA is therefore narrow and it is not advisable that Tanzania should 
follow it.   
 Validity of Online Offers  
  This study has demonstrated that there is a need to provide rules regarding the status of 
marketing through websites.  The necessity for such rules lies in the fact that, in an online 
environment, it is not easy to state whether marketing on a website constitutes an offer or a 
mere invitation to treat.  In Tanzania, the law is currently silent on this aspect.  The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce, which forms the basis of South African law (‘the 
ECTA’), is also silent regarding the status of marketing on websites.  It is stated in s 24 of the 
ECTA, however, that an offer may be made electronically.
44
  Section 24 provides as follows: 
[a]s between the originator and the addressee of a data message an expression of 
intent or other statement is not without legal force and effect merely on the 
grounds that-  
 (a) it is in the form of a data message; or  
 (b) it is not evidenced by an electronic signature but by other means 
from which such person's intent or other statement can be inferred.
 
 
Although the above provision creates equivalence between offers expressed electronically 
and those expressed in other means, the issue of distinguishing between online 
advertisements as mere invitation to treat and those as offers has not been effectively 
resolved. The problem is further complicated by s 43(1) of the ECTA, which contains the 
phrase ‘offering goods or services for sale, for hire or for exchange by way of an electronic 
transaction’. This phrase is ambiguous.  It is not clear whether it refers to an ‘offer’ in its 
strict sense or in a sense that it should be regarded as inviting others to make offers.  The 
ECTA, therefore, does not provide much help in resolving this problem.  
Owing to the intricacies that may be involved in resolving whether marketing on 
websites constitutes an offer or an invitation to treat, the drafters of the UN Convention on E-
contracts decided to include a provision that distinguishes between an online offer and an 
invitation to treat.
45
   Article 11 provides that:  
[a] proposal to conclude a contract made through one or more electronic 
communications which is not addressed to one or more specific parties, but 
is generally accessible to parties making use of information systems, 
including proposals that make use of interactive applications for the 
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placement of orders through such information systems, is to be considered 
as an invitation to make offers, unless it clearly indicates the intention of the 
party making the proposal to be bound in case of acceptance.
46
 
This provision removes uncertainty in e-contracting and aids both e-merchants and 
consumers who purchase items online.  Consequently, apart from adopting s 24 of the ECTA, 
Tanzania should also adopt Art 11 of the UN Convention on E-contracts in order to resolve 
the existing inadequacy in its Law of Contract Act.  Tanzania should also adopt s 21 of the 
ECTA, which provides for a situation where an offeror happens to prescribe the mode of 
acceptance of his offer.  If, for instance, the prescribed mode relates to the use of paper-based 
or means other than data messages, then rules applicable to data messages will not apply. It is 
also submitted that, in order to bring clarity to the South African law, the ECTA should be 
amended by adopting provisions similar to that of Art 11 of the UN Convention on E-
contracts.  
 Issues Regarding the use of E-agents  
As noted in the discussion regarding validity of e-contracts, the ECTA requires all 
agreements, regardless of how they were formed, to be given similar treatment in terms of 
their legal effects. 
47
  This includes agreements formed by e-agents.  For better clarity, and in 
order to resolve other issues surrounding the use of e-agents in contract formation, s 1 of the 
ECTA provides a definition of e-agents while s 20(a), (b) and (c) deals with their capacity to 
form legally binding agreements and who should be responsible for the acts of an e-agent.
48
  
This legal position in South Africa has therefore resolved the objections raised in Chapter two 
of this thesis that were created by the use of e-agents in contract formation.
49
   
The UNCITRAL Model law, however, does not expressly provide for e-agents.  
Nevertheless, Arts 4(g) and 12 of the UN Convention on E-contracts provides for the use of 
e-agents in contract formation.  Article 4(g) of the Convention defines an ‘automated 
message system’ (e-agent) as: 
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[a] computer program or an electronic or other automated means used to initiate 
an action or respond to data messages or performances in whole or in part, 
without review or intervention by a natural person each time an action is initiated 
or a response is generated by the system. 
Article 12 of the Convention further provides that:  
[a] contract formed by the interaction of an automated message system and a 
natural person, or by the interaction of automated message systems, shall not be 
denied validity or enforceability on the sole ground that no natural person 
reviewed or intervened in each of the individual actions carried out by the 
automated message systems or the resulting contract. 
Considering the above developments, it is submitted that the rules contained in both 
the ECTA (in ss 1 and 20), and those contained in the above-quoted provisions of the UN 
Convention, provide a useful reference to Tanzania in the course of developing its rules to 
regulate the use of e-agents in e-commerce.  The UN Convention, however, is not as 
elaborate as s 20 of the ECTA.  Article 12 of this Convention only reflects what s 20(a) and 
(b) of the ECTA provides.
 50
  
It is also important to note, and thus for Tanzania to avoid and South Africa to 
review, the deficiency in s 20(d) of the ECTA, which states that: 
[a] party interacting with an electronic agent to form an agreement is not bound 
by the terms of the agreement unless those terms were capable of being reviewed 
by a natural person representing that party prior to agreement formation. 
The phrase ‘not bound’ is unclear and makes it impossible to resolve whether the contract 
will be void or simply voidable.
51
   It is suggested that if Tanzania adopts this provision into 
its legislation, the law should clearly state that failure to provide a customer opportunity to 
review the transaction before entering into a binding agreement will render the contract 
‘voidable’. 
(ii) Problems Relating to Web-based Agreements  
Although the use of web-based agreements is prevalent in e-commerce transactions, these 
agreements also present challenges.  First, as standardised agreements they result from a non-
negotiated context (hence representing a ‘take it or leave it’ position).  As a result, they 
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harbour a multitude of problems of which an ordinary consumer may not be aware.
52
  
Second, browse-wrap agreements, which are a category of web-based agreements, lack a 
mechanism to demonstrate a party’s consent.  Instead, these agreements typically provide that 
mere browsing of a particular website or an act of downloading a particular software or 
document governed by these agreements is considered sufficient to create a binding 
contract.
53
   
Because consent signifies that a party to a contract wishes to be bound to the terms 
or conditions governing a particular contract, its absence in browse-wrap agreements creates 
uncertainty regarding formalism and enforceability.  Consequently, since the existing law in 
Tanzania does not address these issues there is a need to do so in order to reflect modern 
commercial exigencies.  
In South Africa, web-based agreements are enforceable according to s 11(1), (2) and 
(3) of the ECTA, as read with ss 22(1) and 24(a) and (b).
54
  Section 11(3) contains certain 
useful rules regarding incorporation by reference.  The section requires incorporated 
information to be noticeable and accessible in a form in which it may be read, stored and 
retrieved by the other party.  This section reflects the requirements of Article 5 bis of the 
Model law.
55
  Thus, ss 11, 22 and 24 of this Act, together with Article 5 bis will prove useful 
in the course of developing the law in Tanzania.   
As discussed in Chapter six, however, the South African law did not adequately 
address the controversial question concerning demonstrable acts of consent in browse-wrap 
agreements.
56
  Hence, there is a need to amend its statute by inserting a provision which 
clearly states that a party to such contracts, apart from being notified of the existence of the 
incorporated information, must indicate his or her consent to such information.  Since it is 
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suggested that Tanzania should refer to the ECTA when developing its law, it is submitted 
that it should adopt a clear approach to browse-wrap agreements by requiring a demonstrable 
act of consent in such agreements.  
Overall, there is a need to improve the modality of indicating acceptance in all web-
based contracts.  In  most click-wrap agreements, for instances, customers are required to 
click a button that says ‘I accept’ as an indication of their consent to the terms and conditions 
governing the contract.
57
  The simple click approach, however, does not provide sufficient 
evidence that the customer’s conduct was intentional and not accidental.  In other words, it 
may lead to unnecessary arguments in courts.   
In order to avoid uncertainty which may surround the simple click approach, and to 
further improve the requirement for demonstrable acts of consent in web-based agreements, 
the law should require all online merchants to provide for clear and unequivocal mechanisms 
of demonstrating consent.  Customers, should, for instance, be required to type the word ‘I 
accept’ or enter a particular word in correct order instead of a mere simple click of a button.
58
  
Such requirements help to signify the intentional behaviour of a particular customer in an 
unambiguous way, and thus, remove controversies surrounding web-based contracts.
59
  
(iii)Determining the Time and the Place where an E-contract was Concluded 
The time when and the place where a contract was concluded are intricate issues in an online 
setting.  As discussed in Chapter two, strict rules have been adopted in the conventional 
contract-making process to establish the time and place of making offers and acceptances.  
Such rules are important in resolving cross-border disputes and help to resolve such questions 
as when title passes from one party to another.  Their determination in the online 
environment, however, is a highly technical problem, and the legal position in Tanzania in 
this regard is unsatisfactory.  
New developments, however, have been made internationally to address when and 
where a data message is sent or received.  Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Art 
10 of the UN Convention on E-contracts contain such developments.  Relying on Art 15 of 
the Model law, South Africa developed its rules contained in ss 22(2) and 23(a), (b) and (c) 
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  These sections provide for the time and place of communications, dispatch, 
and receipt of data messages.  They support the reception theory, which, compared to the 
postal or the information theory, is more appropriate to internet-based contracts.
61
  According 
to s 23, a contract comes into effect when the acceptance reaches the offeror’s address.
62
  
While Tanzania should adopt the reception theory as envisioned in the above 
provisions, there are important observations which should be noted.  First, it is important to 
note the differences between s 23(a) of the ECTA and Art 15(1) of the Model Law.  As 
discussed in Chapter six, the notion of ‘entry into an information system outside the control 
of an orginator’ is central to both s 23(a) of the ECTA and Art 15(1) of the Model Law, 
especially in determining time when a data message is dispatched.
63
  Section 23(a) of the 
ECTA, unlike Art 15(1) of the Model Law, provides for an additional phrase in cases where 
both the sender and the recipient share an information system.
64
   
The second observation concerns the phrasing of sub-section (a) of s 23of the 
ECTA.  The entire section reads as follows: 
A data message-  
(a) used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be regarded as 
having been sent by the originator when it enters an information system 
outside the control of the originator or, if the originator and addressee are in 
the same information system, when it is capable of being retrieved by the 
addressee; 
(b) must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the 
complete data message enters an information system designated or used for 
that purpose by the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed 
by the addressee; and 
(c) must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual place of 
business or residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual 
place of business or residence. 
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The problem lies in subsection (a), which contains a qualification not encountered in the rest 
of subsections, namely, the data message must be ‘used in the conclusion or performance of 
an agreement’.  This phrase should be removed and re-inserted in the preamble to s 23 after 
the words ‘data message’.  Indeed, it is unreasonable to restrict the operation of the sending of 
a message in subsection (a) to contract formation or execution, while the same qualification 
does not apply to its opposite (receipt) provided for in subsection (b), or to subsection (c).  
For that reason, it is submitted that all provisions must be restricted to occasions where the 
parties to the communications are about to or have entered into an agreement.   
The third observation is centred on s 23(b) of the ECTA, which deals with the time 
when a data message is regarded as having been received.  Here again, attention should be 
paid to the differences between this subsection and Art 15(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law on 
which it is based.  Section 23(b) of the ECTA regards data messages as having been received 
‘when the complete data message enters an information system designated or used for that 
purpose by the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee.’ 
Unlike Art 15(2)(ii) and (b), which further provides for ‘receipt’ in a situation where the 
address has no information system designated or used for that purpose, s 23(b) of the ECTA 
does not contemplate such a situation.  It is submitted that Tanzania should avoid this gap by 
also adopting the provisions of Art 15(2)(ii) and (b) of the Model Law. 
Overall, Art 15 of the Model Law, Art 10 of the UN Convention on E-contracts and 
ss 22 and 23 of the ECTA, prove to be useful to Tanzania because they support the reception 
theory, which is better applicable to online transaction than the postal or the information 
theories, the latter being the only theories currently applied to contract formation in Tanzania.  
(iv) Problems Concerning Formalities  
Understanding and responding to the nature of electronic communications is an important 
aspect of e-commerce.  These communications are in data form.  In certain circumstances, 
however, statutes may require that a contract be in ‘writing’.  Given the current state of the 
law in Tanzania, whether such a requirement can be met electronically is questionable.
65
  
Unless the law clearly recognises the functional equivalence between paper and electronic 
data messages such a legal requirement will constitute a hindrance to e-commerce.  
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Hindrances to e-commerce that relate to formalities are not limited to writing.  They 
also extend to all legal requirements of ‘wet ink signature’ and documents in their ‘original’ 
or ‘notarised’ form.  The current legal environment in Tanzania does not address the use of 
electronic signatures or rules regarding e-notarisation and certification.
66
  It is evident, 
therefore, that the current law needs to be reformed. 
In South Africa, similar problems were identified and dealt with by drawing on the 
relevant rules from the UNCITRAL Model Law and developments in other countries.  By 
adopting the principle of functional equivalence, technology or media neutrality and party 
autonomy, the drafters of the ECTA were able to adopt rules that do not discriminate between 
paper-based and electronic transactions.
67
  This approach, which seems advisable for 
Tanzania, resolved the problems related to form requirements.  
In view of the current inadequacies in the Tanzanian legal framework, this thesis 
submits that, in dealing with formalities, Tanzania should adopt the rules provided by s 12 of 
the ECTA. The section is based on Art 6 of the Model Law and also reflects what Art 9(1) 
and (2) of the UN Convention on E-contracts provides.  It sets out the basic standards to be 
met if a data message is to satisfy a writing requirement.  These include readability, 
accessibility or retrievability of data messages.  Specifically it provides that: 
[a] requirement in law that a document or information must be in writing is met if 
the document or information is-  
 (a) in the form of a data message; and 
 (b) accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference. 
The UNCITRAL Model law, however, foresaw that, as a matter of policy, states 
may limit the rules contained in Art 6 from applying to certain transactions.
68
  Thus, s 4 of the 
ECTA adopts this approach and limits the application of s 12 (as well as ss 11, 13, and 14) in 
certain transaction.
69
  All of these sections will not apply to transactions governed by the 
Wills Act.
70
  Similarly, ss 12 and 13 of the ECTA are excluded from application in all 
contracts relating to transactions involving transfer of real property 
71
 or the Bills of 
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  In addition, ss 11, 12 and 14 of the ECTA do not apply to transactions 
governed by the South African Stamp Duties Act.
73
  
As discussed in Chapter six, however, there is a need to re-examine the rationale for 
these restrictions, since technology has advanced and proper and secure mechanisms may be 
put in place to permit these types of transactions to be performed electronically.
74
  
Consequently, while s12 of the ECTA and Arts 6 and 9 of the Model Law and the UN 
Convention, respectively, will prove useful in reforming the law in Tanzania, there is a need 
to constantly explore and monitor ongoing global developments that promise the possibility 
of allowing all transactions to be concluded electronically.  In England, for instance, 
electronic conveyancing is legally supported.
75
  Such developments need to be adopted in 
Tanzania instead of the kind of limitations contained in s 4 of the ECTA.  It is thus necessary 
for South Africa to review the restrictions set out in s 4 of the ECTA.   
The UNITRAL Model Law and the UN Convention on E-contract have dealt with 
form requirements regarding ‘written signature’ or ‘wet signatures’ in documents, as does the 
ECTA.
76
  These provide for rules that seek to satisfy the legal requirement for signature in 
commercial or other transactions.  First, they recognise that e-signatures are valid.
77
  This is 
also an approach that should be followed in Tanzania.  Second, they define what constitute e-
signature and how a requirement for signature should be satisfied in an electronic 
environment.
78
  Overall, reform of the law in Tanzania must ensure that the requirement in 
Art 6 of the Model law, that data messages must be ‘accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference’ (and which also appears in s 12 of the ECTA) are adopted.  Doing so 
will create an acceptable basis upon which the principle of functional equivalence will apply 
to all legal requirements for information to be in ‘writing’.  
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(v) Problems Regarding Proof of Contract 
 Authentication and Message Attribution  
Parties to an e-contract must not only have confidence in the messages they receive from 
each other, but must also be able to rely on the available encryption technologies to protect 
their transactions.  They must be able to attribute such communications to each other.  The 
importance of being able to do so results from the anonymous nature of online transactions 
and the possibility that a party may repudiate a particular online communication pretending 
that he or she was not the author thereof.  Having a mechanism in place to identify or verify 
that a particular transaction was initiated by a particular party, and not a hacker or an 
impostor, helps to promote trust in electronic transactions.  Currently, however, Tanzania 
does not have appropriate rules regarding authentication and attribution of electronic 
transactions.
79
  It also lacks rules on how a legal requirement for production of an original 
document may be satisfied electronically.
80
   
As discussed in Chapter two, although the Tanzanian Law of Evidence Act was 
amended in 2007 to address some aspects of electronic evidence, such as admissibility of 
electronic records, the amendments were limited to criminal proceedings.
81
  In respect of civil 
proceedings, the amendments do not effectively cater for the identity and integrity issues 
involving e-contracts.
82
  Given the potential threats inherent in an online environment, there 
is a need to create rules and mechanisms to ensure the security of online transactions and to 
provide for attribution and authenticity of the parties’ conduct.   
Articles 7 and 13 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provide for rules that address the 
issue of attribution and authentication, including the use of e-signatures.  On the basis of the 
Model Law, South Africa adopted rules to deal with authentication and attribution of data 
messages, contained in ss 13 and 25 of the ECTA, including the use of encryption 
technologies in the course of signing e-contracts.   
In the course of signing documents embodying contracts or other documents for 
which a signature is need, s 1, read together with s 13 of the ECTA, provides two definitions 
of e-signature: an ordinary ‘e-signature’ and an ‘advanced electronic signature’.  The former 
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refers to ‘data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data and, which 
is intended by the user to serve as a signature’.   The latter, ‘an advanced electronic 
signature’, results from a process of authentication based on a certification process by an 
accredited authority established under s 37 of the ECTA.  While it is submitted that Tanzania 
should adopt s 13 of the ECTA, as discussed in Chapter six, there is a need to widen the 
scope of advanced electronic signatures to include other technological developments, such as 




Section 25 of the ECTA deals with attribution of data messages to the originator.  It 
is important to point out, however, that the ECTA has adopted a narrow approach compared 
to what Art 13 of the Model Law provides.  The drafters of the ECTA adopted only three 
paragraphs of Art 13, ie, Art 13(1), and (2)(a) and (b).
84
  It is submitted that Tanzania should 
rather adopt the broad approach envisaged in the Model Law by adopting the whole of Art 
13, since it gives other options.  For instance, parties to a transaction may have their own 
preference regarding what constitutes a reliable attribution mechanism to be used in their 
transaction.  In addition, the broad approach envisaged under Art 13 of the Model Law 
promotes the autonomy principle.  As proposed in Chapter six, s 25 of the ECTA should also 
be revised to incorporate the other parts of Art 13 of the Model Law. 
85
 
Sections 29 to 41 of the ECTA provides for the establishment of an accreditation 
authority ‘to accredit authentication products and services in support of advanced electronic 
signatures.’
86
   Although these sections are useful to Tanzania, there is also a need to adopt a 
policy to guide the provision of domestic and international accreditation services.   
 Fulfilling the Requirement for an ‘Original’ Document 
Both the Model Law and the ECTA provide for rules specifying how a requirement that 
documents should be presented in their ‘original’ format can be satisfied electronically.  
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Based on Art 8 of the Model Law, s 14 of the ECTA provides for the criteria to be relied 
upon if information in the form of data message should satisfy such a legal requirement.  
Specifically, it provides that:  
(1) [w]here a law requires information to be presented or retained in its original 
form, that requirement is met by a data message if-  
 (a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated 
in its final form as a data message or otherwise has passed assessment in 
terms of subsection (2); and 
(b) that information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to 
whom it is to be presented. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection 1 (a), the integrity must be assessed-  
(a) by considering whether the information has remained complete and 
unaltered, except for the addition of any endorsement and any change which 
arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display; 
(b) in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated; and 
(c) having regard to all other relevant circumstances. 
 
Since there is a need to ensure the integrity of electronic data messages the criteria set out in 
the above section, which is based on Art 8 of the Model law, are useful and Tanzania should 
adopt them.  
 Admissibility of Data Messages  
The admissibility of data messages was discussed in Chapters two and six.
87
  Both the Model 
Law (under Art 9) and the ECTA (under s 15) provide for rules concerning admissibility of 
messages in court.  Section 15(a) and (b) of the ECTA are to the effect that, unless other 
grounds to the contrary exist, all data held in electronic form will be admissible and should 
not be denied admissibility merely because they are in that form.  It seeks to establish both 
the admissibility of data messages as evidence in legal proceedings and their evidential value. 
Section 15 of the ECTA, however, has been controversial, and, in the recent past, the 
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) issued a Discussion Paper seeking public 
comments on this section.  The Discussion Paper invited comments regarding the hearsay 
rule and some questions concerning assessment of the evidential weight of data messages.  It 
is clear, however, that since rules governing admissibility of evidence apply to data messages, 
s 15 of ECTA was not intended to displace the normal rules that apply to hearsay evidence.   
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, since the current rapid changes in 
technology lead to new forms of electronic evidence, there is a shift from questions regarding 
admissibility and exclusion to more technical concerns about authenticity and the suitable 
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weight to accord to electronic evidence.  This approach is indeed justified given that 
electronic evidence is intangible or transient in nature, easy to manipulate, fragile, and is 
highly susceptible to error, accidental alterations or fabrications in the course of its collection 
or compilation for judicial use. 
88
  
Consequently, although the rules regarding hearsay remain intact, the controversy 
about the application of s 15, in general, is not so much a legal issue than an issue of clarity.  
In particular, clarity is needed regarding what should be done to ensure that courts are 
properly guided when interpreting this section.  As noted in Chapter six, South Africa lacks 
procedures to guide the collection, storage and presentation of such electronic evidence for 
purposes of judicial proceedings.
89
  This further compounds the current evidential problems, 
hence, bringing to the forefront questions regarding the accuracy or authenticity and hence 
reliability of such evidence.  It is therefore submitted that there is a need to put additional 
safeguards in place which provide for such procedures.
90
 
Overall, Tanzania will find the rules provided in Art 9 of the Model Law and s 15 of 
the ECTA useful in the course of developing its rules to govern admissibility of electronic 
evidence.  In particular, the country needs to take into account the following when developing 
its rules to govern admissibility of data messages: 
  rules developed should provide clear guidelines on admissibility and weight of 
electronic records.  This includes stating what should be taken into account;
91
 
 rules developed must distinguish between computer records created with and 
without huma  intervention.
 92
  Reforms should, however, be restricted to 
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 such rules must provide an opportunity for courts to carefully assess the 
background, procedures and the process of data creation or storage and retrieval in 
order to ascertain the level of reliability of such computer generated evidence, this 
being a condition for their acceptability. 
94
  In any event, the onus to prove that the 
records are reliable should be on the person seeking to introduce such records.
95
  
Tanzania must also consider developing additional procedural safeguards, such as a 
code of conduct with rules concerning the collection, handling, storage and presentation of 
electronic evidence intended for judicial proceedings.
96
  
 Electronic Retention of Data Records  
Record retention is a legal requirement in many countries for various reasons.  In the past, 
volumes of paper-based records occupied huge spaces and consumed money and time to 
maintain or retrieve records when needed.
97
  The new technology, however, has made record 
retention easier, hence saving both the space to keep the records and the time to retrieve 
them.  In order to facilitate e-commerce, and to ensure that record retention requirements 
apply equally to information held in paper and electronic media, Art10 of the Model law 
provides that where the law requires certain documents, records or information to be retained, 
that requirement is met by retaining data messages.   
Section 16 of the ECTA echoes what Art 10(1) and (2) of the Model Law provides.
98
  
It does not, however, include subparagraph (3), which addresses a situation where services of 
a third party are relied upon.
99
  The Model Law provides that in cases in which the services of 
a third party are relied upon that third party must fulfil the requirements of subparagraphs (1) 
and (2) of Art 10.  It therefore provides an additional opportunity to be used by a party who 
may not have the means to retain data records as required.  In addition, Art 8 of the Model 
Law contains other supplementary rules on storage of data messages, namely, accessibility, 
integrity, and retention in a form that is presentable with the same accuracy when needed for 
future use.  Given the importance of ensuring that retained data records are available, with 
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accuracy and integral form, Tanzania must adopt these provisions– including subparagraph 
(3) of Art 16 of the Model Law.  The ECTA should also be amended. 
(vi) Dealing with Online Mistakes or Errors 
Online mistakes may either be occasioned by e-merchants out of human error, programming 
of software (e-agents), errors resulting from failed data transmissions or by consumers who 
interact with an e-agent.  As pointed out in Chapter two, the law in Tanzania is inadequate to 
deal with such errors.
100
  Solution to such problems, however, can be found in Art 13(5) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 14 of the UN Convention on E-contracts and ss 20 and 25 
of the South African legislation, the ECTA.
101
   
While it is recommended that Tanzania should develop its rules on the basis of these 
provisions, two observations need to be taken into account.  First, Art 13(5) of the Model 
Law is limited only to errors in the content of data messages arising from transmission 
problems.  This means that it is inadequate to rely solely on this provision.  Second, Art 14 of 
the UN Convention is also limited to errors that occur in an interactive website and permits 
withdrawal from the transaction only in respect of the portion of the affected e-
communications, hence making an e-contract neither void nor voidable.
102
  This makes it less 
preferable, if considered from the perspective of consumer protection.
103
   
As discussed in Chapter six if Art 14 of the UN Convention is to be compared with s 
20(e) of the ECTA, the latter provides for a better position, although it also needs to be 
reconciled with s 43(2) of that Act for the better protection of consumers.
104
  Overall, this 
thesis submits that Tanzania should adopt the ECTA approach, as it provides for a more 
favourable position for natural persons who interact with e-agents.  
(vii) Consumer Protection in an Online Environment 
As a cross-border phenomenon, e-commerce has serious implications for domestic 
consumers, and thus consumer protection deserves special attention.  This is partly due to 
three reasons.  First, the increasing globalisation and liberalisation of markets, coupled with 
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the enhanced power of media through technology convergence, has created the possibility of 
online supply of shoddy, defective, dangerous or substandard goods and services.  
Secondly, given that modern internet commerce assumes a global nature and lacks 
jurisdictional boundaries and face-to-face interactions, consumers who engage in e-commerce 
run considerable additional risks.  For instance, online consumers are vulnerable to hacking 
and invasions of their privacy.  And, because most online merchants gather personal data or 
information that consumers may not have consented to, the latter may not even know the 
purposes for which the information was collected, how it will be handled, stored, or accessed 
by others or generally protected against unauthorised use.   
Finally, the rapid developments of the modern technology, and the continued 
sophistication and transformation of the ways through which suppliers and consumers 
interact contractually, make it impossible for inexperienced consumers to be able to protect 
their interests in online contracts. 
Issues of particular concern are the online safety and welfare of consumers, financial 
security, data protection, protection from unsolicited information, possibilities of gaining 
access to adequate information, and availability of effective and affordable redress 
mechanisms.  While to some extent these issues have been taken into account in countries 
such as South Africa, they have not been addressed in the existing rules in Tanzania.   
As discussed in Chapter two, the laws on which Tanzanian consumers can rely for 
remedies, which include the Law of Contract Act,
105
 the Sale of Goods Act
106
 and the Fair 
Competition Act,
107
 do not expressly take Internet-based transactions into account,
108
 because 
some of these statutes were initially enacted between 50 and 80 years ago and are thus not 
suitable in the modern era of paper-less and faceless transactions.  In addition, certain 
principles, which these statutes support, create dilemmas.
109
  For instance, although the 
principle of privity to contract remains important, some aspects thereof are problematic.
110
  
                                                 
105
 Cap 345 [R.E. 2002]. 
106
 Cap 214 [R.E. 2002]. 
107
 Act No. 8 of 2003. 
108
 See the discussion in Chapter two part 7. 
109
 According to the principle of privity to contract a consumer who consumes goods purchased by another 
cannot sue in contract for remedy.  
110















In spite of the urgent need for laws to regulate these deficiencies, no serious action 
has been taken in Tanzania.  The Tanzanian Fair Competition Act is a good example.  
Although this Act was promulgated in 2003 it does not take into account online consumer 
transactions. This has remained the position even after a study by the Tanzanian Law Reform 
Commission, concerning the legal effects of this technology, recommended that the existing 
legal framework in Tanzania should be reviewed.
111
  The Act is therefore entirely deficient, 
because it does not consider important rights for online consumers.  Such rights include the 
right to withdraw from an e-contract, the right to prior consent, the right to privacy and 
protection of other information that online suppliers gather in the course of online 
transactions.  The Act is also deficient regarding the duties that suppliers owe to consumers, 
for instance, the duty to disclose all relevant information concerning the products or 
services.
112
   
South Africa, on the other hand, has made significant developments regarding online 
consumer protection. 
113
 Although the Model Law on (which the ECTA was partly based) 
does not fully provide for consumer protection,
114
 South Africa developed its online 
consumer protection rules by drawing from other jurisdictions, especially the European 
Union.
115
  These rules (contained in Chapter VII of the ECTA) are mandatory, meaning that 
the parties cannot, by way of an agreement, derogate from them.   
It is important to note, however, that Chapter VIII of the ECTA, which deals with 
privacy, does not sufficiently provide for the protection of personal data obtained in the 
course of transacting business online.  Since data privacy in an online environment affects 
consumer confidence, and, in order to address this flaw efforts are underway in South Africa 
to address this.   The government has already prepared the Protection of Personal Information 
Bill, which is intended to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy in a more 
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appropriate manner than the ECTA.
 116
  These new developments will also be useful to 
Tanzania in the course of developing its rules concerning protection of personal information 
as a measure to ensure security of privacy of online transactions.  Overall, despite the 
imperfections within the ECTA, the rules it contains in part VII are useful for safeguarding 
the interests of consumers as weaker and vulnerable parties in e-contracts.  Tanzania will 
therefore find them useful in the course of addressing the inadequacies in its consumer 
protection regime.  
In addition to the ECTA rules, Tanzania should also, in the course of developing its 
own e-commerce legislation, take into account the SADC ICT Consumer Rights and 
Protection Regulatory Guidelines which were adopted in June 2011.
117
  In particular, these 
guidelines require service providers to ensure, among other things, that online consumers’ 
privacy is protected, including protection against unauthorised use of their personal 
information that might have been collected when they transact online.  These guidelines, 
however, are not binding on SADC member states.  They are only meant to lend assistance to 
decision makers in the ICT Sector to ensure that consumer protection becomes an integral 
part of their developmental objectives. Generally, more comprehensive rules regarding 
consumer protection will need to be formulated in separate legislation to deal with important 
issues envisaged in the SADC ICT Consumer Rights and Protection Guidelines, such as the 
requirements that service providers ‘act fairly, reasonably and responsibly in all their dealings 
with consumers'.  As noted in chapter six, South Africa has enacted a comprehensive law on 
consumer protection and such issues have been effectively addressed.
118
  
(viii) Problems Relating to Court’s Jurisdiction  
Although the current rules on jurisdiction have not lost their relevance entirely, their 
application in internet-based transactions creates difficulties because they are essentially 
predicated on the concept of the territorial state.  The Internet, however, is borderless in 
nature, and as a result as e-commerce does not require the physical presence of parties in a 
particular fixed place.  With this in mind, the traditional principles of sovereignty, 
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territoriality and presence, which form the bases upon which a court may exercise jurisdiction 
over a particular foreign defendant, are inappropriate to the internet-based activities.   
For instance, when it comes to e-contracts, there is no conclusive answer to 
questions that seek to identify the physical presence of a party or the place in which such an 
e-contract could be located, ie, where it was entered into or breached.
119
  As a result, although 
it is generally considered that ‘[w]here activities occur – or, more precisely, where we deem 
them to have occurred – answers the traditional question of jurisdiction ... under conventional 
private international law analysis’, 120  such a proposition does not present the right approach 
for a private international law inquiry into law disputes emanating from e-contracts.
121
  
However, while the localisation approach to determine jurisdiction often proves inappropriate 
for such disputes, 
122
 website owners, e-commerce companies and consumers are desirous of 
clear rules on which they can rely in a cross-border dispute.   
The involvement of consumers in cross-border transactions is an additional factor in 
the current jurisdictional conundrum.  Nowadays, through e-commerce consumers are key 
players in the international trade arena.
123
  Their involvement has complicated transaction and 
litigation planning
124
 because, apart from increasing the possibility of multiple cross-border 
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  there has been a necessity to extend consumer protection concerns to the 
area of conflict of laws.
126
   
As noted in Chapter three, the need to extend consumer protection rules in the 
regime of conflict of laws has never been smooth.  On the one hand, most consumer 
protection advocates focus on the need to ensure that consumers who transact with foreign 
merchants electronically should not bear the financial burden of litigating away from their 
place of domicile.
127
  Thus, in all cases, consumers should at least enjoy the level of 
protection provided by their own laws.
128
  Online merchants, on the other hand, argue in 
favour of party autonomy.  In view of these polarised positions, and taking into account the 
cross-boundary character of the Internet, it becomes difficult to determine the appropriate 
legal protections to which consumers may be entitled in online transactions.  There is, 
therefore, a need to resolve the current tension through clear rules that take into account the 
interests of both the consumers and the e-merchants.  
In Tanzania, before a court adjudicates any dispute it must have jurisdiction over the 
parties.  Courts are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on three grounds:  
(i) the presence of the defendant in Tanzania (either as a resident or if he is 
domiciled in Tanzania or is carrying on business in the country.  His presence may 
also arise from his submission to the court). 
 (ii) If the cause of action arose in Tanzania, or, in the case of a contract, if it was 
made in the country or has a jurisdictional clause choosing Tanzania, and  
(iii) the defendant being properly served with the writ or the claim forms.
129
   
Viewing the above jurisdictional rules from the perspective of the current 
technological developments, these rules are inadequate.  Reforms are thus necessary in order 
to not only make these rules responsive to the modern commercial exigencies but also to 
                                                 
125
See A D Murray ‘Entering Into Contracts Electronically: The Real W.W.W’ (at page 15) (available from 
http://www.100megsfree4.com/andrewmurray/Contracts.pdf (as accessed on 3/6/2010)). See also J Hörnle ‘The 
Jurisdictional Challenges of the Internet’ in L Edwards & C Waelde Law and the Internet 3ed (2009) 121. 
126
 See Gillies (n30) 9-21. 
127
 See M Keller ‘Lessons for The Hague: Internet Jurisdiction in Contract and Tort Cases in the European 
Community and the United States’ (2004) 23 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 2. See 
also J K Winn & B Wright The Law of Electronic Commerce 4ed (2008) 38-39. 
128
See Gillies (n30). 
129















ensure that they are in line with international developments that take into account the need to 
protect consumers who transact with online merchants.
130
  Consequently, the following 
reforms are necessary: 
  jurisdictional rules governing service of writ and other documents within or 
outside the courts’ jurisdiction need to be reviewed to allow service by electronic 
means. As discussed in Chapter three, the UK Civil Procedure rules contemplate 
such kind of service of writs.
131
  Tanzania should therefore adopt a similar 
approach.  
 While courts should continue to uphold choice of jurisdiction clauses (party 
autonomy) there is a need to create in-built mechanism to protect consumers.
132
  In 
particular, rules must be in place requiring such clauses to be clear and 
conspicuous in order to bring them to the attention of consumers who are usually 
considered the weakest party.
133
  Where such clauses are incorporated by 
reference, then they must be subjected to the rules that govern incorporation (as 
discussed earlier), and this includes a requirement that there must be an 
appropriate mechanism to ensure that consumers actually consented to such terms 
and conditions (including such a jurisdictional clause).
 134
  Such mechanisms may 
include a requirement to insert a given security word or number in a particular 
designated space, instead of a mere requirement to click the ‘I agree’ button.   
 To offer additional protection to consumers. In order to do so rules that signify 
the ‘targeting effect’ should be developed.
135
  Thus, interactive websites that target 
(and solicit or prompt) consumers domiciled in Tanzania to conclude a distance 
contract should be required to litigate their disputes in Tanzania whenever such 
contracts are concluded. 
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(ix) Problems Concerning Choice of Law 
Choice of law in consumer contracts is also a thorny matter.
136
  Problems arise because of the 
need to protect freedom of contract, on the one hand, and the need to protect consumers from 
the risks associated with online contracting, on the other.  In a situation where a domestic 
legal regime contains weak or inadequate consumer protection rules, consumers are more at 
risk.  This is especially so because, although a domestic statute may contain rules that purport 
to override the parties’ chosen law, if such rules are weak, consumers will not be given the 
better protection they deserve.   
As discussed in Chapter four, Tanzanian choice of law rules in contracts are based 
on the traditional English common law rules.
137
  Under the traditional English common law 
rules, courts give preference to party autonomy.
138
  Thus, if parties have inserted a clause 
choosing the applicable law, courts will uphold such a choice.
139
  While this practice needs to 
be guaranteed even in online transactions, a choice of law clause ought to be clearly and 
conspicuously brought to the attention of the consumer.  As with jurisdictional clauses, there 
must be additional requirements, especially when terms, embodying a choice of law clause, 
are incorporated in the agreement.
 140
  Thus, similar rules as those suggested earlier to govern 
jurisdictional clauses, should be adopted to ensure that a particular consumer, who is a party 
to an online contract, in fact consented to the choice of law clause.
141
  
In case parties to a contract failed to expressly choose an applicable law to govern 
their contract, the usual practice is that courts must determine ‘the proper law’ to be applied.  
Important connecting factors, such as residence, place of contracting and performance have 
been relied upon.  The contemporary method of determining the proper law has been to 
identify and adopt the system of law with which the contract is most closely connected.  
Because these criteria were developed before e-commerce existed they are not wholly 
satisfactory, since locating various connecting factors in an online environment can be 
complicated.  Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Model law, which this thesis proposes Tanzania 
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 however, offers assistance in determining the place where a contract was 
formed, and for that reason, it offers assistance in the course of determining choice of law if 
parties did not expressly do so.  The South African legislation on e-commerce, the ECTA, has 
adopted it.
143
   
Two more provisions in the ECTA need to be adopted.  These are ss 47 and 48.  
Section 47 is meant to ensure that all mandatory rules contained in the Act (specifically the 
requirements intended to protect consumer, which are provided in Chapter VII of the Act) are 
not derogated from by way of agreement or limitation of any sort by the parties.  
Consequently, the section provides that ‘[t]he protection provided to consumers in this 
Chapter, applies irrespective of the legal system applicable to the agreement in question.’  For 
its part, s48 makes the further provision, stating that ‘[a]ny provision in an agreement which 
excludes any rights provided for in this Chapter is null and void.’  
While ss 47 and 48 of the ECTA are useful and should be adopted in Tanzania, they 
are not satisfactory as a guarantee of a balanced and flexible regulatory regime.  In view of 
this, and, in order to strengthen legal certainty and predictability of online transactions, this 
study submits that there is a need to develop a more flexible choice of law regime. 
Specifically, it is submitted that, since most existing legislation on contract do not provide for 
conflict of laws, legislation governing e-commerce transactions demand conflict rules that 
take into account the plight of consumers.  It is therefore necessary that Tanzania should 
establish flexible rules that meet such a requirement.   
In particular, Tanzania needs to adopt the protective mechanisms, such as those 
envisaged in the EU’s Rome I Regulation.
144
  Apart from guaranteeing party autonomy,
145
 the 
Regulation contains rules that protect consumers in cases where their contracts with suppliers 
do not expressly provide for choice of law.  Determining the applicable law under the 
Regulation is done objectively, and, ‘the objective connecting factor is the habitual 
residence.’
146
  The rules contained in Art 4(1) (a), (b), (d) and (f) of the said Regulation are 
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relevant in this case.  Article 4(1)(a), (b), (d),  and (f) provide rules governing choice of law 
for the sale of goods, provision of services, franchises or distribution.  
Article 4(1)(a) provides that, in the absence of a choice by the parties, ‘a contract for 
the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual 
residence.’  Contracts involving provision of services are governed by Art 4(1)(b), which 
provides that such contract ‘shall be governed by the law of the country where the service 
provider has his habitual residence.’ 
As a residual rule, Art 4(2) provides that where a contract cannot be categorised as 
one of the types covered under the rules provided by Art 4(1), or its elements fall within more 
than one of the specified types, then such a contract will have to be governed by the law of 
‘the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract’ 
resides.  The weakness, however, lies in the fact that, mostly, the party giving characteristic 
performance will be the supplier.  In other words, the principle of characteristic performance 
does not favour the weaker party.  Nevertheless, the rule is subsidiary to what Art 4(1) 
provides.  Overall, the Regulation has brought simplicity of application to persons who are 
not specialised in conflict of laws,
147
 and, in order to strengthen legal certainty and 
predictability, the list of specified types of contracts in Art 4 of the Regulation does not grant 
courts a wide flexibility in the course of determining the applicable law.
148
   
Although reliance on the ‘closest and most real connection’ principle to establish the 
proper law in an e-contract may be inappropriate, given the difficulties of establishing 
connecting factors in an online environment,
 149
 Art 4(3) of the Regulation has retained this 
rule (although it is a ‘mere subsidiary rule).’
150
  It applies to cases that show, from all their 
surrounding circumstances, that a particular contract in question is manifestly more closely 
connected with a country other than that indicated in Art 4(1) and (2).
151
   
Overall, it is important to note, as Chapter four revealed, that to a large extent, the 
choice of law rules in England have been supplanted by the new developments.
152
  Thus, 
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Tanzanian rules, which are essentially common law based, are in need of reform.  It is 
proposed that, regarding protective mechanisms, the EU approach should be adopted.  This 
will effectively and adequately protect both the interests of consumers who take part in e-
commerce and the suppliers who wish to organise their transactions in a more predictable 
manner. 
(c) Final Recommendations 
Tanzania may address issues identified in this thesis in three ways.  First, they may be left to 
be resolved by the courts as and when they occur.
 153
   Secondly, they may be left to the 
parties to be resolved through contractual terms in their agreements, or finally, they may be 
resolved by way of enacting a new statute.
154
  This thesis supports the third approach, ie, 
enacting new legislation to govern e-commerce issues.  The reasons in support of this option 
are set out below.  
(i) Leaving the problem to be resolved by courts to deal with them as and when 
they occur 
As observed in this thesis, there have been views that most of the existing rules can be 
adapted to new situations arising from the utilisation of the Internet technology,
155
 and that, 
the courts have always been able to find ways of addressing the challenges of new 
technologies.
156
  Despite such arguments, it is clear from the perspective of the current 
technological revolution that, there are limits on the adaptability of the law.
157
  Such 
limitations result from the nature and extent of the contemporary technological revolution.   
As argued in this study, technological changes are continuous and rapid.  The 
Internet, for instance, has made some of the existing rules ‘farfetched, artificial, and 
irrelevant.’
158
  As a result, they either ‘need to be supplemented, replaced, or abolished.’
159
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Reform of such rules, through judge-made law, will exacerbate matters because it is often too 
slow and uncertain.  In addition, its development is reactive rather than proactive.  Courts 
have to wait for parties to bring disputes before them for resolution.   If nothing is submitted 
to the court then the status quo remains.   For these reasons, relying on the courts solely to 
develop the law can neither meet the goals of enhancing certainty and predictability in e-
contracting nor can it ensure consumer protection in a fast changing business environment.
160
  
(And, we cannot always rely on the bench to construe the law in favour of the weaker party, 
because courts are very reluctant to interfere with the freedom of the parties).  In short, courts 
are cautious lest they find themselves legislating.  It is clear, therefore, that leaving the 
problems identified in this study to be addressed by the courts as and when they arise is not 
an appropriate and reasonable option that should be suggested as a way forward.  
(ii) Encouraging parties to resolve the identified problems through contractual 
terms in their agreements  
In most cases contractual clauses that specify how contracting parties will carry out their 
obligation have been part of the private mechanisms used to regulate commercial 
transactions.
161
  Indeed, as argued in this study, self-regulation is considered a useful and 
flexible approach able to march with the dynamic and international character of e-
commerce.
162
  While the above reasoning is well founded, given the level of uncertainty and 
risks involved in online transaction, it is clear that relying on parties alone may not be the 
best option through which e-commerce is to be developed.   
Consequently, a combined mechanism of private-public involvement, also referred 
in this work as the new minimalist regulatory approach, is necessary.
163
  This approach 
supports governmental interventions that are facilitative in nature, ie, interventions meant to 
lay down the necessary frameworks for secure, fair and competitive operation of the markets.  
This kind of intervention, however, is achieved through no means other than establishment of 
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laws and procedures that regulate the market or the industry in question. This reasoning, 
therefore, points to the third option, which is supported by this thesis.  
(iii)Enacting new legislation to supplement the existing legal framework and 
remove barriers to e-commerce development.  
In order to effectively address the problems discussed in this thesis, and with the intention of 
promoting certainty through functional equivalence of rules applicable to online and off-line 
transactions, it is recommended that Tanzania should enact specific e-commerce legislation.  
This will simplify business transactions, as businesses and consumers will know with 
certainty which rules apply.  Certainty and predictability of the law promotes the confidence 
of the parties involved in e-commerce.
164
   
It is important to note, however, that whereas a new law on e-commerce is 
necessary, the role played by the existing laws, such as the Law of Contract Act, will not be 
displaced.  A new law on e-commerce, apart from regulating e-transactions, will generally 
supplement and correct what is missing or inadequate in the existing laws.  It will therefore 
play a facilitative role.   
Overall, such  legislation will take into account issues of significance, such as 
validity of e-contracts, use of electronic agents in executing contracts, use of data messages 
and e-signatures, online consumer protection, authentication and certification processes, to 
mention only a few issues.  The proposed Act may also take into account other issues, such as 
cyber crimes (although this area may stand on its own since it is also becoming more 
sophisticated as technology innovations continue to evolve). 
In order to embrace successful and meaningful legal reforms in the area of electronic 
commerce, this study recommends that Tanzania should adopt the best practices, such as the 
UNICTRAL Model Laws (on e-commerce and e-signature) as well as the UN Convention on 
E-contracts.  As discussed in this study, the legal developments in South Africa should be a 
further basis for reform of the law in Tanzania.  In particular, it is recommended that 
Tanzania should adopt the mixed approach used by the drafters of the South African law on 
e-commerce (the ECTA).  The value here is that the ECTA represents a law from a 
developing African country.  Moreover, because South Africa and Tanzania are members of 
SADC, and because there are efforts within the SADC to harmonise the legal frameworks 
within its members, taking account of the South African e-commerce law –save for its 
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inadequacies as pointed out in this thesis – will be a motivation towards realising the regional 
harmonisation process.  
Finally, four things need to be emphasised.  First, while legal transplantation is not a 
novel idea in today’s globalised world, this study has taken the necessary caution in its 
proposal that Tanzania should borrow provisions from foreign legislation, such as the ECTA, 
to develop its domestic legal framework.  In particular, it has taken into account that it is 
unwise to embark on such a process without thoroughly examining the scope, functionality 
and the extent of adoption of a transplant within a receiving state, in this case Tanzania.  For 
that reason, the study has made it clear that while similar foreign legislation may provide 
useful information, each country develops its own laws in particular areas taking into account 
its own policies and circumstances.  In other words, the study recognises that legal reforms in 
Tanzania must be pursued in the context of its own prevailing socio-economic and political 
context.  Even in the course of drafting the UNCITRAL Model Law, the Working Group on 
E-commerce, which was responsible for its preparation, recognised this, and the Model Law 
gives an opportunity for states, intending to adopt it, to consider relevant home grown issues.  
In view of the above observations, and in order to avoid a ‘copy and paste’ 
approach, the analysis in this study included pointing out the weaknesses in the proposed 
legal transplants, whenever it was necessary to do so.   
The second issue to emphasise is that the reforms proposed in this thesis are merely 
the very basic ones.  They are only concerned with a small area essential to facilitate the 
development of e-commerce in Tanzania.  Because the list of other reforms that Tanzania 
needs to embark on may therefore be long, and since e-commerce is a broad area of study, 
more research remains to be done. In particular, research is needed in key areas, such as e-
banking and e-financing, e-taxation, e-governance, cybercrime, e-procurement and e-tourism, 
to mention but a few. 
Thirdly, it is important to emphasise that the government, in partnership with the 
private sector, should take the lead in promoting the new economy.  Doing so, however, goes 
hand in hand with the necessary speed required to embark on modern ways of delivering 
services to government departments, the business community and the entire citizenry.  
Adoption and implementation of an e-government strategy is therefore one of the best ways 
of achieving this aim.  With an effective e-government strategy, the country’s economy will 
be better integrated into the current global digital economy and the benefits of ICT will be 















prospective investors and new entrants in the e-business.  Also, it will be a positive 
contribution to the growth of businesses in Tanzania.  With an expanded business base, there 
will be a further contribution to e-commerce and e-contracting development, either through 
B2B, B2C, or B2G transactions.  
The fourth and final issue is that, while some of these proposals are extra-legal in 
nature, they are nevertheless pertinent to the growth of e-commerce.  Indeed, its development 
cannot be considered in isolation from other factors, such as the need to create a pool of ICT 
skilled manpower or providing innovative skills to SMEs to participate in e-commerce.  
Having resources that are not utilised or a pool of labour that is redundant is uneconomical 
for any country that aspires to develop.  On the contrary, having the requisite knowledge, 
information and skills makes it possible to transform what is available (in terms of resources 
or labour force) for further wealth creation.  This is, indeed, what the new knowledge-based 
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